Transcript
Speaker: Welcome back to the Dynasties Circle Podcast. I'm Dr. Sam Bennett, and today I'm sharing a conversation with Kevin Clark and Dominic Casella about St. Maximus the Confessor. We're focusing on Kevin's new translation of the Puscula and Dispute with Pyrrhus coming out with CUA Press. So, as you probably know, the Church dogmatically teaches that Christ has two natural wills and two natural activities, one divine and one human.
Speaker: This teaching was solemnly defined after Maximus' death at the Third Council of Constantinople in 681.
Speaker: These works that we're talking about, you know, the Apostola and the Dispute, they come decades earlier than the Third Council. And basically, Maximus was defending the two wills, two activities position against opponents who feared that two wills and two activities would divide Christ into two acting subjects. Now, for Maximus, his reasoning starts with the Council of Chalcedon, okay, in 451. So, in that Council, we learn that Christ is one person in two complete natures, divine and human. Two complete natures, divine and human.
Speaker: So Christ must therefore have a complete human nature. And Maximus argues that this includes a genuinely human will and genuine human activity.
Speaker: If Christ does not have a genuine human will, if he doesn't have a genuine human activity, Christ would not be fully human. The one Christ must therefore will and act both divinely and humanly.
Speaker: I also want to flag another key principle, which comes from st Gregory the Theologian. What Christ has not assumed, he has not healed. So, if Christ has not fully assumed our humanity, he has not fully healed and saved our humanity. So, for Maximus, that is why this debate matters.
Speaker: I hope you enjoy the conversation. Kevin, you've recently published with the Catholic University of um of a university of America Press a new volume containing translations of Maximus' Apostola and the Dispute with Pyrrhus.
Speaker: how do yeah how do you so How do you pronounce his name? Is it Pyrrhus? Yeah, Pyrrhus is fine. So he was the deposed patriarch of, of Constantinople who ended up with Maximus in Carthage and 645 and they had this public debate.
Speaker: So it's long been like one of the most important Christological texts from the monothelite controversy. And so now we've got this in, in,
Speaker: the lovely fathers of the church series. Yeah. I was curious why you decided to put them together into a single volume. yeah. Could you, of course.
Speaker: Yeah. Um, so the, the more i worked with these texts and I ended up, uh, So I first got into the dispute with purists a little over 10 years ago as I was working on my dissertation.
Speaker: And that led me right into the Aposchola as well. I had Father Brian Daly was a ah reader for my dissertation, and and we met over a couple of summers.
Speaker: we did some house sitting in South Bend for some family friends and and that gave me the opportunity to spend some time with Father Daly. And so we talked about Maximus and and had a number of great conversations in his office. And that's kind of where the idea came of ah putting these these two together.
Speaker: so So working with with Father Daly, I started diving more into translating the Opuskala. And so I produced a translation of, i don't know, I think maybe 11 or 12 them.
Speaker: for an appendix appendix for my dissertation. And over the following years, after after my defense, i I polished up these translations because they were kind of a what the mess you would expect in a dissertation.
Speaker: um And ah and i there's just so much overlap. between the theological and polemical works, the 27 Apuskala, and the dispute with Pyrrhus, they really, the texts belong together because they're mutually illuminative in a sense.
Speaker: um Same sources, same same agenda, the same Maximus comes through. And it's interesting in sure in Sherwood's date list from, i think it's 1952,
Speaker: he he calls the dispute with Pyrrhus TP 28, Theologica e Polemica 28. So it's like the large theological and polemical work, whereas the 27 are the small theological and polemical works.
Speaker: So another interesting fact about this this volume is that it's it's volume 151 in the series, But it is the 150th that they have published. So, so we're still waiting on the, on um the publication of volume 150. So,
Speaker: so ah um So it's it's ah it's an interesting milestone for the series, ah just apart from this work in itself. Yeah. Yeah. You know, I asked, you know why did you decide to put them together? But on the other hand, it's when you're reading them, it's like completely obvious that they're part of the same theological project of. you know, defending Christ's complete divinity and humanity, including um his two natural activities and two natural wills in one person. So it's not as ah at all like, ah you know, it's pretty self-evident why these two would go together. So not, I didn't, with that question, I didn't mean to want to suggest that like, it's like puzzling while these, why these two would be together, but they do have different formats. So on the one hand, the apostola is kind of,
Speaker: addresses particular ah problems across like kind of shorter essays. Right. Yeah. And then in in contrast, the dispute is, is really, yeah, it's, it's, it's, it's a, it's a dialogue between two people, Maximus and Pyrrhus, and they're basically um discussing this controversy and Maximus is defending um the doc, the idea, the doctrine that Christ has two natural activities and two natural wills.
Speaker: Yeah, it it's a it's a great question, actually. you know the the i was Why put these these two works together? And there there would be a couple of trains of thoughts on that. um Some scholars would would say that you know, they might want to put a little bit of distance between Maximus and the recording of the dispute as well. And so then it's for them less certainly his work, but but perhaps work of a disciple later on, perhaps after Maximus's death.
Speaker: I'm not a proponent of that position. I don't i don't think that is accurate. I think it's clear enough in the debate that it holds together as a unity and that it it also ah comes from a time very much proximate to the debate. Whether we get an accurate picture of Pyrrhus himself is another question, right?
Speaker: ah But, you know, this idea of a ah dialogue, it's somewhat common in ah patristic discourse. We have If you're familiar with the volume Maximus the Confessor and Companions, it was translated by Pauline Allen and Bronwyn Neal that gives the record of the trial and the dispute at Bizia. You have a similar kind of thing where you have a um a conversation between Maximus and his interrogators.
Speaker: i mean, I assume that most of your listeners know Maximus's story, but it's a really fascinating one. He was born in 580 and died in 662. he lived the ripe old age of 82.
Speaker: so he lived to the ripe old age of of eighty two And he was, you know, he was a monk. His his early literature is more ascetical.
Speaker: And you can detect a clear influence of Evagrius, of Pontus. You have a lot of influence from Dionysius, the Areopagite, a good connection with our with with your show here, right? ah ah Origin of Alexandria as well.
Speaker: So you get this ascetical master in monk in Maximus the monk, but then toward the later portion of his life, especially through the influence of St. Sophronius, one of his mentors, a really important mentor of his, Sophronius of Jerusalem, Maximus is is pulled more into the theological and polemical realm.
Speaker: where he has to make a defense of what he regards as, as, um, you know basic Calcedonian Orthodoxy.
Speaker: Right. And so in, um, uh, he's instrumental in the, in the Lateran Synod in Rome in 649, which among Christians,
Speaker: which among ah Roman Catholics is is especially well known for the perpetual virginity of Mary, but the central concern for the Lateran Synod was the question over the the activities and the wills.
Speaker: And this really ah infuriated the Emperor Constans who was a young Emperor ah following his his grandfather Heraclius who was a beloved and long-serving Emperor.
Speaker: So Constans who viewed the Lateran Synod as insubordination, ended up having Pope St. Martin I arrested, and he was ah ah sentenced to death, but his his sentence was commuted to exile, and he died in Crimea.
Speaker: And Maximus also was arrested, and he was tried a few times, and eventually his His tongue was cut out and his right hand was cut off. His organs of speech were removed, right? In May of 662. And he died from these injuries ah in August of that very year. So that's why he's called the confessor.
Speaker: I actually wanted to ask about that real quick. Yeah. So it's like he's called um and then Dominic can and jump in. I saw that you wanted to say, but um so he's called a confessor because i guess, you know, because he was persecuted for confessing the faith.
Speaker: And like you said, his tongue, right hand were cut off. Now he dies shortly afterward in virtue of that. um but he's not considered a martyr, right? So that i thought I thought that was kind of interesting where it's like he he did die in direct, you know, it was directly in virtue of the persecution, but because I guess it was a little bit delayed,
Speaker: it wouldn't be considered martyrdom? Is that, don't know. Do you want to speak to that at all? Any thoughts? Yeah, it's it's a really interesting point um because Pope Martin I, who dies in exile, is considered um a martyr.
Speaker: i And so it's it's almost like a different standard that is applied. i I think there's ah interesting a good case to be made for calling Maximus a martyr.
Speaker: because he he dies as a direct result of his his wounds. I mean, okay, it takes it it takes ah three months for infection or whatnot to to take his life, but...
Speaker: But yeah, he, it's kind of the act, I suppose. it way Especially, especially given the time where it's not as though like they had ordinary means to prevent someone from dying from something like that. Whereas like in our time, maybe it's like,
Speaker: there are like available means to prevent someone from dying from something like that. But at that time they didn't have sort of ordinary means to do that. So anyway, that's just another thought i had.
Speaker: And he basically was imprisoned in, in Georgia, uh, off the coast of the black sea, uh, as part it. So he, he went into exile as well.
Speaker: So I doubt that they were giving him much, uh, much medical attention during this time. Right. So, and just the horror of the act, I think is, is we're thinking about, I mean, Maximus not only experiences these pains,
Speaker: But he also experiences the rejection of the church in a sense, because he doesn't, he dies in 662. The third council of Constantinople is not until the 680s, the early 680s. So 680, 681, in which he is vindicated, but without being named, right?
Speaker: Even though Pope Martin is named. so so So Maximus experiences this, um, I mean, there's clearly an ecclesiastical role in his trials.
Speaker: And it looks like that he's receiving the treatment of a heretic, that of an unruly, disobedient, heretical monk.
Speaker: But now he's the pillar of of orthodoxy for his his teachings on the will and the activity. Yeah, related to that, I was thinking um if you might just give us some background on what's going on with the discussion around activities and will like what's what's all like the baggage surrounding the idea of an activity, why one would want to even assert one or two. for either of those. um Because I know Maximus is considered a very kind of, i don't want to use the word creative, but a very, you know, like, ah robust thinker in his day, as we're as we're looking back. And um he seems to be doing something with philosophy as well as theology together, ah as he's answering these objections in the polemical atmosphere of the time.
Speaker: Yeah, that's that's a great question. So um so so why does this be even become an issue, right? You almost have to go back to Chalcedon in a way, but but maybe we'll we'll get to that in a bit.
Speaker: But Maximus takes his... his um his launching point from Phusis or nature, right? And from a from a very Aristotelian definition of nature, and he says nature is a beginning of movement and rest.
Speaker: And so um now Heraclius toward the end of his reign as emperor. you know He's dealing with the ah this growing threat from the Muslim armies, right, where they're invading and conquering Christian territories.
Speaker: And being a good Christian emperor, he views... um Christian unity in a similar way to what Constantine did. you know Christian unity was necessary for the unity of the empire.
Speaker: And because you have these divisions within churches following the Council of Chalcedon, he's going to be very strongly pushing for a kind of a compromise position. Hmm.
Speaker: And Chalcedon is very clear that there are two natures. So this question about activity, Energea, is something that seems to be an an open one, an area where one can facilitate a compromise. Okay, we all accept let's all accept Chalcedon because there's kind of a one Energea.
Speaker: And so that's what the weight of the imperial authority ends up backing in the 630s, to which Sophronius of Jerusalem resists very strongly.
Speaker: Right? Right. And so... um so So there's this basically the same rules that apply to nature with respect to Christ. you know He has a fully divine nature and a fully human nature, and they're united without division, change, confusion, or separation.
Speaker: The same kind of a rule is going to be applied to Energea, because... Energeia flows from nature ah because as Aristotle says, ah nature is a beginning of movement and rest.
Speaker: And Energeia is so strongly connected with nature's own movement. Therefore, Christ had to have had two, right? ah And so as Sophronius and Maximus after him are unpacking this idea of what to do about Energeia, it becomes clear that that if there is no human energeia in Christ, then humanity is essentially inactive in the work of salvation, right? But salvation is at work.
Speaker: So it's, it's a huge theological problem. ah But, but yeah, that's, that's sort of where this arises as, you know, flowing from what what sort of is philosophically true about ah about Phusis itself then applied to Energea then also applied to Will or Thelema.
Speaker: Yeah. So that point about. um Well, I guess, yeah, just to echo a couple things. So it seems like it's really important for Maximus that like the doctrine that Christ has two activities, two wills, or at least that's the position that um Maximus at that time wants to uphold. He wants to defend the claim that Christ has two activities and two wills.
Speaker: And it's important that for Maximus, it's really like this is an implication of the definition of Chalcedon. It's like, if you uphold Chalcedon, you must also, by implication, uphold um this commitment that Christ has two activities and two wills. So he he but from his vantage point, he wants to argue that um if you were to deny Christ having two wills and two activities, you would basically be falling afoul of Chalcedon, even though
Speaker: Chalcedon doesn't explicitly affirm those things, but for as Maximus sees it, it follows necessarily that if Christ has um a human nature and a divine nature, um he must have also...
Speaker: um a human will, a divine will, as well as a human activity in a divine activity. So, um, um, so anyway, that, that, that seems to be like one kind of way of getting into this. And then I just want to, yeah, kind of highlight to the point that you made though, that the historical point that like imperial unity, they, they kind of needed sort of, they wanted some kind of ecclesial reconciliation. And, and so they kind of wanted to, um,
Speaker: Yeah, they were hoping for some kind of compromise for the sake of maintaining kind of imperial authority. And and then and and and and you you talk about a lot in your you have a substantial introduction in this work. um But you have but you you provide a substantial introduction to these these these two texts. And you kind of emphasize that, like that that Maximus was not content with saying, oh, yeah, let's let's go for a compromise position. He just felt, look, it's kind of logically necessary that we affirm two activities and two wills, given the definition of Chalcedon. Does that sound about accurate? Yeah.
Speaker: Absolutely. I think that's very well stated. It does seem to be an open question at Chalcedon. And so Maximus is going to do something quite brilliant to show that it was and intended to be resolved by Chalcedon, because in his Florilegium that he sends to Stephen of Dora, Eposculum 15, he's going to quote Leo the Great.
Speaker: and his tome to Flavian. So ah so in Episcopalum 15, he points out that ah that Leo says that for each form in communion with the other accomplishes what it has properly.
Speaker: the word accomplishing what is of the word, and the body achieving what is of the body. The former of these things shines forth in the miracles. The latter is subject to insolent things.
Speaker: So Maximus says, see, Leo here is intending to show that there are two inner Gaia. ah Further, in Apostolome 3, where Maximus is talking about the ah the Severins that he encountered on the island of Crete,
Speaker: he says that they, um, they were rejecting the tome of Leo because of the, the idea of the inner, the inner gay eye that that's obvious in the tome. So everyone saw that the the tome of Leo was particularly useful for the dienergists.
Speaker: Um, dienergism of course means the, those who support the the two activities. Um, So I think that's that's really a key point. And one of Maximus's burdens throughout these works is to show how how connected he he is with with Chalcedon.
Speaker: So Maximus is really drawing out of Chalcedon and the fathers. He's he's um in a way just drawing out the logical conclusions, as we're saying. What if we set aside some of like the political ah motivations for mono energies and what would be the more theological or philosophical desire? I mean, is it rooted in a difference of nature energy? Like how how does one argue for those two things, setting aside political things?
Speaker: Well, to so to set aside the political things and um and some of the even more complicated theological things, Maximus in a couple of places does something that Gregory the theologian does in his works. And he um he grants that if the monenergists or the monothelites are correct, then he is not saved.
Speaker: So... So all of salvation is on the line for Maximus, and that's why he's such an ardent defender of these things. ah Because what ultimately what it makes of Christ is it makes of him a a third thing, a tertium quid.
Speaker: So if there's a mixture of the natures, ah according to the Eutyches, for example, then you would have a Christ who neither is divine nor human in his nature.
Speaker: If there's a mixture of the activities, then suddenly there are different activities in the Trinity. he's no like The Son is no longer working with the Trinity. He's got this third thing.
Speaker: And then the same thing with the will. I mean, there's one will in the Holy Trinity, right? And suddenly, now, if Christ's will is composite, then he is um he's he doesn't really will like the Trinity, or he doesn't will like us either.
Speaker: And so what really is going on there soteriologically? It's it's it's a Maximus makes the point that it is completely a confused thing and makes of Christ a a fantasy or a goat stag. Right. You know, it's the the typical go to image there.
Speaker: Right. Yeah, so it's Maximus is arguing that there would be a yeah, the mixture. I was just thinking about like a Puskal M18, which talks about the differences of union. One of those is that kind of mixture molten thing. It doesn't use the goat stag here, but he's just kind of thinking of unions at the moment. And then but I'm just thinking like.
Speaker: If you're looking at Christ and and you're imagining how he accomplishes the salvific work, like like what you were saying, he needs to the idea that Gregory Nazianzen puts forth, he has to assume all of human nature. And the the assumption, or what Maximus is arguing for, is that all of human nature require includes human activity, energe, as well as a human will.
Speaker: To not have those things would be to destroy human nature and create some sort of intermediate thing, this goat stag. ah But the ah monoenergists or monothelites, are they thinking, what what's their concern? Is it just like, does this create dissonance in in God if you don't have a sort of unity of at least energy and will?
Speaker: Like are there two agents, like how does this, if you have two agents, wouldn't that imply two persons? I mean, is this kind of like the opposite counter argument? Well, the, the Moninergus wouldn't see it that way, right? They would see Maximus as like a Nestorian.
Speaker: And so that's the accus accusation that he faces. but But you're right to point out that it's it's Gregory that theologians assumption doctrine that is really operative in ah in in Chalcedon and its consequence, including including dienergism and diathletism. So what is not assumed is not healed or the unassumed is the unhealed.
Speaker: And so the, the, the will Maximus points out, that's the first thing to fall. So Adam first willed to eat of the fruit and then did it.
Speaker: So if the will is the first thing to fall and Christ doesn't assume this ah ah from us, then what kind of account of salvation do we have, Maximus says. The same thing with the the the work.
Speaker: ah ah Adam ah worked condemnation in eating. And so it was a human work. This has to be reversed by a human work.
Speaker: Now, what the monenergists and monothelites are going to argue is that ah this creates almost a kind of a schizophrenia within Christ. It almost forces Nestorianism, in a sense, because the ah the two wills, I think, is the the the easiest one to see. But with the two wills,
Speaker: ah if you have two wills within one person, then they would be at odds with one another, right? But Maximus is going to show that that's not the case within Christ, that with the two wills, you have the evidence of instead perfect harmony rather than that of opposition.
Speaker: So there's this, um and the the question of, of, composition, synthetas, has to be dealt with in one manner or another. And so the the difference is where is Christ synthetic?
Speaker: all So the monenergists will say he's and synthetic in terms of his energeia. ah The monothelites will say that he's synthetic in terms of his will.
Speaker: But for Maximus, it's the composite hypostasis that he is, he's synthetic there because he's he hypostatically one, of course.
Speaker: which is And so so this is where Maximus escapes the charge of Nestorianism. right Because Christ remains one. He just is in um in his hypostasis, he subsists in both natures, right? And so that's where Chalcedon again comes forward very strongly. The the into natures, the from to natures, and the he is to natures, right?
Speaker: this going further a little bit um with the direction that Dominic was just taking us, just thinking a little bit about, yeah, why um why did some people want to affirm um one will and one activity, just trying to get into their, understand um what their reasoning was. And it seems like, you know, one thought is that, well,
Speaker: if you have two wills, you're just going to end up with two subjects doing the willing. So um that seems to be one idea they had. Like if, you know, a will, it kind of seems to belong to someone. So if you add a human will alongside the words divine will, it seems like you're introducing a second personal subject. And this kind of seems to be like a sort of maybe Nestorianism worry. um And then I also wanted to bring up, you know,
Speaker: I'm not sure if you've read any of his work, but like i know William Lane Craig, he's a famous contemporary theologian who, and well, philosopher and philosopher and theologian, but he he is someone who does defend only one will in Christ. And And I think his thought is something like that, which is that, look, if you have one personal mind, then you you need one will.
Speaker: um Anyway, so he he he kind of thinks that if um if you have two wills, again, you kind of divide Christ into like two persons or maybe two minds. Yeah.
Speaker: And then, and then, ah and yeah, just to add another thing. So we have one, two wills implying two willing subjects. Then we mentioned the Craig, William Lane Craig kind of concern. And then we also have like the, the conflict issue. So the idea that, well, if you have two wills that could introduce a potential conflict, um, between the wills,
Speaker: And then, um, I'm not sure I'm trying to remember some of the, I mean, you know, Piers, for example, in his, in the debate, he brings up a lot of a different, um, angles. Uh, I feel like those may be some of the most important ones. Um, um,
Speaker: I guess like one – well, anyway, yeah, I don't know. So so anyway, those seem to be some – another one I guess that that come that comes up is like if you have two activities that seems to divide the single deed of Christ, like you know um it seems like Christ heals one person through a single unified action. So why – you know, analyze that deed into two activities. um So anyway, yeah, just laying on the table here, just a few of the reasons I guess people gave for being um mono, you know, the mo few reasons people gave gay for, you know, endorsing one will and endorsing one activity.
Speaker: These are really important points and ones that I think Appiris was largely aware of and Maximus too at the time of his debate.
Speaker: So, you know, the the question over, well, what do we make of Christ's agency if there's a kind of two-ness within him?
Speaker: ah And and that that's a really good one and an important question. But Maximus deals with this within the tradition's own logic.
Speaker: So, for example, ah when in the dispute with Pyrrhus, he goes to prove from the scriptures that Christ had two wills.
Speaker: you would think that the the place that he would go to would be the Garden of Gethsemane. But reality really where he's going to go, and he does this in Episcolum 15 as well, he's going to go to various places in the Gospels where Christ wanted to do something and then it didn't happen.
Speaker: So how could he do something, want to do something, and then be frustrated if it were the divine will. Because the divine will is unfrustrateable in a real sense, especially when it comes to Christ who is ah both man and God.
Speaker: How could he be frustrated? So when he would have passed by them walking on the water without their noticing him, or when he would have passed through a town without being noticed but people noticed him,
Speaker: That's Maximus performed some partitive exegesis and says that, well, what is the author talking about here? He's talking about the human will rather than the divine.
Speaker: So there's this interplay between the um evidence within the scriptures of the divine will predominating, the human will predominating, or both working together at the same time.
Speaker: But there's still the problem of the tension that appears to be there in, say, the Garden of Gethsemane, which I just mentioned.
Speaker: So for for Maximus, his account of the Garden of Gethsemane is that is's essentially the same as Cyril of Alexandria's. ah and and Athanasius or perhaps pseudo Athanasius, but um this idea is that um not my will, but yours be done.
Speaker: ah well, how is he speaking about will there? Because it seems like there's an opposition within the the wills. But what what Maximus is showing here is that he is he's completely demonstrating the reality of human nature in the the garden.
Speaker: Because it would be really weird and disordered if his humanity desired death, right? it's it's It's normal for a, and and part of the will's movement, I mean, this is this is embedded in the series of definitions of will that Maximus puts together, for example, in Eposculum 26. that it's normal and natural for a will to desire things that are constitutive of the nature.
Speaker: And it's disordered tip for a will to desire the destruction of the nature. So what Christ is doing in Gethsemane then... is that he is voluntarily i ah experiencing timidity or the recoiling back. so So Christ is fully human. He's human though in a different kind of a tropos, a different mode of existence, because for us, we we do not fear voluntarily. We fear involuntarily. We experience the threat and we recoil um in terror.
Speaker: Or we we we we don't weep because we choose to weep. We weep because we're moved to weep, right? That's how the passions act upon us. But for Christ, he moves the passions.
Speaker: And so this is this is a ah really interesting kind of nuance in Maximus' his thought and that he takes from Cyril and and Athanasius before him.
Speaker: that You can see very clearly in the garden that there is the reality of the human nature. So, I mean, to get back to Craig's ah objection.
Speaker: i know that this can be very dissatisfying on some level to to to many modern thinkers who want to have a an account of Christ.
Speaker: But to to get within the maxim Maximian framework and his mindset, it it is a very complete and robust picture of who Christ is and his oneness.
Speaker: Once you see it, um, and, you know, Leontius of Byzantium is, is in the background here as well. Uh, Dominic, I know you're an expert on, on Leontius.
Speaker: Uh, uh, um, anyway, there's, uh, um, you know Maximus, for all his um modesty, topoi, where he's he's always emphasizing how lowly and little he is, he's a brilliant mind.
Speaker: And it's really brought together the whole of the tradition into this account of who who Christ is. I find one point really interesting about Christ moving himself rather than just kind of being thrown around by passions. You know, like, you know, what is assumed is not saved. we're going to affirm that Jesus Christ is one hypothesis, two natures, two energies, two wills, okay. Okay.
Speaker: ah That's great. But the will the will and the energy of the human Christ um ah has to be fully human. There does seem to be something extra going on here, though, because it just makes me wonder, like, ah is is in Maximus's conception here, does Christ ah need extra grace? in order for his will not to be thrown off his human will not to be thrown off of course, or is the hypostatic union itself sort of sufficient for moving the humanity or like kind of holding the reign or maybe even, would we say allowing the passions to be moved by withholding a grace? Or is is there anything like that going on in Maximus's thought?
Speaker: Yeah, that's a great question. I'm, i'm I should probably think on that some more. But for for Maximus, all that Christ accomplishes by nature in his condescension and his becoming man, he works for us in the grace of our divinization.
Speaker: So, so, so I don't know that, I mean, yeah, for matt Maximus, it's clear enough from the Episcola, I can't remember which one he talks about that maybe, or I mean the Ambigua, maybe it's Ambiguum 7 or 10, but he speaks about grace as, as uncreated.
Speaker: um And so there, there is this, ah gifting of the divine to the nature that of course happens in the incarnation and as a result of the incarnation but I think the way he tend tends to speak about this is with respect to to us a um but yeah i and so in Christ it's is's more of an appropriation
Speaker: of of our um our things, our passions. our So the one of the core ah foundational scriptures that Maximus is going to cite more than any others is Hebrews 4.15, that Christ is like us in all things except sin alone.
Speaker: He cites this directly. He alludes to it without citing it. It's just... It's part of his theologic and his Christologic that ah that he ah that that he just returns constantly to this scripture. and And so it's all connected with his theology of the logi or his ah logology, right? you know, the idea that humanity has this perfect logos,
Speaker: in the divine mind. And so sin and its consequences are not part of that original concept of what we were meant to be.
Speaker: So the idea of Gnome, for example, the vacillation between good and evil is, um is not part of what we're really meant to be as, as humans. And Maximus scholars have argued at great length over whether Maximus's account of Gnome is sufficient.
Speaker: Because, you know, that's, as Paul Blower says, that's kind of how we, that that's what that's what it it is to will as a human, right? But Maximus would say, no no, that's what it's like to will as a fallen human, right? yeah Because it's the darkness that,
Speaker: um ah that that comes from not knowing ah what it is to be to to do good or not to do good I like to use this example ah when I'm trying to help people through this problem of GNOME.
Speaker: So imagine that we're we're at ah ah where' the three of us are at a restaurant and we're each at different tables and the the the person, ah there's one person covering the bill at each table.
Speaker: And we'll say that that each of us is the one paying. and our waitresses all make the same mistake. They all forget to charge us for a bottle of wine.
Speaker: And so I think as I'm paying, oh, that's great. i i get ah I get to save some money, right? Dominic, you you get the bill and you start deliberating.
Speaker: Oh, golly, you know, ah would that'd be great. I'd get to save some money, but would come out of her... that would come out of her salary. And that's probably, I don't want that. Well, I don't know. And Sam immediately says, Oh, a waitress, ah youd you didn't, which one of us is freest.
Speaker: I mean, obviously anyone would say it's, it's Sam. I mean, he's, he does not deliberate, but I think that's part of the the argument that, um that some people will make that, that, um, that really, Dominic, the essence of your wrestling is what it really means to be human.
Speaker: But true freedom is to do the good, right? And to be unhindered in doing the good. Because a lot can happen in that moment of deliberation.
Speaker: Yeah, the deliberation is indicative of being torn in various directions, having multiple things pulling you here and there. But in the example, Sam has no deliberation. He just knows what's right. He just does it goes and does it.
Speaker: And that that is more free, clearly. i agree. Yeah. Yeah, so this is this is really great. I mean, and just to step back for a second, maybe for the listeners, like it's basically, you know, we have a methodological principle, as it were, before even considering the question of the number of activities and the number of wills, which is that.
Speaker: We want to say that Christ assumes complete human nature without sin. So we basically need to distinguish what genuinely constitutes humanity from what disorders humanity.
Speaker: And so that creates the question, okay, now that when we touch the will, it's like, is the human willing itself, um is human willing itself, is that part of our nature Or is it a consequence of sin?
Speaker: and so for Maximus, it's like the capacity to will, that belongs to nature. um it's It's sinful misusage. is not something that belongs um to nature. and and But then it's kind of like you get into the details.
Speaker: It seems like now we're kind of talking about in more detail what that willing would look like. And it seems like, okay, well, you know, does um is deliberative uncertainty, is that constitutive?
Speaker: of humanity or you know basically that's the question of you know when it comes to how we exercise the will um what is kind of constitutive humanity such that you know if christ fully assumes our nature um it must be included in what is assumed versus you know is something kind of actually more connected to um the disorder of our nature And what you're suggesting there is that like, you know, when someone is sitting there deliberating about, oh, should i um you know, should I come clean and sit in and point out to the waitress that she forgot the wine,
Speaker: um is that Is that related to something essential to our nature? Obviously, it's depending on capacities essential to our nature, but do the capacities may have to be expressed in that way?
Speaker: um Or instead, if you were perfectly oriented to the good and you perfectly love the good, um would you um would you not deliberate in that way? um Anyway, I'm just trying to try to set the context. is that Do you think that's accurate? Kind of like the way we're trying to approach this is from the perspective of we need to make sure that all the things that are constitutive humanity, Christ has those things. Because again, we're going back to that wonderful quote from Gregory the theologian that you know um what has been assumed has been anointed. you know And so um if Christ has not fully assumed our nature our human nature, then that human nature has not been
Speaker: anointed, it has not been saved. Yeah, I think that Maximus makes a really helpful distinction and and i I probably shouldn't have passed over it, but there there is something distinct between what he calls prohiresis and gnome.
Speaker: So prohiresis is deliberation. This is what is involved in making choices. And so that really does seem to be part of the natural movement of a will.
Speaker: So when we're trying to figure out, do I want, um, a Neapolitan pizza or Detroit pizza, ah that that is prohyrosis.
Speaker: That's not necessarily gnome. The answer is Detroit. The answer is Detroit pizza. Well, now, if you're perhaps preferring Chicago pizza over Detroit pizza, that's more a gnome. But...
Speaker: No, i it we we of course, we make that we we make choices. And that is part of being human. Maximus talks about this in Apostolos 1, where he traces out the the the movement ah from ah from desire to possession of something, right? the various processes, right? And so prohiresis is...
Speaker: an important part of that. Now, the deliberative ah experience of Christ is a little bit little bit different because he sees with true knowledge of what is good and in all things.
Speaker: So there's there's perhaps even a um a slight nuance with how Christ experiences something like Prohiresis in Maximus. But Gnome is different because it is the the the darkness that comes over a man's face before he commits a crime it's the um you know it operates in that sphere So it's not apples or or oranges, ah which which is best for me.
Speaker: It's um good or evil. That's Gnome's area, right? So Christ it does not become, ah he doesn't take on an inhuman mode of decision for for Maximus.
Speaker: Yeah, that's helpful. I mean, um i just occurred to me, like, yeah maybe just posing this kind of question could be helpful for, like, seeing how the theology kind of works. um I'm just thinking, you know, someone might say, well, you know, it's part of human nature to be to not perfectly see the good, to be unclear about what the good is, to be uncertain about it. So so if Christ isn't uncertain in such a
Speaker: Doesn't that entail he didn't fully assume our nature? So I guess like, you know, what's going wrong in that type of that line of thought? Right. Because that Maximus would would disagree with that. Right. And so I'm just kind of curious, like how how would he approach that kind of line of thought?
Speaker: Well, Hebrews 4.15, like us in all things, but sin alone. i mean, with with respect to sin, of course, the the the Latins have the this idea of the a preternatural gifts, right? um ah And I think there's something similar going on in St. Maximus that...
Speaker: um that that Christ is fully living out what it meant to be human ah from from man's essential logos.
Speaker: So what was Adam, what what would Adam have been like? And that's, And this is why for Maximus, Adam sins from the beginning, because he, from the moment of his creation, he forsook the essential logos that God had made for him. And so Christ in in the Ambigua, in Ambigium 41, Christ mediates between the five divisions ah in the cosmos, right?
Speaker: as I think one of your earlier guests talked about this very well. so um So Christ shows us what it truly means to be human. So for those people who would think, well, no, Clark was freest because he wanted to pocket the money right away. He's unconstrained by moral norms, right? So that makes him the freest.
Speaker: So, um ah No, Christ really does show us that that is in um that that is an inhuman way to live, right?
Speaker: And so we we we become trained toward perfection by Christ's manner of living. he he's That's what it means to imitate him, right? He's put forward as this this example of perfection toward which we strive. Now, for some people, that means he looks really inhuman.
Speaker: But That's because we're fallen, right? And we see what is lacking in our own selves when we look at him, but also what's possible through grace.
Speaker: um So when it comes to, um is this related to the consequences of sin? I'm just thinking like um Christ does assume certain consequences, right?
Speaker: of our sin, right? Like he assumes, um, um, he's wary, he's in pain. Sometimes he, I guess death itself, uh, he has fear of death too.
Speaker: um so there are certain consequences of sin that he does assume, right? Um, Corruptibility. Yeah. Right. Corruptibility.
Speaker: Now, but again, but he is, but what he excludes is, of course, sin and then, i guess, sinful inclinations. That's what we're kind of getting at with this, this, this, the, the, the, the nice case study you gave regarding the waitress forgetting the wine to include the wine. um And yeah, he he kind of excludes ah so he excludes sin, he excludes sinful in inclinations, he excludes the inner kind of moral disorder that would set man against God.
Speaker: um So I guess it's like all the blameless consequences of sin. like hunger, wariness, fear of death, those he assumed. But well, anyway, I'm just kind of yeah thinking through a little bit like how that relates to this this particular conversation, um the consequences of sin idea.
Speaker: Yeah. um So all of the the blameless passions, a as you so well put it, are what what Christ assumed.
Speaker: But Any of the passions that would have been a result of sin, Maximus is going to keep those at at a distance from Christ. But he still heals them because of the way he experiences the ah the blameless passions.
Speaker: So even um even desire, Christ is going to heal a desire through the the temptations. And the questions to Thalassius, I think it's number 21, deals with this very beautifully, this idea that on the on on the mountain or in the desert when when Satan tempted Christ, he tempted him with respect to all ah all all passions associated with pleasure.
Speaker: And then on the cross, he tempted him with respect to all passions associated with pain. And so Christ conquers then the devil's temptations in both senses.
Speaker: So that's why when he dies upon the cross, Colossians 2.15 comes into the mix here, this idea that that he triumphed over the powers, principalities, and rulers of this age in him.
Speaker: you know What do you make of that difficulty of triumphing over the devil in him? Well, they go in into him to look for something of their own.
Speaker: and finding nothing, Christ then triumphs, leads them away almost ah as military spoil in a public spectacle i by his victory on the cross. so ah So, yeah, Christ, he hungers, he thirsts, he um he becomes tired, he ah he is sorrowful, he grows angry,
Speaker: but all things in, in a blameless way for, for Maximus. And I think that's where Maximus is monastic background is really helpful. So if you read the chapters on love ah you can see the, the, the the logic of, of ah Maximus is moral psychology and, and the,
Speaker: how the passions work on us and how they're they're healed through ascetical practice. So even Christ fasting in the ah wilderness. On the one hand, it was completely unnecessary as as God, and there's something supernatural, obviously, about it.
Speaker: um But on on the other hand, he is he is practicing asceticism, which is really always always ordered toward the healing of of the passions there.
Speaker: He's healing ours because his are ordered, right? Good, yeah. So, yeah, I mean, that's really helpful that, um so Christ assumes the human capacities and the kind of blameless experiences like hunger that sin often exploits, right? Like sin often exploits those, those blameless experiences like hunger um, anger, but he doesn't assume the misuse of them, right? Cause the, the sinful like misuse of hunger is gluttony.
Speaker: Christ doesn't assume that the sinful misuse of anger is, um, I guess, hatred. And he doesn't assume that. um but But yeah, he does assume those kind of blameless experiences that are so tight so closely um joined to them. and And I have to say, just this is just an aside, I just feel like...
Speaker: um it seems It can seem very abstract, this kind of discussion, but to me, when you really search your heart and you search why you can feel so closely united to Christ in this life and why you can feel so passionately connected to him, I just feel as though the if if Christ had not undergone had not fully assumed our human nature, had not undergone these things. I just i just can't imagine the having the same type of fervent attachment to Christ that I have, you know, that kind of personal feeling of union with him. i just...
Speaker: you just it's just hard to imagine i mean it's just so i don't know i just think that this that what's at stake here is so fundamental to the life of faith you know that that christ truly did assume all the things that belong to human nature um anyway well yeah So I think, yeah, that's right. And I think that um that this actually is kind of related to another point, but back on the energies side of things, ah because um as I was thinking about this, about the mono-energist or dial-energist position, ah the fear with dial-energism would be, well, then you just have this man living these operations and then separately God is...
Speaker: saving mankind. And like you have two energies, you've got these two wills. There seems to be just what is what is the point of the rehearsal of the second energy and will of the man if God is doing his own energy and willing and That is obviously what is saving mankind is the divine power and not the human power. But Maximus is having them come together. And this actually makes me think of and I know, of you know, Sam, ah you know, we've we've kind of pointed to this as that sort of the andric energy idea that Maximus has ah taken from Dionysius. i was just wondering, um maybe, Kevin, if you want to comment on that or wrap things in. Yeah, definitely. um And I was thinking about this ahead of the the podcast for the Dionysius Circle. I mean, we we have to talk about the theandric energy.
Speaker: um And so this became a really controversial issue in the 630s because, you know, in the letter four to to Gaius,
Speaker: Dionysius talks about a certain new theandric energeia. And energeia is singular. So what what on earth do we mean by a certain new theandric energeia?
Speaker: Well, i Cyrus in the 630s had misquoted this as mia theandricae energeia.
Speaker: So one theandric energy. yeah Now that's a a whole different ballgame ah because Maximus shows through his treatment of Dionysius' quote in his epistle to Gaius that Dionysius by saying a certain new is kind of searching for the words in a way that's very typical of of his apophaticism.
Speaker: you know, words are failing to really describe what this God and man activity, quote unquote, is is ah is doing there, right? so ah So especially in the dispute with Pyrrhus, when it comes to the second part of the debate around Energeia,
Speaker: ah ah Dionysius' quote and Cyril of Alexandria's as well, um that it seems like they are suggesting that there is one Energeia.
Speaker: But the the problem with that is that when that happens, you end up with a kind of Apollinarianism, almost like a,
Speaker: ah as um ah to take from Father Daly, which I believe he gets from Grille Meyer, this idea of a spacesuit Christology, that the the word just sort of puts on humanity and does everything ah but in a way that overpowers humanity.
Speaker: but Energea really does come from Fusus itself. it's it's It's nature's movement. And if you don't have nature's movement, then you don't really have any human collaboration in um in salvation.
Speaker: ah So, but it it's it's a it's a um Yeah, it's just something that that he deals with at at some length in the dispute with Pyrrhus. And then aher Cyril's quote, also one activity shown to have kinship through both.
Speaker: i mean, that's a problematic quote for Maximus as well. ah And a little bit about the a kind of theological i method in the seventh century is that flora legia were everywhere.
Speaker: Flora legia were this practice of compbiing compiling quotes of the church fathers that seemed to support the the doctrine that one is bringing forth.
Speaker: And on the on the surface, it can seem like, well, how could there be that many quotes about Energea and Thelema from earlier fathers that are available there in the seventh century? Well, Sophronius and Maximus find them.
Speaker: ah At the Lateran Synod, it mentions a florilegium of 600 quotes that Sophronius had compiled showing the the two activities from the fathers. Now that would be an incredible discovery, that's lost to us. ah So there's there's what you wonder about what's sitting in some archive somewhere. But right um but they yeah the way that Maximus, to circle back to the the point here, the the way that Maximus deals with
Speaker: the the problems that arise in these quotes is through a discursive reading of the works of these particular fathers. So for Dionysius, he's going to go to the divine names where there Dionysius talks about how um how how Christ innovates the nature by the ah the birth without seed or the conception without seed, the the miraculous birth, and the walking upon the water.
Speaker: So... So there, in those activities in particular, you can see both a divine and a human activity at work. So when Christ is walking upon the water, walking is something particularly particular to human activity.
Speaker: But upon the water, making ourselves solid upon the surface of water is not something that we can do as humans. So that illustrates humanity. the divine activity. But all of these ideas, I mean, Cyril too, throughout his works, it's clear, as Maximus points out, that you have two activities. So you can't just pigeonhole their thought into this these one-liners.
Speaker: as the monenergists and the monophilites were doing. You have to see the whole. And the whole is that they're dealing with both Christ's oneness and his twoness.
Speaker: How is he both one and two? It's like the glowing sword, the the sword that ah that both burns and cuts.
Speaker: And you have two activities there. You have the activity of iron and you have the activity of fire. But they're so united that you you can't really tell the burning apart from the cutting and the cutting apart from the burning.
Speaker: Right? Yeah. Yeah. Go on, Sam. Oh, no, I was just going to say, OK, like. I don't know. Do you like this way of framing things, Kevin, that like if if we let's suppose, you know, for a moment we grant, you know, two activities and two wills, it seems like the next move that.
Speaker: um someone like Maxis should make is to kind of tell us, well, how are they related? What's the relation between these two wills? What's the relation between these two activities? And it seems like, you know, when it comes to the activities question, you know, we can think of like different possibilities.
Speaker: So one idea is like, Well, there are two activities and they're performed by like separate agents somehow. Maybe it's like, you know, a human subject does one thing and then a divine subject does another. And that obviously would divide Christ into like two subjects. And that just sounds like it doesn't work. You could say, oh, the human activity, it doesn't really do anything. It's all that divine activity. Humanity just like a passive instrument. Pyrrhus seems to kind of suggest this when he talks about like,
Speaker: Christ kind of commanding um the the human the human to do so. Anyway, ah I can't recall exactly. but then but But it seems like the key question is, the more plausible options is, on the one hand, the idea of a blended activity, that you know the divine and human activity sort of merge into a third kind of um activity. And maximus it seems like Maximus is going to reject that.
Speaker: And instead, what Maximus wants to say is, the two activities are united to one actor. So there's a single actor. It's the word. It's the person of the word.
Speaker: And he acts both divinely and humanly. And um exactly somehow they're neither, neither activity is abolished. It's not only the active divine activity acting and and then, and then they're but they're also not blended anyway. So it seems like those are kind of the the options on the table, I guess.
Speaker: Yeah, and he uses that very Dionysian turn of phrase. He does human things in a divine way and divine things in a human way. So it's always the the eternal Logos who is acting.
Speaker: um he's He's acting, though, as man, and he's acting as God. And the you know the he really is the the agent of all of the actions of Christ.
Speaker: ah And to some sense, you can parse these out. But in another real sense, there they're they're also extremely difficult to parse out because like the walk in the water is such a great example.
Speaker: ah you know it There's something human going on there. There's also something very divine going on there. But it's also 100% human and 100% divine. God moving over the waters.
Speaker: ah God is upon the waters. He is, and and Christ is just taking a walk across the sea. you know So how do you how do you separate those things? And for the Monenergists, Maximus in Zephronius' account is dissatisfying because it it um you know they they circle back to the Nestorian problem.
Speaker: Right. And and so even even the this the severance that Maximus was dealing with, they so they saw Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo as something that was um uniquely Nestorian. Right. Yeah. The though really all the Christological problems from Chalcedon onward seem to be the the various thinkers, the various theological thinkers wrestling between two-ness and oneness.
Speaker: So that seems to be the the the core of of the problem. but yeah yeah, Maximus is, he's very difficult. And in this, this text is difficult to work with as well. I mean, it was something that, that ah translating it, it became frustrating because I just want, okay, Maximus, just give me like the the, the, the, the nut and the bolts of the things, you know, like just break it down for me. But
Speaker: it's It's kind of like the whole of it together that ends up being the the force of the persuasion. I mean, even like, okay, what is the definition of Energeia? Well, Maximus gives all the definitions that the tradition has provided.
Speaker: Okay, well, fine. oh Give me the definition of of willing. Well, he gives all the definitions that he finds anywhere. So... And then when he when he's talking about these ideas, he he's he's going to allude to these different definitions, and they're they're kind of all occupying the same space.
Speaker: So it's difficult to pin down pin him down and say, what where're where is your thought actually grounded? And you know can you just give us a really concise...
Speaker: Well, yeah, I mean, i was thinking maybe for for the listeners, we could try to at least, I mean, we we've kind of we've touched on this before, but maybe we could try at least like kind of give, give them a sense of, you know, the fundamental sort of line of thought um that leads to, you know, the two wills and the two, two activities. And, know,
Speaker: It seems like something like this, I don't know how you would describe it, but it seems something like, okay, we start from the cha the Chalcedonian assumption, the Chalcedonian doctrine that Christ possesses two complete natures.
Speaker: And then we move from there. I think you brought up, I think this might be the Aristotelian move where we say, well, look, every nature has a certain characteristic activity that is natural to that nature.
Speaker: And then we think about, okay, well, at least with respect to the will, it's like, if he's gonna assume a rational nature, if he's gonna assume human nature, which is is a rational nature,
Speaker: um part of being a rational creature, he talks about this with purists. um One of my favorite parts of it was, is that look, a rational nature is an intelligent nature and an intelligent nature includes self-direction.
Speaker: And so if you're going to have self-direction, you need to have a will. And so, I don't know, I'm kind of losing the thread of the argument here, but it's something like, yeah, ergo, you know, if, if both natures are preserved in the union,
Speaker: Therefore, both the but the natural activities need to preserved. and And one of those natural activities, at least, you know, ah certainly with with respect to the human nature, we can see clearly that, well, look, you got to be self-directing and that requires a will.
Speaker: So um anyway, ah yeah, obviously, Maximus can be subtle and difficult, but I feel like something like that is like the kind of the basic argument there. Yeah. So Episcolum 26 says,
Speaker: is a really helpful one for ah for readers to get the sense of what Maximus is working with, with respect to Energeia and Thelema.
Speaker: And ah so there are a couple of definitions. So post-column 26 and 27, you get very little of Maximus. These these are just ah florilegia, quotes of the fathers that he compiled.
Speaker: But Eustatius of Antioch says natural activity is the innate movement of every essence. He calls it the evident power of every essence.
Speaker: Gregory of Nyssa calls Energea an essential movement characteristic of the nature. you know so you've got the this idea that Energea is associated with mo with nature's movement.
Speaker: I think that to to break down the question of Energeia, that's where you have to go, this idea of the essential movement of nature. Now willing, Eustatius says, is a a natural movement of reason in us.
Speaker: So ah there you can see the connection with um ah both of these ideas Energeia and Thelema and the notion of movement, but and natural movement, right? So as distinct from something like ah hypostatic movement.
Speaker: So, and Nemesius also is really important for Maximus. Opusculum I is, there's a lot of Nemesius of Emesa in the background, but Maximus takes this definition of willing ah from Nemesius in Episcopalum 26, he says, willing is a deliberative appetite about possibilities coming in our control and through us having an obscure end.
Speaker: So for us, we have these possibilities. We have this sort of what is up to us, right?
Speaker: sort of what what is what what is up to us right And, ah but Maximus's definition in the same Eposculum, he says a a natural will is simply having an essential attraction and longing in like manner for things constitutive of nature.
Speaker: Right. So what helps the nature continue to exist? So this essential attraction and longing So, but it is it's it is natural. and And that, you know, keep circling back to Chalcedon, and I ask the patience of the listeners, but it's it is such a Chalcedonian notion that that the same logic that applies there applies here with respect to Energea, Thelima.
Speaker: Right.
Speaker: Okay, good. Yeah. um Yeah, no, that's helpful. You explaining that kind of um crucial premise that, um yeah, nature, it's not merely like a collection of features. it ah kind of possesses characteristic powers, activities, and the Energea is kind of a, it's ah it's like a characteristic operation. So movement, um you know, it's not just movement through space, but like a kind of characteristic operation. ah connection Well, yeah. I mean, just so if I could just make like, ah like, ah like, like Kevin said, it's, it's kind of that Aristotelian notion of Fousey's, the intrinsic principle of motion, ah a principle of motion of rest intrinsic to a thing and not accidental. is, I think, physics book two. And it's that you know rocks, you know they have an energe because they have an intrinsic principle towards down.
Speaker: And fire has the energe because it's the intrinsic principle towards up. And it's not like you know the same way we think of activity and like do it you know as in like a ah something like something you would do um like Running wouldn't be Energea necessarily as a natural outgrowth from Fousey's, but it's you know doing the rock thing well or going up into the sky as fire does. And so it does seem like you know you've got...
Speaker: ah Even though the example is of the iron and fire or the cutting sword, right? That seems like the quality of the sword. um It has this purpose to cut and fire by nature burns. And so these these are the energies that unite with one another and then Sure, the fire could burn on its own, but when united with the sword, which can cut on its own, it both burns and cuts together. And the burning is communicated through the cutting, and the cutting is communicated through the burning. That that whole sort of thing is this unity. And I i actually brought... when i when a little while ago, when we were Sam, when you were talking about the sort of like relation that one has with Christ, this is kind of... What came to mind, because, you know, if we think about God as the sort of, I think it's in Hebrews, right? god Our God is a fire, right? He can burn away sins. He can do that sort of work.
Speaker: He chooses to do so with the cutting of the sword, you know, to like get into the hearts of man, it seems, by uniting this activity with humanity. And so, yeah, man can die, but...
Speaker: God can save man. And so God can save humankind by being a man who dies. like This sort of amazing unity between the two going on there. so And to bring it back to the mystery of Maximus's own life, ah he had to have contemplated these mysteries in his flesh,
Speaker: how the cutting burn ah gave him three extra months because how was he to stop bleeding, but they were to cauterize his wounds after his organs of speech had been cut off.
Speaker: you know So in a sense, um so in in a sense he He experiences the touch of this this healing hot iron, as it were, that gives him ah a few months of monastic silence before he expires.
Speaker: it's it's It's beautiful to think about. But yeah, it's... and but yeah ah Maximus is so interesting. And and any anyone of your listeners who who hasn't gotten into reading him, I just can't encourage it enough.
Speaker: You don't have to necessarily start with a work like like this. The Centuries on Charity, the Chapters on Love. great place to start to get to know St. Maximus or ah or his chapters on theology. If you're interested in his interpretation of scripture, the questions that the Lassie is. So,
Speaker: But he he's one of those thinkers that you just you can't stop. You got to read everything that he's written ah because he amen he he resists the that sort of systemization.
Speaker: Everything that he's written, he's written because there's somebody's asked him to. It's really ad hoc. it's just yeahbra ah Beautiful. Yeah. Right. Great. Well, I think that's a good, good spot to end it maybe. And, uh, well, I mean, just to close thing out. Yeah. Kevin, do you mind, uh, telling us, uh, what you're working on these days?
Speaker: Sure. ah so, um, We've got Oxford patristics coming up next year. so i'm or I've organized a workshop of of papers on Maximus and his world.
Speaker: So if anyone's coming to Oxford, um you can find me there and and we'll hear. I've been working more on Maximus and his interpretation of scripture lately. His, especially his his reading of the literal sense.
Speaker: And this is leading me in the direction of patristic exegesis, because Maximus does a really interesting thing from origin of Alexandria's commentary on the Gospel of John in his reading of Proverbs 16.23, that um that the the the wise understand the words that are coming out of their their mouths. Yeah.
Speaker: And so for him, for Maximus, this refers to the the human author completely understands the mysteries that he's that he's writing about. Same kind of interpretation that you find in Origins, I think it's book six on the commentary on John.
Speaker: So I'm i'm working on ah let maybe more broadly the idea of human inspiration, the the inspiration of the human author in the writing of scripture.
Speaker: And, you know, just organizing our conferences at Sacred Heart. We have a conference next month in October on human nature, and and we'll have, we've we've launched a regular conference series. so So keep an eye out for interesting topics. If you're if you're interested in coming to Detroit and and having some of our uh, elite pizza up there.
Speaker: I was there last year. it was great. Yeah. So, uh, so good times. So that's what I'm up to lately. So thank you for asking. it's Awesome. Yeah, of course. Yeah. Well, thanks so much for coming on, Kevin. You as well, Dominic. I really appreciate it. You guys joining me and, uh, yeah, take care.
Speaker: Thank you, Sam.
