Introduction and Episode Overview
00:00:08
Speaker
And welcome back to the Observations podcast, brought to you by Democracy Volunteers. My name is Ethan Reuter, and in today's episode, we'll be talking about the 1964 general election, where Wilson won off the back of the white heat of technology, the first episode of the swinging 60s.
Meet the Guest: Stephen Fielding
00:00:26
Speaker
I'm delighted to be joined today by Stephen Fielding, who is an Emeritus Professor of Political History at the University of Nottingham. Stephen, welcome to the show, and thank you for being here. Well, thank you for having me.
1964 Election's Impact on Politics and Economy
00:00:38
Speaker
I want to first get into what this election meant as it brought about the end of Conservative dominance and the continuation of the post-war economic consensus. How much did that impact the shift in Britain?
00:00:55
Speaker
Well, it's i think actually, I think the 1964 election is is talked about in kind of um epochal terms in some ways, in bringing an end to the Conservative dominance and and this this great big shift. But in actual fact, the the closer you look at it, um it's more continuity than change. in And when when we talk about Harold Wilson and the White Heat, is um I mean...
00:01:21
Speaker
He got a lot of attention and and arguably he made an impact on certain kinds of voters. But then when you actually look at the result of the 1964 election, um he didn't appear to make that much of an impact, even though Labour just about got into office. um So it's a kind of paradoxical election, which is high on symbolism in many ways. um But in actual fact, it's it's a bit, it's kind of a bit less interesting in terms of epochal change. But there are lots of interesting other things going on um that will have consequences for later.
Foreign Policy and Superpower Status
00:01:57
Speaker
And what is the impact heading into the election of foreign policy, of what we see that happens in Suez and France and the ECC? How much does this play on the minds of British voters?
00:02:14
Speaker
Well, just ah like like most like most British general elections, the foreign policy is not to the forefront, but it but it did create a context for how people were had started to see the Conservative government.
00:02:29
Speaker
um I mean, the 1956 Suez adventure, which proved to be disastrous for for for Britain, um and and confirmed its sort of second order status and supplicant um relationship with the United States. Actually, the Conservatives, who were responsible for Suez, had managed to kind of navigate their way through that and and actually won the general election of 1959 on the back of it.
00:02:57
Speaker
um but But what Sue has revealed, that is Britain's ah declining um importance and power um as ah as ah as a superpower, no longer a superpower, um that that that that kind of continued, that that theme continued, because the one the the basic reason why Britain was no longer superpower up there, partly because the United States was so dominant, but the British economy was was starting to um show signs of of weakness.
00:03:27
Speaker
it It had been... And and that that and that that meant Britain couldn't have... um couldn't sustain um an army um of of any consequence. Things had to be cut back. The empire, there was a retreat from empire. That couldn't be sustained. Britain didn't have the material or the moral or political will um in some ways to keep keep the empire together.
Economic Struggles and EEC Membership Debate
00:03:45
Speaker
And so after 1959, there's a search ah by the Conservative government to try and find a way to um inject new dynamism in the british into the British economy. And that and that became, um under Harold Macmillan, the attempt to join what was called then the EEC, European Economic Community, most of whose members were doing really well economically. And Britain hoped to sort of enter the EEC and piggyback on that dynamism.
00:04:16
Speaker
um And that that kind of ah the the problem for Macmillan is that the French didn't want Britain to be in the EEC at that at that point. And de Gaulle famously, President de Gaulle of France famously vetoed all negotiations, said, no, this is not happening. So and that that was a serious political defeat.
00:04:34
Speaker
for Macmillan and a serious challenge to his economic strategy. And of course, that made him look you know like like a failure. And that although he wasn't the prime minister that took the Conservatives into 1964 election, that that sort of um contaminated or gave people a sense that the Conservatives um were not able to deal with Britain's increasing relative decline vis-a-vis their competitor economies, mostly from Europe.
00:05:03
Speaker
You mentioned that the EEC could have helped with some of Britain's economic troubles and struggles that were taking place. What particularly was wrong with the faltering economy and why did it matter?
00:05:17
Speaker
Well, arguably, there's been a problem with the British economy ever since the high peak of imperialism. um britain Britain enjoyed a huge advantage, and this turned into a big history lesson, but Britain enjoyed a huge advantage for various technological and military reasons um and in the 19th century, which those advantages were you know eroded um as as that century um you know advanced.
00:05:42
Speaker
And... and Although Britain and exited the Second World War damage, you know, been bombed, um the economy had been you know turned into a military economy rather than a peacetime economy, and that needed to change. um Immediately after the Second World War, most of Britain's competitors were in no position to compete. ah Britain had kind of like a free hand in terms of exports, and and but didn't use that advantage um to invest properly. ah British private industries had ah had a big problem investing um in itself, um and productivity ah was was was a problem as well. These these are long-term issues.
00:06:23
Speaker
um And so but but by the early 1960s, Germany had you know was was back on was back on track. The Italians were industrializing for the first time. The French were were back. And the British economy um really was finding it hard to compete. Manufacturing was finding it hard to compete.
00:06:41
Speaker
So ads as people in Britain, we're actually much better off. um after the Second World War, um it's it's been estimated that between the the middle 50s and the middle 60s, the average male worker um was about a third, in in real terms, it was a third better off during that period.
00:07:02
Speaker
The economy itself was starting to struggle, and that meant there were going to be more imports coming in. um Those better off British citizens were buying Italian fridges rather than British fridges and you know and all of that so that. And that was causing problems for the for the British economy.
Conservative Challenges and Scandals
00:07:19
Speaker
So there were kind of intractable issues that Macmillan hoped to sort of short circuit by joining the EEC. Whether that would have happened or not, I don't know, but it didn't happen.
00:07:28
Speaker
So there was this big issue about the British economy, there's something wrong with it, what can we do about it? and And the Conservatives were were showing themselves to be unable to deal with those intractable problems.
00:07:42
Speaker
And I want to get into some of the other Conservative troubles that we see come out of the early 60s, starting with the Profumo affair.
00:07:54
Speaker
What actually was potentially one of the most salacious bits of British political history? Well, I think, well, first of all, we should look at this in in the context and of up to up to this point, um the media treated politicians with great reverence. they didn't They didn't intrude into their private lives. We didn't know anything about that. And Profumo is, the Profumo affair is the first time that that the British public see behind behind the curtain about what's going on. Okay. Okay. So essentially, um John Profumo, who was um Minister for War, was sleeping with a prostitute who was also sleeping with um a member of the Soviet embassy staff, right?
00:08:43
Speaker
And that whether secrets were were transferred and you know inadvertently you know via via the prostitute or or not, um unknown, but but it was revealed that Profumo was having this affair.
00:08:57
Speaker
um Although when he was confronted by his Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, he denied it. He denied that he was having this affair, but it turned out it you know that he was having this affair.
00:09:09
Speaker
So there's there's, first of all, the the the issue of the morality of of a leading politician, ah secrets to the Soviet enemy, but also, and this this is this was a big problem for Harold Macbillan, the prime minister, that he initially believed Profumo as a man of honour,
00:09:28
Speaker
the denials and was shown to be a complete fool for doing so. So that that that led to a political crisis. um And for for him him personally, for the Conservatives in general, and allowed the Labour Party to kind of, in a kind of populist way, to attack you know the Conservative elite, you know the aristocratic elite that were all doing these sort of immoral things behind the scenes and all kinds of rumours circulated. So it kind of it was the first time. um i mean, today we would say, well, yeah, this happens all the time. The press is always looking into politicians' private life. But the shock the shock of this happening for the first time was really quite profound and did damage perceptions of of the Conservative government.
00:10:17
Speaker
And with those damaged perceptions of the Conservative government, faltering poll numbers and the Liberal resurgence, What was the Night of the Long Knives and what did it lead to Well, in 1963, I mean, Profumo came out in 1963, the whole thing. um Harold Macmillan was feeling embattled that he needed, you know, that an election was on the horizon within the next year or so.
00:10:47
Speaker
And I think he just wanted to, you know, as as many prime ministers now today habitually do, reshuffle their cabinet. And it's just that Harold Macmillan kind of reached, it was more than a reshuffle. It was a massacre.
00:11:01
Speaker
and And it wasn't seen um as sort of restoring strength and and purpose to the government, but we've just seen the act of a desperate old man who was trying to, you know, he was stabbing his friends in the back, getting rid of them, getting a new lot. And he just went, I think the perception more than anything else was,
00:11:19
Speaker
This was more the end of a conservative regime and an attempt to shore things up rather than he's bringing in new blood and he's going to you know revive the government going into an election. So we I think it kind of backfired on Macmillan. And in the end, Macmillan was sort diagnosed with... with in ah incorrectly with with a serious illness, which then led to his resignation anyway. So um it was kind of like he reshuffled himself out of his own government in the end.
00:11:52
Speaker
And that leaves space for Sir Alec Douglas home to become prime minister. However, his route was slightly more complex, at least certainly, into the House of Commons and becoming leader. How did that transpire?
00:12:10
Speaker
Well, he was he was a member of the House of Lords. And so, um yeah i mean, technically, i mean, he was in the cabinet um as as foreign minister. um I think Harold Millen's last foreign minister, I think. And but and he could have technically had been um prime minister in the House of Lords. um This has happened in the so relatively distant past in the 19th century. Lord Salisbury, I think, maybe was the last one.
00:12:36
Speaker
um But it wasn't considered to be appropriate for... for him to be you know in the House of Lords. So he had to renounce his peerage, partly thanks to Tony Benn, who had done the same thing when he inherited his that that his father's title. and He renounced his peerage, and then he fought to by election and became an MP. Now, and that that was that was an unusual thing, although, as I say, Tony Benn, the Labour MP, had it actually brought the legal process, that created helped create the legal process where that could happen. um
00:13:08
Speaker
But the the consequence for the Conservative Party was already they looked out of touch. I mean, this is one of the things about Macmillan believing Profumo. He seemed out of touch with what was really going on.
00:13:20
Speaker
And also Macmillan was himself, although in reality he wasn't really a member of the aristocracy, but presented himself as a kind of like... Song Foa sort of member of the aristocracy. He had in his cabinet, he had members members of the peerage, to of great members of the numbers of members of the peerage. But then when Alec Douglas Hume became prime minister, it didn't really help the untouchedness of the Conservative government that, you know, there are things going wrong with Britain and you and you bring in Alec Douglas Hume, who... um
00:13:52
Speaker
looked and sounded and acted like a typical silly twit, really, unfairly to him. um But as far as most people concerned, he just looked like he'd stepped out of the 19th century off off a grouse moor.
00:14:07
Speaker
um And so that didn't necessarily help the Conservatives with their attempt to say to present themselves as being the solution for Britain's modern problems in the run-up to an election.
Cultural Shifts: The Swinging 60s and Migration
00:14:21
Speaker
And I want to touch before getting more deeply into the leadership profiles that we see on the cultural moment before the election. This is the swinging 60s, but also there's a significant portion of migration into the country.
00:14:37
Speaker
How was the election felt from a cultural perspective and what was the cultural context of the UK? Well, it it's difficult it's difficult to avoid the word zeitgeist, which I don't really like, because it's very vague and it's not quite clear what it really tangibly means. But certainly um from the early nineteen sixty s I mean, the early 1960s, there was a huge number of young people as part of the post-war baby boom. They were all becoming teenagers in their early 20s.
00:15:08
Speaker
Jobs were plentiful. Wages were going up. They had a lot of disposable income. There was a sense of possibility um amongst amongst that group. um And there was just a broad a broadening sense of the ordinary people were now empowered, younger as well as older people are empowered to a degree that their parents, grandparents before the Second World War had been beaten down by unemployment and insecurity um that this this was a group that really was with had greater self-confidence. Trade unions were much more powerful and workers, you know as I've indicated, real wages were going up. Everybody was feeling...
00:15:49
Speaker
With some limits, poverty still existed, but many people were feeling much better off. And that kind of led to, in some cases, and the Perfumer affair kind of contributed to this, a declining respect for those in authority.
00:16:03
Speaker
You know, a greater sense that they wanted to challenge that. um And that that put the Conservative Party, particularly with Alec Douglas-Hume and Harold Macmillan, on one side of being on the on the side of the old guard.
00:16:17
Speaker
and And under to Harold Wilson, at least, the Labour Party tried to align itself with that new sense of um kind of more optimistic potential for ordinary people and to try to politicise it in some sense. So there's so that's that's going on. It's quite an optimistic, forward-looking idea that was challenging for for conservatives for the Conservatives. But then on the other so on the other side, um there was a sort of darker, maybe backward-looking um thing that may have played, well, certainly did play to the advantage of the Conservatives up to a point, which was a greater um antipathy to um black Commonwealth immigration.
00:16:58
Speaker
that had been slowly increasing as the British economy expanded, um a demand for labour was needed. and And that demand for labour couldn't be met by by by Britons themselves.
00:17:11
Speaker
And so there were active recruitment exercises to try and get people from the Commonwealth um to come and to come and do do these various jobs that were being created. And an increasing number, although in in relative terms, very small number, maybe one or two percent of the entire population and by the early 60s, were coming from um what was called politely the new Commonwealth, i.e. the black Commonwealth, um India, Pakistan and and the West Indies.
00:17:41
Speaker
And and this This was a challenge to um what was kind of very visceral racist hostility to black people in Britain, in particular in those areas where where where these immigrants were settling, um in the bigger cities, London, in the city in least city London, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire and and the Northwest, those towns and cities.
00:18:08
Speaker
where maybe there was an increasing increasing competition for poor housing. i mean, housing remained an issue in Britain and there was greater competition for it. And it was seen in racist, racialized terms.
00:18:24
Speaker
um and led to conflicts and riots in the case of um in 1958 in Nottingham, in Notting Hill, Middlesbrough a few years later, but were lots of racist tensions.
00:18:37
Speaker
And the Conservatives decided that so they would effectively take advantage of this this situation and introduced restrictions on immigration along racist lines. They introduced a 1962 Commonwealth um Immigration Act.
00:18:55
Speaker
And I should say that it up until then, ah from 1948, the Labour government introduced um legislation which was which was to the effect that all members of the old British Empire that would become the Commonwealth...
00:19:13
Speaker
were entitled to a British passport. Everybody was entitled to a cross a passport who existed in the empire. and And that was partly because they wanted, seeing Britain's decline and anticipating the empire was going to go by the by at some point, Britain couldn't sustain it. they They wanted to have a bulwark for Britain's sort of superpower status. And they thought the Commonwealth would become that. This would become something very important and significant. And so by allowing everyone in the Commonwealth to have a British passport to enter Britain, um that was kind of a so try to create a Commonwealth identity.
00:19:49
Speaker
At no point did they imagine that this would then lead to people coming into Britain. Right. They didn't think that would be an issue. um But that's that that. So that facilitated free flow of population. So in 1962, the Conservatives decided that they were going to restrict the ability of certain people with a British passport to come into the country. And guess what?
00:20:13
Speaker
The way that they um drafted the legislation, it was specific. It specifically affected ah usually black men from the West Indies. not Not Australians, not New Zealanders, all white. They they were fine.
00:20:27
Speaker
But they introduced racist... it's affected It was racist legislation to address these racist concerns and these this this tension and was massively popular, very, very popular with with the British population.
00:20:42
Speaker
And I want to transition from racism and the split of Conservative difference into the leaders that we see heading into
Wilson's Modern Leadership and Campaign
00:20:52
Speaker
the election. We've already talked about Supermax resignation.
00:20:57
Speaker
um But firstly, the opposition party, who was Harold Wilson as a leader? And how what did he signify? well um Well, Wilson wilson became a Labour leader in 1963, so not very long before the 1964 election, on the death of his predecessor, Hugh Gatesgall.
00:21:19
Speaker
um And in many ways, they they were very similar in terms of their general approach to politics. um Labour had been losing elections since 1951. So they lost in 51, they lost in 55, they lost in 59. And every time their vote went down and every time the Conservative vote went up.
00:21:39
Speaker
So there was this sense of crisis amongst the Labour Party. But are we ever going to win? You know, that was a lot of the rhetoric and some and lots of pamphlets and books about can let you know must Labour lose.
00:21:51
Speaker
And they both both Wilson and Gates effectively had the same kind of um analysis as to what needed to be done, which was, well, we need to we need to bank the working class, which was slowly declining. Britain remained ah an overwhelmingly sort of industrial manufacturing economy, but it was in decline.
00:22:10
Speaker
um We need to keep them on board, but we need to focus our attention on the increasing number of people in white collar occupations, semi skilled, well off, semi skilled working class men who are now and and women who are now um buying their own homes, you know getting televisions, fridges and all of that, and particularly younger people.
00:22:31
Speaker
So we need to present ourselves in a kind of a new way that makes us relevant to these people. And we sort of maybe move away from the old style nationalisation. So Wilson took that up ah in a way that I don't think Gates School could have done, because Gates School was, ah in terms of being a public performer, was very stiff.
00:22:50
Speaker
A bit like, I don't know, a bit like Keir Starmer is today. You know, he just couldn't sell a speech, really. But Wilson um is was a performer a ah and a great actor and also benefited from um people who came up with various nice turns of phrase to embody. So he he tried to embody...
00:23:11
Speaker
this new feeling, this new sentiment, a kind of classlessness. even even wore um a kind of, a it was a Ganex Mac, which was kind of like, seemed to be classless, you know. and And he stopped smoking cigars and was smoking pipes and You know, he just tried tried to present himself as a kind of a modern man of the middle, you know, not working class, not middle class, a sort of someone who was good at maths, um is an economist, and somebody who could fix Britain's modern problems. He was like, like Tony Blair tried to do in 97, you know, I'm a modern man, right? um I'm here. and And also to juxtapose himself with um Alec Douglas Hume, you know, the 19th century aristocrat.
00:23:55
Speaker
and and But the focus of of of um Wilson's campaign was kind of summed up in his speech to the Labour Party conference in 1963. And it's a phrase which kind of echoes through the decades when he said that what Labour would do to address Britain's you know economic problems, the fact it was getting sluggish, it was being overtaken by other countries,
00:24:20
Speaker
Labour would unleash the white heat of the scientific and technological revolution. you know Everything would be computers. Everything would be you know new and modern and flashy.
00:24:31
Speaker
um Partly through old labour, we're going to re-nationalise the steel industry, so old labour ways and means of doing this, but also through planning.
00:24:44
Speaker
and um and you know which was a very vague kind of thing and and didn't really lead to very much, has to be said. But he he wants he kind of, for a moment, he encapsulated the sort of um the optimism and the the sense of wanting to get on amongst those sort of newer groups, the better off groups that are emerging in Britain, um and juxtaposed Labour, which had been seen in 1959, it's been old fashioned, only for the poor, as a new dynamic party in juxtaposition to the Conservatives.
00:25:16
Speaker
And in comparison and in juxtaposition, we've already mentioned Hume's aristocratic background compared to Wilson's.
00:25:27
Speaker
And who was Hume not only beyond his background, but also how was he as a performer and how did he find the campaign? Well, if if Harold Wilson seemed to be sort of born for the television age and television was becoming very significant um in nineteen but but but by the early 1960s, more and more of the population had televisions ah by this point. It was a way in which you could communicate directly with with voters. Instead knocking on doors, going to speak, doing speeches, you know, and in in in halls, you could actually talk to people face to face. I mean, 59 was a bit like that, but 64 even more so.
00:26:08
Speaker
Wilson accommodated himself to all of all the disciplines of TV, whereas Alec Douglas Hume was, but like i like I said a few times, just like you just come out the 19th century. um he He was what he was, um just sort of a very well-spoken um member of the traditional upper class. um And he even, you know, sort of...
00:26:34
Speaker
created, helped reinforce that image when he, and if if Howard Wilson was ah was an economist, an Oxford economist, sort clever, he you know knew how to addd to add up, Alec Douglas Hume admitted in the television interview he found it hard to add up and he needed matchsticks, which was clearly a bit of a joke, but it was then taken to actually really, sort of youve just reinforces out of touch with upper-class twit sort of view ah that that that that he unfairly had because he was clearly a very astute and clever politician, but his demeanour didn't necessarily help sell the idea that the Conservatives were you know on the ball, they knew what the problems were, and they knew what to do you know what to do to to address them
00:27:19
Speaker
I have the prop of some matchsticks here that I was going to bring up with it. But yes i want to thank you i want I want to get into some of the other parties. yes What was particularly their fortunes, but also were their leaders perceived by the population?
00:27:41
Speaker
Well, if we're i mean if we're talking about other parties, effectively, we're really talking about the the Liberals. um I mean, there was some evidence of a so little resurgence amongst ah nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland, but of at that point, not not that significant. They would become much more significant um into the nineteen seventy s And there were, um on the back of um hostility to black immigrants, um Oswald Mosley and his fascists sort of were kind of on the ground, sort of trying to what you know get get get some votes, but didn't really lead to too far because the Conservatives were...
00:28:18
Speaker
were part the anti-immigrant party on the ground. They successfully presented themselves like that. um So it's really the Liberals. And the Liberals um kind of benefited from Labour's problems because um by 1959, Labour had been out of office for nearly a decade. It had been divided over and became even more divided over nuclear weapons between left and right in the immediate aftermath.
00:28:44
Speaker
of that And those people ah living in suburbs, relatively well-off middle class, um living in the South often, ah in relatively safe conservative seats. But who these people were becoming disenchanted with the conservatives, but but were fearful of maybe voting for Labour.
00:29:04
Speaker
So the Liberals were able to present themselves under Joe Grimman. They're relatively youthful and dynamic and quite... um You know, he had a turn of phrase. He was quite, he's a good but he was a good performer.
00:29:16
Speaker
They were able to present present themselves as as as an alternative to these socialists, the Labour Party, but also the fuddy-duddy Tories. And actually enjoyed some success in by-elections, um particularly the Orpington by-election um in 1962, when they overcame a big conservative majority.
00:29:43
Speaker
um and and won the seat. And there was talk at this at this point, this fanciful talk of Orpington man, that there was a sort of suburban, um progressive Tory, radical in different ways, you know, but this kind of person, suburban man, um was maybe moving away from the Tories, but were not really keen on Labour. And the liberal the Liberals were able to present themselves as that.
00:30:08
Speaker
But when it came to the general election, um which we maybe maybe we talk about the results a bit a bit later on, they just didn't have the resources to be able to follow through on on some of that and got squeezed to some extent.
00:30:23
Speaker
I want to get into the campaigns of each of the parties specifically.
Labour vs. Conservative: Economic and Racial Policies
00:30:30
Speaker
um Labour particularly were offering...
00:30:35
Speaker
something known as New Britain, the Conservatives had prosperity without a purpose. What were each of the parties from a policy platform presenting to the country? Well, in although in in rhetorical terms, everybody talks about Wilson, Whiteheat and all of that, um both both parties were looking in the same direction. They all they all agreed the British economy was was in trouble, that there were new methods that needed to be um employed.
00:31:04
Speaker
Wilson talked about planning. The Conservatives talked about planning, right? um It was just... that they were kind of, um maybe Labour emphasised that a little bit more. And and certainly, as i've as I've said a few times, the the image, well, the fact that Tories have been in office for quite a long time, but also the image of the Conservatives, rightly or wrongly, was was against them being seen as, although they still had um a kind of an advantage in terms of people saw them in terms of economic competence, but in terms of addressing the particular problems,
00:31:37
Speaker
they they Their imagery was all was all wrong, really. So and in many ways, um anyway lots of general elections are actually um the two the two main parties are talking about the same issue, but in slightly different ways. And I think 64 was was very very very much like that. But Wilson was better able to communicate with you know, that sense of dynamism. I'm going to sort it out rather than rather than the Conservatives, um I think. But the the other interesting thing was um how immigration wasn't an issue.
00:32:11
Speaker
um And that was partly because Labour, which had initially opposed the 1962 Immigration Act and and called it for what it was, racist, and initially said they would sort withdraw it, Labour saw that many of its own supporters were in favour of restriction of black immigration and just didn't want to talk about it. They didn't want to talk about it.
00:32:34
Speaker
So um it does have a consequence in in at least a few seats. But Labour recognised that the Conservatives had sort of the issue of restricting black immigration in their pocket. And if Labour said anything about it, um it would probably only just draw further supporters away from it. So it was it was interesting that Labour didn't talk about that um in any shape or form, because they realised that many of its own voters were, in fact, racist, and they didn't want to put them off.
00:33:08
Speaker
I want to get into at least one of the specific constituencies where it did matter and where racism was an incredibly important factor. What was the role Smedic within the election campaign?
00:33:24
Speaker
Well, some of it was was the one result um that that took the headlines because it was a fairly safe Labour seat. um The Labour MP or going in coming out of the go going into going into that election was ah Patrick Gordon-Walker, who was a leading member of the Shadow Cabinet, would have been Foreign Secretary, and he lost his seat.
00:33:46
Speaker
Now, these things happen, but it happened. i mean, Smethwick is in so just just north of Birmingham. It's in the West Midlands. It's in an area of relatively high black immigration. And just over, just a few few miles away in Wolverhampton was Enoch Powell's seat. And he would, a few years later, take on that issue in ah in in a greater way. But the Conservative candidate...
00:34:13
Speaker
um basically ran on on on on on a racist platform. And whether he um commissioned it or his his some of his supporters... um
00:34:28
Speaker
did Did it without his permission, but it's it it's clear, i think, that he had some links to it. um There was an infamous, infamous leaflet ah that basically said, and I won't necessarily sort of quote quote it in in terms, but, you know, if you if you want to have a black neighbour, you should vote Labour, right?
00:34:46
Speaker
And it made it a it made the issue of black immigration front and centre and won him votes, won him the seat. um And i ironically, although Labour now had accepted accept accepted all the restrictions in the Conservative um Immigration Act and would, after in office, increase those restrictions, which were themselves continue to be racist,
00:35:09
Speaker
um Harold Wilson said that the ah Peter Griffiths, who was the Conservative, would be treated like a parliamentary leper. But in actual fact, Labour was continuing the process of restricting immigration along racist lines.
00:35:23
Speaker
So it was it was kind of like... um A small hand, Smithick, like a cloud, you know, a cloud the size of a small hand that would grow and grow and grow.
00:35:36
Speaker
um And Labour would try and accommodate racist sentiment as best it could. But at that time, Wilson came out against it, although in actual fact, there's some continuity between what he was offering or what the Conservatives were offering. So that that stands out, um but not not necessarily as as ah as an issue that was then contained, but one that grew and grew and grew.
00:36:00
Speaker
And I want to get into particularly the messaging and the role of almost being the first TV
The Role of Television in Political Communication
00:36:10
Speaker
election. We've spoken about how Hume was far less of a TV charismatic performer than Wilson But what was the role actually of the TV compared to previous so radio elections?
00:36:28
Speaker
Well, as technologies change, then the way in which politicians can communicate with voters changes. with voters changes um I mean, there were still there were still meetings, actual physical meetings, but they in terms of they they became more um sort of nationally constructed just for the leaders and would also be televised.
00:36:52
Speaker
um But in terms of constituency meetings, they they were really dropping off. So it was the way... And also... um party activists, there were relatively few of them on on the ground anyway to to knock on doors and and to to create sort of local events. So it was becoming, the campaign was progressively becoming more sort of nationally focused, organised through TV. And and in fact, how there's one is incident where Harold Wilson, he would time his public meetings so that he could catch the TV news, which was, this was like, obviously this is done today as a matter of fact, but this was like, you know,
00:37:32
Speaker
hugely novel, and and he would know when um one of his speeches was speeches was going to be um shown live on the TV news, and he would have a little bit that was just for the TV audience and then he'd go back to the to the meeting itself.
00:37:47
Speaker
So Labour, I think, and i think the the the issue for 64 is that Labour became much more astute in using and PR devices, using TV, and and and using Wilson himself, who has, like I say, he kind of clothed himself in in order to reject a certain image of himself to appeal to a certain kind of certain kind of um voter. and Because the Conservatives had had been usually very good at this kind of thing. you know whatever Whatever the technology was, they had the money and they had the desire to so use this. Labour, up until this point, had been...
00:38:24
Speaker
been a bit iffy about using you know the same techniques that you might sell soap powder. um and they you know But under Wilson, and it would have been under Gates School too, but under Wilson, they fully embraced this. They even had a catchphrase, which you've never heard of, let's go with labour and we'll get things done with a with a thumbs up you know symbol like that. And they spent months coming up with that.
00:38:47
Speaker
And again, this is something which we now take for granted. But really, and like I say, the the advance was really within the Labour Party. So it was more competitive on that kind of front with the Conservatives.
00:38:59
Speaker
And what was still the role of the fourth estate and of opinion polls? And what did opinion polls predict throughout the election campaign?
00:39:12
Speaker
Well, the press remained conservative-dominated, so it played that role um that it would that it would always play. It was wasn't advantageous to Labour, but it didn't always stop Labour being able to get its message across.
00:39:25
Speaker
Obviously, with television and the BBC and ITV were under kind of very stricter rules of fairness, That's one reason why Labour was very keen to take more advantage of TV, because it would get a fair far a shake of the stick.
00:39:38
Speaker
So so the the role of the press wasn't necessarily so particularly noteworthy, although there were remained mass um mass means of communication still at that point.
00:39:50
Speaker
um So it wasn't really particularly significant. um i know I know that Wilson himself was very keen to see see what the opinion polls were um and was very you know attuned to what they were saying, but I don't think there was any... There was no sense in which the the opinion polls were massively out of whack with what the um the eventual result was. they they They were predicting a very close race, and it was a very close race, and as we will find out when we talk about the results, the results were extremely tight. Yeah.
00:40:22
Speaker
I want to then get into said
Election Outcome and Legacy
00:40:25
Speaker
results. um You've mentioned the closeness and the tightness of the results. What actually were they and what did the majority end up to be?
00:40:38
Speaker
Well, um I mean, the result is kind of, it seemed to be very significant because it ends, it ends that run of Conservative victories and it ends speculation that Labour was finished as a political party. I mean, the number of academics and others who were saying after 1959, Labour's finished, you know, it has to completely transform itself or it's finished or the Liberals are going to take over. i mean, there was a phase, particularly around the time of Orpington, you know, they're going to be the new progressive party, right?
00:41:08
Speaker
so So the very fact that Labour was able to win, um i think, seemed to be significant. but But the nature of the victory is is salutary, really, the more you look at it. And it and it kind of behoves haves people that deal with historical cliches and you know white heats and all of that to look more closely at what how people actually voted.
00:41:31
Speaker
Because... um Very surprisingly, Labour actually increased its vote share by only 0.3% compared to 1959, which was the election that everybody said, right, Labour's finished.
00:41:45
Speaker
So it marginally increased its vote share. And its actual total vote was smaller than 1959. um And yet it won a number of seats from the Conservatives.
00:41:56
Speaker
um But the reason why it won these these seats is because the Liberal vote went up. So this sort of third parties can play, in in in our fairly ridiculous first-past-the-post system, third parties can can play a quite significant role. So um the Liberals almost doubled their vote from 59 to about three nearly 3 million.
00:42:19
Speaker
um And that and that that that increase came from Conservative voters. So in in a whole range of seats, the Conservative vote went down, the Liberal vote went up, the Labour vote stayed the same.
00:42:35
Speaker
But as a consequence of that shift of votes, the Liberals didn't get enough to win the seat. Labour won the seats. So kind of a Labour crawled in thanks to the Liberals taking votes off the Conservatives, um maybe suggesting that after 13 years of being out of office and all kinds of propaganda about Labour, that Wilson hadn't yet been able to overcome, that people who were dissatisfied with the Tories were not yet willing to make the shift direct to Labour, but to the Liberals.
00:43:07
Speaker
So Labour did win quite a number of sit quite a number of seats, but only gained a majority of four, which is not enough to sustain you through five years because know there might be deaths, resignations, all kinds of things.
00:43:22
Speaker
So they just about got in. But nobody nobody thought that Labour would not call a general election very, very quickly within a number of years. But it got Labour in, which was the most significant thing.
00:43:34
Speaker
um And, you know, for all Harold Wilson's rhetoric and the fact that everybody who really studies modern British politics can quote Whiteheat and all of that, quite what impact that made on the electorate is maybe moot. met Maybe had he not presented himself to the Labour Party in this way, maybe the Conservatives might have actually...
00:43:56
Speaker
retained office. I mean, you know, it was very close. So all this stuff about the Conservatives were unable to solve Britain's problems. Still, they had a loyal base that was going to vote for them.
00:44:08
Speaker
So were yes, it was very, one of the closest election results in British political history, certainly in modern british political history.
00:44:18
Speaker
And you touched on Labour not entirely increasing their vote share. Instead, Conservative votes going to the Liberals. Yeah.
00:44:29
Speaker
What was the reason for that that shift? Well, partly because the Liberals under Joe Grimm were able to present themselves in a very sort of positive, you know purposeful light. um But um ah like like I think I said, um people who were discontented with the Conservatives,
00:44:50
Speaker
they were not yet willing to go direct to Labour. So kind of the Liberals were a halfway house in some ways. And and actually the time that you know that Wilson used as Prime Minister to try and say, you know try and convince those people, Labour government can do things, the roof isn't going to fall in, we can actually do some positive things.
00:45:12
Speaker
then those people went to Labour in 1966 and gave the party a landslide. um So it was a kind of almost a transitional um election in terms of how Labour was perceived by the kinds of voters that...
00:45:28
Speaker
You know, there might be Tories, they might might float around a little bit, they're not convinced Tories. um And so Labour was able to use a period in government as a kind of propaganda exercise to get those people to move directly across to to Labour.
00:45:46
Speaker
And what was each of the three ss parties' reactions and the reaction of the public once the announced results had come through?
00:45:58
Speaker
Well, the so I mean, although the Conservatives won ah lost fairly narrowly, it seemed to be, well, we've we've really got to shake things up. you know Why did we lose?
00:46:09
Speaker
Alec Douglas-Hum got some blame for that. or And the process through which he got made leader. There was no election for Alec Douglas-Hum. He kind of just emerged out of... um I think it was called called it the charm circle of of conservative grandees, most of whom were members of the House of Lords, who thought, well, he'd he'll be, you know, ale oh Alex, a safe pair of hands.
00:46:31
Speaker
um So the conservatives um during this period of Labour government decided we need to we we need to find our own Harold Wilson. You know, we we need to kind of modernise ourself you know So we look more in touch with what's going on, like like Wilson.
00:46:45
Speaker
and in And they ended up with Edward Heath, who many people thought of as being their own version of Harold Wilson, someone who was from a a relatively working class background, um who seemed to be you know modern and in touch. But he was, you know, they they were trying to ape what Labour was doing in some ways. um So they kind of fell into a so period of introspection.
00:47:08
Speaker
um And the Liberals, well, the Liberals um had ran out and microsoft run out of money. and they'd They'd put loads of candidates up in 1964, hoping that this would result in getting lots of MPs. They got votes.
00:47:23
Speaker
They got 3 million votes, which is double what they got in 1959. But... theyt They only got about three more. They got near nine MPs. I think it's three more than got in 1959.
00:47:34
Speaker
So they got nothing for their money, but they had no money left. So when Wilson called the election in 1966, they couldn't field that number of candidates. So one reason why Labour got those votes is because there were no Liberal candidates to to stand. So um they kind of had shot their bolt um and come to the end of their their resources, really. So... um during that period. And as I say, Wilson used um the period in office to do positive things. I mean, essentially, the the the two years or so of that Labour government were essentially designed so they could put it in the manifesto and win people back, just to show that a Labour government can do good things and don't believe all the propaganda. So that's that that that was really essentially that that varies that that period of just under two years. That's what what they're all kind of doing, really. everyone Because everyone was expecting a general election. um
00:48:31
Speaker
So that's why the Tories had their version of Harold Wilson. The Liberals couldn't do anything about it. They were raise money, but they didn't didn't have enough money bags. that you know They weren't backed by big business or the unions. um And Labour was just trying to find reasons for people to vote Labour.
00:48:49
Speaker
And you touched slightly on at least the short term aftermath, but I want to get more into the legacy and significance. You've already mentioned it brought about the end of conservative rule, but what is the legacy of 1964?
00:49:07
Speaker
Well, mixed, very mixed. um I mean, actually in actual fact, there's some echoes with the the last general election um in 2024, because both parties are addressing the problem of growth or the lack of growth right in the British economy. you know Things have to be done, right? um And to ah to ah to a large extent, they agree on some of the mechanisms, planning. Labour was a bit more inclined to get more more direct ownership. get They re-nationalised the steel industry, iron and the steel industry, for example.
00:49:42
Speaker
um And they all talked a good game. and and And Wilson talked an especially good game. you know I'm going to unleash the white heat. of scientific and technological change. You know, everything's going to be unleashed. We're all going to, everything's going to be modern, going computers everywhere.
00:49:56
Speaker
And on the basis of the promise, labour failed. It didn't improve the trend rate of growth. British productivity remained sluggish. um Competitor countries continued to surpass ah the British imports. And british the British economy was dragging in imports um because because manufacturing wasn't well wasn't either investing, ah that's that's kind of...
00:50:26
Speaker
what what many people think. At the time, people were blaming the trade unions for going on strike and disrupting production. There were whole disagreements as to what the actual causes were. But 1964, despite being associated with white heat, did not produce white heat.
00:50:42
Speaker
It was more of the same in terms of economic um economics, British economy. Harold Wilson tried to re try to enter um like that the Conservatives had done, the EEC failed like the Conservatives had done. um there was There was more continuity than change. um So if if anybody says, oh, 1964 was a white heat election, well, yeah, but what did that result in? um And in and in the end... um Labour did certain useful things, but not it it the central promise of improving growth and liberating British industry from the dead hand of class. That just didn't happen.
00:51:25
Speaker
Thank you for joining me. It has been a pleasure to have you on the podcast. If you enjoyed this episode, our next episode in the series is the 1979 general election, which truly did create a white heat of change and lit the match of Thatcherism on the United Kingdom.
00:51:41
Speaker
We're also available on YouTube at The Observations Podcast, where you can see my extra-long matches prop for Alec Douglas' hoes matchsticks analogy. And if you're watching there, please do like, comment, and subscribe. It does greatly help us.
00:51:56
Speaker
Thank you for being here, and thank you for listening to The Observations Podcast. Thank you.