Transcript
Speaker: Welcome back to the Dynasties Circle Podcast. This episode is with philosopher Jacob Yerza, whose new book is The Function Argument in Aristotle's Ethics, Happiness, and the Human Good.
Speaker: So in this episode, we talk about the so-called function argument in both Plato and Aristotle. The basic idea of the argument is something like this, that when we want to know whether something is good, we often ask what kind of thing it is and what its characteristic work or activity is. So for example, a good knife cuts well. A good eye sees well. A good flute player plays the flute well.
Speaker: And then Aristotle basically applies this pattern to human beings. If there is a characteristic human activity, or ergon, then the human good should consist in performing that activity well.
Speaker: And so basically that leads him to connect happiness with the excellent exercise of um human capacities which are distinctive to us. And so, Years' book follows this argument from Plato's Republic through Aristotle's Protrepticus, his Eudemian ethics, and, of course, the Nicomachean ethics. And, you know, in this conversation, we discuss what ergon means, how it relates to virtue, whether human beings really have a function... and other topics like that. So I began the conversation by asking Jacob what he takes to be the heart of Aristotle's ethics. I hope you enjoy the conversation.
Speaker: Well, ah philosophers love these general questions, truly. But wait, okay. um I guess that many people would say that it's virtue because concerning Aristotle we usually speak about virtue ethics.
Speaker: Some people would say that it's a human flourishing, happiness, some kind of a full development of human nature perhaps. And some philosophers or some interpreters might go for the maxim becoming like God, becoming as similar to divine as possible.
Speaker: However, I try to understand this core always as a core problem which Aristotle addresses and that for me would be the relation between the theoretical and the practical aspect of our nature, of what it means to be a human being. Basically the relation between the practical side of our lives and the theoretical capacity of reason which we have as well.
Speaker: in your work, you're really sensitive to like the, that the human being has different parts, there's different dimensions to us. And so it seems like certain parts of us sort of pull in a practical direction.
Speaker: And then certain other parts of the human being, of the nature of the human being, kind of pull more toward a purely theoretical activity. um Yes, you are right, Sam. so So I guess the core problem, perhaps, or how to put it, ah
Speaker: if I put it simply, it would be much easier not to have the theoretical reason in a certain way. That would definitely be a much easier situation for us to be in. But yeah but we see we are not, and we have to figure out what then is the role of the practicalry of the theoretical reason in our everyday actions, how they you know how those two aspects come together.
Speaker: And it's part of ongoing ancient debate um Aristotle's Protrepticus, about which we are going to talk later as well, I guess, ah is exactly written as a defense of theoretical theoretical philosophy, you know, to counter arguments or to go against arguments which call theoretical philosophy, perhaps metaphysics and so on, a completely useless endeavor, you know, a nice practice when you are young, but an adult human being should give it up.
Speaker: and go and devote himself ah to more practical issues. And I think that this is actually nicely depicted in the lines of the so-called Ergon argument in the Necomachian ethics, where basically when Aristotle wants to say what is the Ergon of a human being, he says, well, now we are left with a living of doing, practical, with a kind of a practical living based on the rational part of us.
Speaker: you know And that means, according to him, the part that's responsive to reason as well the part that possesses reason. That doesn't matter for a while. But this specification of human ergon entails this core problem, which basically has to be investigated further.
Speaker: What does it mean to live a practical life based on the reason? Okay, so this core problem of of, you know, how to understand the relation between practical life and theoretical reason, you think that core problem is is like importantly related to what people call the Aragon argument, and which is you know, is the name, sorry, is the kind of the focus of the book that we're that you've just risked that you just wrote and that we're kind of talking about today. So basically,
Speaker: um in both plato and aristotle we have something that that one might want to call the function argument or the aragon argument um in plato it appears in book one of the republic in in aristotle appears in a few different places um most famously i guess the nicomachean ethics um but um book one of the Nicomachean ethics, but it also appears in the Protrepticus and, uh, Eudemian ethics. So anyway, we have this idea of this, this Aragon argument. And so you think it's, you know, importantly related to this core problem. I mean, um, I guess it's, is it a way is basically the Aragon argument? I know we'll describe what it is in a second, but is it kind of a way to, to, to find out, you know, is the human good,
Speaker: found mainly in a sort of practical activity or maybe instead in a theoretical activity or maybe some kind of blend of the two or um good points several good points and and definitely a good problem to discuss uh i don't think that the ergon argument per se gives a solution to these questions you raised As you said, it is found in several writings, both in Plato and in Aristotle. um
Speaker: Perhaps I focus more on the three occurrences in Aristotle, in the Protrepticus, the Udemian and the Nicomachianetics. And indeed, in each three of them,
Speaker: I do believe that it plays a specific role or basically it it plays a certain role in the in the overall argumentation of the text, but it can be used to produce different conclusions, so to say, exactly different conclusions about this particular way how to relate the practical and theoretical in Aristotle's work. So famously, Eudemian and Nicomachian Ethics differs in that subject, we might come to it later. And then Protrepticus has yet another way how to approach these things. But yes, you are right, in all of those writings, the erragon argument the so-called ergon argument or function argument appears.
Speaker: Good. Okay. And maybe we could just, um yeah, before kind of like analyzing
Speaker: each argument and also kind of describing what you see as the sort of um overarching commonality between all of them, um Basically, one of the key ideas in your book is that like the Aragon argument for Aristotle is really the way he moves from a more like formal discussion of various ethical concepts to something much more substantial um in his ethical theory. And yeah, so before we get kind of into all that, I was thinking maybe just to we could try to give a little bit of a sense for the listeners, you know,
Speaker: um I agree. What exactly the Aragon argument might, like how it works or how it plays out. So like, I was just thinking like, just really quick, like in book one of the Republic, basically you have a situation where Socrates, he's arguing with Thrasymachus about whether justice or injustice is the better way of life.
Speaker: And, and basically, you know, Socrates is like, this is like a really important issue. It's really about the way one should live. And he then introduces the idea of an air gone work or a function.
Speaker: And he kind of says this, this idea that like, well, the air gone of a thing, the work or the function of a thing, it's what that thing can only do or, what it does better than other things. So for example, eyes, only eyes can see, um, or a pruning knife. That's a case where, you know, they can prune vines better than anything else anyway. And then basically what Socrates then does is he applies it to the soul and he's like, you know, maybe the soul has its own work, its own job to do living, ruling, managing,
Speaker: um And then he also, and then virtue comes up where it's like virtue is what lets the thing do its work well. Let's start to make it simple for our listeners, right? like And let's start by a negative example, right? You yourself, you mentioned knife.
Speaker: Well, but we all know that if in a situation when, for example, I need a crowbar, you know, just to like open something with it and I miss it, I don't have it, i don't have it with me, a knife can serve as a crowbar.
Speaker: Well, and if I'm in a situation that I miss a screwdriver, right, to to to screw something in or out, well, I mean, perhaps everybody uses sometimes a knife in a situation like this instead of a screwdriver, for example.
Speaker: But the point is that a crowbar is always better in levering something open and the screwdriver is always better with screws than a knife. Yet, when it comes to cutting, a knife is the instrument you want.
Speaker: Like, you know, there might be some other instruments you could use, but knife is basically best in it. A knife is there for cutting and cutting is the ergon of a knife. It tells you what a knife is.
Speaker: it is it is It is important that this activity or product or ergon is always telling us something substantial or essential about the entity of which it is an ergon.
Speaker: And it is analogous with the eye, right? I mean, there is no other organ we can use for seeing or, well, yes, if it's really dark, you know, sometimes you orient yourself around in space with the help of your yeah of your hands and touch and so forth and so on. but Basically, the eyes are best for that. Seeing is the ergon of an eye.
Speaker: so And then, you know when when it comes to natural entities, it's always actually a bit more tricky. you know Plato, for example, mentions the ergon of a horse, but he never says what it is. And I have to say, I have no idea.
Speaker: perhaps running or I don't know. However, one could say that even in this case, it would definitely be something specifically horse-ish, if you can say that terrible term, you know something belonging to a horse and telling us something about what a horse is. So basically that is ah perhaps um how to explain the term ergon. Okay, yeah, that's helpful. so um So there's some kind of characteristic work associated with at least, yeah, like a lot of things around us, you know, like clearly, yeah, it seems like, yeah, a flute player, his, his thing, the, the, the activity that,
Speaker: um, you want to connect with him is playing the flute knife. The activity you want to connect to a knife is cutting. i activity is seeing, and and that's really interesting. The point you make about, and it seems like at least in those cases and those examples, um, that activity is like related to the nature or the essence of the thing.
Speaker: um, Yes, but let's make it even more complicated because in all the examples which we had so far, you know, I seeing ah pruning knife, pruning vines and so forth, so on, or an ergon of a cloak, which would be to cover and protect us and so forth, so on. ah It might seem that really it is function or activity or something like that. But ah there comes the problem because sometimes this translation of Ergon as function can be slightly misleading since Ergon can be, for example, thing or a product. You know, a shoe is...
Speaker: an ergon of shoemaking. The shoemaker makes shoes. It's basically not only the activity which we want from him, it is the product which which which there is. So basically that has to be taken into the consideration as well. It's it's kind of complicated to find a term which covers exactly the semantic range as the Greek term ergon.
Speaker: Well, that is that is kind of complicated because it's like maybe intuitively it's like you want to say, well, why aren't why don't we just restrict Ergon to the activity associated with some type? So it's like for the shoemaker, why don't we just say, well, the the shoemaker's Ergon is making the shoes because that's his characteristic activity.
Speaker: Well, I mean – Why would we also want to say it's the shoe? could you Could you just flesh that out a little bit? Yeah. Yes, and I don't think one needs bit much of philosophy here. Well, if you if you if if you want if if you go to a shoemaker, right what do you want from him?
Speaker: You want a bloody shoe. You don't want him you know showing you how he does that only, and you don't want the activity. You want the thing which you put on your feet and walk away. So that's basically the product which you want in this case.
Speaker: Well, no, no, that that makes sense. I'm just thinking like you could say the same thing with a knife though. It's like i what I want is the apple to be cut in half yeah or whatever. And I want to walk out in in the shoes. And basically now – If we push the analogy further, ah the shoemaker has to produce a shoe so that we we make it and basically the knife ah has to open the can or open open the box with the food or whatever it is whatever it is in there. but
Speaker: You know, the knife cuts the thing and that is what it's supposed to do. If you say that the idea in with the cobbler is that it merely, you know, works and it is merely the activity, you will never actually get what you want from him.
Speaker: Okay, fair enough. Yeah, i mean, at the very least, it's very clear that it seems like a in certain cases, at least, whatever ergon or, you know, characteristic activity...
Speaker: is associated with a thing, often that activity issues in a product and that product is often like the reason why that thing exists in the first place. Like, yeah, like the cobbler. Yes. some cases it's not. So for example, in the case of an eye the seeing is the whole thing is is what the eye does i mean there is no product over and above this kind of a seeing as far as it is treated uh in these in these texts right it's uh it's the activity itself that's it okay interesting um good well i love i love the point about like you know we have to think about the complications because i think that's something what that is so um
Speaker: excellent about your book, which is that, um well, you know, to back up a little bit, it's like, I think the the listener probably has a sense where how this is relevant to ethics, where this is going. You know, the idea is going to be like, well, if we want to figure out how to be a good human, maybe what we need to do is figure out the air gone that the human being has the function that the human being has, because if we do that well,
Speaker: presumably then we would be a good human being. So anyway, people can probably kind of anticipate that, but, but I just wanted to flag like your book is really good at like bringing up the the tricky questions, you know, do humans even have an air gone? Is the human air gone natural? Is it a sign? You know, uh, which human activity among all the various ones is the main human activity. So and we'll get kind of into those, but for now, why don't we just turn to the idea of virtue? Because you know we've kind of set up this idea of an ergon or function.
Speaker: And as I mentioned in the original um you know Republic passage, the idea of virtue comes up. But but yeah, could you just quickly spell out you know what's the... Yes, I do. I do believe I can. And it is...
Speaker: Actually, kind of an easy scheme, which explains my understanding of virtue, arete in Greek. So let's say in a general abstract way that we have an entity and this entity does something. Its activity does something.
Speaker: And this activity can be done well or badly, right? I mean, you you can succeed in it. You can fail. You can do it good in a good way. You can do it in a bad way. And then the property or quality of the entity due to which or because of which the entity does a given activity well, that is virtue.
Speaker: those This set of, this these these characteristics which is responsible for, or the which is responsible so that the entity does something well is a virtue or goodness. Some people translate a goodness of a given thing. And on the other hand, ah the property or the characteristics because of which a given entity does something badly might be called badness or vice. So yes, in this sense, let's say, um which
Speaker: property is important for a knife to cut well. It doesn't have to be size, it is definitely not color, right? It's sharpness.
Speaker: So although no no nowadays it would be very strange to call sharpness of a knife a virtue, but it's perfectly fine way how to describe how to describe what the ancients meant by arity, by virtue. And yes, we speak then specifically about human virtues, about moral virtues, but still it is basically a property or a characteristics of an entity which is responsible for ah the fact that a given entity does something well.
Speaker: Okay, yeah that's yeah, that's very clear. Okay, so it's like you have an entity, tip generally often these entities seem to have like characteristic activities, and then generally speaking, at least with the examples that we've been thinking about, um the that That activity can go well or poorly, you know. So the knife, its activity is cutting, but like some knives cut better than others. And so we want an explanation, you know, what's, what's separating yeah these various knives. Or we can go directly that to human being and, and it's certain virtues.
Speaker: So for example, you know, um, you know, friendship, um, seems to be possibly something where some kind of a virtues can be at play. Now I'm not talking about any specific, um, about specific author or such, but basically I you know like i can be i can doing i can be doing well with getting friends and having a strong bonds and basically enjoying friendship and so forth so on, or I can do that badly. So basically either I'm virtuous in that sense or I'm not. Or when it comes to being witty, another great virtue described by Aristotle,
Speaker: i i i can you know I can do well in being witty and and and saying telling good jokes at at the appropriate moment and not too much and not too little or not to be grumpy and so forth and so on. or i Or I can be a terrible joker. you know i can I can be really bad at it and I i can suck at it and everybody um would suffer around me telling jokes. And so basically this is the activity and it can be done well or bad.
Speaker: And then when we are looking at the reason why we can describe and see that this person is for example good at being friend or having friends and and being being friends and being in a relationship with friends or that he or she is good in transactions, right? Meaning he or she is just.
Speaker: And when I suck in transactions, so for example when i um and I rape other people off and so forth so on, and I'm unjust. So that's a very easy way how to how how how to understand what a virtue does.
Speaker: Okay, so on the one hand, you know, just to emphasize, like, you know, a lot of listeners, just generally speaking, in our contemporary day, when you think of virtue, you normally think of like various moral virtues. But, you know, so the first point is, hey, actually, you can talk about the virtues of a knife, you can talk about the virtues of ah basketball because it's just going to be whatever property allows the thing to do its characteristic work and to excel in it right yeah to excel exactly okay and then
Speaker: The other thing too is that, okay, I think if we ask somebody, hey, is wit a virtue? I think you know a lot of people might say, yeah, I suppose it is. Maybe they would, even if that's not necessarily like morally loaded. But what they might not immediately think of is like the activity that it's connected to.
Speaker: that it makes excellent. So I think it's really interesting how you're saying, look, like you can think about different activities so or like friendship, for example, and you can think about what are the properties that allow a human being to excel at being a friend.
Speaker: And so anyway, it's kind of so I guess like, I guess, so I guess it's like you could have a, you could discuss the virtues relate relevant to a particular activity, but then What about virtues just in general? Like, I guess I had the thought of, okay, if the human being had a specific activity, which was like made to do, which it was like, everyone is supposed to do it. Then maybe the virtues that let you do that activity well would just be like pure and simple. The virtues, not simply like, Oh, that that's a virtue for doing that specific activity of friendship. But,
Speaker: These are the virtues that like everyone should want regardless of, of, of who you are. Anyway, did do you kind of see my point here? It's cause it's, see, I see, I see, I see your point. So, but that, that to, to, um, to develop this point or to explain it, uh, it, it would need.
Speaker: a broader explanation, let's say, or twotututu at least how how I'm trying to make sense out of it. So, oh yes, in what sense what you said is important when we are talking about the Ergon argument and when we are talking about all these different examples?
Speaker: So I do believe that the thought in the background is such that Aristotle seems to believe in a certain natural scale of living entities, of living beings, right? I mean, you start with it, it's something which is generally known, you start with the plants and you got animals.
Speaker: You've got human beings and then possibly some kind of divine entities, gods or something like this. hierarchy. On this hierarchy of of of living beings. And then you you have those um strange entities which are capable of somehow like dualizing between the two, right? Something where you're not sure whether it's a plant or animal and so forth so on. and some Some human beings can behave as badly as to become nearly animals, and some animals are kind of a clever or or vice and so forth and so on. And then you have some special kind of human beings which are capable of becoming like God, as we said at the beginning. so
Speaker: ah But it seems that he at the same time believes that this scale is somehow normative, meaning um that the higher...
Speaker: you are on this scale of somehow better it is or at least that activity which you can do is better than the activities which are found below you and then if there is indeed a certain kind of an activity which is characteristic of us as human beings, if there is a certain kind of an activity which is essential for what we are as a human beings, which basically makes human beings distinct, and by that it makes them what they are, and we can figure out
Speaker: what kind of property, what kind of characteristics of us, what kind of virtue improves or makes this activity good, that is a billion-dollar question. That is a great way how to figure out, how to cultivate what we are, but what kind of a virtue we can calculate this essentially...
Speaker: important activity of us which makes us human beings. So that I think is somehow a possible background um for for your question, right? That if we can figure out what this, I mean with a knife it's simple, right? I mean if if if it's sharpness then when we sharpen the knife it becomes a good knife.
Speaker: It's definitely more complicated with the human beings but if we are capable of figuring out what kind of activity we have to ah improve so that we excel in what we are, in in being a good in being a human being and therefore being a good human being, that's that's an important question to investigate.
Speaker: I mean, it seems like it's like it could be a way of trying to get some handle on, you know, fundamental moral or ethical questions. So if you're trying to figure out, you know, how should we live? Well, you know, if human beings have a distinctive activity, something that makes us what we are.
Speaker: and maybe places us above other living things, then it seems like we should ask, you know what virtue or excellence lets lets us perform that activity well Right, and you have to know what activity is. Or, to put it in Aristotle's terms,
Speaker: in living any other life than the life of a human being is perhaps possible for us somehow, but it would be always worse for us than living life which is truly human.
Speaker: right i mean we want we want to live a kind of life that suits us as human beings and living any other kind of a life doing any kind of other activities might be possible but it will be but we will we will always be more so we will always suffer because living the life which is natural for us means that we are living a kind of life which corresponds to our nature, allows our nature to excel and allows us to live a good life as well. So basically that's that would be some part of what what of the importance of figuring out
Speaker: a certain kind of a general activity or a certain kind of human ergon which helps us to start the investigation and to interpretation of let's say what a good human life is, what human good is in general.
Speaker: Okay, so at this point, i kind of have a question for you, Jacob, that I'm curious what you think. So this might be my, um I don't know, maybe this is like a platonic side of me showing here. But here's the base here's like one thing I was thinking while reading your book is like, okay, so one route you could take.
Speaker: when Okay, so so let's say broadly speaking, we're trying to figure out, you know, how to live life, how to live it well. Okay. And it seems like one route you could take is be like, okay, what is the characteristic human activity? So what is the air gone of the human being? And let's say we took that in the, the, the, the Republic way of defining the air gone. So like we could be like, yeah know, what's the only thing that we, what's, what's the thing that we can that only us can do? What's the activity that only we can do? what What is the distinguishing activity, the thing that a plant can't do, the thing that we can only do and a um a frog can't do, an ape can't do, and so forth?
Speaker: um Or maybe we could look for the thing that we can do best.
Speaker: right, so that would be one route. And it seems like that's the route that Aristotle kind of took. he he He looked for the characteristic activity, the ergon of the human being, and he kind of, in a way, built his ethical theory around that. But now, to be honest, I kind of had this intuition of like, well, why wouldn't you do instead so something else?
Speaker: Why not instead go, what's the best thing we can do? So not... of all the activities, which one is like specifically ours or of all the activities, which one, um, is the one that, uh, we are best at doing, but which one is just the best thing. So like there, my thought is like, you start from the idea of like, what, like what's good, generally speaking, what's the, what are like, what's the good. And then you pick,
Speaker: Among our possible activities, you just do the best. So so I guess here's like my thought. And I know this this connects to the stuff you talk about in your book, but it's like, if it turns out the best thing we can do is, let's say, contemplate, and then you tell me, oh, guess what? God can also contemplate.
Speaker: I'm not really worried about that because I'm like, yeah, well, we should just do whatever's best. I understand that this is not, it's not only us that can contemplate. Yeah. God can come contemplate too, but that's fine. We can, what we should just do whatever's best. So anyway, I don't know what you think about that, Jacob. Just, um,
Speaker: Right. I think I have ah two thoughts on that. ah Possibly, i might be slightly careful with going from Plato's conception and definition of the what Ergon is to Aristotle's usage right right off of the Ergon argument. There are a lot of people...
Speaker: like Rachel Barney in her great article, um, believes that basically Aristotle departs from Plato's conception of the Ergon, which is usually some kind of like an instrumental usage on so of so so somehow.
Speaker: And yes, indeed, as you said many times, Plato in the Republic defines Ergon as, as you said, that which one can do only with it or best with it or something like this.
Speaker: Uh, however, ah In the Eudemian version, we don' you don't find this stipulation, not at all. um Aristotle claims um in the Protreptikos that everything is done well when or when it's when or everything is well disposed when it is in accordance with its own proper virtue, right? So there suddenly appears something, this kind of a proper, proper virtue, like something which is proper to us.
Speaker: And famously in the Nicomachean Ethics, he says that he looks for something which is own to us. Some people say peculiar, but I like some something more than our own, which is idion, which belongs to our to the given entity alone.
Speaker: right So it means that Aristotle seeks something that is proper to us human beings and and what distinguishes us from other living beings, especially ah the so-called lower life forms, and as well perhaps from ah from the divinity. now And there here it comes to something which is important and which I try to argue for in my book as well. I don't think that the fact that the best activity we are capable of, namely perhaps the theoretical thinking, the contemplat contemplation, theoria, as he said, and the fact that it might be possibly the same activity that the gods do or that the divine does, might be
Speaker: might be problematic for the rest for for the rest of the Aristotle argumentation because, you know, still it seems that we do it at least in a very different way than the divine does.
Speaker: to so to to to to To be clear, the divine is this activity. It's nothing else. you know It's this pure activity of thought with no potentiality, no rest, you know nothing. But it's not our case. And now, of course, then the question is, how...
Speaker: You know, we we sometimes think, sometimes don't. We sleep, we need to take a rest and so forth so on. So that's very, so there is some kind of a unique way how we do how we do this, which is common to us and which differentiates us from lower lower lower forms, from lower animals, as well as from the divine, which is over and above us. And we should not forget about that because Aristotle, at So many places says that basically, you know, the human being is not the highest living form in the universe. There is always something over and above it and so forth, so on.
Speaker: So that would be, ah that would be, That would be that that one point. And saying that, well, then the next question would be, how does this affect our way of life?
Speaker: How does that affect our decisions and our constructions of the way how we live? But that's a different question, I believe. yeah that's Yeah, that's fair enough, you know especially the point about potentially um that definition of Aragon was using.
Speaker: was using that might just be the Republic definition, maybe not exactly the, the Aristotelian one. And, and especially because, you know, when Aristotle, even though he's searching for the proper, what is own most, I guess, to the human being in an, in terms of activity, i mean, maybe what is proper, or what is own most is actually determined by what is best, what we can do best. So I don't, I don't know if that's the case, but,
Speaker: you know if i If I may, right, I forget about one thing. ah the the The assumption behind is that if you look for a good of a certain thing, you find it in ah in its ergon, namely in its doing its ergon good. As you said at the beginning, human beings do several different... they they We do a lot of activities. We do a lot of things of different generality and so forth so on. But when we ask what makes...
Speaker: human being a good one, then it is, Aristotle would would would would answer the excellence in that kind of an activity or activities which are proper to being a human.
Speaker: So basically, yeah just to make it simple and to give a simple example, when we talk about the shoemaker, ah so basically how do you tell a good shoemaker from a bad one?
Speaker: Well, because the good one per does makes makes makes makes good makes good shoes, right? That's it. It's air gone is a good one. Right.
Speaker: Let's let maybe talk about the horse thing, right? So famously in in The Republic, or I don't know if it's famous, but basically Socrates, he's asked the question of, you know, tell me, do you think there is such a thing as the air gone of a horse? So it seems really clear that at least it's very plausible to me that like, yeah, various natural implements, you know, equipment, the, you know, my, my espresso machine, it has an air gone my, you know, the cup, the phone, the knife. Okay. Okay.
Speaker: Once you get to living things, I'm a little bit less like, hmm, does it have an ergon? Does it have a function? um Right.
Speaker: So anyway, i yeah can you walk us through that? Yeah. Well, so i mean it's a yeah i see I see the problem, or I think I see the problem, and I might see where you where you are heading. well um you know knife and other artifacts are easy because there is an intention there is the creator there is someone who makes a knife to be the best thing you can use for something for and then there is someone who makes another kind of an instrument and it's designed intentionally designed for doing something Now, it's definitely much less obvious with the natural entities, right? And because the natural entities, for example, are somewhat complex and basically it's it's an it's not and it's not a simple entity, but it's ah it's always a complex organic entity and so forth and so on. so that that's what makes it complicated. So, well, okay. um
Speaker: what we can what we can What we could talk about, but it would be much longer, and I believe believe for a different talk, that I guess that what comes forward here is the idea of natural teleology, of natural some kind of a natural way of entailing something like a purpose in in in in in natural human beings, well sorry, in natural living beings and so forth so on, or in in living beings general.
Speaker: Well, yes, ah that's true. But um it at the same time opens two related questions. ah The question of an organism and the question of whether an ergon of something in a complex entity can be related or dependent on something or someone, right? um So the clear case in the knife is the creator.
Speaker: You know, the man who made the knife, this particular knife, had an intention, put it in there. But at the same time, um when you talk about the horse, right, in the Republic, and I have to say, I really do not know what Plato thought the ergon of a horse might be. If I remember right, he might talk about swiftness about as its as it's as its virtue, but I'm not sure he says something about what about actually the ergon of a horse is. it's It's just agreed that everybody knows that there is something like an ergon of the horse and they go go forward and go go forward, which is
Speaker: It's kind of a tricky. But okay, could it be, for example, that the horse is Ergon, a way how it serves human beings, right? I mean, we talk about the domesticated horse or something like this.
Speaker: And indeed, ah the interesting question, can an ergon of something be essentially relative, namely ah related or dependent on something or someone?
Speaker: And this is this this is a problem which Aristotle discusses, right? This is the problem which which he is interested in. ah if if If I could quote from the Protrepticus, if I remember it right, he says that something that is composite and partitioned has many activities, but something that is by nature simple and whose substance is not relative to anything else necessarily has a single virtue in itself in a strict sense.
Speaker: That doesn't matter for it now. But what what what is perhaps more interesting is that
Speaker: In a complex entity which has several activities, ah it is always a bit more tricky to figure out what is the ergon off ah of such of such a given such ah such a given complex entity.
Speaker: right It is not so easy ah because there might be some entities or things where their ergon, I believe, is relative and context-dependent.
Speaker: However, perhaps mainly in the sphere of artifacts, artificially created entities. What do I mean? Let's talk about the example of an artifact, perhaps a catapult, right? You you know, the things which throws the stones when you when you try to conquer another police, another city. Very common in evil times. Yeah, exactly. And um and I guess that there is that this piece of wood which actually moves, you call the arm of the catapult.
Speaker: And the virtue of the arm is its strength and the flexibility, since only a strong and flexible arm would work well, right? So basically, if that arm is strong and flexible, it works as a good arm.
Speaker: However, apart apart from the catapult as a whole, it is basically a lock of wood, you know, and strength and flexibility remain its quality. But there is no reason to call them virtues.
Speaker: in this way. The virtue of the arm of the catapult is derived from its position within the larger hall and in this respect the arm is not a simple entity according um to ah to the passage from the protracticus which we mentioned and above.
Speaker: And the second issue to discuss here are, of course, ah complex organic entities, living living beings as humans or something like this, and their bodily parts. right And the important thing is that it seems that Aristotle ah believes that if you if these beings Parts natural parts are naturally organized and we know that ah Their activities are always considered in relation to a whole so for example, you know if I if I cut my finger and cut my ah cut my hand Well, I mean it somehow loses its function or its ergon as a hand or as a finger, right? That's that's something that's that's that's something to it and But when they cut your hand I guess sorry
Speaker: Which is, which I guess is why it's bad to cut your hand. No, it's like no, no. We can come back to that. I don't think so. I mean, I think that here the moral badness of Of depriving, for example, that piece of meat bone and sinews of its ergon by cutting it is not that basically you go against its ergon. It's basically that you harm yourself. It's painful and you harm harm yourself. This is the source of the badness here.
Speaker: it's It's slightly... it's's it's Of the moral badness. Okay, I was thinking... It's more complicated to get from... from the Ergon argument into it actual ethics. Because in in in this respect, and now we are going slightly astray from what I wanted to say, but I should mention it now, in the contemporary divisions of ethics, or basically how usually the ethical theory is structured, I do think that the Ergon argument would belong to something which nowadays is called the metaethics, right? And its relation to normative ethics is quite complicated. So basically that's it. that's it But ah what I wanted to say about the complex entities, I do believe that Aristotle assumes that if a certain whole is composed of parts which have a function and which are for the sake of something, and they are composed in...
Speaker: a natural way then the corresponding whole is naturally for the sake of something and has a function as well yes i i think this argument is fast i mean you discuss it and it comes up in the nicomachean ethics um uh this point that aristotle makes maybe can just read it because i i think this is a very interesting argument where he says and so again it it kind really i think it relates to the question of does the human being actually have an ergon you know in the first place And he says, ah are there then certain functions and activities of a carpenter and a shoeman shoemaker, but none of a human being?
Speaker: So point being there, like, interesting that everyone would agree that we have various social roles or professions that have functions, but then claim that the human being doesn't have one. That would be kind of odd, maybe. he says, is he by nature without a function, the human being?
Speaker: And then he gets to the the organs like you're talking about here. Or just as an eye, hand, foot, and in general, each of the parts plainly has some function, may one also posit some function of the human being beyond these. And so you kind of do a really fascinating analysis of this, and I found it, cause because like I said, I was kind of like, hm I'm not so sure a human has an air gun. I'm not sure a living thing has an air gun. But I thought this was a very powerful argument, to be honest, where it's like,
Speaker: Okay, like so it's kind of an inductive argument. it's like Or at least one version of this is inductive where you just say, hey, look, wouldn't it be surprising if all the parts of a human being had an air gone, but the human being as a whole didn't? That just seems kind of odd Well, i as as far as I remember right, I'm trying to be slightly careful here in this argumentation. I do believe what what Aristotle does here is that he plays the ball to the other side of a net, right? Let's imagine someone who says, no, Aristotle, you are completely wrong. There is no such a thing as a human Ergon, right? And i I'm really not sure whether any of the versions of the Ergon arguments at
Speaker: explicitly argues for the fact that a human being has an ergon. I do believe that it's an assumption there, which is which is really, which which which is, a sin and Aristotle shows good reasons why we should think that it has an ergon here. I'm not sure he gives us an argument, proof, or so anything like this, but, and as far as I can tell, or ah how I would summarize it, what what goes on in this way in the in the Nicomachean Ethics. He talks about there about, let's say, occupations, as social roles, right? On the one hand, he has the flute player, the cobbler, and we can add to it, for example, the role of a father or a husband's son and so forth and so on.
Speaker: And on the other hand, you've got the organs. You've got the eye, hand, and so forth and so on. So first, a human being is an entity which is composed out of parts which have a function, which have an ergon, and it is living in and in an environment, in social environment, so to say, where yet again it has certain functions, a certain erga, because it has an occupation, it has a family role, perhaps sociology could talk about the roles here, right? So it would be very strange if that entity, which is A, um which is natural, ah
Speaker: composed of parts which have an ergon. And so to say, living in the environment and encircled by functions, by the social functions which we have, that entity would be without a function on its own.
Speaker: so that and And now the ball is on the other side of a net. And if you still want to argue that there is no function of a human being, you have somehow explained how come that there that it's so that it might be so different from anything around it that it would lack an ergon.
Speaker: Yeah, I mean, I love i i love this argument. um I know you're saying you're not sure if quite if it's supposed to function as an argument for human beings having a function, but I do kind of think of it as... Because it's just like, you know, you consider two hypotheses. you know One hypothesis is that the human being has no ergon. The other hypothesis is that we do. And it seems like under the hypothesis that we do not have an ergon, It would be very surprising, hard to predict that even though we don't have an ergon, all of our parts do. And our entire social life is saturated with a bunch of... so and and And remember that basically, yes, the parts have their ergon and the function in relation to the whole.
Speaker: right and well naturally compost entity is something else then i mean if you have the garage sales you know you you you you take a box and you put all different things into the box and you put a box outside of the of your house you know a garage sale and and and and you know, those things together in the box, well, I mean, there is no, so to say, an ergon of that complex entity, though you can perhaps, like, or, you know, you put a different different things together and you tie them with a rope or something like this. No. Here we have a natural entity, and the function of the organs in the natural entity is always related to that entity as a whole.
Speaker: As I said, exactly. When I when i cut my finger, it might be a finger by name only, but it's not a finger anymore because it doesn't function doesn't doesn't function as one.
Speaker: It functions as one only as a part of the complex entity. And then it would be very strange if that complex entity would be deprived of that kind of an ergon as well. So to me, that almost is like, I guess, I don't know if you would agree with this, but to me it almost seems like there are two possible arguments. like One is this sort of inductive type argument where it's just like, look,
Speaker: it would be very surprising, seemingly unlikely for the human being parts to all have air gone to each have each part to have an air gone. And then suddenly the whole thing as a whole doesn't have one.
Speaker: But then I feel like to me, it's almost like a second argument, a more deductive one where it's like, well, the, if you actually think about each of the, if you think about the function of each of these parts,
Speaker: you realize that the function actually is relative to the whole. And so there it's almost seems like you could maybe try to, to degenerate a more deductive argument where it's like, look, if the whole had no function,
Speaker: Then these parts, which gain a function with respect to the whole, themselves would never have a function. And so I almost i almost had the thought of like, it seems like we could we could we could extract on the one hand a more inductive argument on the other hand a more deductive argument.
Speaker: i'm as As nice as it would be, I'm not sure I can dig something like that out from the from the text, unfortunately. So I still it's very yeah i still i still go with the basically, yes, you it's it's enough at that point to play the ball on the other side of the net. Yeah.
Speaker: Perhaps somebody comes and explains to you that you are wrong, but i'm um in in in a given context, it's it's it's fair enough to go go on because you can continue and and you can you can show how what what what else would be there and what how how to how to develop then some kind of a normative ethics further on and so forth and so on.
Speaker: But I'm not sure that I would be capable of digging out this this argument from the text itself. Okay. fair Yeah, fair enough. um Good. Well, maybe we can look to another kind of interesting issue that you discuss.
Speaker: So, i mean, we've already touched on it, but what about the whole issue of like the human being, very plausible, you know, it seems like we're complex and it seems like we can do a lot of different activities. We can digest, we we perceive, we desire, we think, we speak, we deliberate. We do a lot of different activities. activities. So why to, why to choose the one that Aristotle chooses?
Speaker: Well, yeah, I mean, i guess it's like, which activity is going to count as the Ergon um Or maybe another question would be, why can't we have multiple Aragon? Would that mess things up if we had a few?
Speaker: um Right. I mean, so to the first first version of it, I mean, there is that that there is a there is a text but text by Bernard Williams, if I remember it right. And he says, well, I mean, even if Aristotle looks to something which is owned to our human right to to to to human beings, so for example, those are his, if I remember right, it's his example of, ah you know, making fire.
Speaker: like or using fire for um for for for some kind of a technological improvement and so forth so on. That's something. Or I'm not sure whether he mentions telling jokes as well or something like this. Well, I mean, you know, as far as I can tell,
Speaker: Aristotle's methodology somehow differs from from and and and and and has a good like has a possible answer to those counterarguments that it's unfair to pick up the activity which he picks up, you know the activity of us our soul or the practical living with reason or however you want to call it. I mean, making a fire is a fine activity, but you know, when we are talking about the good human life and we are talking about the goal of the good human life and the Ergon argument functions there as one of the first steps on this interpretation in which we go,
Speaker: I mean, trying to imagine a life which is organized around making fire and as such, nothing else, you know, or about telling jokes, right? I mean, that's kind of strange, you know, and well, perhaps you can go and try,
Speaker: I don't think you will find it any any kind of a pleasant or satisfying and so forth so on. So I guess that this in in in this way in this way, that's the point where aris why Aristotle is convinced that he...
Speaker: has to go to the broadest possible activity which involves human beings um as such, because that's basically the issue of aesthetics, a good human life. So basically then he looks for an activity which is not which which is natural for humankind and not a particular part of it so for example not a flute playing or ruling or something else because only a few of us do that few of us do that and at the same time he goes for that one which is not shared with at least the lower ah living beings or the other living beings such as the animals or plants
Speaker: I'm not sure that that it it is helpful. And if you said about multiple ergo, yes, he he actively tries to avoid that. You know, there is, um there is enter at least in the Protrepticus and in the Nicomachianetics, when he talks about even about human happiness, and then it has some counterparts in his usage of the ergo, in the boarding of the ergo argument as well, he says, well, you know,
Speaker: Eudaimonia, human happiness or flourishing is the activity of our soul in accordance with virtue. And if there are more virtue than the best one of them.
Speaker: right And it's it's as I said, even when he talks about ah the own virtue, the oikea arete, a single virtue which is something our own and and peculiar to us, then yet again this is the term which is found only in the protracticals and the Nicomachean ethics, and it is somehow suspiciously absent from the Eudaimian ethics.
Speaker: right so And in both, in the and my and and and i feeling or one of one of one of one of the conclusions which I try to put forward in the book is as well, then then that allows in the Nicomacheanetics and not in the Protreptikos exactly, but definitely in the Nicomacheanetics, that allows Aristotle to say what the human happiness is as a single activity, right? Namely in the Nicomar genetics, the contemplat contemplation.
Speaker: So, yeah. So, we so we asked the question, you know, why not identify the human air gone with something distinctively human, like using fire or making technology or telling jokes. Okay.
Speaker: And it's like, okay, those may be distinctive human activities, but they're too narrow because what we're really looking for is, an activity that's sort of like, it's like the human life as a whole, the the activity of human life as a whole.
Speaker: And it seems like with using fire, it's like, i don't know how to explain this, but I guess I just, I'm just having this kind of sense right now that, um,
Speaker: that clearly sort of fits within a broader context of like, I don't know, surviving or like meeting the necessities of life or maybe like family life or home life or like securing.
Speaker: so in in other words, it it kind of seems to be fit, like making fire seems to be sort of fitting within ah within a context that isn't just the human life as a whole. In other words, it's just ends up seeming too narrow to me. I don't know how to quite,
Speaker: Well, you know, I mean, still, i like when we go back to the text and we find that Aristotle wants to find something which is owned to us, which is idiom to us, and, for example, something which the topics describe as something that belongs to a given entity alone, right? Right.
Speaker: ah even though it might be problematic in the case of human beings in relation to the gods, ah it seems to me that it's something which is proper. And at the same time, it is something which Aristotle says expresses our nature, or even sometimes he talks that it somehow depicts or shows something about something about our essence, right? So it would indeed allude to the best realization of our nature as well. And this means that Aristotle seeks something that is proper to us, human beings, that which distinguishes us from other human beings, especially so-called lower form of lives and animals, right? And that condition...
Speaker: and comparison with other life forms introduces this hierarchy of living activities which we which we talk about already and we must distinguish human beings from the lower forms from the higher forms right and if there is something proper to us human beings then fully realizing this means realizing what we are and what is natural and proper for us Failing to achieve this means failing to realize what we are.
Speaker: Moreover, then ah destroying, for example, the capacity which manifests itself in this activity of our ergon, namely, so for example, deliberately destroying a reason or something like this, would be a destruction of what we are.
Speaker: So that's somehow somehow one way how how how to organize how to how to understand that. yeah Would you want to to to you know describe in rough terms for us you know why I think contemplation specifically would be the the best activity? it seems to be i mean like It makes sense that it seems to be the activity connected to the best part of us, I suppose, reason or intellect. Yeah.
Speaker: Yes, but there is a long road from the Ergon argument to contemplation. As I said, in the Nicomachian ethics, when we look for something which might be the conclusion of the Ergon argument, then Aristotle says that it is... um uh that it is the it it is the statement that the human good is the activity of soul exhibiting the appropriate virtue right or that what the and the that the ergon he's looking at looking for is this active life uh in accordance in accordance or with with with the news there is no talk about the contemplation at this place and we need
Speaker: ah basically eight and eight more books or nine more books to get to the fact that when we ask the question what is happiness the answer is that it's contemplation so it's it's in that way it is more complicated than that And we should still within the framework of the argument work with the, with those conclusions, yeah which are far away from, uh, the final conclusions of the texts.
Speaker: yeah Right. So, so in the arrogant, arrogant argument, we do in terms of more substantial, yeah, we, we're not reaching the point of, um, saying that happiness is contemplation.
Speaker: So, for example, in the Nicomachean ethics, yeah, like conclusion I suppose we reach is that the ergon of the human is going to be some activity of the soul that involves reason. Yes. Yes. And therefore, we have to investigate those activities. We have to investigate what the virtue is and what are particular virtues.
Speaker: ah Exactly. But there is a long way from the Ergon argument to the final conclusion. of the There are some suggestions that already some terminology used in the Ergon argument in the different texts is used in in a way that might give us some hints what to think about the conclusion of the book. But as I said, usually the Ergon argument is found in the first book of the treatise and then we have to still wait for much longer, for for so for a long time till we get to the conclusion of the actual book.
Speaker: Yeah. we we We reach the point of like knowing that, you know, if the argument succeeds, we reach the point of knowing that the kind of thing that happiness is, is going to be, i guess, excellent rap.
Speaker: Excellent soul, rational activity. Definitely there is a relation between the two, but the relation is really complicated. I'm trying to show in one of the chapters in the book how the conclusion in Enocama Genetics can be linked with the Ergon argument at the beginning of the book. But it's rather problematic and in ah in ah in inov in a way technical to show how to do that. And we would have to go to terminal, as I said, to the terminology used and so forth so on. Okay, good. Well, just to kind of close things out then, I mean, is there anything, obviously there's, you know, we we all eat barely scratched the surface, but i don't know, is there anything that you'd say like you want um readers to take away from from your book? Any main points or...
Speaker: um Well, i mean I do believe that someone might use the book ah to see how not to write about Aristotle, for example, and somebody might use the book of for better understanding of Aristotle's ethics. but Well, perhaps I think there is one issue which which which which which might need some further attention, further work, and it would be nice if if if that could be a start of a further discussion in that particular subject.
Speaker: And that is um but one but one ah one of the things... which I open, and I know that I open them in a very unsatisfactory way, is is the chronology of Aristotle's text, right? because um because Because now we can work with the Protrepticus in a much better way than we could do ever before because basically of what Doug Hutchinson and Monty Johnson did with the reconstruction of the Protrepticus.
Speaker: So, we know approximately when Aristotle composed the Protrepticus, right? And it seems that the Ergon argument in the Eudemian ethics reacts to particle problems entailed in the Protrepticus version and tries to correct them, right? it has a different The book has a different conclusion and a slightly different topic than the Protrepticus, but it does react on it and it it seems to in see it seems to correct the Ergon argument from the Protrepticus in a certain version. And then the Nicomachean ethics seems to utilize both arguments, some features from the Protrepticus as well as from the Eudaimian ethics.
Speaker: and So in that way, it there seems it seems to suggest a certain kind of a chronology of writing of these three texts. And that could be perhaps one of one one of the issues, which is kind of like a sidetrack in there or side result of the book, but it might be interesting, at least, for example, to destroy my argument in that sense and and show that it must be the other way around or I don't know.
Speaker: Awesome. all right. Well, I guess ah we can end here. And so, yeah, the book, to remind everyone, is The Function Argument in Aristotle's Ethics, Happiness and the Human Good by Jacob Yerza. So, Jacob, thank you so much for joining me.
Speaker: Samuel, thank you so much for inviting me.
