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Brendan Case: Bonaventure vs. Aquinas on Angels

The Dionysius Circle Podcast
The Dionysius Circle Podcast

0 plays · Nov 12, 2026

Transcript

Speaker: So Aquinas and Bonaventure agree that angels don't have physical bodies. Where they disagree is what angels are made of more exactly. So today I'm talking with Harvard theologian Brennan Case about this dispute, about this dispute over angels. And it's one of the four disputes he examines in his new book on Thomas and Bonaventure called Doubting Thomas, Early Franciscan Disputes with Aquinas. So St. Thomas says an angel is a form that exists without any matter.

Speaker: Bonaventure instead says an angel has both form and what he calls spiritual matter. So that might sound odd, the idea of a spiritual matter, but But the idea is that matter, in this case, spiritual matter, is what gives an angel the capacity to change without, even though the angel doesn't have a physical body. So think of Lucifer, for example, right? He was created good. And then he chose to rebel against God.

Speaker: He was still the same angel, but he changed in some sense. I guess his will changed. So for St. Bonaventure, spiritual matter is what made that change possible. I hope you enjoy the conversation.

Speaker: The motive for the book really is to um showcase the extent to which ah the positions that Bonaventure and Thomas take in each of these debates aren't just opposed conceptually, but ah I think in each case there's a there's there's a reasonable argument that and they actually constitute an actual argument and that that these two, and in some cases their students, were having with each other you know over the course of their lives. um And it's and i mean it's interesting in a way, biographically, because Bonaventure and Thomas taught together at the University of Paris for five years in the 1250s.

Speaker: So they're they're sort of bound up together, kind of in the way that Plato or and Aristotle were, you know what mean? Yeah. deeply intimate, you know, uh, intellectually tons and tons of common ground, some really important disagreements that they then worked out, you know, over the course of their, their intellectual lives. Um, and, uh, I mean, um the the comparison is illuminating because obviously, you know, boatloads of ink has been spilled on how Plato and Aristotle relate to each other. um much, much less has been written specifically about the, um,

Speaker: the debates that unfolded between Bonaventure and Thomas or or indeed other figures in the 13th century where, you know, the the done thing is more sort of to treat them as, you know, internally complete intellectual edifices, you know, sort of on their own terms. um And ah yeah, so ah I've chosen these four debates in part in part because I think they're intrinsically interesting and in part because they're, um they offer a nice way of of ah showcasing some important differences of sort of intellectual style and temperament between the two figures and really between the two orders that they represent, the Franciscans and Dominicans in this period. So,

Speaker: One of the big intellectual questions in the 13th century is what to do with the newly reintroduced ah works of Aristotle. Almost all of Aristotle had been lost in Western Europe, apart from you know some some parts of the logics, his his works, his logical works.

Speaker: And um they were reintroduced by way of um a Muslim dominated Spain in the late 12th century and um were widely available for the first time, you know, in the 13th century. So everyone's trying to make sense of how you integrate all of this new, ah this new impressive intellectual edifice into the kind of preexisting and Christian way of thinking about the world, which and in the Latin West was ah dominated um not exclusively by any means, but but heavily dominated by the thought and sort of legacy of Augustine. um

Speaker: and for you know for And Augustine represents a um ah a more Platonist and sort of Neoplatonist style of ah intellectual engagement, um you know heavily influenced by Plotinus and and um and ah and and you know for Augustine too, ah much much less influenced by Aristotle directly than by figures you know from the this sort of um broad Platonist tradition.

Speaker: So ah Thomas's approach is, you know, sort of ah cutting a long story short, and we'll get into the details in a bit, but Thomas's approach is generally much more sympathetic to Aristotle's thought than bottom interests.

Speaker: ah Both of them, obviously, are deeply influenced by Aristotle, particularly in terms of intellectual style. So the kinds of distinctions they make ah between form and matter, say, or act and potency, you know, those kinds of distinctions are important.

Speaker: Second nature to both of them. But um Thomas is a much more thoroughgoing and easiergoing Aristotelian than Bonaventure is. And this this informs a lot of their debates and ah inform the sort of sense of anxiety that Thomas provoked in in figures like Bonaventure and his students that that he was sort of throwing over too much.

Speaker: from the long Augustinian tradition in an effort to accommodate these new Aristotelian insights. So you see this ah on on, this is, this probably ah is illustrated most dramatically in the book in the first chapter about divine illumination and the, what's called the ontological argument.

Speaker: So that's a debate about ah the nature of our knowledge of God and how that knowledge relates to our knowledge of other things. um So Bonaventure's position, this is ah basically, he thinks basically an Augustinian position, which I think is pretty much right, is that um the very first thing we know in knowing anything is God. um God sort of represents not just a ah transcendent condition of possibility for the existence of things, but a kind of transcendental condition for our knowledge of anything at all. um

Speaker: He's the sort of ah uninflected to be that's implicated and um in every belief you know that has existential import. I was kind of thinking it as like, it's not just that God is like the ultimate cause, let's say, of you having a knowing faculty. I'm not saying this is Aquinas' position, but just to be like clear, like,

Speaker: You can imagine someone saying, yeah, I can't know anything without God in the sense that God had to create a world and he had to give me a faculty. And like and without him causing that, I wouldn't have been able to know anything like this cup or that whatever that I'm a human being. But but but you're but you're talking about something in the case of Bonaventure where the way in which God is involved in every instance of knowing is a little bit deeper than just God is the ultimate cause yeah of that knowing. Yeah. And I mean, it's, it's a Platonist position.

Speaker: Bonaventure is, you know, by way of, of Augustine's position is Platonist in the sense that, um, ah The debate really is about whether our knowledge of um universals has to be is prior to or posterior to our knowledge of particulars. You know, so the Platonist position is that we um you you find this particularly, you know, say in the dialogue like the Theotetus.

Speaker: ah is that we have to bring some apprehension, however tacit, of universal concepts to bear on the empirical world in order to have any you know coherent experiences at all.

Speaker: um So we have to use we have to be able to bring to bear categories like the same and different, you know large and small. i mean you know I mean, there's a famous example from the Mino of you know how do you know a triangle?

Speaker: How can you recognize a triangle in the actual world unless you have some prior apprehension of what that is? you know So um the Christian move, kind of you know this is ah ah very early on um in the patristic period, this sort of Christian move. this is I mean, kind of following other other ah middle Platonists, I suppose, is to relocate those forms in the mind of God. you know So what we know in knowing you know, the sort of universals that are implicated in our our ordinary experiences.

Speaker: um We have a kind of tacit acquaintance with with the very mind of God. That's the thought. um Thomas ah has, and you know, there's ah this is a complicated debate, but basically ah Thomas's position is, you know,

Speaker: ah the the aristotelian position like aristotle in most of his moods at least although there are some moments where aristotle sounds quite platonist on these uh on these topics as well but um uh aristotle in most of his moods thinks that this is um this is confused you know there's not ah there's not like a realm outside of space and time where the forms exist uh they just exist in things and we have to we get at them by knowing the things first and then abstracting the forms from them um And that's Thomas's position too.

Speaker: ah Yeah, more or less. And so we know God only after knowing creatures. um We know him by inference from creatures, you know, that's the thought. So, ah so you see how that these positions divide, they're both interesting, you know, um and, and what's you know important is they're kind of arguing with each other. Yeah. yeah i was about to say, that's like, you're that's what you were saying earlier, that it's not just that they're opposed, but there's an actual argument between them. And by that you mean like, even if, right. Cause like, it's not as a, is Aquinas when he's discussing, yeah. Like for example, this issue of divine illumination, it's not necessarily case that he's explicitly mentioning Bonaventure, right? Like by name.

Speaker: Oh, yeah, never. And they just don't do that. Yeah, they they don't they don't mention contemporaries as a rule, you know. um but But you think that when you actually consider what is being said, it's it's pretty clear that they are knowledgeable of each other's arguments and kind of implicitly...

Speaker: Yeah. in ah In a number of cases, they use the same highly specific analogies, for instance, although often kind of reversing the import, you know, so an argument that appears, you know, in the pro section of Thomas's discussion will appear in the contra section in Bonaventure's same basic argument, you know, highly similar analogies about the nature of light, say, and in the case of illumination, you know, whether we perceive color or light first, that sort of thing. ah So, yeah, it's, um and i you know, I think it's, um i don't I don't want to make strong claims necessarily about, you know, Thomas's dependence, you know, on Bonaventure's The Mind's Journey to God in writing his commentary on Boethius where this analogy appears. I mean, there's other possibilities. They knew each other in real life. You know, this might have been...

Speaker: a conversation or series of conversations they had and person that they've been kind of serialized. I mean, so I think that there's, um ah but I do think, yeah, it's important to, what's important to my mind is to recognize that this is a real debate that seems to be unfolding between two flesh and blood people, you know, that that's, a and you can, it's not just that you can compare them in the way that you can compare, you know, say,

Speaker: um ah you know, today you could fruitfully, it'd be interesting to compare, you know, um Hume with like early Buddhist thinkers on the question of the, you know, ah the emptiness of the soul or something like that. um But um there's like a kind of, there's a thicker connection than that, you know?

Speaker: So, and I've, I've, I've obviously spent more time probably than I should have on this first debate. The other two debates very briefly are on the, on the nature of the Trinity. It's a question about the, um,

Speaker: It's really a question about the the relationship between um ah unity and plurality in God and by extension in creation. um ah Thomas thinks that there's a you can't really ah make any inferences from knowing that God is one.

Speaker: um There are no pathways that lead ah the no pathways in thought that lead to the the idea that God is three. Bonaventure thinks that ah what we know and knowing that God is one um and and particularly knowing that God is unbegotten, this is the sort of predicate, you know, that that he's the sort of um ah principle without principle, you know, of all things.

Speaker: Um, is ah that that that that concept itself ah already intimates a kind of self-diffusive fullness in the life of God, ah which is the wellspring of the processions in the Trinity, as well as of the plurality of the cosmos. So that there's a kind of, Bonaventure thinks that there are rational demonstrations of the necessity of of processions, like the consubstantial processions in God.

Speaker: and That's the basic argument. So, so you know, it's a... um ah this is This is a little bit less squarely a difference about Aristotle, sort of for obvious reasons that this is not a thing that Aristotle really entertained.

Speaker: Right, he wasn't discussing the Trinity, yeah. Yeah, but um but it is it's a nice illustration, that debate, along with the debate about the finitude of time, where the question is, can we demonstrate rationally that time is finite? and That is a squarely Aristotelian debate. Aristotle says no, Thomas follows him, Bonaventure follows him.

Speaker: ah John Philipponis, you know, fifth century, sixth century, I guess, Christian philosopher, um and saying, yeah, we can actually, there are good Aristotelian reasons for thinking that um that time, contrary to what Aristotle thought has to be finite in extension. um And what's interesting about both of those debates is, um to me, is they highlight the extent to which, and this is this is true for the divine illumination debate as well, the extent to which, um despite his reputation as the sort of paradigmatic natural theologian in the 13th century, and kind of for all time, you know, a lot of people who who don't know much about the Middle Ages sort of think of Thomas as like the guy who does natural theology, you know?

Speaker: And and ah often people who are quite anxious about this, you know, will single out Thomas as like the example of how not to do theology because it's too reliant on reason, you know. But what's funny about it is Thomas is actually quite a fainthearted practitioner of natural theology in the 13th century. Bonaventure is willing is is ah is ah way more aggressive in the claims that he makes for what reason is competent to demonstrate than Thomas's. Right. For example, that that that God is a trinity, like... Yeah. that I mean, you know, Bonaventure thinks there's there's heavy heavy qualifications here, which I try to elucidate in the

Speaker: in the um ah in the book. I mean, you know, Bonaventure does think that we have to be um he thinks essentially that it would never occur to us that that kind of consubstantial sharing was possible if we hadn't been told that it was, that it was actual, but that once we know that it's actual, ah we can trace out rationally, you know, uh, the sort of assess necessary linkages, you know? So, uh, whereas for Thomas, yeah, there's just no, there's no connection rationally between the two. ah So, yeah, I mean, it's um it's interesting.

Speaker: I think that people, it' and it's a nice illustration. This is one of the one of the reasons, honestly, for Thomas to read this this kind of book is that um it gives you a better sense of what's actually distinctive about Thomas in the period and what can and can't be claimed for him, you know?

Speaker: I mean, so, ah yeah, I think that's a, there's real, and this is this is true, obviously, for people who are in interested in Bonaventure principally as well, but you get a better sense of, you know, how an individual's thought hangs together by contrasting it with a near contemporary who's sort of putting very similar pieces together in quite a different way.

Speaker: um And this is true as well for the manner debate, which I guess willll will we'll spend more time kind of digging into. So first issue, divine illumination, basically, you know, for Bonaventure, our grasp of any truth involves some kind of awareness of God.

Speaker: um Even if it's not a clear vision of God, it involves some kind of awareness of God. With respect to the Trinity, um yeah, like something like what explains the distinction of persons?

Speaker: Bonaventure is kind of like... Well, anyway, we we we I was to say, yeah, gives he kind of gives priority to their origin over their relation, I guess. ah maybe Yeah. I mean, the way the way they put it is the priority of what they call notional acts. So the act of begetting to the relation. So the question the question, actually, they have a nice way of putting this in terms of two questions. So is it...

Speaker: ah Is it that the father ah begets because he's father or is he father because he begets? ah So for Thomas, it's the la it's the former.

Speaker: um We have to be told about the relationship of the father to the son. And then by inference, we recognize that the father begets the son. ah For Bonaventure, it's actually that we we recognize by inference from the mere, merely being told that God is principle without principle, that he's unbegotten.

Speaker: um ah already suggests that um ah that he's the one who begets everything else. ah And so because of that, by inference from that, we we reason to the insight that he is father, that he shares himself perfectly, his essence perfectly with with another.

Speaker: ah And so that's just, yeah, it's a different, it's, you know, it's I think it's, it's, um I don't want to overstate the differences between these views. I mean, there's a kind of tendency, especially among Thomist theologians today to accuse Bonaventure of like being an Aryan or subordinationist or something like that, you know, and um ah on, on with the idea that, you know, the, um ah that ah if only, only the father has the property of sort of being of existing,

Speaker: ah ah I'll say, you know, like from, from himself without, without principle that, um, the son has to be a kind of deity in a second and the spirit in a kind of secondary sense, you know, sort of in an in an Arian sense. And that's, um, I mean, essentially not only, I think the bottom, which is quite clear that that's not what he's saying in, in, in ascribing this sort of positive content to the father's unbegottenness, but, um,

Speaker: ah Thomas himself never accuses Bonaventure of that, and he's clearly aware of these discussions. I mean, this is a case where the principal discussions, one one text of Bonaventure's that know for sure that Thomas read carefully and and um and closely is um his commentary on Peter Lombard's sentences, which we know he used in preparing his own commentary. This is sort of like the 13th century equivalent of the dissertation.

Speaker: ah all of the, ah as ah the last step to becoming a fully qualified magister is to comment, give a series of lectures on this textbook ah called The Sentences by Peter Lombard. And they're preserved typically in these big commentaries, you know. um So Bonaventure's was a couple of years before Thomas's at the University of Paris. And it's just very clear that Thomas in many cases is um sort of responding almost point by point to Bonaventure's. So, um yeah. So if that was a thing that Thomas was worried about, he would have made that clear in his own discussion of this issue. And he doesn't. So I think that it's a I don't want to overstate the differences between the views. They're interesting differences, but kind of within this broadly, you know, Nicene framework, let's say.

Speaker: your book is not just like a historical reconstruction. Here's the, you know, the differing positions. Here's the argument between Aquinas and Bonaventure. There's also an element of you, uh, side with ah Bonaventure on these four particular issues. So there's, you know, there's this, just this, a straight, you know, philosophical theological element where you're kind of, um, you know, defending, uh, Bonaventure.

Speaker: Um, now, So that's just one point I wanted to to emphasize. And then the second point or second kind of thing I wanted to bring up was just like, um how deep is the disagreement here ultimately? Like, um you know, like for example, people can think about like Barkley versus Hobbes. It's like idealism versus materialism. That's like a very profound disagreement. Yeah.

Speaker: Descartes versus Hobbes, like dualism versus materialism, like very profound disagreement. Sartre versus Spinoza, like huge disagreement. One doesn't think, you know, yeah one just thinks we're like, like is is a determinist, right? So anyway, like those are kind of like really profound ism type disagreements. um Now, the type of disagreement going on here would seem to be, you know, oh less high stakes than that. Anyway, I just i just want to kind of get a sense of like, yeah, what do you think about like when you think about overall like systemic level type fundamental philosophical framework? How deep does the disagreement between Bonaventure and Aquinas go?

Speaker: Yeah, yeah, not nearly that, not as deep as the cases you've you've enumerated. I mean, you know, it's, yeah, and that's, in a way, is what makes them the debates really interesting, you know, because they have so many premises in common free for every debate, you know. So it's, um same I mean, a lot of the debates, you know, that you referenced, ah arguably, you know, there's a fair amount of talking past each other that that's going on, you know, where, I mean, it's not, um it's it's difficult if you don't already share quite a lot in common in terms of basic convictions about the world, even to get an argument off the ground. You know, ah um and there's a funny moment. I was just thinking as you were describing this, I've recalled there's this in one of, um um you know, Hobbes wrote these objections to um to Descartes, these letters, you know, sort of, criticisms and he he at one point he says, you know,

Speaker: um uh that Descartes proposition that there's an immaterial intellect is like saying that there's uh that there's uh jumping without a jumper you know like that's just what it is to exist is to be a body know it's like doesn't and it's I mean it's clear they're just talking past each other I mean you know this is not a so um yeah it's not like that you know I mean they they uh ah yeah more The more profound the divide, is sometimes the more yeah difficult it is to have like a serious philosophical yeah conversation, I guess. Yeah. And it's worth it's worth emphasizing that, you know ah for probably all this to sign a kind of random number, but this is directionally accurate, that like say 85% of the questions that they're interested in, they really basically agree on. you know i mean there aren't There aren't deep differences on on many, many questions that are of common interest. ah

Speaker: um So the 15% where they really disagree are quite, and I mean, they're, they're, uh, they're interesting. The ones I've chosen are interesting in a way because they are kind of architectonic, you know, I mean, in the sense that they're, they're, they're pretty far upstream in each thinkers, uh, views of the world, you know? So, uh, you know, when, um, when Bonaventure looks out at the world, you know, what he sees uh, uh,

Speaker: a ah a reality which is accessible sort of only by only sort of across ah the, uh, the prism of the supernatural in a way, you know, I mean that like, it's a world that you're seeing through God in a very profound sense. Um, and that's where I'm as we'll talk about in relation to matter, you know, it's a world that is, um, uh, uh, constructed out of matter at every level, you know, even, even, you know, at the risk of kind of, um, uh,

Speaker: potentially overextending that term or, you know, extending that term beyond its sort of colloquial ah usages even in his day. Yeah. yeah So that's, you know, Thomas, like he's just, when he looks out at the world, he sees a pretty different, it looks quite different, you know, ah just because he thinks in these, at these kind of fundamental levels at ah in a very different way about the structure of reality.

Speaker: But, um but yeah, like on sort of narrow questions, I mean, like questions about, you know, um the nature of pervenient grace or, you know, I don't know what, what, what else would be of interest? You i mean, sort of the the cut, what we think of as like, you know, typical theological debates, they tend, you know, uh,

Speaker: They're both kind Augustanian and it's fairly straightforward. I mean, there's way bigger disagreements between them and, or, you know, how we think about the filioque or something like that. Like if you compare them to any Greek theologian of the of their day or whatever, I mean, there are much bigger differences between them and other other people of other confessions, say. Yeah, I mean, this is a little bit off the cuff, but I'm just thinking how on the one hand,

Speaker: I'm inclined to think, yeah, like it's, it's the, the, the differences are sort of trivial in a way, but on the other hand, at least with respect to the divine and illumination issue, I do part of me wants to say that, um, there's some sort of like deep, like,

Speaker: Jamesian type, like I'm thinking of like William James with like philosophical temperaments. It does like, there seems to be something like deep about that where it's like some people want a really inclined to say, maybe it's on like aesthetic grounds. I don't even know, but there's some deep inclination within certain people to be like, yeah, there's a way in which like my knowledge of God is somehow built into human existence. It's always there, even if it's inchoate, even if it's like implicit, it's like somehow it's like the heartbeat of all of my intellectual acts or something. Anyway, I feel like that, that gestures at some kind of like deep thing at the very least that particular, um, issue, but,

Speaker: Anyway, i don't That's just a side thing. Anyway, maybe we can start talking about angels now. And um so basically, yeah, this is going to initially seem maybe will remain to seem that way to you. But anyway, it's kind of seems like a technical, peripheral, theological question. It might seem initially. But I think, you know, when you think about this angel question of like, basically the question is, what are they composed of? um it actually ends up, at least as your book shows, it raises some really deep um issues. Anyway, so, but let's kind of just first get, you know, be introduced to the debate. um

Speaker: Like I said, as I understand, it's kind of a ah debate about what angels are composed of. This is another case where ah the 13th century debate is really profoundly shaped by the novel reintroduction of Aristotle's physical and metaphysical works, um, in the, you know, which had just been lost, right. Uh, to the, to the, to Western Europe for centuries.

Speaker: And so, ah when, uh, Christian theologians, philosophers in the 13th century read these works. They encountered discussion in Aristotle of these set of a set of beings he calls intelligences. You find them find discussion of them in the metaphysics in particular.

Speaker: um And these are basically, it's this is his his kind of... um ah not secularized, but um ah demon demythologized account of the Greek pantheon.

Speaker: um So there's one high God, the unmoved mover, who is the wellspring of all being and all motion in the universe. But um there's also a realm of um relative changelessness.

Speaker: they thought above the moon, right? Below the moon, stuff's changing all the time. Everything's falling apart. Above the moon, and this is, you know, again, just given the limits of their own, you know, they didn't have telescopes, right? I mean, given the limits of what they could observe, just nothing, everything seems constant, right? The stars just revolve in their courses year after year.

Speaker: ah There are these wandering bodies called planets, which do move quite a lot, but also never seem to change, right? They sort of move move across the fixed stars. And Aristotle's theory is that these things are sort of driven, i don't know if that's the right word for it, but they're moved ah by a set of subordinate intelligences. um And these, you know, not coincidentally, the planets are named for gods, right? So Jupiter is moved by, you know, what we think of as Jupiter, right? And this is, in his mind, it's kind of self self-consciously a ah a way of rationalizing

Speaker: you know, and sort of imposing order on this unruly, you know, kind of home the Homeric conception, let's say. a seeing yeah um And the thing to understand, that what's really important about this for Aristotle is that, um ah as I've said before, in the superlunary realm, ah nothing changes. Things move locally, but nothing changes. It's a fixed order um eternally in Aristotle's mind. ah And so the intelligences, he's quite explicit that the intelligences like the unmoved mover are pure forms.

Speaker: um What they are is a single subsisting act of contemplation. They contemplate the unmoved mover, they contemplate God. And in that contemplation, they impart motion to the planet, which try to imitate the perfection unmoved mover.

Speaker: of the, of God's kind of self enclosed contemplation through the circularity of their movements, eternal, eternally circular movements. That's the theory, right? This is again, kind of simplifying, but, and so what's interesting about that is, um, so the question is for the Christians, okay, so, um,

Speaker: It seems reasonable to identify at least kind of very broadly what Aristotle means by intelligences with what Christians mean by angels, you know, um you see how that would go there in the soup. They're also in the heavens, you know, right? So angels and demons broadly court. And so the question is, okay, um what then to say about angels in view of this theory? We have this, we have this sort of, you know, very impressive intellectual edifice, um, uh,

Speaker: it has, it has a kind of place, uh, in its universe for pure, pure forms below God, you know, uh, which are acts of an election.

Speaker: um Can we just take, and so Bonaventure and Thomas represent two ways of inheriting this picture. um Thomas, again, kind of takes it straight and tries to fit what Christians ah ah felt compelled to say about angels into that Aristotelian picture. So the biggest difference between a Christian angel or demon and... um in Aristotelian intelligence is that Christian angels have to change at least a little.

Speaker: um So like everybody in the 13th century agrees that angels change at least once at the in the first moment of their creation, you know, either for or against God. And this is how you get the division between angels and demons. um there's sort of disagreement or, you know, it's a positive to understand exactly what's happening, so to speak in the life of an angel after that, you know, and whether there are subsequent success of accidental changes, but at the very least we all, you know, everyone agrees that we need to say that, um, you know, that angels, uh, are capable of accidental change. Right. Um,

Speaker: And so the question is, how's that possible? ah So thomas Thomas's angelology is an attempt to say, well, we can hold on to this Aristotelian conception of angels as pure forms, but ah introduce a different different kind of composition into them that can explain how they change.

Speaker: Bonaventure's view is that ah ah the Aristotelian equation of subsistent forms with changelessness is um inflexible, you know, that there's just no way around that, that equation. And so we need we need to introduce additional kinds of composition ah beyond just the sort of um what you need to account for the existence of a subsisting form, if they're going to be capable of change. ah And yeah, it's, and I mean, you know, I think you're, you're right to say that in a sense, this is, um,

Speaker: This is a highly speculative debate. Obviously, that's just how it goes in angelology. um its you know Angelology is interesting in a lot of debates as a way of thinking about it's a kind of limit case. you know So um if we imagine taking away bodies, for instance, and both all parties you know to the debate agree, this actually goes back to to Peter Lombard's sentences. and he He sort of spells out, you know here us here are four things that everybody agrees about with regard to angels. One is that they don't have bodies. This is a kind of... a principle which was up for debate in the patristic period ah all the 13th century folks agree that angels whatever else they are they're disembodied so they're they're not um they don't consist of parts outside of parts that's the the sort of you know somewhat technical way of putting and that's what a body is it's it's um it's uh spatially extended parts that exist you know um in a non-overlapping way yeah in constellation with one another. So they don't have that kind of existence.

Speaker: ah So the question then is, how do they, if they don't exist like that, how can they change? How can they know things, you know? um And so it's interesting. it's an interesting way of thinking about like, you know, in principle, what are we talking about actually when talk about accidental change um in like a deeper metaphysical sense, is it really just talk about changes in bodies or is there like a deeper, deeper level to those discussions, which we tend to miss because we're thinking so much about, you know, right now, you know, there's a bunch of things changing in me at the moment. Um, body parts are moving, you know, obviously brain is brain activity that involves locomotion, but, um, there's a further set of changes that's happening, you know, um,

Speaker: Invisibly accessible only wi by way say of the signs I'm generating, like in my mind, if that's if that's a thing that's that's distinct in some way for my brain activity. um And the connections I'm tracking, they're conceptual, you know they're logical.

Speaker: ah ah It seems like we need some way of accounting metaphysically for what's happening there that isn't just reducible to local motion. you know There's real problems at any rate conceptually with um with making sense of what we're doing when we understand a proposition you know or or follow an argument.

Speaker: And so, yeah, angels are an interesting way of thinking about that as a, it's a kind of laboratory chemically pure lab lab setting, you know, like what's a mind like if you take the body away, you know? So that's, I think that's the interest, you know, in a way the extent that they have contemporary answers for people who aren't like deeply invested in, you know, the dog dogmatic debates, they're kind of interesting in that way. No. Yeah. Just to echo that, like the deep issues that come up here, you know, so one might be,

Speaker: um if something exists and it's not God, so like a creature, um is it necessarily going to be a composition of matter and form?

Speaker: um So that's like kind of one kind of question that comes up here. A second question would be like, suppose something exists and it's not God, it's a creature and it changes.

Speaker: Must that thing necessarily be a composition of matter and form? And then, yeah, then I don't know how to put this one, but like, that's what you're just gesturing out with the last comments where it's like, if,

Speaker: you were to have a non bodily substance and it were to change. Well, yeah. i mean, would a non bond could a non bodily substance have some kind of matter to it, like a spiritual type of matter. Yeah. Yeah.

Speaker: yeah And it occurs to me that I didn't, um in so and I was sort of setting the table that we didn't actually describe exactly, exactly how Thomas and Bonaventure solve. Oh, right. Yeah. yeah solve this so So just briefly, I mean, Thomas's view is that, you know, we can, we can take seriously this idea, Aristotelian idea that angels are subsisting forms, meaning forms without matter. So,

Speaker: I mean, it' and I guess, yeah, just very, very briefly, this is a lot of debate about exactly what Aristotle or any later figure means by matter and form, but um these are complementary principles, metaphysical principles. So they're not, um don't think of of, you know, Descartes' wax or something, you know, spatially extended, but um ah they're they're metaphysical principles of um ah actuality and potency, basically.

Speaker: ah So ah matter describes the a kind of indeterminate capacity of a, of a thing to take on some actuality.

Speaker: Um, and form describes essentially what it, what, what a thing becomes in taking on some actual state. So, i mean, the easiest way of understanding this is like in a, in a, a concrete substance, like, like, uh, you or me, you know, uh,

Speaker: ah the individual composite acts as a kind of matter for um a kind of receptive principle for all kinds of accidental properties. So I i i used to be shorter than I am now. Eventually I will be i will once again be shorter than I currently am. you know I was born with much less hair than I currently have. Eventually I will probably have much less hair than I have, right? You see how that goes. so And we're we're subject to all kinds, of I mean, these are those are physical accidents, but um We can also grow in accidental properties like wisdom, you know, or let's say, you know, I was, I was born with a potency to reading Latin. I acquired, I actualized that potency, you know, in learning Latin. I might at some point forget it, right. And lose it. So those are all accidental properties that wax and wane. Right. And, uh, so the, um,

Speaker: ah The idea is for um and and it's and it's clear throughout there, right, that to the extent we're talking about matter, we're talking about a principle of mutability, a principle for change with respect to forms. Forms are what stays constant or it sorry, matters what stays constant form is what changes over time. Right. ah And forms are. um principles of intelligibility.

Speaker: Uh, so they're the thing that we track when we're tracking, uh, common structures across. So, you know, when i pick out say a white whiteness, an instance of white over here and an instance of white over there, what's the same as whiteness, you know, um, it's instantiated concretely by virtue of being received in matter. That's the theory, you know, uh, but what's the same is this sort of, um,

Speaker: form is a kind of one over many or a generic, you know, it's a yeah it's a universal, I guess, in that in that broad sense. So the, and there's ah there's a sort of, you know, an intuitive principle, ah which Thomas acknowledges as well in general, that um forms cannot be the subjects of predicates.

Speaker: um Like we don't predicate things of whiteness, right? We predicate whiteness of things. um ah So ah it seems strange on its face, you know, to think that you could, you could treat an angel as a kind of, it's like almost, it's almost like a subsist, you know, subsisting shade of blue. This is sort of, you know, from ah I think that Douglas Adams in one of his novels describes this as one of the characters, you know, it's sort of like that. That's sort of what a Thomist angel is, you know? um

Speaker: So then how does that change? How does blueness itself change? It doesn't, it's just blue. You know, i mean, that's what it is to be. That's what blueness is. It's, it's instantiated in things which change with respect to color, you know, um, Thomas's view is that even self subsisting form, um, uh,

Speaker: if it exists, if it exists contingently as a creature in the world, uh, has to involve at least one kind of composition, uh, which is the composition of its essence with its existence.

Speaker: Uh, so, um, it's, it's whatness with its thatness, you might say, you know, so, so you know, you can, the theory is sort of like, you could have an exhausted description of um,

Speaker: of me and of Mr. Tumnus, say from the Chronicles of Narnia and not know which one of us existed. you know um Like what has to be added to that essence is an active existing, which realizes it as a concrete being in the world. you know that's the That's the theory.

Speaker: And um Thomas thinks that that that every creature has that, whether it has matter or not, and that suffices somehow to explain how it could change.

Speaker: um how an angel could change. the um The Franciscans, Bonaventure and his students, sir William de la Mer, Peter John O'Levy, I consider a number of of critics of of Thomas on this point, um jeff I think make the very reasonable point that um That distinction, um I call it, it's a distinction which um goes back in the medieval discussion most immediately to Boethius, to a distinction he makes in um his his work on the Trinity. So I call it the Boethian distinction. um

Speaker: There's a bunch of different ways of formulating it, but everybody kind of agrees that there's this sort of composition that even, even say the... um the the accidental form of brownness you know that makes my hair brown. you know That's how you want to think about what's what's happening you know in um in hair color.

Speaker: is um ah Even though it couldn't exist independently of you know the other of the the ah the composite you know strand of hair that it that you know for bonaventure even that bonaventure agrees that uh that accidental form taken on its own uh is a is a composite creature it's composed itself of a of a whatness and of thatness there's the what it is it's you know this accidental accidental property of brownness and there's the fact that it happens to exist like my hair color could have could have been different i could dye my hair you know right that sort of thing

Speaker: ah But it doesn't make sense. Noting that doesn't give you any reason to think that that accidental shade, you know, the the accident of my hair color could somehow be the subject of independent change, you know, on its own.

Speaker: um That composition explains contingency, um which which is a real, it's really that's a really important distinction, right? this is This is one of the things that marks the kind of boundary line between um contingency is, is, is, ah ah one of the things that distinguishes creatures from God, right? ah That, that, um, in God, the sort of Thomas way of putting this is that essence and and existence are one, right? He is his own act of existence, right? That sort of, that sort of thing.

Speaker: Um, but, um, noting that something exists contingently doesn't tell you how it could change. Right. And it's just, I, it's, I think for Bonavitch, it's very important that, um, the, um,

Speaker: you know, the sort of Aristotelian origins of this theory um entail that the intelligences don't change. um That's like by design, you know? So Bonavitcher thinks you have to you have to add to that distinction, ah the Boethian distinction, you have to add a further distinction of form and matter, even in angels, if they're going to be able to change, there has to be some principle of mutability and receptivity that explains how they can receive accidental properties like, you know, say, um, wisdom or folly, you know, um, beatifying grace or, or estrangement, you know, it's privation and estrangement from God, you know, those, those, uh, those kinds of properties. And so, you know, the, um the, the objection,

Speaker: ah the The most interesting objection that the the spiritual immaterialists like Thomas make to the the universal hylomorphous position that kind of, you know, everything is matter has matter, including angels, um is that... ah a mind which included matter would being capable of knowing, ah universals.

Speaker: Um, cause the, the idea basically is that matter, and this is, there's a kind of reasonable intuition here is that the way you get particular beings is by embedding universal forms in matter. That's what matter does. It particularizes things, you know? Um, so, you know, you and I both have a common, we both instantiate in, in our own ways, a common form of humanity, you know? Um, so the idea is,

Speaker: if when I recognize, if in knowing that, you know, in intellecting that, what I'm doing is abstracting that form mentally from its particular its particular conditions, right? So I'm abstracting your form and my form from the matter that particularizes them.

Speaker: So the worry is that if my intellect itself is composed of matter, that it will it would it would sort of re-particularize it. Like I wouldn't be able to actually to treat them, um if I'm receiving it into matter in my intellect, why doesn't that just result in another particular, you know, sort of the is sort of the worry. um so yeah, so it's an interesting question. Thinking of an apple, why don't I become an apple? Why don't I become an apple? Exactly, yeah. Yeah, and I mean, I think the most interesting the most interesting response to this, ah to my mind, is um In, um in, but there's, there's this book ah by the Franciscan William de la Mer called the, um the Correctorium of divine of, ah of brother Thomas. um

Speaker: And it's a kind of critical commentary on Thomas's Summa Teologiae, which he wrote at the behest of the order and which was sort of, um,

Speaker: the the order, this is in the 1270s when Thomas was at like the height of his, his reputation was at its lowest ebb, you know, I think in the, in the Western world, ah the order, um,

Speaker: uh, mandated that Franciscan novices were only to be allowed to read Thomas's summa, uh, if they also read William de la Mer's correctiorium alongside it as a kind of like antidote to it. But, um, but so a William makes the interesting point that, um, there, that this, that Thomas's argument, um, if it proves anything proves way too much because it ah it ought to prove the basic, the basic intuition here is that like is known by like, you know, that, um,

Speaker: we need to if we're If we're to know ah pure forms, we have to be pure form in some sense. But, you know, William makes the point that that that argument, if you take it seriously, would imply that to know universals, the intellect should have to be a universal itself, you know, ah or that, you know, for the the senses to apprehend the ah the immaterial images of universe.

Speaker: of sensor sensible objects, they should have to be immaterial images themselves, which is obviously nonsense, right? Like no one, these are not positions that anybody entertains, you know, including Thomas. So, um, uh, yeah, but you know, Bonaventure, he makes the point, I think, I think this is a, it's an interesting question, I think, you know, exactly how we, um, how we put these pieces together. But, um, you know, he says we should think about, we should think about the mind, this is a venerable analogy, obviously, as something like a mirror, um, that, uh, uh, mirrors are, are receptive.

Speaker: Um, like the whole point of a mirror is that it doesn't have, um, it has no content of its own. This is why, you know, it can receive the images of any and everything, you know, and the mind is purely receptive. This is part of what it means to ascribe spiritual matter to it. Uh, but only in the sense that it's sort of potentially open to receiving the abstracted essences of anything. Uh, so, you know, it's, um,

Speaker: Yeah, i'm i'm my my view, I guess, about that stage of the debate is that um ah Thomas's position, i think, for sure fails. ah I just think the the sort of the sort of imminent critique of it that the Franciscans mount is um sufficient to show that it's just not a candidate position, actually. you know i mean, properly understood, it just doesn't actually have the the resources. to It's too parsimonious. It doesn't have the resources to explain um all of the relevant phenomena. um you know the The Franciscan position is um ah is metaphysically you know more freighted.

Speaker: It's just got more stuff going on. ah So it's a bit more it's a bit more cumbersome and complicated for that reason. But um yeah to my mind, it's a much more promising candidate. if you're If you take, and it's worth saying, I say this at the beginning of the chapter, but, you know, I don't have strong views about the obligation of any of anyone to sort of take on board all of these presuppositions. um ah So, you know, i mean, for instance, if you wanted to go to the mat for angels having ethereal bodies, whatever those are, like maybe lots of other things would become possible. um That is itself, you know, requires further understanding.

Speaker: ah you know, staking further controversial metaphysical claims, ah which might create more problems than they solve, you know. ah But if you if you if you take, as you're starting presuppositions, something like the picture of angels that Thomas and Bonamitcher have in common, so they're bodiless, they're intellectual, they change at least a little bit, you know. um Yeah, I do think that the Franciscan route is way more promising than the Thomas route.

Speaker: Yeah, good. Well, that's a really helpful kind of overview of like a lot of the key issues in the debate. And yeah, just to kind of echo a few things that you discussed there, you know, just, yeah, going back to the fundamental point that, all right, so for Aquinas, the basic theory of angels. Yeah, like you said, it's inspired by Aristotle. And the idea is that an angel lacks matter. So it's just a subsistent form.

Speaker: um Although there's still a distinction in it, there's still a kind of composition which, as you you know spoke about, concerns the Boethian distinction between essence and existence. so But yeah, the idea for Thomas is you know the angel is just subsistent subsistent form. On the other hand, Bonaventure, even though he agrees with Thomas that an angel doesn't have a body, like you said, yeah,

Speaker: yeah its it's not like an angel has like extended part outside of part type body, like you said. However, you know Bonaventure thinks that the angel is still a composition of...

Speaker: matter and form. It's just the matter here is spiritual matter. So like we have this kind of like, uh, special idea of spiritual matter, which, uh, might be, you know, initially a little bit puzzling. Uh, but, but anyway, that that's like part of his theory is that, yeah, the angel is still, um, a composition of matter and form. Whereas for Thomas, it's just a subsistent form. And, um, yeah, like you were kind of,

Speaker: pointing out like there's kind of a key challenge for each theory. You know, there's a key objection that each theory has to kind of answer to. So it will kind of be focused more on the, the, the one that applies to Thomas. But yeah, like you said, that there is one that, um,

Speaker: um there is one also that Bonaventure faces, which has to do with like basically um explaining how spiritual matter is kind of compatible in some sense with intellectual activity. And like you said, there's the whole issue of like, you know, if you don't have, well, yeah, like wouldn't in thinking of something would that like entail that,

Speaker: um whatever you think of, you end up becoming that thing. um And anyway, that's kind of like dependent on some like Aristotelian stuff. And I don't know, I don't know we can maybe just skip over. I mean, but yeah, i mean, just for the listeners to be fair, you know, you definitely go over like the key objection to Bonaventure's view and your book. And maybe we we won't focus on that now, but maybe we could talk about this whole like change problem.

Speaker: Cause that's kind of like the key objection to Thomas. Cause like you were bringing up with Aristotle, okay, he has these pure intelligences, but they don't change. in Aristotle's theory, right? So he's not required to explain how you could have a pure intelligence without matter that also changes. He doesn't need, he doesn't have that burden because he doesn't think these intelligences are changing. Whereas Thomas is, yeah, he's he's committed to this idea that no, actually the angels at least change once, right? When they're, they go from like, I guess it would be like a volitional change. Like Lucifer went from,

Speaker: I don't know, being committed to God, to committed to rejecting him. So that's like a change in his will. And like you talk about in your book, it's an accidental change. So a substantial change is different from an accidental change.

Speaker: Accidental change like yeah would be going from like wanting ice cream to wanting root beer float. Whereas a substantial change would be like, you burn down a tree and it goes from an Oak tree to a bunch of ashes.

Speaker: Um, when it loses a leaf, that's an accidental change. And so anyway, so the kind of the ah the thought here is that for Bonaventure is like Aquinas, you need matter in, in the angels because that's what you need to explain accidental change.

Speaker: Is that kind of, yeah. I mean, you know, the, Yeah, I mean, the idea basically is that um the essence existence distinction might account for the mere fact that ah an angel exists. So you can imagine, you know, let's um let's concede, Bonumenter says that, you know,

Speaker: we can imagine a form that subsisted on its own, you know, self subsisting form. i mean he does, it's worth saying he thinks there are other problems with this theory to do with like the way angel angels are individuated. So one, one sort of counterintuitive consequence of Thomas's theory the angels is that they're each their own species.

Speaker: Like there are not, there's no such thing as the category angels. That's a, that's not a natural kind. Um, they each That's our our kind of our kind of imposition. you know We group them together because they're sort of similar. you know but um So yeah, like Gabriel and Michael and Lucifer, are not they don't belong to one genus called angels. you know That is very counterintuitive. Yeah, well, I mean, at the very least, it doesn'ts it's revisionary, you know let's say. I mean, lots of things are counterintuitive where angels are considered. Yeah, it can fine. I mean, I mean i think, generally speaking, it's like counterintuitive things can be like a point yeah against your theory, but it's just a point. you know It's not like the whole game. yeah anyway But the the big, so the big, that's like that's a kind of side issue, though. I mean, the biggest issue for Bonaventure is that um even if you imagine that Gabriel, let's say, is constituted as a creature, existing contingently, you know, in ah in a kind of finite bounded way in contradistinction to God's, you know, um infinite actuality,

Speaker: um necessary existence, all of that. If you imagine that Gabriel is constituted by ah the the real composition in him of essence and existence so that, you know, his whatness has to be actualized by the kind of super addition of this um active act of being, which he borrows from God. You know, if you take that,

Speaker: even if even if that's all true, um all that suffices to explain is the mere fact of Gabriel's existence. And you can even imagine that this is an intellectual existence, right? I mean, he's he's happy to concede that, you know, you can imagine Gabriel as constituted in a kind of eternal act um of um of contemplating God under some particular aspect, you know, so that his mind is um is fixed, you know, let's say on a certain set of objects. This is basically how Aristotle thinks about the intelligences, you know, again, it's a kind of frozen, act of frozen finite contemplation, you know.

Speaker: um So that's all fine. But you still haven't answered the question how Gabriel changes. Because, I mean, the holy angels have to change too, you know, in the sense of um of their will becoming fixed. You know, and there's a kind of decision for against God, you know. ah They receive beatifying grace, which fixes them, you know. And they're this is the this is the theory. Again, this is like, you know, I'm not saying anyone needs to accept this theory. But like if you...

Speaker: This is a this is a ah a pretty traditional, you know, ah like fairly boring Christian conception of angels goes back to Augustine, basically, you know, if you take the broad lines of that theory seriously, um you have an obligation to explain how it is that Gabriel changes. And and I do think this is not something that Bonaventure really dwells on.

Speaker: ah You get this more in Alevia, actually, we'll talk about, I suppose, in a minute, but... um ah There is the further issue, too, of, um you know, what certainly seem like distinct events, so to speak, in the life of an angel. So, you know, just in the Gospel of Luke, for instance, you know, Gabriel ah at time one has a conversation with Zechariah. At time two has a conversation with Mary. They seem like distinct events, you know. ah Those require some degree, you know. It would be hard to imagine being a Christian and not...

Speaker: thinking that angels to some degree undergo yeah some kind of change. Some kind of change, right. So however you want to parse that out, you know, ah yeah, you need, so you need a principle, not just of contingency, but also of mutability.

Speaker: And, and the point is Bonamitch's basic point is that these can't be the same principle. ah Explaining contingency is just a total, you're digging in the wrong place. If you think that that's going to explain mutability. Yeah. The idea is that, yeah, like this essence existence distinction can do explanatory work. You can use that distinction to explain certain things. So for example, um we want to understand why, um you know, so we take the oak tree, we burn it down, it becomes ashes. And we want to explain, well, how is it possible that the oak tree didn't exist, did exist, didn't exist again?

Speaker: How is that possible? Well, it must be the case that it in itself is not like existing. Instead, it receives its it's nature, the being a tree, I guess, whatever. It receives existence at one point.

Speaker: And then, you know, get that existence, which it received gets removed. And so it's like at one point it's a composition between, don't know, this is, I'm hopefully I'm not butchering this too bad, but like at one point it's a composition between this tree, a tree and existence, that composition gets broken apart and that's what happens when it no longer exists. And so anyway, the point being is that like the, the, how you're able to explain that a tree could go in and out of existence is by saying, well,

Speaker: it's a composition between um ah nature, Trinus or whatever, and existence. and that's how you And that's how you can explain why God could never go out of existence because he's like his godhood and his yeah existing factor are like identical. Anyway, so Bonaventure would agree that there are certain things you can explain with the essence existence distinction. But the the question is whether you can explain that angels changing with that distinction.

Speaker: Yeah. Cause I mean, again, you know, he, he makes the point, um, that, uh, uh, accidental properties have, have this, uh, uh, composition as well, you know, so the accidental property again of like my, you know, the brownness of my hair is contingent in the sense that it could, it came into being, it will, it could go out of being, you know, nothing, knowing nothing about, uh,

Speaker: The description of brownness you know entails that it exists in the way that a description of God's essence entails you know his existence, right? It sort of includes existence. So ah that's that's interesting. It's interesting to know that about accidental properties. This is true for height, say, as well or whatever. you know The temperature of my coffee you know is gradually changing.

Speaker: uh, changing, you know, from, from hot to cold. Right. Um, all of those, and they, you know, they, they think, uh, they hear meaning, you know, scholastics, you know, who are sort of working in this period in the spirit of, um, of the kind of broadly or setelian scholastic method. Like they all think that, uh, uh, at the metaphysical level, we're talking about real existence when we talk about accidents, accident accidental properties, uh, uh,

Speaker: are are real properties that, um, aren't just, I mean, I think it's, we're, we're, we're sort of people today are often so, uh, without realizing it, even, even Christians are kind of, um, like reflexive materialists, you know, in the sense that we tend to think that like, oh, well that's just motions of atoms, you know, like obviously that's just parts banging into other parts, you know, at a certain physical level of physical description, that's true. But the, the meta, the reason the metaphysics remain interesting is, is in part that it lets us get a grip on this question of, um, uh,

Speaker: Like, I mean, this is, if you zoom out far enough, this is sort of Leibniz's question. Like, why is there anything at all? You know? I mean, like nothing, make that it make the physical description as complete as you want. You know?

Speaker: um It doesn't get you an inch towards answering the question. So why does this exist? You know? um And and you get at the local level, that's what this question is about. you know um So for anything you can specify in the in the physical universe, there's always going to be this question about it.

Speaker: um What explains the fact that it exists? you know And the essence existence distinction is a useful way of marking that. you know That um being is something that has to be borrowed, so to speak, by these things. They don't possess it in their own in their own right, in the way that God does. Yeah.

Speaker: And yeah, so they accept that, Bonaventure accepts that across the board, anything you can pick out in the world. Even that's true for for concrete substances, it's true for their accidents, um it's true for the universe as a whole, you know. ah But that doesn't, knowing that something is exists contingently doesn't help you understand at all how it's capable of changing. Because plenty of things that exist contingently, like like accidental properties,

Speaker: are not capable of being the subjects of change in their own right right so if something is a subject of change that's in bonaventure's view um the most intuitive way of explaining that uh and it's sort of sort of this is a kind of argument for parsing from parsimony i suppose you know that the um uh uh the most intuitive way of explaining that is by extending the category manner so that it takes in intellectual beings as well, you know, that, that we can, we can imagine by a process of kind of progressive abstraction, beginning with the central case, you know, of, um of ah um bodily matter, um which it's worth saying for him becomes bodily by the addition of accidents, like it's it's accidents of quantity and quality, you know, ah that, that, that ramify, you know, so to speak, complicate prime matter. Prime matter is their, is their way of talking about, you know, kind of, you know,

Speaker: ah the most general principle of receptivity and change, you know, over time um that can receive as a, ah when when, when that receives forms that include accidents of quantity and, and certain kinds of quality, what you get as a body, you know, but that's not what matter is intrinsically. Um,

Speaker: that's just how we tend to encounter matter, you know, um, that's the, that's the basic idea. So, um, if you have, if, if what matter receives as a form that doesn't have those accidents of quantity, um,

Speaker: which are one of the quantity and quality are, you know, two of the the nine categories of accidents that aris Aristotle identified in his in his book, The Category. So that's that's where that language comes from. But um yeah, so if you don't have those those accidental ah properties, then you don't get bodies, you know? It's not it's nothing, it's like, it's um it's a mistake, know,

Speaker: of a kind of misplaced extension of our ordinary concepts to think that matter is intrinsically bodily.

Speaker: It's usually, in our experience, usually bodily. That's what we mostly encounter, but it's not intrinsically bodily. Yeah, because I think normally when people if, if they had thought about it, I guess, or if I thought about it's like, why do we tend to posit matter? What is it supposed to explain?

Speaker: Well, I guess normally what it's supposed to explain is that something's bodily. It's like when, so when you encounter something bodily, you say, yeah, it's, it, it's material. And so the, it being material is like explaining it being bodily or maybe honestly, maybe normally we would just identify the two things and just say, that's exactly what you're saying. Uh, you're saying anyway, but, but yeah, here it's like, and I don't know. Um,

Speaker: This seems relevant. It's like, so it seems like if Aquinas was, correct me if I'm wrong, but if Aquinas was going to explain how a cup changes or how a tree undergo, sorry, a cup or a tree go undergo accidental change, in those cases, he would appeal to matter. Matter would appeal.

Speaker: factor in as what um allows us to explain the change from um you know from from like the cup going from red to blue or something. um And so it's a little bit, so you might think, oh, ideally that's how we would deal with all accidental change regardless of the object, regardless of whether it's ordinary or more extraordinary in the case of like an angel.

Speaker: but but But Thomas wants instead to yeah, have a different... um ah principle of change or you know factor that allows for change in the case of angels. um Now, I'm trying to remember, I might butcher this, so you correct me if I'm wrong here, but like there was this whole issue of, like well, could we just use the form to explain change? Because obviously, um we in some sense, we use the form to explain change, accent all change like just in some sense like so for example if um if uh if uh

Speaker: you know, if my daughter grows, uh, I'm going to explain that change accidental change in her height in terms of like, well, she's like a living being and, you know, like living beings grow. So that's a case where it's like some accidental change occurs and, and, and, and at least part of the explanation or something relates to what my daughter is a a living creature. And so, yeah, can you just help me with that? Like I was just thinking like, so, so hypothetically, my point here is just like, so can't, if, ah if an angel is a pure form, couldn't we kind of use the form to explain potentially the angel changing from, you know,

Speaker: desiring God to desiring rebellion or something like that. Anyway, yeah, I just, just wanted to throw that out. Yeah. Right. So it's, I mean, part what you're flagging here is the, is the, the issue of like the powers of the soul, we might think, you know, which are at, which are active powers, right? So their power stated was simulate.

Speaker: so you know, we don't matter, ah taken on its own terms and in in this sort of Aristotelian conception is a purely passive principle. Like it's a principle of receptivity. It's a principle that receives forms, you know.

Speaker: And so, yeah it's an interesting question how you get from that to ah principles of like active reception, you know. So growth is a capacity to kind of take things in in the world, you know, assimilate them to yourself, right? That's a power.

Speaker: um which is proper only to living things, not the bodies as such. So it it has to come from from the form, you know, the soul. If we think of the the soul as the kind of principle that um ah enlivens and organizes all that stuff, you know, to be not dead but alive. So yeah, that's, and this is sort of the intuition, yeah, is that, you know, souls have powers.

Speaker: ah Why can't we just say that the and angel angels, you know, have have a bunch of intellectual powers like that, that they actualize, you know, I think that the difficulty here is that there's a um there's a sort of slippage um between thinking about the ah between between thought about what. um Again, sorry, sorry, this is I'm i'm i'm having to do more Aristotelian jargon than I that I'd like. But there's a distinction that Aristotle and then these guys in consequence make between primary and and secondary substances. So primary substances are like you and me, right? Like things that exist in the world. Secondary substances are the forms that we predicate of those things that explain what they are. Right. So like the difference between a human and humanity. Right now. um

Speaker: there's a sense in which you can ascribe powers of the, of operation or of activity to either primary or secondary substances, but in very different senses, right? So a primary substance, like an actual human, a living human, um, has all kinds of powers for operation precisely because, ah that human exists as a concrete individual, you know, like that occupies a certain space in the world, you know, that, and all of that's true, right? The, what, what, um,

Speaker: What explains the concreteness of that individual existence comes from the matter side of the equation. Like it's only the marriage of those two and a form and matter that explain how it is that the form has, um,

Speaker: ah scope for operation, let's say in the real world, you know, um humanity as such doesn't exist anywhere or anywhere. Right. I mean, it exists. You might think eternally in the mind of God, but if we ascribe powers of, you know, digestion, let's say, or growth, you know, to humanity, we're doing that in a highly abstract sense.

Speaker: Um, like humanity as such doesn't have powers of ingestion. Only humans have those powers, right? By virtue of the form, for sure, the form confers the powers. That's what we're talking about. What we're picking out when we talk about the powers are things that flow from um ah their nature as humans, but only only concrete, you know, subsisting substances have um have those powers. So, yeah, the the difficulty here is, you know, Thomas wants angels to be a kind of...

Speaker: um Strictly speaking, definitionally ah ah secondary substances, like they're subsisting forms without matter. um they' they're I mean, for him, literally, they're like humanity. you know I mean, this is the whole point of saying they're their own species. you know They can't be, they precisely because they're not they're not multiplied across ah by by being received in in matter, um there' is not there aren't multiple instances of them, right? They're actually subsisting universals. um And so ah the idea is, you know, if you can, this is part part of why I said before, you know, i think the the debate, you know, sort of proceeds in its early stages by saying, let's concede for the sake of argument that that makes sense, you know. It's not clear that that does make sense. You know, i mean, you sort of have to pick a lane, I think, you know, i mean this is the, again, the part of the problem of wanting to kind of um like have your Aristotelian cake and eat it too. Like you want the Aristotelian theory, but without all the consequences that flow from it. So like, if you want an individual that can act in the world, you know, ah for, um for Aristotle, you need, um could that can change in any way, you know, you really need matter. So like, there's no,

Speaker: all All the changes you're describing, you know, I mean, the the growth, you know, and and progress of a of a a living creature um are properties of the composite. They're not properties of the form itself. You know, the form itself in abstraction does nothing, um undergoes nothing.

Speaker: Yeah, well, so yeah this is so yeah this is something, um i think ah i think if I'm following you, this is kind of something I was wondering about. like So one question is, like can you explain accidental change?

Speaker: without matter. In other words, if something doesn't have matter of some kind, can it undergo accidental change? But another kind of issue is like, that seems intuitive to me is like, well, there's also like a more fundamental question is like, could you have a particular individual or could you have a concrete item in the broadest sense? Could you have a, a being, guess. Yeah.

Speaker: Yeah. without um matter, I guess that's like something like, i guess like, let me just, yeah. Like try to flesh this out. Just like my sort of intuition here is like something like um if I, let's suppose there are like pure forms, not so like in a platonic sense, let's say there's like whatever humanity separate by itself.

Speaker: You know, it's kind of tempting to say, well, if there's ever going to be a particular human, Yeah. A human. Yeah. We need matter to receive or instantiate the form.

Speaker: um But I guess like maybe that's just talking past Thomas because like I guess were you saying that he doesn't think is the angel ah the angels a species something. Well, it's like, I mean, yeah, this is, this is the, um, species is just another way in this period of of talking about universals, you know, like it's the thing, it's the, it's the one that isn't, that's that we track over many instances, you know, like in looking at many humans, the thing that makes them all members of a genus, you know, is the, is the secondary, uh, substance in that sense the abstracted form. So, yeah, he thinks that they're, um, they're a kind of, um, uh,

Speaker: a, uh, a concrete universal concrete here. So it is a concrete individual. Yeah. So like he thinks, yeah, the angels are are individuals, but they, but they're also universals, like in the sense that they exist in, they exist as pure forms, uh, in just the way, well, in just the way, is this the right way of putting it? Um, and something like the way that if, um, if, you know, per impossibile, um,

Speaker: you could instantiate blueness as an individual or humanity as an individual without individualizing it, without concretizing it in matter. You know, you would have, um you'd have, you know, this is why, I mean, I draw the analogy kind of facetiously to add Douglas Adams, is right you know, subsistence ah shade of blue, you know, because it is sort of what he's talking about. I mean, it's a, which is, hot yeah, which is difficult. I mean, it's a, and again, lots of,

Speaker: ah but you know Angelology is is sort of like um like quantum mechanics. you know It's a place where intuitions go to die. you know and i think that's fine. i don't I don't think that counterintuitive results necessarily count against the truth of claims you know in these in these speculative realms. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's just hard to make sense of. like I think it's not just at first glance, but at second and third glance. like It's not clear what we're talking about at this point.

Speaker: Yeah, I didn't necessarily mean for that to be a decisive objection, but more like that makes me wonder what is, what explains something being a concrete individual?

Speaker: Because it's, because it seems tempting to say, well, in order for something to be a concrete individual, you need it to have matter involved. Yeah.

Speaker: that like, in other words, that's how we, I don't know. Anyway. So, so matter is a principle of like individuation, I guess. Um, but, but, ah but maybe that, you know, maybe that's, but anyway, so yeah, I guess I'm just like trying to think like, okay, it seems like one question is, you know, do you need matter for accidental change? Another question might be, um, you know, do we need it for, um, individuation, but,

Speaker: At any rate, maybe just ah just to kind of, I mean, we you know were we're kind of pressed for time here. So I just kind of wanted to wrap up here. I mean, so obviously been a really super kind of dive into into to this particular dispute between Bonaventure and Aquinas in your book. And I'd recommend everyone to read your book, which is really also very well written too. um But yeah, before we go, do is there anything um you kind of want to like, know, what are you working on these days maybe?

Speaker: um Well, you know, I guess one thing I'll mention just because I think my my publisher would be annoyed if I didn't. um Funnily enough, just because of the vagaries of the um publishing industry, I've had another book published kind of recently. don't know if I've mentioned this too, So, um and that's ah that's a book which is about another, a distinct a set of debates in the 13th century about the reason for the incarnation and whether the incarnation is sort of logically prior in God's um intentions to ah the fall.

Speaker: ah So yeah um whether the, oh, do you have it there? Justification the Timeless? Yeah. Nice. Well, thank you. Hey, good for you. Yeah. a Good man. So I think, yeah, I mean, that's that's um those those obviously have both recent kind of recently gotten them off my desk. And and ah so I'm I'm ah ah finishing up another project ah on, um ah well, actually it's it's done now and I'm in kind of the stages of like copy editing and and um and working with the publisher on ah on and another monograph on the ethics of, it's like a Christian ethics of love and anger.

Speaker: um So thinking through, you know, ah and um it's funny, the through line in all of these books is that it's like things Thomas is wrong about. Yeah. I've realized, like not not intentionally, that's just like turns out to be the the kind of books I write, I guess. But ah so, yeah, so just the Justification of a Sinless with Baker Academic is um an exposition primarily of the thought of this guy, Robert Grossetest, who's an older contemporary Bonaventure and Thomas and those folks. And who's sort of the he's sort of the first person to argue,

Speaker: extensively in the 13th century that ah the God the Sun would have become incarnate even without the fall. And they make the case in a kind of vigorous way for that for that position. um And um yeah, and so then I had this other book, which is just titled with coming out with Routledge next year. um ah titled, I guess, somewhat unimaginably, A Christian Ethics of Love, Anger, and Ennity.

Speaker: and ah And that's, a you know, kind of some of that is like exposition of the New Testament, but a lot of that is is trying to retrieve a um ah I think now, unfortunately, neglected tradition of a strong skepticism about anger. um that's That's particularly prominent in the Greek-speaking East, much less prominent in in the watton the the the Latin Western tradition, kind of running from Augustine through Thomas, you know, and and others. So, um yeah, i'm making making the case really that the...

Speaker: ah the um an important implication of Christ's ethic of ah universal love, even for enemies, is that we should do our best to abjure anger.

Speaker: as part of our moral lives, that it's just not a helpful addition to our, our moral lives in the way that, you know, advocates for so-called righteous anger tend to want it to be. right So that's the, yeah, that's the brim of that book. And i mean, I'm, I'm um with those three kind of recently off my desk, ah you know, including doubting Thomas, I'm now kind of um taking a breather before i i launch into another book project, but, um but yeah, lots of interesting things happening still. And I'm, I'm,

Speaker: I imagine, I do hope, i hope to I hope to return in a fuller way to um ah the debates about superlapsarian Christology that I take up in the justification of a sinless book, because I think there's a lot more to be said than I've written about it so far, but both we'll see.

Speaker: Well, it sounds great. Yeah. Well, thanks again for coming on, Brendan. And yeah, I'll just mention, definitely check out the new book, Doubting Thomas. It's coming out or it's out with with ah Notre Dame Press and then also the other book, The Justification of the Sinless from ah Baker Academic. But yeah, thanks thanks again for coming on.

Speaker: Thanks, Sam.

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