Transcript
Speaker: really these distribution points and this aid mechanism is a way to achieve ethnically cleansing Gaza and of moving the population south. And this is not to mention the use of the foundation or the distribution points as tools of collective punishment through the very undignified and inhumane way of managing these distribution points, which are constructed as ah narrow cages that that Palestinians have to be crammed into in order to access aid. And there's been repeated massacres as well.
Speaker: From Ashabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network, I am Yara Hawari, and this is Rethinking Palestine.
Speaker: This episode was recorded prior to the start of Israel's war with Iran, which has already claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians, mostly Iranian. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime continues to kill dozens of Palestinians on a daily basis in its ongoing genocide in Gaza, and is still limiting the entry of aid to a population that is being deliberately kept on the brink of starvation.
Speaker: This episode focuses on the use of private security contractors and the weaponization of aid more broadly. Private security contractors, usually former military or secret service personnel from the global north, have long been a feature of so-called war zones.
Speaker: They were used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Palestine is no stranger to their fair share. Recently, we have seen their deployment in Gaza, and in particular, they have been used to secure a new Israeli-backed USAID distribution mechanism.
Speaker: a mechanism which has received widespread critique and has also been accused of facilitating war crimes by UN officials. The privatization of aid and security in Gaza has had deadly consequences.
Speaker: Indeed, many Palestinians have been shot and killed at these new aid distribution sites. It also paints worrying future for aid in Palestine and beyond, where local and international institutions like UNRWA and other UN agencies are eroded and eventually replaced.
Speaker: Joining me to discuss this on this episode of Rethinking Palestine is Safar Jouda, a postdoctoral researcher at the Arab and Islamic Studies Institute at the University of Exeter.
Speaker: Safar recently published a policy memo on this very topic for a Shabaka, which can be found on our website, al-shabaka.org. Safar, thank you for joining me.
Speaker: Thanks for having me. Can you give us an overview of how private security contractors have been used during the genocide and what have they been typically recruited to do?
Speaker: Yes, in the current context, since the beginning of Israel's assault on Gaza in October 2023, private contractors have primarily been involved in aid distribution and in managing security operations and logistics tied to aid.
Speaker: um The main operation that security private security contractors were recruited to manage is the operation of the Gaza Strip. humanitarian foundation. The foundation was established in February 2025 by the Israeli and American governments in order to provide aid or to manage aid delivery into Gaza.
Speaker: And um it has four distribution points in the southern Gaza Strip, which are controlled by armed personnel, private American security contractors. And these armed personnel are hired or recruited to manage aid distribution operations in these sites.
Speaker: They work in cooperation with the Israeli army, and so the sites are surrounded by military Israeli military patrols. And the job of the security contractors is to to manage the operational side, to screen individuals, conduct identity checks, to crowd control, etc.
Speaker: So US private security contractors were deployed quite early on in the genocide, I think mainly to to secure the US floating pier. Can you tell us more about that?
Speaker: Yes, in early 2024, the U.S. announced plans to build a temporary pier off the coast of Gaza to facilitate aid delivery, the delivery of food, water, medicine, at a time when Israel was... um increasing the blockade or intensifying the blockade on Gaza. um Private security contractors were were hired to build and manage logistics and to operate the pier as well.
Speaker: um They were US private contractors, though the nature, the names of the companies weren't really released, but reports indicate that they were ah companies that had operated previously in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Speaker: constructed the pier and were there on the ground to manage ah aid delivery. The pier suffered damage and there were other logistical complications. And so it was dismantled after, I think, only three weeks in operation.
Speaker: So it wasn't really effective as a solution or a model in boosting humanitarian aid. But the idea primarily was to bypass land routes, was to bypass traditional mechanisms of delivering aid, primarily through crossings, ah land crossings, mainly the Kerem Shalom and the Rafah crossings, which Israel had either restricted or closed off at the time.
Speaker: ah But the bigger picture also is to to sort of establish these private entities working under Israeli oversight and to bypass not just traditional land routes, but also traditional aid delivery mechanisms carried out by ngos and by staff.
Speaker: u n staff highly problematic, ah not transparent. Again, it the nature of these forces, that the companies they belong to was all information that was never released.
Speaker: And so no international bodies, no local bodies involved in these operations, no kind of legal mechanism or legal oversight. And just another example of how Israel is experimenting with new aid distribution and broader governance models that would be able to bypass existing mechanisms and establish Israeli control indirectly by outsourcing these operations to private entities.
Speaker: So Safar, you've mentioned that these security contractors have been used to secure this new aid distribution mechanism. And you mentioned that it is American and um receives backing from the the Israeli regime.
Speaker: Can you tell us a bit more about it? Who's behind it? What are the sort of different bodies involved? Yes, so the new aid distribution mechanism is significantly different from the traditional system of aid delivery in Gaza that was used before the genocide.
Speaker: It's highly ah centralized under one entity, which is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. It's deeply politicized. and it's ah deeply militarized as well.
Speaker: So the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is a a political entity. It was founded and funded by the U.S. s State Department in cooperation with the Israeli government, though funding sources are still quite opaque.
Speaker: But there are reports that ah the Israeli Mossad was also involved in the funding. The foundation involves consulting groups that have been linked to the Pentagon and other branches of the US military. Some of them are headquartered in the US, um like the Boston Consulting Group, which participated in the design and the planning, the operational planning of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
Speaker: The Boston Group is headquartered in Israel among its offices, a large headquarters in Israel. um And of course, there's a heavy reliance on private security contractors, U.S.-based companies that are employed to execute plans on the ground to manage aid, the the entry of aid, and to manage and control um access to aid.
Speaker: So again, it's ah it's a deeply problematic politicized model where humanitarian functions are outsourced to politicized and militarized bodies, undermining humanitarian norms and using food and aid as a weapon of control.
Speaker: And the bigger picture here is not simply the the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, But this emerging models that can be seen aid distribution, also in security operations and checkpoint and population management um and other aid distribution initiatives, such as the American-led pier off the coast of Gaza.
Speaker: And this model of organizing humanitarian ah supplies and and distributing supplies aims to bypass the existing system, an existing medicine mechanisms that are traditionally and carried out by neutral humanitarian actors, and to place sort of oversight and control of humanitarian operations with the Israeli army. So there's a lot of questions around transparency, around accountability, potential violations, ah very dangerous conditions, and of course the bigger picture of what kind of political landscape Israel is trying to formulate and to to impose on Gaza.
Speaker: If you're enjoying this podcast, please visit our website, al-shabaka.org, where you will find more Palestinian policy analysis and where you can join our mailing list and donate to support our work. So how is this new mechanism functioning? What does it look like? How are they distributing aid?
Speaker: So the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is in the form of distribution aid distribution zone or distribution points that are located in the southern Gaza Strip.
Speaker: They are points that are patrolled and controlled by private security contractors um who manage a distribution in these sites under the oversight of the Israeli army. and There are four distribution sites in the southern Gaza Strip.
Speaker: And really, the UN has called this a fig leaf or a way for Israel to manage the movement of the population or demographic control of the Gaza population by forcing people to relocate to the southern parts of Gaza or risk starvation because Israel has prevented the entry of aid and the distribution of aid in any location beyond the four distribution sites of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
Speaker: So this has been this has been a plan that has been put into action through repeated evacuations, forcing people to the south of Gaza, ah mass destruction of of ah us neighborhoods and of homes, of infrastructure.
Speaker: But it's also a plan that has been laid out by Israeli citizens. officials in the most recent ground offensive, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israeli forces would take control all of of all of Gaza and limit the presence of Palestinians to pre-designated zones.
Speaker: um Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has also said that the entirety of Gaza would be destroyed. And so really these distribution points and this aid mechanism is a way to achieve these objectives of ethnically cleansing Gaza and of moving the population south.
Speaker: And this is not to mention the use of the foundation of the distribution points as tools of collective punishment um through the very undignified and inhumane way of managing um these distribution points, which are constructed as ah narrow cages that Palestinians have to be crammed into in order to access aid. And Palestinians who, you know, there's been repeated massacres as well of Palestinians who have to walk for miles to access aid to get to these distribution points.
Speaker: So clearly these distribution sites are not acting as a humanitarian lifeline, but more as a tool of democratic and territorial control. And we've always seen those horrific images of of tens of thousands of of Palestinians being, you know, forced to scramble for these very small aid boxes. And these sites have been referred to by many as essentially death traps. And it's really telling as well that many UN officials have said that this aid mechanism will be used to facilitate war crimes, war crimes of forced displacement.
Speaker: weaponization of aid, etc. So it's not only is it having sort of real-time, very deadly consequences, also does not bode well for the future of the aid landscape in Gaza, but also beyond In terms of what the situation will look like in Gaza the day after the war, and in terms of post-war governance, it seems through the arrangements that Israel is putting into place now that you know we're getting a view of what Israel's plans are for who will administer Gaza.
Speaker: There's been no substantial conversation towards Gaza planning for the post-war situation. Beyond the fact that it appears that Israel just is not invested in reoccupying or retaking Gaza, it's unlikely that Hamas will be able to play a role in Gaza's governance, even if Israel fails to destroy or disarm it and and Hamas continues to exist as a political organization. Hamas itself has announced that it it's relinquishing control of um post-war administering or governance of Gaza.
Speaker: So Hamas is unlikely to be there. Israel has refused any sort of suggestion for the PA to assume the role of administering Gaza. And so it appears that there will be a void. And the question is, who will fill this void? And it seems like what Israel is doing is constructing a landscape of a number of concentration camps, which are ruled ah by Israel-backed armed gangs or militias that are being funded and and supported and backed by Israel now to operate in Gaza.
Speaker: And the population's needs will be administered and met through um these aid distribution points that Israel is setting up almost as a pilot for some sort of permanent arrangement in order to provide services for the remaining population. So it's really a very worrying question about what will the post-war governance landscape look like, and it it requires attention and and serious action if a disastrous and tragic situation like the one we are seeing now at present is to be avoided.
Speaker: So why why are the Israelis trying to erode existing mechanisms for the distribution of aid and and why are they trying to erode UN institutions when it's actually previously relied on them to shoulder the the responsibility of the continued occupation?
Speaker: UN bodies, especially UNRWA, have been providing ah humanitarian services in in Gaza for decades. The UN, i think 15 UN agencies, along with a network of NGOs and partners alongside traditional Palestinian governmental bodies, have been responsible for providing education services, healthcare services, food, medical services to Palestinians for a long time now. and Israel allowed this or or or sort of maintained the stable ah formula or the stable system and actually relied on the UN and the international community alongside conventional Palestinian leadership um for a reason, which is Israel was able to maintain its occupation, its control of whether it's Gaza or
Speaker: as well in the West Bank, um maintain a system of occupation and control without actually having to shoulder the responsibility, ah the cost, and being responsible for the welfare of the palace of the Palestinian population, of the population it occupies.
Speaker: After October 7th, Israel has sort of moved towards having greater security control, greater surveillance over Gaza. And this this has sort of been consolidated in looking to replace the existing system, the governance system, the aid delivery system, primarily led by the UN and Anurah in particular, with a centralized system.
Speaker: aid delivery system in the form of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which operates under Israeli and U.S. control and security coordination. So um this is this is sort of in the medium term. In the bigger picture, UNRWA's mandate is specifically UNRWA, which provides a majority of education, primary education and medical services to ah humanitarian services to Palestinians, its mandate is rooted in Palestinian right to return, and it is the institutional sort of expression and protection of this right. And so by dismantling Anurua and doing its work in Gaza, Israel wants to
Speaker: end the legal status of Palestinian refugees and their claim to their right of return and turn this state of displacement and also the annexation of Gaza, plans to annex parts of Gaza, into a permanent arrangement.
Speaker: And as you said, um Hamas will not have any role in in governing post-genocide. That has been made clear. um And the Israelis have have also said that the the PA should not have a role in that either. And so where does that leave local institutions that have been very much involved in involved in in in efforts to distribute aid to to local communities.
Speaker: I think something that is really important to talk about, which is, I think, left out of the conversation, is what the existing governance arrangements looked like before October seventh in Gaza, the government apparatus, the management of of government institutions and departments. As a ruling party in Gaza, Hamas took control of ministries, of governmental institutions by installing Hamas's employees and officials at the management level of these institutions and departments, figures who were sometimes, though not always, politically aligned with Hamas.
Speaker: But the overall structure of governance institutions, the structure the administrative structure of these bodies is something that was inherited from the PA. It existed prior to Hamas.
Speaker: Many of the key institutions and government bodies, in fact, almost all of them weren't changed. Technical and administrative ah staff in all fields remained in their departments providing ah public services to residents.
Speaker: So really much of this structure was inherited from the PA. It's been built up since 1994. There was no parallel governance structure that Hamas somehow controlled and used to govern Gaza, which would technically mean that it's possible to end Hamas's governing role in Gaza by removing its officials from the government apparatus, you know, managers, politically aligned figures, while maintaining the formal governance structures of these government institutions and the bureaucracy, which is staffed with thousands of employees who have no affiliation um with Hamas across these departments.
Speaker: But it's very clear that Israel is not out to undermine Hamas or to destroy Hamas. It's out to destroy Palestinian self-rule by creating a complete breakdown in governance in Gaza and um removing these structures that existed. And this is very clear through targeting government in municipal buildings alongside targeting you know public infrastructure, water, sewage, electricity, etc.,
Speaker: um impeding the ability of these institutions and their employees to provide services during this genocide, whether it's coordination with the UN on schooling, whether it's enforcing law and order, whether it's clearing rubble, etc.
Speaker: And so Israel is interested in in in not only maintaining this division, political divide between Gaza and Ramallah, but by completely de that decimating um the governance infrastructure in in Gaza to prevent the ability of independent and autonomous self-rule to happen again after the genocide and the day after.
Speaker: Right. And so in this way, this this aid mechanism that uses US private security contracts could be a test run for for what Israel envisions for the governance of Gaza. i mean, literally outsourcing governance to colonial actors. Right.
Speaker: It is very possible, and again, Israel is not interested in having um boots on the ground in Gaza and reoccupying or committing um you know military forces to remain in Gaza. It's costly, it's not a popular option.
Speaker: um And at the same time, having the PA reassume responsibility of administering Gaza would would would allow Palestinians in some way to form a a a a unified um ah as sort of structure and and begin to sort of build up um that structure after, you know, years of division and and and collapse.
Speaker: And so it appears that, um you know, is there's no interest in having a legitimate civilian administration ah to run Gaza.
Speaker: And this is where this experiment of outsourced, privatized governance and aid in security, but also in other sectors and and spheres comes in. Safar, thank you so much for joining me on this episode of Rethinking Palestine.
Speaker: Thank you, Yorah.
Speaker: Rethinking Palestine is brought to you by Ashabaka, the Palestinian policy network. Ashabaka is the only global independent Palestinian think tank whose mission is to produce critical policy analysis and collectively imagine a new policymaking paradigm for Palestine and Palestinians worldwide.
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