Transcript
Speaker: Welcome to Stoa Conversations. My name is Caleb Ontiveros. And I'm Michael Tremblay. And today we're going to be talking about Cicero's On Ends, Book 2.
Speaker: So Book 1 included an initial salvo against the Epicureans, the Epicurean response. um And now Book 2, that's where Cicero really gets into his criticisms of Epicurus and his school. So...
Speaker: That's what we'll go over, i just ah and more critiques of the Epicureans, and I think especially sort of honing in on what we think the most important ones are from Cicero, as well as some other interesting interesting notes and things that come up in this chapter.
Speaker: Yeah, just a vicious, a vicious takedown. If we're following the story, ah the story of On Ends, we're treating this like, because there is a little narrative in it. As you said, first part is more open-minded um about Epicureanism.
Speaker: This one is just a, is just the takedown. it's just Cicero going at it, trying to really dismantle it, I think, um before getting to the merits of Stoicism.
Speaker: Yeah, absolutely. And if you look at the form of this book, it starts with Cicero more or less doing some form of Socratic questioning of the two Epicureans,
Speaker: ah Triarius and Torquatus. um But they essentially they can't handle the heat. So they say, you know, all this logic chopping, dialectics, this is nonsense. Just give us a speech of what you what you think about Epicurus. So then that's that's what Cicero does. He gives a ah long speech and there is no reply. Essentially, Triarius or Dequatus, they respond and say, looks you sound a lot like a Stoics.
Speaker: He made some interesting points. We'll have to check in with our Epicurean mentors and And see how we should respond. So they essentially duck out. And that's that.
Speaker: And book three gets into Cicero and the Stoics. So ah you can sort of take this as Cicero's more or less final statement about why he's not an Epicurean.
Speaker: Yeah. um No, I think that's – we'll get into the content of it, but I do think that's a funny format where they they start this back and forth kind of dialogue, argumentation, and then everyone's like, ah, this kind of sucks. just like just Just give it to a straight Cicero. I much prefer the long monologues.
Speaker: And then you get like 50 pages of Cicero monologues just ripping it up. ah So the the first point of substance, first criticism, is that Epicurus, he says that the ultimate end is pleasure, but Cicero charges Epicureans as equivocating between two different kinds of pleasure.
Speaker: And this is where he gets into a little bit of the Socratic questioning, trying to nail down what Triarias and Troquatus think about pleasure. But the Essentially, to sum it up, the Epicureans hold that there's static and kinetic pleasures.
Speaker: On one hand, you have, i think what we normally, and certainly Cicero thinks this, normally call pleasure, which is you know the satisfaction of desire, that positive sensation that comes when thirst is quenched, when you you know attend an energetic party.
Speaker: When you have a fine meal, that that's pleasure, and it's an active kind of pleasure. It's kinetic. And then you have static pleasure, which the Epicureans hold, actually hold is, in a sense, the better pleasure, the one one should truly be aiming for.
Speaker: And that's the absence of pain, the kind of tranquility or calm ataraxia that arises when Pain is absent when no desires are frustrated.
Speaker: But what Cicero says is that these things are actually two different things. And typically we use the word pleasure just to refer to kinetic pleasure, what Epicureans call kinetic pleasure, not static pleasure.
Speaker: So yeah what do you think about that what that that argument? Or do you want to draw any out draw any other details to it? Yes, I think you did a good job summarizing that. Basically, the the Epicureans talk about these two kinds of pleasure. And if you're part of the school, if if you're listening to their school, you're you're kind of taking that in as doctrine. And Cicero as an outsider is like, whoa, like, hold, slow down.
Speaker: um
Speaker: When we talk about pleasure, we just mean kinetic pleasure. ah This static pleasure is an entirely entirely different thing. I think the the argument is that there's a kind of equivocation going on.
Speaker: And then that equivocation between these two different things, one which is, you know, dancing, eating a meal, partying, um you know, going on a roller coaster and, you know, lying at home comfortably in your own bed.
Speaker: said when you when you equivocate between these two kinds of things, you can – um I guess, confuse what we're talking about and you can confuse the ends of life. um You're really trying to combine two two things that are that are not the same.
Speaker: And then one is not even what we mean by pleasure. And I was trying to think about, well, maybe maybe you have a better um way of thinking about this, Caleb. But On one hand, he wants to call out that, look, if if you say pleasure is kinetic pleasure, which is what you know the common sense person is going to think you're talking about when you say pleasure, then there's a whole range of issues with these. And we get back to the...
Speaker: we get back to these common criticisms, which is basically like, if you, if you, if you say the ends of life is like, you know, a sensation of eating a good meal, um, uh, you know, or partying, then you, you, if you just make the end kinetic pleasure and you, you know, you fully double down on that, then you lose a lot of the things that make your school sound kind of reasonable about,
Speaker: Well, um you know pleasure is easy to get. It's not that difficult to come by. um There's a lot of claims the Epicureans make about pleasure.
Speaker: Oh, it's like, um you know it's something facilitated by friendship. It's something better brought about by virtue. There's a lot of claims that that make the Epicureans sound reasonable that don't actually apply to kinetic pleasure.
Speaker: ah That's cicero's going to be Cicero's argument, or as as I understood it. you know It turns out that the best way to get kinetic pleasure is probably to do you know maybe some non-virtuous things, to you know to to maybe betray some people or to acquire money by whatever means necessary or go about getting um getting these sensations in maybe non-sustainable ways.
Speaker: So there's that one argument. um And then I'm not exactly sure, and maybe you have a sense of this, besides just the fact that we don't refer to static pleasure as pleasure, I was having trouble by the end of this really wrapping in my head around the criticism of static pleasure. because I think that makes sense. like on one hand, you know we can take pleasure to be kinetic pleasure.
Speaker: And that's kind of like not a good life if you think of it like that. um And then you're kind of doing this trick, bringing in two types of pleasure into it. But let's say the Epicureans bite the bullet and say, okay, well, it's just static pleasure or static pleasure is the more important of the two.
Speaker: um Yeah. What's the criticism there other than his language is confusing? What did you think? Well, I think there's a number of things here, that number of problems that Cicero thinks this equivocation causes. And I suppose one the most perhaps the simple way to put it is that yeah he has some lines from him.
Speaker: I think way there different arguments here. So think first premise, there's equivocation. Then the
Speaker: i think in a way there's there are different arguments here so i think the first premise of course is there's an equivocation then ah question is okay what's wrong with that what's the philosophical problem with that equivocation if there's any so just ah an issue of language One of them, perhaps, is that the you know you what we're trying to do is we're coming up with a philosophy of life, and that means defining the purpose, the end of a human life.
Speaker: And the Epicurean... Say they're providing a single end, but they're not. And that's just a logical issue in terms of, you know, they have a philosophy that ah says, you know, human purpose is to experience pleasure. And that's a single thing.
Speaker: But pleasure is a simple point. premise of this version the argument is pleasure on the epicurean account is not a single thing it's two things so they aren't proposing legitimate purpose telos for human life in that sense there is no ultimate ah aim of pleasure on their account because pleasure is two things ah that it cannot possibly be.
Speaker: so So I think that's what that's one way to put it. And then there's sort of the issue of ranking static versus kinetic pleasures. Epicureans rank static higher, and and Cicero thinks that's problematic.
Speaker: There's the issue of which one of those correlate with virtue, if any. Yeah. which you're getting at. And then there's also his argument that you know Epicureans point to the development of humans and say, you know naturally, we pursue pleasure.
Speaker: But Cicero says, well, naturally, we pursue kinetic pleasure. Where does static pleasure come in? you know That's what the infant pursue pursues, animals pursue. They pursue kinetic pleasure. um So there's a few other, I think, issues with this equivocation, but I suppose the the first one that you know comes to mind for me is just that that logical one, and I think that's sort of where where it begins.
Speaker: Yeah, i mean, Cicero doesn't like
Speaker: doesn't think And he has some some lines where he's like, look, I don't doubt that um Epicurus was a good guy, but we're talking about him as a thinker right now, and this is some shoddy thinking. And then he's like, but then let's not you know let's not use what the let's not do what the Greeks do who insult people. okay I'm not going to insult...
Speaker: I'm not going to insult people. He insults Epicurus and the Greeks, and it's like but i'm I'm not like that. Yeah, I'm not going to uneducated epicureia ah you know epicur uneducated Epicurus. like the What did he say? The light-minded Greeks?
Speaker: Yeah. Yeah. of What was I? um So yeah, so there's the there's a logical issue and then there's there's an issue. And I think that's ah it's an interesting point to call out, right? It's like, why are you even using the word pleasure when you're using something that is so unintuitive?
Speaker: And it it almost speaks like the Stoics have this view of preconceptions, right? There's something interesting that like, I know what pleasure means. You know what pleasure means. The the Romans knew what pleasure means and the Greeks knew what pleasure means.
Speaker: And none of them thought it was absence from pain. Right? Like you talk to any, it's almost like a cross-cultural understanding of like, oh yeah, that is like, um I mean, I think Cicero had a definition, I'm paraphrasing it, but it's like, you know, some sort of, um you know, elated experience in the body or something like this. And We all know, everybody knows what pleasure means, and it's really weird.
Speaker: first It's just weird for you to throw take this these terms around and then do a bit of a bait and switch. um in terms of the I guess, yeah, and then i'm i'm I'm curious about in terms of the issues with with static pleasure, though.
Speaker: Is it just that i think static I think we need to throw away kinetic pleasure, as, or I think, I think maybe the point here is that even the Epicureans already throw away kinetic pleasure. They make a hierarchy.
Speaker: And so if they're going to pause at one end, it has to be static pleasure. And then what you can do from that, which is like the passive experience of living without pain, it's not drinking water, but it's having your, having your thirst quenched, not being hungry, you know, not suffering pain.
Speaker: um and then when you And then when you're on this, so then by this definition, i I guess this needs to be the thing that's evaluated as an end. um And then it comes up short for a number of reasons that we discussed in our our last episode. But um any of any of those you wanted to tackle? Why so that static pleasure comes up short?
Speaker: Well, I think there's, maybe before we get into that, there is sort of a question about, you know, what's the Epicurean move here? Because we don't really Get it. And I suppose what you're suggesting is that, look, the Epicurean, what one way to handle this is to say the Epicureans are just going to say, look, we're talking about static pleasure. That's what we're talking about when we talk about pleasure to begin with.
Speaker: Yeah, maybe there are two different things we care about is static. I'm not sure. I don't think the Epicureans would make that move, but is that what you're suggesting? No, no, I don't think they would do that. i would think I would think it might have to be necessary, or at least Cicero's arguing it's necessary.
Speaker: um I don't think they would do that. I guess they would what they would probably do is they would extend... I mean, they would do what they already do, right? Which is they'd point out that pleasure does relate to the body.
Speaker: ah It is a sensation. Yeah. we're just extending it to multiple kinds of sensations. So, you know, when people, people who are not literate in pleasure, think about the fancy dinner, they think about the, the dancing and the drinks, but somebody who is literate in pleasure could probably you know, with a nice quiet night at home a, and a, you know, good meal of potatoes and vegetables could take from that moment, kind of an appreciation of the ataraxia they have really the freedom from disturbance and kind of get a pleasure from that.
Speaker: I don't think the, I don't think they're going to argue that because the the Epicureans do argue that there's not really any improvement on that. Right. That's, that's, that's one of their things that they're not unaware of this criticism, right.
Speaker: Like they they they knew it was counterintuitive in their own time. It's not Cicero. It's not the first person to point this out. And there's this idea that Really, youre you're your once you're moving, once you're experiencing kinetic pleasures, they're just of different type, different colors, different shades.
Speaker: But there's not like a real gradient or I don't know, there's not like a hierarchy. And then once you're in a state of ataraxia, there's nothing there's nothing really better than that. And that was controversial back in the day, right? Like people thought that was not the right way to talk about pleasure.
Speaker: So they've always had this unique view. Yeah, yeah. I think I would size side with the Epicureans on this actually against Cicero. and it's say but they they do They do talk about static pleasure as absence of pain, but Epicurus is also clear that he does think it's a kind of positive bodily sensation that comes from static pleasure.
Speaker: So it's maybe sometimes Cicero seems like he's talking about Look, you have that positive sensation of quenching thirst. That's positive. But this absence of pain, that's just a neutral state or something like that.
Speaker: But I think that's that's not sufficient for the Epicureans. I do think both static and kinetic pleasure that. some positive physical sensations, which maybe you can think of as, you know, tranquility or ah simple pleasures that don't have, you know, this augmenting intensifying aspect that, ah you know, when making you crave more and more that the Epicureans say is so dangerous, especially about kinetic pleasures. So I think they they can say, look, there they have there is pleasure or common to both of these.
Speaker: And we're not, you know, we're not equivocating. You're perhaps just, Cicero's, being too literal in his reading of, this is a state that's purely the absence of pain, which I don't, I don't, you know, Epicurus does say things like that, but I don't think that's ultimately what, how they define the state.
Speaker: With that, I think the other thing I guess is that you could use these same kind of arguments against the Stoics, right? Where you could say, how can you talk about happiness? Someone being happy on the torture rack. That's ridiculous. You talk to any person and you'd ask them if they're happy and that's not what they would say.
Speaker: And you just say, yeah, well, we just have a different definition. It's unintuitive. It's maybe a bit paradoxical at the start, but we've defined it clearly. And if you understand the argument, it makes sense.
Speaker: And so the Stoics going to have lots of those moments. So, of course, the Epicureans can, as long as they're consistent and well-defined with it. Yeah. i think I think there would be a weird play if you started to say, well, um you know I'm going to call pleasure this inanimate object or something. But they're they're're they're just different kinds of – as you said, they're just different they're talking about different kinds of physical sensations.
Speaker: And just because we – it's more intuitive for us to talk about the kinetic pleasure as pleasure it doesn't mean we can't have this other kind. Yeah, so there's not like... it's ah A paradox is not a gotcha unless it it gets totally... Unless there's some reason why it's also um nonsensical.
Speaker: And that was, I think, what I was getting to at the start of the episode. is Gotcha, gotcha. It's not clear to me from listening to Cicero why static pleasure is nonsensical. um I see the issues with kinetic pleasure, but I really don't see the conceptual issue with ah static pleasure.
Speaker: So... I think we both agree the sort of logical version of this argument, not that persuasive. Something that does come out from this, though, is the Epicureans rank static pleasure more highly than kinetic pleasure.
Speaker: But Cicero says, look, if you're going by testimony, ordinary observation, that ranking is you know questionable. you know He talks about people who...
Speaker: have dined exceptionally well, contrast them with a person who is a minimalist? Are you really going to say the person who dines exceptionally well does not experience the same level of pleasure has a worse level of pleasure than the person who's moderate ah to the point of um you know being a minimalist of sorts, sticking with bread and water, what have you?
Speaker: He has this funny line, can we assert that a thing is for the whole of life, the supreme good, though we do not think we can say it is so even for a dinner?
Speaker: By which he means, look, if you're really choosing between the static dinner and the kinetic dinner, why do so many people go for what we typically call kinetic, you know, bigger bigger portions, finer meats, vegetables?
Speaker: more crap, you know, a better, more talented chef, what have you? aren don't Aren't those really more productive of pleasure? And if so, isn't this ranking of pleasure mistaken? You know doesn't it point towards yeah ah the Cyreniacs who we talked about in a past episode, Aristippus and such? You know, these are the people who essentially hold that common sense meaning of pleasure, kinetic pleasure. That's what you're trying ah trying to optimize for over life and moment to moment.
Speaker: So yeah, i suppose that's that's one argument is that, that you know, Epicureans, you just have, if you really took pleasure seriously, you have this ranking wrong.
Speaker: Okay, so it's something like, Again, i'm just trying to I'm just trying to get to the so what here. the are The so what is something like you got these two things. They're not the same. You've got the ranking wrong.
Speaker: clear like you You make these natural arguments. We see people pursue pleasure. we make this appeal to what children do and what normal humans do. And they're clearly pursuing kinetic pleasure. So all your arguments about pleasure being the good rest on these kinetic pleasure arguments. Yeah.
Speaker: And then there's a whole bunch of issues with kinetic pleasure. um And then static pleasure, you know, it's fine it's a fine thing, but you lose these these arguments for it um that you you made these appeals to nature for.
Speaker: And as you said, it it doesn't really stand up against scrutiny when you compare it to something like virtue or something like this. So is is that the play? Is it like it loses its appeal to nature um and then static pleasure on its own is clearly not as good as the other things we can talk about?
Speaker: Yeah, I suppose I wasn't thinking of it so much in terms of this sort of, you know, different path, logical, argumentative paths.
Speaker: But just sort simply saying, look, same like Epicureans, you say pleasure is the way to go. You rank pleasures this way. This ranking is wrong. That's it. And in a sense, you know, the Cyreniacs are more consistent, more...
Speaker: ah congenial with common sense, ordinary observation that you appeal to. So ah setting aside arguments about whether pleasure should be the end at all, and at the very least, you don't have any reason, you know there's not sufficient reason to put static pleasures on a higher pedestal or at least the same pedestal as kinetic pleasures.
Speaker: So another line he says, This would be true if you did not value pleasure so highly. And he's actually referring to sort of the person who judges fine meats aren't really that valuable, whatever.
Speaker: Fine dinners aren't that valuable. but But because you do value pleasure so highly... The pleasure, he says, that is obtained from the cheapest things is not inferior to that which is got from the most costly. That's ah Epicurus.
Speaker: To say this is to be destitute not merely of intelligence, but even of a palate. So, like you know, you're optimizing for pleasure. What's the more pleasurable meal?
Speaker: The more costly one, usually. The fancier one. The tastier one. Not the what cheapest things that Epicurus says you should eat. Yeah, so a bunch of like, again, it's that it's that thing of if if k connecttic if what they mean is just kinetic pleasures or ah composite of both, but Or if kinetic pleasure is the most important one, then a lot of these arguments kind of fall apart. a lot of epicuring a lot of the Epicurus' arguments rely on tranquility. you know These arguments that are going to make it sound appealing, right? It's like you need virtue to achieve these things. You need friendship to achieve these things.
Speaker: You need to minimize your desires. uh, like, you know, want what is, want this kind of minimalistic temperate reasonable path. A lot of the things that are going to make Epicureanism seem like a reasonable life philosophy, rely on the hierarchy of static pleasures above kinetic.
Speaker: And then this is, this is calling into question that hierarchy, especially when we think of them as two incredibly distinct things. That makes sense to me. yeah Yeah. or Yeah. If we think of them, or it if you think of them the same, they're both pleasurable experiences, but which one's more pleasurable?
Speaker: ah Yeah. Yeah, exactly. um But I think as you say, of course, the Epicureans do have arguments for preferring static.
Speaker: And they do say there are risks with kinetic pleasures. You know, whether those arguments are persuasive or not is is another thing, but you know i'd say I'd say there's something to this argument from Ciceroan. You could perhaps almost interpret it as an argument for the Cyreniacs being more consistent, perhaps.
Speaker: Or at least I find that plausible. you know If Epicureans are going to rely on things like ordinary observation, isn't the fancier meal, the tastier meal, the more pleasurable one?
Speaker: Seems right to me.
Speaker: is there Is there a more radical play Epicureans could take, which is something on line lines of, I'm just trying to think if there's anything lost, if they rebrand their school, you know, the Ataraxia school or the freedom from pain school.
Speaker: And they just, okay, you know, Cicero, whatever. People use pleasure to mean a certain thing. We're going to describe this as the freedom from pain um and the sensation that accompanies that freedom from pain.
Speaker: Is there anything lost there in in in them kind of shrinking or rescinding to that smaller scope? Well, I think there's what's lost there is some of these appeals to common sense, to nature, to development, and really their epistemology of that sounds so common sense. You know you do things because it makes you feel good.
Speaker: Really, that's what life's all about. And then, of course, they make some counterintuitive moves that what feels good isn't aren't these intense pleasures, but over a life, you know, we're talking about happiness to be understood as something that happens over life.
Speaker: For that, you want to experience these static pleasures, these kinds of things that don't make you crave more and such. I mean, that's, that's might be what they'll miss out on.
Speaker: So maybe... I think maybe like one, i think this would be non-standard, but one kind of Epicurean response to this ranking type argument, and this seems plausible to me, just say, yeah, in a real sense, the fancier meal is more pleasurable, but what what we care about is happiness over life, and that's pleasure over life.
Speaker: And the kind of the kind of character you want to build is the one that is satisfied with these small these cheaper meals that avoids you know the hedonistic treadmill that doesn't risk you know the becoming addicted to this kind of experience and such. I think that's the move that I don't i think the Epicureans in a real sense, well, I don't know about this. Maybe he's
Speaker: i'm not I'm not too sure, but my impression was traditional Epicureans wouldn't even say that kinetic pleasure was more pleasurable than a static pleasure, but I think maybe a moderate adjustment to their view would be to say, yeah, it is it is more pleasurable, but we care about happiness over the over the long term, over the long run, and over a life.
Speaker: And I think that moves can pretty consistent with how they think. Hmm.
Speaker: I think i maybe I'm confused, um which is definitely possible. um But I think I'm not persuaded, Caleb. I'm not persuaded by your – because, again, you would have maybe this argument that – because they they need to rely there because you you end up with these two buckets, right? Sure. You've got kinetic pleasures and then you've got freedom from pain.
Speaker: And if if what what I hear you saying is, look, like, yay, that – That fancy dinner, that shopping spree, that feels good, but it's not the kind of thing you could sustain over a lifetime. So if you want to maximize feeling good over a lifetime, you got look at the static pleasure, this absence of pain, this being satisfied, having good friends, having enough.
Speaker: But then then that again just sounds to me like ataraxia. That sounds to me like absence from pain. And I agree with your argument if they make the final end absence from pain, but then the final end isn't, that's not pleasure because...
Speaker: you know maybe the best Maybe the way to get the most pleasure over a lifetime is to just have parties and crashes. right You end up with this kind of calculus that isn't it isn't maximizing pleasure at all. it's like It does seem to me like a minimizing pain calculus, which is fine. I'm fine with that, but it's just a whole different kind of philosophy, as you said, that loses its appeal to what's like intuitive or um really enjoyable about it Yeah.
Speaker: Yeah. I think there's got to be some positive sensation to the ultimate aim for the Epicureans. It can't just be the yeah absolutely like an absence of pain. So I suppose that's that's what I wasn't seeing. as i So a number, like maybe it's a bit – um um If I put a number to it, which is like not the right way to do this. It's not how the Epicureans think about it. But it's something like, look, partying is a 10, and then you get hungover, and you're minus 5.
Speaker: But if you're just like if you're just kind of chill, satisfied, you can actually... get to I mean, I think their argument is you're going to actually sustain a 10 as well. It's just a different kind of 10, which is weird.
Speaker: And then maybe the argument, or there could be another argument, which is maybe that this is like a seven or an eight. And a lifetime of a seven or eight is better than fluctuation between 10 and minus five. um But your point is it can't be zero.
Speaker: Ataraxia can't be zero. Otherwise it doesn't, yeah, it's not coherent. Yeah, absolutely. I think it it is crude putting numbers to this, but that's super helpful. And I do think the traditional Epicurean view would say you you can get that to a 10 even with static pleasures.
Speaker: And then what I was trying to propose is, but you know there's maybe a modification, which is like you can get to, the best you can do is get to a seven. The issue with these momentary 10s is that they come with you know negative fives, negative 10s later.
Speaker: um So the best you can do is shoot seven over your lifetime. Yeah. And then, then then yeah and then everybody agrees with that math and then like you can disagree factually with Epicurious and say, well, I don't agree with you that you can get to a 10 with static pleasure.
Speaker: i still think you can hit a higher high with kinetic pleasure. Um, right yeah but, but, but then functionally the recommendation for a good life is still the same. Minimalistic temperance, good friendship, you know, virtues, still looking for that consistent seven or eight over a lifetime.
Speaker: Yeah, I think so. Okay. This was helpful. I, okay. I'm back on the Epicurean train, but yeah as you said, it has to rely on some sort of sense of, um, absence of pain being actually a good feeling.
Speaker: I think so. Yeah, I think so.
Speaker: All right, so we got some more arguments from Cicero, of course. I think a very common one, Epicureans, they argue, you we're trying to promote these static pleasures, simple ah pleasures, you know avoiding pain and such.
Speaker: And that's best brought about, really, with the life of virtue, acting in a just way, courageous way, moderate way, with wisdom and prudence. But ah very common argument against this question procuratorians get is, does the life of the virtuous person really promote more ah pleasure over the whole life?
Speaker: And I think one common... issue is it seems like maybe you can cheat on third times you were you just you can just get away with a more pleasurable experience even if you're virtuous you know 90 of the time cicero talks about a story where he says ah you know as advisor to publius sextilius rufus a solid roman name and he was heir to quintus fattius gallus um essentially ah
Speaker: Phadius Gallus requested to Rufus that he see his whole property passed on to his daughter his death. But Sixtilius was able to say, i don't actually have to report that.
Speaker: you know He stated to his friends, I don't need to say that he wished his daughter to inherit ah the whole of his property. I can just take it and get away with taking it. And, you know, Cicero says, do people like that, people who make those kinds of decisions, do they really live lives that are devoid of pleasure because they're able to get away with it a few times?
Speaker: Mm-hmm. And I think this is maybe, i think one, going back to this first charge that Cicero has that the Epicureans equivocate on different kinds of pleasures or insist that there's a single thing that static and kinetic pleasure share, namely that they're both pleasurable experiences.
Speaker: ah One way that this sort of insistence makes the problem sharper for them, perhaps, that maybe we don't need to rest on this point is that, uh, Whatever pleasure is involved in acting with vice, both the static and kinetic pleasures count in the positive sense, at least, you know, the the pleasurable aspects of them. So, and that seems perhaps to make this problem even a little thornier to deal with.
Speaker: Yeah, I mean, I'm i'm persuaded by the argument. I think this is a good criticism. um Cicero gives another example. um I'm paraphrasing, but it's something like, you know, you got some guy you hate and you see he's about to sit on a snake.
Speaker: And you're like, you know, you don't say anything. You're like, I'm going to let him sit on the snake. And he dies. And it's like, you know, was that a bad decision? He's like, by Epicurean standards, that was a great decision.
Speaker: This guy you hate is dead and your life is way better. Nobody knows you you saw the snake. Nobody knows you could have said something.
Speaker: Yeah. And then then, and like, yeah, your point was that if we, if we phrase both of these things as positive sensations, it's like, yeah, there's a lot more positive sensations in both of these kinds of lives. If you do this, um,
Speaker: I think about this in terms of utilitarianism as wrestling with utilitarianism because even utilitarianism, because utilitarianism contemporary, more contemporary, like 18th century school of philosophy about maximization of pleasure. And you can apply that either at an individual level or across a society, but it does look as, as basically looks at ethics as, as I understand it as, as, you know, a question of distribution and maximization. How do you appropriately maximize and distribute ah pleasure and and minimize ah and distribute, I guess, pain.
Speaker: And there's this thing in utilitarianism where this rule-based utilitarianism, which is this idea that you should act um according to rules that tend to maximize pleasure and tend to minimize pain,
Speaker: um I think that idea is there is that like pragmatically, you're not always going to be sure in the situation what does what. So going tend to not steal, lie and murder because ah because I'm not very i'm not very not able to do the math in this particular situation. This will give me a better sense of things.
Speaker: um Or this will this will tend to to to go as well as possible. And so the Epicurean, it seems to me, is stuck in this kind of rule-based utilitarianism at best, at least on an individual level, where that's what virtue is. is Virtue is, well, going to tend to be courageous.
Speaker: I'm going to tend to be just because that's going to tend... to ah to lead to the most pleasure. And Cicero is just pointing out the very reasonable example that like, you know there was a situation where you didn't, where you knew that being unjust would maximize your pleasure.
Speaker: The Epicurean has to say you should be unjust. They have to bite that bullet. Right. um And i think I think the Epicurean would be would be fine with that. um i mean, I think they they could bite the bullet. And there's no issue if you don't think that's gross or sad or like if that doesn't make it seem like, oh, this can't be the right philosophy because i'm i'm so I hate that idea so much.
Speaker: ah then and the Epicurean can bite the bullet. um But if you like virtue, if you think virtue is necessary for a good life, then it kind of disqualifies them, right? And Cicero's banking on that idea.
Speaker: Yeah, absolutely. I think you either have to you have to bite the bullet and essentially say, sure, in this hypothetical, you can act with vice. But in the real world, those sorts of situations never happen because we never have enough knowledge or something like that, which is...
Speaker: questionable or you have to make another move which some real utilitarian also will say is something to the effect of you you know because
Speaker: essentially the the rule is what you ought to follow. And when you're making decisions, rationality requires that you follow the best rules. And this is the best rule. There is no rule that applies to all circumstances. You're not making one-off decisions.
Speaker: um and Instead, you're following the optimal rule, which for the rule utilitarian is optimize happiness. Then maybe for Epicureans, the analogy is to act with virtue in order to promote pleasure. That's that's the best best thing to do.
Speaker: And I think those are there there are some things you can make to are some moves you can make. If listeners are curious, you can look into some debates in decision theory, yeah know sometimes called Newcom's Problem, that makes these kinds of moves a little bit more plausible. But ah I think you do need to sort of go down that that rabbit hole if you want to justify this this kind of this kind of play. Because just saying these sorts of situations never happen in the real world, that's that's a bit questionable, I'd say.
Speaker: I watch lots of TV shows where this stuff happens. And then i what well but I think this, what Cicero is doing here as a thought experiment is he's, one thing he talks about, he he refers to the, a lot of different philosophical schools and their positions.
Speaker: And he talks about you know Aristotle and in the Peripatetics, the followers of Aristotle. And he says, well, they think that virtue is this the most important good, and there's a bunch of other goods. And then you've got something like ah the Stoics who think that virtue is the only good. And this is totally coherent, and these people have interesting debates about this. But Cicero says you know they're really debating about where to put virtue in the hierarchy.
Speaker: But the Epicureans have to come in and do this... Totally topsy-turvy thing say, well, virtue is not actually in the hierarchy at all. It's not only is it not the highest good, it's not the only good, it's not even a low good, it's no good.
Speaker: um It's only good as it's it's only good um in terms of its instrumental value of helping you get to the real good. And so that's what that's for me what the thought experiment is about is thought about experiment is saying, okay, let's just pull an example where – because you can you can change it from – there's this example of of yeah breaking – don't remember those long Roman names, but the guy is basically lying to get the estate or you're omitting something to kill somebody.
Speaker: And you give these examples of getting tons of pleasure. But the Epicurean would have to provide this example of like you know even a little bit of pleasure, even $5.00. Well, you know um I can buy a chocolate bar with that. What's the point in in me saving this person's life?
Speaker: like the the The virtue has no – he's just calling out this example of um is there anything is there anything wrong about having this situation where virtue plays no math in it?
Speaker: um and And he's going say just – it doesn't appeal to intuition really. It's like a reductio ad absurdum of the argument. He's like, that's so absurd that that could be the right way to live. And yet the Epicureans are saying that, that it would be right to not warn the person, not to not that they're going to die, that they're going to be bitten by the snake.
Speaker: um And that you could look at that person and say, oh, that person has lived the best life they could live. Right? Because by by your criteria, they've maximized their pleasure. it's It's, yeah, it's reduction of absurdness. Like that's absurd by showing that, you know, any system that doesn't include virtue in its calculus at all is going to leave itself vulnerable to these kinds of criticisms.
Speaker: Yeah, absolutely. So I think this is his fundamental criticism really is that moral virtue matters. It has value. And as you say, the Epicurean can say that it matters only instrumentally, only insofar as it promotes pleasure.
Speaker: But sister i think so we you know we think moral virtue matters. Maybe it's not the end-all be-all, like the Stoics would have it, but it's at least something that's intrinsically valuable. And what shows what sort of proves this fact? Well, think, again, it's an appeal to these different sorts of cases, but he talks about different Roman heroes who didn't necessarily live pleasurable lives, but we think there was something good in the fact that they acted virtuously nonetheless. You know, we talked about the previous, in the previous book, he mentions ah one of Torquatus's ancestors who acts with martial virtue and sacrifices his own son.
Speaker: In this book, he talks about another roman ancient Roman, Marcus Regulus, who
Speaker: you know Shows civic virtue where he's captured as a prisoner of war by the Carthenagians, and they tell him to go to Rome and essentially negotiate a peace treaty and only return if he's unsuccessful. and with the expectation that he'll be tortured and killed when he is returned.
Speaker: Marcus Regulus goes, and instead of negotiating the peace treaty, he says, you know, it's in Rome's best interest to take it to the Carthaginians. don't you know Don't negotiate for my release. ah so And that's a classic example of Roman virtue, ah putting the Roman state above your own individual sensation on on pleasure.
Speaker: and And he says, look, we Romans think that's valuable. If you want to step outside the Roman context, you know just think about different moral heroes, artists, are Marcus Aurelius to ah religious figures. you know Do you imagine them as feeling great all the time, feeling really good in states of permanent bliss?
Speaker: Maybe sometimes, but at least some of what makes them great, if not what primarily makes them great, makes them admirable is the moral virtue they they display and that's something that's good even of itself. you know Cicero writes, that is not the witness of the inscriptions on the tombs.
Speaker: This, for example, at the city gate, you know he's talking about another Roman hero. Many peoples agree that he was a leader of the nation beyond compare. Do we imagine that many peoples agreed concerning Calatinus that he was a leader of a nation because he far excelled others in the production of pleasures?
Speaker: Yeah, you know, we we have the different tombstones, you right. You know, he was a great, great father, a great general, a great neighbor, what have you. We don't write, you know, he really knew how to experience pleasure.
Speaker: Yeah. guy i knew I mean, sometimes this guy knew how to have a good time. Yeah. Or at least, you know, what you what maybe that's one thing you add, but you also add the other things. And that's what you need for the argument to to be successful. as' those other things are valuable in and of themselves, you
Speaker: I mean, this is what yeah this is what gets me. i'm actually I've enjoyed these episodes because I'm less Epicurean than I was before. There's always part of me that was like, hmm, do I agree with the Epicurean argument? Am I just into Stoicism?
Speaker: Because like there's always that aching suspicion or concern on my ends that like maybe I'm just taking on Stoicism because it's um yeah it's helpful for reducing anxiety, for leading to... like more, a more joyful life for myself.
Speaker: But i really think this is the crux of the issue. i just, I do think there are things that matter that are not pleasure. I do think there are things that matter that aren't producive of pleasure.
Speaker: Um,
Speaker: Yeah, and that's just like, that's just, I just can't. ah Even if that is just recognizing the value of pleasures in other ah pleasure in others and maximizing in others, I just can't take the soul, you know, the purpose is for you to feel good. i just can't, i just, yeah, doesn't doesn't do it for me.
Speaker: and And these are like appeals to intuition that Cicero is making or appeals almost like, ah um you know, an argument from authority or something like just pointing to examples. of people we would consider great, right? People we would consider to have lived great lives. And, um, it's almost, it's this kind of like Aristotelian, like naturalist play of like greatness exists out in nature and it's our job to describe it. So let's look at great people.
Speaker: And, you know, do we think they like, they think they maximize pleasure? Now that's not, that's not really what we were selecting for here when we picked, uh, you know, Leonidas of the Spartans, the main character in the movie 300. He talks about him not really picking we're not really maximizing for pleasure there when when we thought he was an amazing general.
Speaker: um yeah this This for me is the don the nail in the coffin, so to speak. i don' i don't know if there's a good way around it. Yes, likewise. I think this is a powerful argument. and A good reason to not be Epicurean, what I find most challenging about
Speaker: the philosophy of Epicurus and and related views, you know, the Cyreniacs and modern modern day views. You have ah ah utilitarians who think pleasure, happiness is what's what's most valuable.
Speaker: I think this is also a powerful criticism of those those philosophies as well. Yeah. And one one well compelling point that Cicero raises here, and this comes back to the kind of language Cicero, again, i don't i don't think this is right because i think that you can, I don't think that it's evidence against your claim if if the crowds disagree with you, if popular opinion disagrees with you. It's not necessarily evidence that you're wrong.
Speaker: ah Stoicism was very paradoxical. A lot of people disagreed with it or thought it was silly as well. But Cicero has this really compelling part where he talks about Epicureanism and says that you can't even say what you really think. You can't even get up on stage, address a crowd, and say that pleasure is the ultimate good.
Speaker: because people would you know basically be disgusted by it. You have to go up and you have to adopt the language of the Stoics. You have to adopt the language of the Aristotelians and you have to talk about pleasure, ah its not pleasure sorry virtue, justice, kindness, courage, courage things like this.
Speaker: you have to You have to use the language of other schools to compel people because you can't even say what you really think because basically the people would find that so unappealing if it was, if all of its implications were shown, um fully, you know, people wouldn't think it's silly. Oh, it matters to feel good and it's good to feel good.
Speaker: But if you really brought out these kinds of thought experiments, people would just entirely reject it.
Speaker: Yeah, I think so. I think so. And it's sort it's an interesting issue, you know, to be Epicurean, you have to deny or at least not talk as much about the the ultimate end of life, which is a It's perhaps not and a knockdown argument, but it is throw up a question mark, I think.
Speaker: um One other point I wanted to touch on before we end is Cicero mentions the yeah stoic argument that happiness must be under the control of the wise.
Speaker: So he says, happiness, if ah if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man's own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy.
Speaker: who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting in his own case always continues solid and strong. But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses must must needs apprehend that he will sometime or the other be wretched if he loses them.
Speaker: So i think essentially there's, i mean, think there's that point about maybe some amount of contingency. And that's one reason why happiness must be under one's control is otherwise you might fear the future.
Speaker: But perhaps the more essential point is that ah happiness is described to a life as a whole, not a particular moment. And happiness And it should be separate from the circumstances you are in at any given moment.
Speaker: Andy says, look, Epicureans, they can't grant that because you're not in full control over the physical sensations you experience moment to moment. And I think that's ah that's an interesting argument. I think there's something pretty plausible about that idea that the happiness...
Speaker: The kind of happiness that matters must be something under your control um you know because we're making decisions and decisions concern what's up to us or not and why make why care about something that's not up to you. I think that's one of the classic classic Stoic insights.
Speaker: And sometimes pleasure isn't ah isn't always up to you. So I think, of course, the Epicureans try to respond to that and say, well, static pleasure, that's perhaps another reason to be in favor of static pleasure because it's easier to obtain.
Speaker: And it is more up to you than these kinetic type pleasures. But ultimately, even so, it's and sensation, bodily sensation, and that's not always going to be in your own power.
Speaker: Yeah, I don't think, i mean, the interesting point.
Speaker: I don't think I'm persuaded by the stoic point. I guess I'm not persuaded by the argument. I don't understand the argument that like happiness has to be up to you.
Speaker: I think it follows from the fact from the stoic arguments about what happiness consists in, that it happens to be the thing that's up to you. But I don't think... I don't think that on its own makes sense to me as an argument for disqualifying um happiness, relying on things that are not up to you. Basically, i don't I don't understand why life couldn't be necessarily tragic, why life couldn't necessarily be the kind of thing that you know some people are happy and some people aren't, and it's just like sometimes not up to them, and that sucks.
Speaker: I think the Stoics have arguments for why that's not the case, but it doesn't seem to me. i don't think the fact that it's not up to you. um not understanding that argument, although I would like it not to be like I would like life to not be tragic.
Speaker: um But then I think the point that you hit on the end is the one that really resonates with me is that the Epicureans are are almost trying to have their cake and eat it too, where they're like putting the good in something that's clearly outside of their control But then trying to say, oh well, static pleasure is so easily acquired.
Speaker: It requires so little. It's like basically available to everybody. um And Cicero has these really good arguments against in the passage of like, what are you talking about? like I have lots of friends who have chronic illness and chronic pain. He's like, if you're ah when you say that pain, is if it's bad, is short-lived. like You're talking about dropping dead from...
Speaker: know, dropping dead, but nobody's afraid of dropping dead. They're afraid of being, know, terribly ill and sick for a year for longer. So I see that as the issue with Epicureanism is I feel like they're they're not like leaning to the fact that like, yeah, it is pleasure. Yeah.
Speaker: Some people just get more of it than others and that sucks. But here are the strategies you can make to maximize it. Yeah. I guess i'm not I'm not getting the other argument about, you know, happiness should be up to you. It doesn't seem to me why that should be the case before you introduce other arguments about, you know, the fact that happiness is virtue or something like that.
Speaker: Yeah, yeah. We should dive into that some more. it' it's ah Maybe we're getting a little far afield from this book. But for me, it's it's ah sort of an argument that happiness must decision-relevant.
Speaker: So I think that's what is important. And I think maybe you might just and someone could certainly deny that again and say, no, happiness can always be decision-relevant.
Speaker: There's room for tragedy in life. But... For me, it's I think the happiness is decision-relevant and anything that's decision-relevant should be something that's up to you. and Of course, there there are more moves here one could make, but that's the ah that's a general thrust of the argument, if you will.
Speaker: I did want to say one way before we end, just in terms of general impressions. I think for these conversations, our conversation about Aristippus, the Cyreniacs to me seem pretty underrated in terms of being ah more consistent, maybe more plausible than the Epicureans in terms of hedonists.
Speaker: So again, they're that philosophy that essentially says, you know, you should maximize pleasure moment to moment. And they and don't really care about whether it's static or kinetic um pleasures. They Aristippus, you think of sort of as that guy who's successful, skilled, virtuous 80% of the time.
Speaker: ah They didn't have the trappings, some of the trappings that Epicureans had. you know They admitted that the wise man isn't guaranteed happiness because there's not guaranteed pleasure.
Speaker: It's only a problem probabilistic thing. And it's something that demands skill that perhaps like the Epicureans, you know, should cause us to reject social conventions just to pursue pleasures.
Speaker: um But as a part of that, they also didn't think that, you know, the wise man was necessarily virtuous all the time. That wasn't wasn't as important.
Speaker: Yeah, I think I agree with you. um I like that kind of focus on kinetic pleasure. The Epicureans sound... less convincing. i think Cicero did his job.
Speaker: I ate up the Cicero propaganda here and i no longer am a fan of Epicurus. Um, but I think yeah, I think, I think your point about, you know, okay, whether or not we want to throw it up Curianism or not, at the very least, we've got this undervalued alternative that, that really does bite all the bullets and address all the kind of hypocrisies or, um issues that, uh,
Speaker: that Cicero is raising. And then in Cicero is almost like he, he, he gives them credit um as the more coherent hedonistic school. um I think he also thinks that there, there's there, they can't be the case because they, the kinetic pleasure is kind of base and inappropriate, but at least it's more kinetic with the Syrenaix.
Speaker: Absolutely. Awesome. Do you have any ah takeaways you want to mention before we call it? I think my takeaway is the one that already raised, which I think i think that... um I think really wrestling with the school ah and you know reading somebody who's sympathetic to Stoicism, right, really thoughtfully about Epicureanism as a peer and as an alternative has persuaded me. I think Cicero has done a good job of showing me the weaknesses in the school. I just... ah
Speaker: So less of a fan of it. I don't think it can be, mean, I'm more of the stoic position, which is like, okay, well, maybe I'm not a stoic because I'm actually an Epicurean. Maybe i'm just m maybe i just ah follow the stoic view that pleasure is a preferred and different.
Speaker: And I should try to get as much of it as I can without compromising the other thing that matters, which is you know virtue and good character. And that's totally coherent with within the Stoic school. Whereas if you if you jump over into the pleasure camp, there's lots of other incoherencies and issues that come up as well.
Speaker: Nice. Well, in the next two books, we'll get into Stoicism. The third one, that's Cicero's presentation of Stoic doctrine, arguments for Stoicism. And then the fourth is his criticisms of the school. Cicero's not a Stoic.
Speaker: So we'll get into those in some future episodes. Awesome. Thanks, Caleb. Yeah, thanks for doing this.
