Transcript
Speaker: Could our commitment to pursuing happiness give us a reason to believe in God? Welcome back to the Dinosaur Circle Podcast. I'm Dr. Sam Bennett and today I'm sharing a conversation with philosopher David A. Horner of Biola University. So, Kant famously argued that our commitment to living morally, to the moral life, gives us a reason to believe that God actually exists. But Horner's new work explores whether we can find something similar, a similar kind of reasoning much earlier in Aristotle and Augustine. So both thinkers, Aristotle and Augustine, believed that we are ultimately seeking happiness and that our deepest happiness actually requires God to exist.
Speaker: Now, consider an analogy. If you want to read the New Testament in its original language, well, you have a practical reason. You have a reason to do something, namely learn Koine a Greek. Similarly, if our ultimate happiness requires God, does our commitment to pursuing happiness give us a practical reason to believe that God actually exists?
Speaker: That's the question Horner explores in his new article, Aristotle and Augustine on God and Happiness, published by Oxford University Press. We begin with Kant's argument before turning to Aristotle and Augustine. So here's our conversation.
Speaker: Could you tell us a bit about probably the most famous moral argument for God's existence, the one that comes in Immanuel Kant's critique of practical reason, which the second critique. Yeah, could you just tell us a little bit about Kant's famous argument? According to most interpreters of Kant, he he doesn't think, he separates two questions, which I think are helpful to separate.
Speaker: One is the rational, the the grounds of moral obligation. Um, and he doesn't think God is necessary for that in any way, according to most interpreters of kind.
Speaker: In other words, like you don't need God to explain why any moral obligations exist in the first place. Okay. Exactly. Why murder is wrong, et cetera.
Speaker: Okay. Yeah. Uh, so. and And most modern moral arguments are actually are about that, right? that that there're that That we do need God for that.
Speaker: But ba Kant has his own you know idiosyncratic sort of way of justifying all those claims. And he doesn't think God is necessary, although there are a few interpreters who think he he actually is ah a kind of divine command theorist.
Speaker: But then there's a separate question is, so what about the rationality of the pursuit of the moral life? You know, oh they a fully rational commitment to the pursuit of morality in in living the moral life as a whole.
Speaker: And he thinks when he asks that question, at least on my interpretation, that's what he's talking about in the in the second critique. And he thinks that, um,
Speaker: there is, we we have a duty to pursue the ultimate end or object, the ultimate object of morality, which is a kind of moral ordering, of of a full moral ordering of things where acting according to virtue, acting according to the moral moral law, is converges with happiness and well-being and so on. ah that it makes sense, that there's a kind of sensible moral order to things where where it all fits together and is worth it.
Speaker: And in order to pursue such an end rationally, he he thinks that presupposes certain necessary conditions for such an end to obtain, one of which is the existence of God.
Speaker: ah If you want, to just quote a a quote a ah briefly from from the critique. He says, now it was our duty to promote the highest good.
Speaker: And again, the highest good is where virtue and happiness converge ultimately. And it is not merely our privilege, but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite.
Speaker: He's not the the the the smoothest writer. Okay, so in other words, it's not just a cool thing, but actually, if we're gonna do that, it's it's necessary to fulfill this duty that we presuppose the possibility of this highest good.
Speaker: And therefore, he says, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God, because that is necessary for the possibility of attaining this this highest good.
Speaker: um So as as, you know, Kant, typical strategy for Kant is taking some some feature of things and then thinking about, okay, what must be true in order for that to be true, or for that to obtain?
Speaker: and In this case, it's the it's the rationality, the ultimate rationality of the moral life, or we might say the the ultimate intelligibility of the moral life and the pursuit of of of moral virtue and goodness.
Speaker: that it presupposes it ah certain things, including the existence of God. And so we must assume that to be the case. So he's not saying that God's existence um explains why moral obligations exist.
Speaker: It sounds like he does think that God's existence would be necessary for the highest good to exist, right? Is that correct? Like for the highest good to be realized for it to actually be actual.
Speaker: Yes. then God would need to exist. And so it's like from there, it's like something about, oh, if trying to realize the highest good is like a duty and if it's only rational to pursue it, if it can actually be actualized, then you know I guess maybe it would rationally pursuing the highest good what might somehow require require postulating the existence of God or something like that.
Speaker: Okay, good. Yeah, well, yeah. And so we that's I think that's good for now in terms of just kind of giving the audience a rough sense of like what Kant was up to with his moral argument. And we might circle back at some point um to that, but um we're going to be focusing more on Aristotle and Augustine, how they might be understood as having a kind of implicit moral argument. um But maybe before we talk about Aristotle and Augustine,
Speaker: We could just kind of lay out some, talk about some really interesting distinctions you make in your article. So, um so you, you describe Kant's argument as a practical moral argument for belief in God.
Speaker: um rather than a theoretical moral argument for belief in God. um So maybe we can first start off like what's, you know, what makes an argument a moral argument for belief in God versus a practical moral argument versus...
Speaker: a theoretical moral argument. So yeah, maybe we can just kind of get some of those interesting distinctions. let' say Sure. Yeah. So let's, let's start broad and and just say, okay, what is a moral argument?
Speaker: And so I ah set forth a kind of characterization, sort of a generic characterization of a moral argument. a in the following way.
Speaker: First premise is that that morality has some characteristic X, um and and that's where lot there's a lot of variety ah between different kinds of moral arguments about what the X is.
Speaker: So we've already talked about a couple of options like that the existence, and well, that that there are objective moral values or objective moral obligations.
Speaker: and These are features of morality. um And that's that's a real common way of approaching moral arguments today. ah But we could just, you know, other features we could we could talk about.
Speaker: ah So one, morality has such a characteristic, important characteristic. characteristic Two, that X depends on or presupposes or is intelligible only in relation to or is best explained by, et cetera, et cetera, God or some relation to God, okay, or believe in God.
Speaker: So I call this the dependence relation. So morality has X as an essential feature, but X depends on, in some way, God or belief in God.
Speaker: Three. Therefore, morality depends on, or et cetera, belief in God, the existence of God or belief in God. And therefore, finally, insofar as one is committed to the reality of morality or the practice of morality, so that that's where the difference is going to be between theoretical and in practical moral arguments in that distinction there, which we can come back to.
Speaker: So insofar as one it holds to these things, one has reason to be believe in God. So that's the that's the big generic thing. And different moral arguments fill in especially premise one, but also premise two in different ways.
Speaker: And so a very common way to do it to today is to say, well, as as William Lane Craig would say, you know, ah
Speaker: morality involves objective moral values. Objective moral values are only possible ah if they're grounded in God. Therefore, morality is only possible if it's grounded in God. Therefore, if we believe that there's a real moral ah order and so on, we have reason to to think that God exists.
Speaker: Good, yeah. I had a real quick question because I feel like to me, a really popular moral argument that I hear is maybe a little bit more epistemological. And so I just wanted to see whether you would say this counts as a moral argument in um your definition. So it's basically one where it's like, hey, we possess genuine moral knowledge. So the This is why it's a little bit tricky because it's not quite ah it's sort of a feature of morality, but it's sort of like a relation morality has to us, which is that we actually know about it. We like have knowledge of various duties. like For example, we know that you know killing innocent people is wrong or something like that.
Speaker: Anyway, and then the idea is like, well, naturalism, um you know God not existing, there being only natural properties, however you want to define naturalism, it makes our possession of like moral knowledge extremely improbable.
Speaker: Theism makes it you know would make it much more probable. Therefore, like us possessing moral knowledge is you know supports theism. over naturalism. Anyway, something like that. Would that would you you say that counts as a kind of moral argument in your eyes?
Speaker: Yeah, absolutely. I think, you know, the the the thing the feature of morality, and I'm using that fairly loosely, right? Right. it it So it could be like an external feature maybe of like how it relates to us or something. Yeah, but well, I think i think when we talk about morality, and this is more of a meta-ethical approach,
Speaker: but i But it's widely shared. And I and i I think it's right, is that we begin with in many ways with moral phenomenology, you know, moral experience. How do we experience morality?
Speaker: And that's why we we experience it as in fact having obligations and and authority and normativity and so on. But also one of the things that we could could argue as in your argument, is that we actually possess knowledge.
Speaker: this isn This is something that we actually have knowledge about these things. right And so that would be a feature. how's What's the best explanation of that? Well, you know, you've just, you've you've stated it very well. and And then we would ask, okay, so on what view of the world does that make good sense?
Speaker: And, the you know, the inference to the best explanation or however you want to put it. Right. ah So yeah, that would fit exactly within what I'm trying to say a generic moral argument is.
Speaker: Okay, good. And maybe this can actually lead into like im ah the next distinction um between practical moral arguments and theoretical moral arguments. Yeah.
Speaker: my so My sense is that this kind of moral, this epistemological moral argument would be more of like a theoretical one. But anyway, yeah, if you want to if you want to explain now the difference between like a practical and a theoretical moral argument, that might be helpful too.
Speaker: I think you're exactly right. i would consider your epistemological moral argument as a theoretical moral argument. So um the distinction between theoretical and practical ah moral arguments really has come into the to the discussion through Robert Adams, as as has a lot of stuff.
Speaker: And so he had a he had an introduction he had an essay on moral arguments back in 1987, where he, ah and at that time, there was not this big resurgence as there is today.
Speaker: And he sort of gives it somewhat of a taxonomy. And when he gets to Kant, then he makes this distinction between theoretical and practical. And i think it's I think it's very helpful. Now, what he says is that theoretical arguments in general, now not just moral arguments, but theoretical arguments, theistic arguments, purport to prove the truth of or enhance the probability of theism.
Speaker: ah But practical arguments purport only to give ethical or practical reasons for believing that God exists.
Speaker: Now, that distinction, of course, is big in Kant because he rejects all theoretical theistic arguments. He doesn't think we can know that God exists ah for those reasons, but he thinks we can believe. So but one of the questions that's- Slightly controversial position. Yeah, yeah.
Speaker: And so what does he mean by, you know, in the statement that I read earlier? ah It is morally necessary for us to believe that God exists. what What exactly does it mean there? And and actually, Adams really, um he he he thinks a lot about this, and he and he he wrote another article called Moral Faith, where he really pursues these sorts of questions.
Speaker: But we can we can talk more about that. But in any case, the distinction is one that's that's common in in the in the history of philosophy, but especially in in earlier thought, and Kant has his own version of it.
Speaker: but the distinction between theoretical reasoning and and practical reasoning. and Theoretical reasoning from the Greek theoria ah has to do with it's the sort of reasoning that we we we use when we do metaphysics and so on, where we're trying to think about, okay, what is the case?
Speaker: um And then practical reasoning from the Greek word praxis, which means action, is thinking about how to act how to live and so on.
Speaker: Now, in the in the classical world, all sorts of moral arguments, all all sorts of reasoning about morality at all would be considered practical in in ah in ah in a broad sense. right That it's about action, right? And so, you know typically ethics was called practical philosophy.
Speaker: um But this distinction is not exactly that because what Adams wants to do is distinguish between different kinds of moral arguments.
Speaker: So within this broad notion of practical, we can we can make further distinctions. So within broad practical rationality, which is simply thinking about morality...
Speaker: um there are There are two different kinds of arguments we can make in theistic sorts of arguments in from morality. One is theoretical moral arguments, which are things like moral ah objective moral values exist.
Speaker: ah They're best explained by the existence of God. Therefore, God exists. This is evidence for the existence of God from the existence of objective moral values or moral knowledge, etc., etc.
Speaker: So it these are arguments about what is the case. um And so in this case, in this sense, they would be parallel to something like cosmological arguments or design arguments.
Speaker: um And I would again, I would say virtually all contemporary moral arguments are of that kind. But for reasons we've already said, client doesn't think there are a good moral arguments in that sense, or any other kind of good theistic arguments in that sense.
Speaker: But he thinks once we enter into the more now strictly defined practical world, where we're thinking about how to live, how to act, what to choose, and so on, that an argument can be made from that, within that, not about that, but within that for the rationality of believing that God exists be insofar as it is a necessary presupposition, uh, for that pursuit, for the, pursuit the, the actual rational pursuit of, of morality.
Speaker: And, uh, So what what I suggest in the in the in the article is that there there are three... Well, I'll say one more thing. So we could say that for theoretical moral arguments, we're appealing to ah theoretical reasons related to morality for believing that God exists.
Speaker: In practical moral arguments, we're appealing to practical reasons. And part of the... the interesting ah questions that all of this raises is, you know, what's the relation between those things? And and what can we reasonably conclude from practical reasons about the nature of things?
Speaker: yeah Yeah, because I'm just thinking about, you know, okay, we were talking about practical moral arguments, but you might think, well, what would be just a practical argument in everyday life? Like what would be an analogous type of argument in everyday life? And so you could think, okay, well, something like I'm committed to passing my exam, passing my exam requires studying,
Speaker: Therefore, i have a practical reason to study. Yes. And you might think, okay, that seems like a practical argument where what you're what you end with through that train of reasoning is that you have a certain practical reason. You have a reason to do something, namely study. Yeah.
Speaker: Now, what's tricky is that in the Kantian moral argument, or just in the practical moral argument that we're talking about here, we're talking about a reason to believe God exists So in other words, there's just a little bit of a disanalogy between that example I gave where where the conclusion is I have a practical reason to do an action, namely study, versus I have a practical reason to believe God exists. Anyway, there's a little bit. But anyway, we we don't have to necessarily dive into that right now because I think we'll kind of like return to this kind of issue later on. But um but yeah, I just wanted to. Yeah, no, yeah that's right.
Speaker: And that's that's part of what's interesting about this. um is to to to try to understand where this fits in things. it's it's not So typical theoretical reasons are pretty clean.
Speaker: Oh, yeah. you know Here's the evidence that X exists, et cetera. um And then your example of practical reasons is is pretty clean, too. pain So what Kant is doing is different.
Speaker: and a And again, ah theoretical moral arguments don't do that, don't have that feature. um and and And so what I'm doing actually in this in this article is trying to um tease out what seems to me to be something like what Kant is doing in his practical moral argument in people, in two figures prior to Kant.
Speaker: um who who don't make theoretical moral arguments. Right. ah But they do seem to have something like what Kant is doing. Good. Yeah. Yeah. So let's turn to them a little bit more. good um And I mean, you know, in this vein, you know, okay, it looks like they're doing something, may as we'll see, it looks like they might be doing something a little bit similar to Kant. But on the other hand, there are there are, you know, one crucial thing to put on the table before we get into that is just that Aristotle and Augustine have a very different understanding of morality than Kant.
Speaker: And... um they They kind of understand morality within this kind of broader project of achieving human happiness or flourishing. Eudaimonism is the way it's normally talked about. So yeah, maybe could we just start there? Maybe could you just tell us a little bit about, yeah, they're kind of their you know the understanding of morality and ah Aristotle Augustine and how it kind of brings in happiness as a key key concept. Yeah.
Speaker: Well, one thing to say here is that the reason um the reason that that this sort of approach seems to be appropriate, that this sort of approach to moral arguments that we're talking about, practical moral arguments, seems to be appropriate to Aristotle and Augustine just is that they have this conception of morality, which is a pursuit of of the good, you know, of a flourishing life For Kant, that that's I think that's also true, but that's the second critique, right?
Speaker: um It's not it's not the the the underlying rational basis for holding that certain things are obligatory and certain things are appropriate. Right. So like happiness and flourishing is a factor in Kant's system. it just comes in. just doesn't the same kind of exactly role. Yeah.
Speaker: Okay. And I actually suspect that... and And we can get into this, that there's that um we we might be able to say something similar about Aristotle and Augustine um with respect to eudaimonism.
Speaker: But I'm not absolutely positive about that. but but But again, so there – I'll just mention this, that that that's something that does seem to be true, i mean, that we that that both Aristotle and Augustine share with Kant is this conviction that there is there is a connection between happiness and virtue, even though in Kant it's this sort of idiosyncratic thing that's – And that God is is necessary in some way ah to make that intelligible or make that possible.
Speaker: And then Augustine is actually going to add one more thing, ah a similarity to Kant, and that is the necessity i of immortality to this whole picture. Of course, ah Aristotle doesn't have that view.
Speaker: So... Yeah, so the the the the the classical way of thinking about ethics that really is true ah clear up until the the late Middle Ages is eudaimonism, ethical eudaimonism.
Speaker: The idea that they the shape of the moral life is this pursuit of flourishing ah in in which i as an agent and pursuing what I think is the best possible life, and that involves my flourishing, my my perfection of my nature and all that kind of stuff. Both Aristotle and Augustine view the shape of the moral life in that way, as did all of the classical thinkers.
Speaker: ah And for Kant, he he He rejects that sort of view in terms of what grounds moral obligation and so on. But then again, he returns to to at least the possibility that that this could that such a life could be realized as being a kind of um necessary condition for but the ultimate pursuit of the moral life, of living according to the obligations.
Speaker: that he suggests in a fallen contingent world in which we, we are simply not able in many cases to pull off this sort of thing.
Speaker: So it's like happiness. It's not like Kant thinks it's worthless. it has a role in the system. It's like an important component of the highest good. um But but like I'll just interrupt if I may just keep in mind that ah there's There's a distinction between – we have to be careful with the word happiness.
Speaker: So we just have to keep in mind right right that the contemporary ah understanding of happiness is a kind of superficial feel-good kind of a thing.
Speaker: yeah Yeah, you bring a block in your in your work that it's yeah his conception is a lot more hedonistic. Exactly. It's kind of associated with pleasure, freedom from pain.
Speaker: Yes. um Whereas with if I understand what you you know you were saying in in Aristotle and Augustine, happiness is a lot more like um just flourishing as the kind of being that you are.
Speaker: Um, so, so someone could be very vicious inexperience pleasure and be, and fail to flourish. Yes. Yeah.
Speaker: Yeah. Which sounds kind of nutty to people, you know, on, on the standard contemporary notion of it. But it was just obvious, I think, to classical thinkers, virtually all of them thought of of flourishing, as of happiness.
Speaker: The Greek word is eudaimonia, so that's where we get the word eudaimonism. that therere That whatever else it is, it's it's a typically the the major thinkers would think it's some sort of objectively good life.
Speaker: objectively good life It's not a superficial thing and it's not mere pleasure. In fact, it's morally loaded. It involves living according to to morality, according to moral virtues and so on.
Speaker: So it's a good life in the in the fullest sense. And Aristotle himself, in in Book 1, Chapter 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, says this thing that we're after, we all recognize that we're after,
Speaker: this kind of end, this sumum bonum, this this this chief good that makes sense out of all of our lives. And we all agree that it's called eudaimonia.
Speaker: um Where differences come in between different people and different philosophical schools and everything is ah is in how we cash out what that is in terms of specific conception.
Speaker: and And then he spends the rest of his Nicomachean ethics, you know, kind of laying out what he thinks is the proper way to think about what the ultimate end is, what eudaimonia actually consists in, um and how and how weak we attain it.
Speaker: ah Augustine was also a eudaimonist. He accepted all of that. um His interlocutors were primarily the Stoics.
Speaker: um but it's it's quite similar. His view is quite similar to Aristotle, except in certain key ways. But what's interesting is that he doesn't reject the eudaimonism of the his philosophical interlocutors.
Speaker: What he rejects is that that they're in that they don't follow it through well enough. Their solutions, they're the the substantive views that they arrive at, their substantive conceptions of eudaimonia, fail to satisfy even their own standards.
Speaker: And in in ah in ah kant just Kant's view of happiness, I think, is is basically hedonistic, like law. Yeah. and And interestingly enough, according to John Hare, Kant was the one who who coined the term eudaimonism in derision.
Speaker: um But again, you can you can kind of think of him and on on one level, at least in the second critique, as a kind of eudaimonist. He's doing eudaimonistic things, although they don't they don't really land in in our present um thinking about morality so much as just kind of merely this second order sort of question about the the rationality of the moral life in general.
Speaker: um So I'm kind of curious, how might Aristotle and Augustine, you know, respond to this kind of Kantian objection to eudaimonism? So, you know, something like this, you know, we all know i should not betray an innocent person.
Speaker: Question is why? and you might think the fundamental reason is that doing so would be wrong or violates the moral law. It just seems odd to say that I shouldn't betray the person because it would prevent me from achieving happiness. So yeah, I'm just kind of curious, you know, how what would be, you know, eudomonistic response to that kind of textbook objection? Yeah.
Speaker: Yeah, and and this is, I think, probably the the chief objection to eudaimonism. We could call it the egoism objection. And, you know, how does it make room for concern about other people if it's all kind of about me? in But I think it's interesting to to ask the question, okay, do you think Aristotle it or and Augustine were both of whom are card-carrying eudaimonists,
Speaker: would answer the, you know well, why should I not betray an innocent person? Well, because it you know it would prevent me from achieving my happiness. It's just hard to imagine those guys ever. So it's sort of, I think it's sort of- He's straw man.
Speaker: Yeah, I think it, so whatever else is going on, in eudaimonism, it, you know, I mean, there and I'm sure, so ah let me back up for a second. As Aristotle said, we all agree that it's eudaimonia that we're after.
Speaker: There are a lot of different ways to to spell out what that consists in substantively. Similarly, with eudaimonistic theories, I think,
Speaker: if we if we just have sort of a thin notion of it's this it's this flourishing shaped pursuit of of of the good, et cetera, that there there are different ways to kind of work out the specifics of that. And probably there are egoistic versions ah that you but that one could find. But the but the the main figures here It's just hard to imagine them actually holding this sort of view, right?
Speaker: Now, Nick Woltersdorf is very persuaded by the egoism objection. And so he argues that although Augustine started as a eudaimonist, later in life, he cared about, he he brought into his his ethical reasoning, the the wellbeing of others and everything. So clearly,
Speaker: He rejected eudaimonism and that's a claim that that he's made. But um by far, most Augustine scholars reject that.
Speaker: There's just too much evidence that he was a eudaimonist all the way through his life, ah which I think implies that he, you know, Augustine didn't see that as a problem.
Speaker: because he had a different view of eudaimonism. So I guess what I would say is that eudaimonism is a view about the shape of the moral life and kind of what it's about and what it's for.
Speaker: It's a teleological shape. It's about the good. But then when we try to figure out, okay, what is the good and does it include other people?
Speaker: And what is it grounded in? And does it include, does it entail moral obligations and so on? Those are all questions that are not answered simply by the fact of the shape of the moral life, right?
Speaker: um There might be egoists, but there don't need to be egoists. And Jennifer Hurt from Yale has written in an important newish book called Ecstatic Eudaimonism.
Speaker: And she distinguishes between what she calls welfare prior eudaimonism and goodness prior eudaimonism. welfare prior eudaimonism would be the kind of thing that we're worried about here.
Speaker: That what makes actions, um the what's driving the boat is my well-being. um But she says all of the classical thinkers, pagan and Christians, ah held to a goodness prior, that they saw the the goodness that they're after, the goodness of the life that they're they're seeking, they're pursuing,
Speaker: um as the good. and it's it's grounded And it's grounded in the nature of things. It's grounded in God, whatever. um And that's why it's good for me to pursue it.
Speaker: It's not good because it's good for me. um right My welfare supervenes on the goodness itself, which is independently specifiable and grounded in other things.
Speaker: And so that's why i said earlier, I think there's probably something similar to Kant's distinction here that I don't think... so modern So modern theories typically, Julie Annis argues this, modern ethical theories tend to be what she calls scientific in the sense that they they they they take whatever is the the fundamental moral concept and like consequences for consequentialist. And then they try to derive everything else from that, all other concepts, all obligations, et cetera, et cetera.
Speaker: And the classical theories don't really want to do that. There is a structure. there There are things that are basic, but everything else is not necessarily derived from that. And I think in particularly in ah in know one instance would be what are the right-making properties or wrong-making properties of actions, they they simply didn't think those um were entailed or derived from the pursuit of happiness.
Speaker: um And in in the case of of, I mean, Aristotle thought there were moral obligations. He didn't really talk about him as such, but he clearly thinks certain things are objectively wrong.
Speaker: is no consequentialist. And Augustine, you know, holds in the moral, he holds to the moral law. So they were not deriving all their normative stuff from the shape of the moral life.
Speaker: And so i so I said earlier, I think maybe something kind of like Kant is is here, you know, or is at least open to a edimonist that moral obligations and so on,
Speaker: um ah arise from the good itself. And it's not merely that I'm pursuing the good that makes those things obligatory.
Speaker: ah But that pursuit makes sense out of my pursuit of morality, however it's ultimately grounded. Maybe we can look more squarely at um the kind of arguments that you extract from Aristotle and Augustine, um these practical moral arguments that you extract from them. and And you're clear in your work that, you know, these are implicit in the text. In other words, as you read Aristotle and Augustine, they contain all the relevant kind of philosophical material. They, you know, uh,
Speaker: they kind of establish or they presuppose some kind of important relationship between morality and God. They maybe don't explicitly conclude that we should believe in God on that basis. But your point is that the materials, um the material for for that type of argument is all there. And um and so maybe we could first go to Aristotle.
Speaker: And yeah, i I mean, it seems like basically what's going on with Aristotle is that he has the thought of like, we pursue happiness, happiness requires God.
Speaker: And he could have maybe drawn the conclusion that we should believe God exists because we pursue happiness and happiness requires God. Um, So, yeah, maybe we could just start with in the context of Aristotle, um you know maybe what is happiness and why and why would why does happiness require God in Aristotle's thinking?
Speaker: that this I find the structure of what Aristotle's doing ah interesting and it's also central to this whole argument because Aristotle starts the Nicomachean ethics in a way that you know, modern ethical texts don't start. Usually they're they're defining terms or they're using moral dilemmas or something like that.
Speaker: And Aristotle starts with ah the nature of rational human action, that it's indirect. In other words, we we we think about what to do and we and we do it, we choose things because we think there's a point to them. There's a telos, there's a good that that we're after here.
Speaker: And then the whole rest of the book is is kind of now unpacking the implications of that. So rational action is teleological in structure. It's indirected and there are these you know nested hierarchies of ends and so on.
Speaker: And it it points, it it it it's it's it's what i what I call a teleological train. it it's It starts moving toward an end ah that is able to rationally and motivationally ground the actions that are done for the sake of that end.
Speaker: And right at the at the at the the end of the the very beginning there, he says, now, if there is some sort of end that we choose for its own sake and not for the sake of other things and so on, otherwise we would just be going on to infinity, that whatever that is, that's going to be the chief good.
Speaker: um And then he, for several chapters, he continues to to talk talk about different things. And then he eventually starts clarifying certain, what I call and others call, formal constraints.
Speaker: Now, these are the things that whatever that end is like, it's going to have to be like this. And the the two formal constraints that I identify, and in many people do. First of all, it's a completeness condition. And secondly, a sufficiency condition.
Speaker: And so in in Book 1, Chapter 7, I'll read from this. He says... um Our argument then has arrived at the same point by different root from what he'd just been talking about, but we should try to make it still clearer.
Speaker: um Since there appear to be several ends, teloi, telos means is end, and some of these, such as wealth, flutes, and implements generally, we choose as means to other ends, it is clear that not all ends are complete.
Speaker: The word there is teleon. So endish. But the chief good manifestly is something complete. So if there's only one end that is complete, this will be what we're looking for. And if there are several of them, it will be the most complete, the tele-atetad. Yeah.
Speaker: yeah um We speak of that which is worth pursuing for its own sake as more complete than that which is worth pursuing only for the sake of something else, and that which is never worth choosing for the sake of something else as more complete than the things that are worth choosing both in themselves and for the sake of this end. And so now...
Speaker: That which is always worth choosing in itself and never for the sake of something else, we call complete without qualification, full stop. Eudaimonia, in particular, is believed to be complete without qualification. It's not something that we seek for the sake of anything else.
Speaker: Even what, and he goes on to talk about virtues, even things that we choose for their own sake, we also choose for the sake of, well, these are part of a flourishing life. So the the idea is that once we start on this teleological train, we start moving toward a a kind of end that is not followed by other ends. It's it's sufficient.
Speaker: excuse me it's It's endish enough to stop moving. the, the, the journey. Yeah. You're not pursuing it as a means to something else. Exactly.
Speaker: And, um, and, and, and, and so there, what he's doing, I think is teasing out the intuitive kind of rational rationality of, of teleology here.
Speaker: This is where it's going ineluctably, right? Right. And so if we're going to find out whatever the chief good is, we're going to have to take it to the end. and And whatever that chief good is, it's going to be something we're not doing for the sake of something else or choosing for the sake of something else, just for its own sake.
Speaker: And then the second sufficient or the second formal criterion is the sufficiency criterion, which he turns to next, which is... There's a lot of debate over what that actually is, but the intuition seems to be that it's enough.
Speaker: We're not looking for any more. We don't need any more motivation, you know, to to do stuff. This, this settles it kind of thing. If you have it, there's, it's if you have it, then there's nothing further, nothing else you would need for a fully satisfactory life. Yes.
Speaker: And I think built into that, as you as you just articulated, is is a kind of the motivational component. so there's ah there's ah a rational component in the sense of things are ungrounded, you know, until they get to the to that what's most complete.
Speaker: But there's also built into Aristotle that that this these choices are are motivated choices. they're They're things that we're after, that we desire, right?
Speaker: And this ultimate end is going to satisfy it's going to it's going to yeah satisfy those desires. it's goingnna It's going to be enough. Now, Aristotle says eudaimonia is that sort of thing, too. So eudaimonia is the thing.
Speaker: But, of course, these are just formal criteria. They don't tell us what eudaimonia actually is. they just But they do rule out certain claimants. He thinks hedonism is ruled out because it's not endish enough.
Speaker: He thinks that wealth is ruled out and so on. So these are common views of the good life, but he says, you know, and this is a little more controversial, but I think it's the right interpretation that if we're going to, if we're going to identify, ah true eudaimonia, true flourishing, we're going to have to appeal, not just a formal criteria, but to, um, metaphysical, more substantive criteria.
Speaker: And, um and And he starts talking about human nature and kind of presupposing a lot of what he talks about in De Anima, his treatise on the soul.
Speaker: And then he concludes um that, ah you know, in that context, that this all has us reach a certain kind of life
Speaker: He says the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. That's the kind of life that is a flourishing life. And in his view is that it is a kind of life. It's not a state of affairs or something like that that can be maximized. It's like it's ah it's living a certain sort of life that's realizing human nature fully, that's fully complete, fully sufficient.
Speaker: um Now it's in this sufficiency condition that objections start arising from like Stoics because Aristotle seems to include ah in his view of what eudaimene is, oh, by the way, you need to have a certain amount of external goods. and you You need to be good looking, he says, and you can't be ugly and and so on.
Speaker: These are sort of commonsensical things about a flourishing life But now they introduce a kind of contingency, dependence on fortune and so on which Terry Irwin calls ah so instability now in the system.
Speaker: And the Stoics agree with... with the first condition and they agree with the second condition, but they say Aristotle bailed out too soon because he's he's holding, it's not really sufficient because he's holding eudaimonia ah hostage to fortune.
Speaker: And so it can't be held hostage to external goods or anything like that. And so that's that's one division now in the in in in the history.
Speaker: And Augustine's going to come back to that. And then just ah just to more quickly ah make the God connection here. In Book 10, his final book in the Nicomé-Kinney Ethics, Aristotle seems to make a new a new move, startling move that is know many dissertations are written about.
Speaker: But whereas he's emphasized moral virtue now, because he's he said, you know, this is the good this is the human good human life is one lived according to virtue. So let's talk about what the virtues are.
Speaker: So he gives all this account about what the moral virtues are and the theoretical virtues. And then here at the end, he says, but actually the kind of virtue that that's most important is intellectual virtue.
Speaker: The kind of activity that's most important is contemplation of the highest things. And the highest things are God or the gods. And so true human flourishing, full human flourishing, most complete human flourishing is going to be...
Speaker: ah contemplation of god ah doing what god does or the gods do uh sharing in that sort of of life because there is not just human nature we have a divine element in us which we share the god so he's he's continuing the teleological form of reasoning uh But now it's taking him into into theological territory.
Speaker: And so, again, that it's it's a very implicit argument. But he's he's saying that the ultimate grounding here of this whole picture of of what not only the whole metaphysical picture that he has, but what happiness is, what true human happiness is, it's engaging with right?
Speaker: yeah It's contemplating God. And so it's it's not a an unwarranted inference to say, oh and so, you know, if you really want to ground the the full pursuit of of true human flourishing, you know, that involves God. So you have reason to believe in God.
Speaker: Good. So it's like the argument, the kind of implicit argument in Aristotle, you know, it would begin with human practical reason, the fact that it's directed toward ends and this, these kind of chain of ends would seem to point in the direction of some kind of ultimate end.
Speaker: And then we get this, like these two formal conditions that you just kind of pointed out related or you pointed out like regarding um what this ultimate end would be happiness you know should be complete it should be self-sufficient then we like you said we kind of get stuff related to human nature he starts investigating human nature he starts thinking of humans as distinctively rational and that leads to the what's a little bit of a surprising development in the text, but it leads kind of to the idea that our highest activity is, you know, using our rational capacity in its highest way, which would be, i guess, contemplation.
Speaker: So anyway, so it's, so it it ends up looking like the ultimate destination of our practical activity is contemplation. And it turns out that contemplation has this divine element, or at least it in terms of its object, I guess, it's ah the best thing to contemplate is is God or the gods maybe. um And so, yeah, so if our end is fundamentally related to divine reality, that seems like it's going to provide the materials for a practical moral argument.
Speaker: um So yeah, can you just just emphasize that and that and that point right there? like So how exactly does this add up to a practical moral argument?
Speaker: Well, I guess I would say, ah so let's distinguish it between theoretical and practical versions of it. So we could, I think we could make a theoretical moral argument in a way for Aristotle.
Speaker: Maybe. i'm I'm just, I'm just thinking i'll all out loud here, but. Yeah, I think I see where you're going. Yeah, yeah. But um say, well, look, if we examine the conditions of morality understood in a eudaimonistic way,
Speaker: um We see it it's ultimately ah ah Aristotle is presupposing the existence of God as kind of the ultimate guarantor of all this kind of stuff.
Speaker: and And so, and of course, he elsewhere, although it's it's not huge, and but a number of people have made the argument that he's it is is is his ultimate metaphysical vision is broadly speaking, theistic, I mean, he's, or theological, put it that way. um and And so his his explanation of of why morality works, or you know or the ultimate metaphysical bases or ontological bases of morality are are theological or something like that.
Speaker: So, but his, mean, But he you know and he doesn't make that specific sort of claim, but I think you could. you could ah But that would be a theoretical argument.
Speaker: So I'm thinking of this as a practical argument kind of along the lines of Kant. Okay. So in in practical moral arguments, one of the features of them has to be that not that we're thinking about morality so much as we're thinking in morality. Okay. If we are committed to the project, okay,
Speaker: Presupposing that we're committed there and we're trying to think now from within the practical frame, as it were, um what have we reasons to do? um Well, one is to think about, okay, what what can make it sensible to be pursuing morality despite all of the ah hindrances and challenges and and everything else?
Speaker: Well, that it makes sense that it's actually a coherent sort of that that the end that we're after is possible and well grounded. That makes the whole thing intelligible.
Speaker: And so if Aristotle were making a practical moral argument, it would be something like, well, you see that what we're committed to, as soon as we start acting, we're committed to getting on a teleological train, the destination of which must be sufficient and and complete, that it's the it's the fulfillment of of our natures and and actually, know,
Speaker: um It makes sense out of all of reality. And so it's possible. it's it's the The good makes sense. It's intelligible.
Speaker: And that includes belief. That includes the existence of God. And so we have reason insofar as we are committed to morality. to to hold to the existence of God. I have a question about the question related to practical moral arguments in general. And so I was kind of thinking of an analogy where, you know, suppose I have a friend who goes into the forest, he gets lost, ah he's gone for three days, and suppose I'm committed to rescuing him.
Speaker: um So it seems like, I can only succeed in rescuing him if he's alive. So he's got to be alive for me to succeed in rescuing him.
Speaker: Similarly, you know, we might say for me to have highest contemplation, God must exist. We might, we might grant that to Aristotle. Um, now,
Speaker: the The only thing is that, so one issue is that like, if I think it's very unlikely that he is alive, it would still be rational for me to pursue rescuing him, right? I might think there's a 5% chance he's alive.
Speaker: And that doesn't make it irrational to try to rescue my friend in the forest. So similarly, you might think, okay, this argument would or these materials would show that um I should think that there's like some at least some likelihood that God exists. Otherwise, don't But it wouldn't. Anyway, I guess my point is like, it doesn't seem like it would be. your i could be committed to practical action.
Speaker: i could committed to pursuing happiness and just think there's some minimal chance that God exists, even if it's not likely. i don't know. Is it, am i making sense here? sorry yeah I feel like I've made it more complicated than needed to be. no lets but Yeah. So that's, I mean, this is, this is why this whole area of, you know, we're teasing out the nature of practical rationality and how it relates to other beliefs and so on. And it's, it's very interesting and I'm not, I'm not at all convinced that I, ah i have it figured out by any stretch.
Speaker: Um, so, but for one thing I would say is, well, I'll, I'll come back to that. But, um, first of all, let's think about the D about disanalogy here.
Speaker: So, uh, you know, your example is of a ah kind of, um, simple example about the existence of some, someone right in, in this case.
Speaker: um And it's an important one, though, to you very much, you know, and and and so whether or not he is alive is is really an important thing and and it's guiding your action.
Speaker: And in you do have to you have to believe that it's possible that he's alive. If you know he isn't, then it doesn't make any sense. Yeah, if I think it's a 0% chance that he's alive, yeah it doesn't make sense to go seeking to rescue him. Obviously, it would make sense to find his body and bury it. But if we're talking about rescuing someone, yeah that aim would not make sense if I thought, okay, definitely he's not alive. Yeah. And and Aristotle himself says we don't wish for things that are impossible. Right.
Speaker: You know, we that that that's not in the practical rationality lexicon. Interesting. It has to be possible.
Speaker: It also has to be somewhat in our our power. Right. And of course, you know, in in your case, rescuing somebody, that is something you can do. You can't, it's not like, um you know, trying to make it the case that there are more planets than there are or something like that.
Speaker: um But it's, ah and it just seems exactly right. Your analysis of it seems right to me. um Then the question is, okay, is this is this case sufficiently analogous to that?
Speaker: right And so one thing that would certainly be different ah is that we're talking about um the something that we're all that, by the way, this, this one one of the things that makes it interesting here is that this kind of puts us in the area of William James and so on in terms of forced choices and things like that.
Speaker: It seems to me that, but But the moral life is something that we all have to deal with. um And so then the question is, okay, and and and and many people choose the moral life. They choose to live according to morality without having any ah thought about any sort of rational justification for that pursuit.
Speaker: And in I'm grateful that they do want to pursue pursue morality rather than the other. I i certainly don't want to you know argue them out of it. So this is this is um This is not that, right?
Speaker: It's okay. Now let's think about the rationality of it. Now in your case, it's rational for you to pursue finding this guy if there's any chance that he's he's alive until until his body's found, et cetera, up to some point.
Speaker: then the But of the way, the But the the choice to to to pursue the moral life is something that is a pervasive feature of everybody's life. It's unavoidable in William James's book.
Speaker: ah thing. And so really, i think what Aristotle, what all these guys probably would which say is that the conclusion is a dilemma. you know Either there' this this person if if we're kind if you're pursuing if you're committed to the pursuit, that's why that's a necessary necessary condition for ah for a practical moral argument.
Speaker: You're committed to the pursuit of the moral life then it's either grounded or not. It's either rationally grounded, ultimately motivationally grounded or not.
Speaker: And if you think it's not grounded, there's no justification for it. You might still pursue it. I don't think I'd call it a rational pursuit, but again, I'm i'm glad you're pursuing it um that So this is where the interesting thing is, a you know,
Speaker: At what point does or how should we think about evaluating the rationality of something in these cases? Now, I think you may have mentioned the word hope may be more appropriate to what you' what you have for your friend, your hope your friend exists. And Kant...
Speaker: uses the word hope sometimes. And so in this volume that we're talking about, a Kant scholar, Kyla Ebels Dugan, spells out Kant's argument in terms of hope.
Speaker: And she she focuses on kind of um certain elements of it, but... The contrast is between ah between despair and hope.
Speaker: And so some some people like Bernard Williams, who was my teacher, um he just doesn't think the moral life makes any sense at the end of the day. It's not ultimately coherent.
Speaker: um Virtue and happiness and are not going to converge. ah It's absurd. ah And that's just the way it is.
Speaker: He'd probably agree that if God existed, it wouldn't be absurd. But he doesn't think God exists. So. um That's the despair option. Right.
Speaker: Kant seems to be wanting to say, well, yeah, you can you can live that way, he might say. ah But if you're going to be fully rational, you need to think about what's required in order for it to be fully rational.
Speaker: And you have to have a rational hope that that's the case or a rational faith that that's the case. And again, it's kind of hard to know what he means when he says, believe that God exists. You know, is that is that sort of lesser...
Speaker: Weaker epistemic attitude, what he's talking about, than believing, you know, the the regular, typical, factual believing, which comes on the basis of theoretical reason. I think it is weaker than the question is, how weak is it?
Speaker: Yeah. Yeah, no, it definitely seems pretty clear to me that to go seek my friend, to to attempt to rescue my friend in the forest, I must at least think that it's possible that he's alive.
Speaker: So at the very least, if we accept the premises of the the kind of Aristotelian style practical moral argument, it seems like at the very least we could conclude that you must think um God possibly exists. Yes.
Speaker: exists that or that that rationality requires that God, in order in order to be rationally committed to practical action, if all that is right, then you must think it's possible that God exists.
Speaker: um And probably you need to hope that Because, you know, yeah, there's a difference between thinking i think something's possible and I hope in it.
Speaker: Because obviously hope is like a positive, like I want it to be realized. but But yeah, I mean, that seems clear to me as well that in this case it would also...
Speaker: show that in order to be rational you would have to hope that God exists um anyway yeah so those definitely that seems clear i guess yeah then it's like the question is you know moving potentially we're talking about like you said something a little bit stronger when we're talking about it being rationally required to believe God exists if you're committed to practical action um When what Kant says, you're morally required.
Speaker: um Again, it's within the moral pursuit. And, you know, again, and I think here's where the word faith might be what he's trying to get at, because faith would imply a kind of commitment.
Speaker: And so it's not a kind of mere, well, you know, I've added up the the reasons on both sides. i think God exists. But there's a kind of commitment yeah involved. And it's either grounded or it isn't.
Speaker: And I would also say that in the case of of Aristotle's picture, there are even within the practical sphere, but it it gets richer when we add the theoretical sphere.
Speaker: But even within the practical sphere, this this whole teleological structure of things seems to make sense. You know, and it has it has something going for it.
Speaker: It makes sense of how we act and how we choose and so on. And then if you can add theoretical stuff in there that like it makes sense out of our natures and the conditions for flourishing of of our natures and all that kind of stuff, then this is ah this is a broader framework of thought that adds to the credibility of of this choice. It's not just like, oh, you know, there's this, I have to believe that there's this green Martian exists in order to rationally ground this this whole thing that I want.
Speaker: No, it's this whole thing that I want makes sense out of, you know, it's not just what I want. It makes sense out of so many things.
Speaker: um and And so it's not a mere, okay, y'all, i'll I'll believe that the green Martian exists. Excellent. Well, I mean, at this point, maybe we could shift a little bit to Augustine because that's the other thinker you you you treat in this, um, this recent work of yours. So, um, yeah, like, like the idea is that he, like Aristotle is also giving a kind of practical moral argument, even if it's implicit. Now you think it's a little bit more explicit than, than Aristotle's, but, um,
Speaker: But we can leave that aside for now. But at any rate, yeah, how if you had to just kind of give an overview of Augustine's argument, how would you summarize it? Yeah, well, ah I can't ah can't resist throwing in the the line in my article, which I thought was pretty good about ah arguments like movies are some arguments like some movies are more explicit than others. yeah So, um but yeah, there's a range.
Speaker: So i put I put Aristotle in the more implicit end because he doesn't actually give, you know, theistic or theological arguments very clearly. Whereas Augustine obviously does.
Speaker: and So it's it's it's it's pretty obvious obvious that he would be comfortable with something like that, I think. And he actually does, at the end of the article, I i point out where he does make something like that.
Speaker: A movement from the pot from happiness to belief in God. but Okay, so we can we can just build on what we've talked about with with Aristotle here a bit.
Speaker: um So Augustine comes, you know, 700 years later, his his primary interlocutors are the Stoics, who are also eudaimonists, but they reject certain aspects of of Aristotle related to the sufficiency condition.
Speaker: And so Augustine kind of starts there. And um i I think a a nice summary of his of his reasoning, I mean, this this is all over his stuff. And of course, he was a massive thinker with just so much.
Speaker: um But in in The City of God, Book 10, he says, God himself is the fountain of our happiness.
Speaker: He himself is the end of all our longing. We strive toward him by love, so that by attaining him, we might rest, happy because we are perfected by him who is our end.
Speaker: Thus our good, the end which is extensively disputed among the philosophers, is nothing other than to cling to him, only in his immaterial embrace, if we may so speak.
Speaker: Is the intellectual soul filled and made fruitful with true virtues? Now, we can see several things that are distinctive about his view. um Obviously, he he thinks he's very explicit that God is the fountain of our happiness. He's he's what we're after.
Speaker: He's the end of all our longings. So he's he's he's including in here this kind of motivational component ah to to our teleological reasoning, but emphasizing it A longing, we strive toward him by love. And that adds in a relational element that's not in Aristotle.
Speaker: ah Because and so unlike Aristotle, where God is sort of the object of our highest power, um for Augustine, God is the subject. he is he is it it is union with him that we're after.
Speaker: And so it's relational and effective. And so and there's so it's a lot of that good stuff in in Augustine. ah And then he says, so that by attaining him in him, we might rest. So that's that's kind of a Neoplatonic theme.
Speaker: And famously, in the beginning of the Confessions, he says, you have made us for yourself, O God, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in you.
Speaker: and And so this... this element of rest, of kind of peace, of tranquility that we see in Augustine, that's much more emphasized by the Stoics, not by Aristotle.
Speaker: um we are happy because we are perfected by him. So that's an appeal to our nature. we're we're our But also that God is the one, it's it's a gift, he's perfecting us.
Speaker: um Our good, the end, which is extensively disputed among philosophers, is nothing other than to cling to him. And his the verse he he appeals to here with is in Psalm 73, which,
Speaker: um Which is, you know, the nearness of God is my good that this did or in earlier translations, my good is to cling to God.
Speaker: so And so anyway, all that stuff is is now front and center for for Augustine. But again, notice that this is a teleological thing. This is what we're after. The God is the end.
Speaker: Now, Augustine agrees with ah with Aristotle on the two formal conditions. the the The completeness one, he you know he says that it's it's it's a final good.
Speaker: after which we we we don't need anything else. And same with the sufficiency condition. Now, here's where it where he he differs, though. In early Augustine, he follows the Stoics and thing in in not leaving any feature of happiness to be contingent upon fortune or good you know luck or anything like that, external goods.
Speaker: um But later in his thought, he comes to see actually those goods are real goods and they're part of a flourishing life. So he, in a sense, agrees with Aristotle later.
Speaker: But at the same time, he doesn't he strongly affirms the the stoic um notion that whatever happiness is, it cannot, as Augustine puts it, cannot be taken away against our will.
Speaker: It has to be firm and solid and not contingent in any way. And so by adding in back in this kind of Aristotelian point about external goods, it seems like he's now going to be subject to the same instability as Aristotle.
Speaker: But he says, no, actually what's what we do long for those things, those things are part of what we long for, and they can only be realized in an afterlife. And so it's on this basis that he says,
Speaker: that only the properly ordered goods can be enjoyed in an afterlife with God. Also, only the only possibility of true virtue is going to be there because we or live in a fallen condition.
Speaker: we We face temptations and distractions and ah harassment and, you know, various kinds of evil in this life. So kind of like Kant, you know, that that's only going to be, we're only going to be able to be truly, fully virtuous in the afterlife. So he like Aristotle, I think that's important, but it's only realizable in union with God in the afterlife.
Speaker: So one question that comes up for me here is, I'm not sure how to articulate this, but like what ultimately is the ultimate good in Augustine then? Is it cleaving to God or is it these various goods or...
Speaker: or such as virtue, for example. I'm just wondering, like, is it like we want virtue because it's necessary in order to cleave to God? Like you can't and you can't ultimately kind of unite with God without the virtues?
Speaker: Or, don't know, is does my question make sense? Yeah, sure. It's like I could see how virtue might be understood as and like an instrumental thing.
Speaker: instrumentally necessary in order to cleave to God because God is holy and maybe will only allow cleaving if you're virtuous. But it seems like in that situation, then virtue is not the ultimate good.
Speaker: Anyway. Yeah. Well, I think you're right. The the virtue for for Augustine is not the ultimate good. So, but yeah, exactly how we, we we so again, with with Aristotle, the ultimate good is a kind of life.
Speaker: It's a virtuous life. And the fullest realization of that involves the theoretical virtue ah of contemplation.
Speaker: Well, ah Sophia, which is expressed in the contemplation of of the highest being, highest goodness God. So it's about a kind of life specifically.
Speaker: For Augustine, it's... it's The emphasis is on God Himself as the good, which we enjoy in union with Him.
Speaker: And part of that is going to be the fullest expression, I think, of our natures in virtue and and and so on. but it also Properly ordered goods and all of that kind of stuff. So it's ah it's a kind of, relate it's a i don't think it's a kind of life so much, although that involves a kind of life.
Speaker: It's a kind of state of union and relationship. That is also a kind of life. um and and and And I think maybe I don't think it's it's all that clear.
Speaker: Now, when we get to Aquinas, he wants to say he wants to combine these two things and say, well, happiness is a kind of life. Yeah, it's the you know, this is the Aristotelian thing.
Speaker: It's the fulfillment of of our nature as human beings, fully expressed, etc. And ah the end of the teleological train is ultimately the good God.
Speaker: And so he he makes a distinction, I can't really remember exactly how he puts it, between that in which happiness consists, which is God,
Speaker: And the realization of the happy life in relation to that, which is living a virtuous life kind of thing.
Speaker: That's Aristotle. The latter is Aristotle. the The former is Augustine. I think it's a little um ambiguous in in Augustine, but the emphasis is clearly that the that that in which happiness consists is God.
Speaker: We can't stop till we get to God. And this is more platonic. probably, that God is, that everything that is good is good insofar as it participates, and although that's not absent from Aristotle completely.
Speaker: But ah that's that that's the the impulse of the teleological train, which, whereas in Aristotle, the teleological train sort of ends in my contemplation, but my contemplation presupposes the the finest object of contemplation.
Speaker: Because in Aristotle, powers, capacities are denominated by their objects. So, you know, it's it's it's object to power to understand it.
Speaker: um and And that's why it's presupposed. it's It's not coherent otherwise. What would you want to say in terms of, you know, ultimately the differences between the type of implicit practical argument, implicit practical moral argument and Augustine and Aristotle? What would what what kind of key differences would you want to highlight there?
Speaker: Morality is pointing toward a person in a relationship with a person for Augustine. um And and and it it it makes, by the way, great room for considerations of others, um at least in in the the later era, Augustine.
Speaker: So at the at the, you know, in in book 19, of the city of God, he he has this beautiful description of ultimate happiness in the heavenly city. He says, it's one of a perfectly ordered and completely harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God and of each other in God.
Speaker: The peace of the whole universe is the tranquility of order. So you can kind of hear the stoic stuff there, but it's broader than just my tranquility. it's ah It's a, it's a,
Speaker: It's a ah communal vision. Now, we don't have that in in Aristotle. We do have concern for others, but you have to work, you know, to figure out how how that fits. Right. And it's, course, not very sacrificial or anything like that.
Speaker: ah So so that that's different. This picture of what happiness is. um Also, the the immortality thing, the immortality.
Speaker: You know, and again, Augustine is saying, this is where the teleological train ends. Yeah, you Stoics got mad at Aristotle for for jumping off the train too soon. Well, you jumped off the train too soon also.
Speaker: Here's where it goes all the way. And um yeah, I guess those would be the the the kind of differences I would emphasize. Yeah, that point about Augustine's vision of happiness being fundamentally relational and how it creates room for other persons, I find that really, really interesting. I mean, I guess it kind of makes me think like, you know, would...
Speaker: would um Would Augustine say that loving other person is genuinely good in itself and not merely because it brings me closer to God? It's kind of a question that... Yeah. Well, I think early on, he he held a view somewhat like that in his use in joy distinction.
Speaker: that that God is to be enjoyed, that is, love for his own sake, and everything else is to be used, that is, love for the sake of some other end, ultimately God.
Speaker: God, ultimately, you you should never use, you should only enjoy. And he does talk about, you know, using your neighbor. um But he later, as as I just mentioned, you know, in that vision of heaven,
Speaker: It's enjoying God and enjoying your neighbor in God. So, you know, his his ethics is is often characterized as ah as an ordering of loves, order amoris.
Speaker: um Yeah, we got to keep the order straight. But my impression is that the later Augustine does think we are, enjoying i mean, if you're enjoying your neighbor, you're actually enjoying him for his own sake and in his view, ah for the sake of God.
Speaker: And you obviously should never omit the last, but you shouldn't omit the former either, I think he would say in the later Augustine. And so it's interesting to think that this teleology, you know, that's all bound up with the teleology, right? The use and joy distinction.
Speaker: um And so he's been he's been working out what this involves. And so in his earlier thought, the teleology would sort of seem to push him to think the only one we enjoy is God, period.
Speaker: Everything else is to be used. But later um comes to the conclusion that that's not entailed by the teleology, that a broader teleological approach is is possible and makes more sense.
Speaker: Fascinating. Well, um and we've obviously only managed to scratch the surface here. I hope, yeah, I really highly recommend the article, Aristotle and Augustine on God and Happiness. It's, ah like I said, it's in the collection from Oxford University Press, Moral Arguments for God's Existence. Yeah, so thanks so much for coming on, David.
Speaker: You're welcome. It's great to be with you.



