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Dr. Stephanos Stephanides on Plato’s Phaedo: The Soul’s Nature and Indestructibility
38 Plays3 months ago
In this episode of The Dionysius Circle Podcast, Dr. Sam Bennett speaks with Dr. Stephanos Stephanides, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cyprus specializing in Platonic philosophy, about his article, "Reconsidering the Essential Nature and Indestructibility of the Soul in the Affinity Argument of the Phaedo." The conversation touches on the structure of Plato’s Phaedo, the Affinity Argument’s approach to the soul’s indestructibility, and the distinction between composite and incomposite entities, while reflecting on how later interpretations, including Neoplatonic perspectives, have engaged with these ideas.
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Transcript
Introduction to the Dionysus Circle Podcast
00:00:00
Speaker
Welcome to the Dionysus Circle Podcast. I'm your host, Dr. Sam Bennett. On this podcast, we explore the wisdom of the Eastern Christian Fathers and the philosophical traditions that influenced them. Today, I'm thrilled to welcome Dr. Stefan Stepanides, a researcher at the University of Cyprus and a graduate of the University of Cambridge, where he completed his PhD in Classics.
00:00:21
Speaker
Stefan specializes in the philosophy of Plato, especially the metaphysics of parts and wholes.
Essential Nature of the Soul in Plato's Philosophy
00:00:26
Speaker
In this episode, we'll discuss his fascinating article, reconsidering the essential nature and indestructibility of the soul in the affinity argument of the theto.
00:00:36
Speaker
Together we examine the affinity argument and its exploration of the soul's nature. Is the soul a composite entity, made of parts, or is it utterly simple, without parts? And if it were truly simple, would that imply that it is also indestructible? A special thanks to Peter Anthony Tonyi for letting us feature his beautiful rendition of the hymn, Of the Father's Love Begotten, from his album, Sea Dreams. God bless and I hope you enjoy the episode.
Dr. Stepanides' Journey into Plato's Philosophy
00:01:04
Speaker
Why don't we just start off, could you just tell us a little bit about yourself, you know maybe perhaps share where you grew up and how you first got interested in philosophy. Sure. um So I grew up in London. I'm originally a Greek Cypriot, which might explain my fascination in in the ancient world in the past. I was educated in the UK. I did my undergraduate degree at UCL, um where I was first introduced to ah the dialogues of Plato and in my second year um of of my degree um and from then on really it was just a kind of love affair with with Plato and not just Plato with ancient philosophy in general. um You know like I said I have a background in classics which introduced me to all of the different ah branches of the classical world but it was really ancient philosophy which interested me the most and where I felt um I kind of had a natural home
00:02:00
Speaker
um And you're right to mention that my PhD was in parts and holes. I would qualify that slightly to say that um it wasn't just about the metaphysics of parts and holes
Plato's Myriology and the Soul's Structure
00:02:12
Speaker
in Plato. That was ah something which my PhD addressed, but it was rather about um ah Plato's different conceptual models for elucidating or explaining the coherence of complex items ah like the soul, at least in Plato's Republic onwards, ah the city also being a composite of distinct and potentially opposing hearts, the cosmos, and how Plato's conceptual apparatus for elucidating the coherence of these items
00:02:42
Speaker
ah develops over time. Now of course within that discussion I engaged quite a lot of the metaphysics of parts and holes in Plato and specifically the myriology, the study of parts and holes. And my my article on the affinity argument kind of um falls out of that broader interest in parts and holes, composite structures um in in platonic philosophy. ah But really the Fido kind of posed the really the FIDO posed a problem, I guess, to my examination of Plato's interest in complex structures because Plato seems to be quite interested in the dialogues in these complex structures and explaining how they can become well-ordered holds specifically.
00:03:27
Speaker
So we're faced with the situation where the soul is a complex of different parts, the city and likewise the cosmos. And Plato is really interested in in explaining, despite their internal complexity, how can these items become well-ordered in contrast to the forms which are ah pure absolute unities.
00:03:46
Speaker
so facing you know in the face of this binary distinction what do we do with these complex items they're not pure unities like the forms uh so how can they become uh you know increasingly unified like their um like their counterparts in the forms and then we're faced with the feeder where Plato seems to present us with a conception of the soul as an encompassing unity which sits rather awkwardly with the conception of the soul we find in the republic so what does you know How does that kind of fit in with Plato's um larger interest, broader interest in ah these complex items?
Fido Dialogue and the Theory of Forms
00:04:27
Speaker
Yeah. So on the one hand, it looks like in the Republic, it looks like the soul is not an in composite unity. In other words, in the Republic, it looks like the soul has parts. In contrast,
00:04:41
Speaker
in the fado looks like the soul is supposed to be absolutely simple. In other words, it does not have parts. And in fact, um that idea that the soul is simple, lacking parts. For you, this is really crucial ah to understanding the affinity argument, which is the kind of the topic that we're going to be dealing with today is ah is is the affinity argument in the in the fado.
00:05:11
Speaker
And so maybe we can kind of turn to that. Maybe let's just, for the audience, just a quick refresher. you know What's going on in the FADO as a whole? And then what is the position of the affinity argument within that overall structure? I think it's i think it's a good question. And I think it's really interesting to consider um the FADO as a dialogue in its entirety. The FADO is in many ways a very unique dialogue.
00:05:35
Speaker
um in Plato's thought, I mean just think about the dramatic context of the dialogue, you know this is Socrates' his last hour, is his um he's about to drink the hemlock which will ah send him into the afterlife um and so we're we're in this kind of very austere kind of otherworldly context which is a unique dramatic context um in the trajectory of of butto of Plato's dialogues And that will steer context in a way um kind of informs the presentation of Plato's ethics, metaphysics, conception of the soul, psychology that we find in the Fido as well. And so I think it's important to take into consideration um the broader dramatic context of the dialogue when when reading the Fido generally.
00:06:25
Speaker
um you know we're faced in a context where Socrates is talking about the separation of the soul from the body, where in this otherworldly context which takes us um away from the material world. It's also a really important dialogue in so far as it introduces some quite new ideas into Plato's philosophy as well. um Ideas which will have a long-lasting legacy ah in Plato's dialogues, like the distinction between forms and physical particulars. We have some intimations of what these kind of
00:07:01
Speaker
unchanging entities might be in previous dialogues. ah Famously Socrates is a what is question DST when thinking about things like justice, piety etc. um But this is the first time really where Plato introduces us to his famous ah theory of forms which ah endures I would say despite ah some of the oddities posed by the Parmenides endures right up until Plato's Timaeus where we have this same ah binary distinction or opposition between forms and physical particulars described in quite similar ways.
Socrates' Defense of the Philosophical Life
00:07:38
Speaker
um So I kind of take this ah broader um overview of of Plato's dialogues and I think it's helpful to consider the position of the feeder within Plato's dialogues as a whole. um And the other thing to say um
00:07:56
Speaker
It also foreshadows some interesting ideas in Plato's later philosophy as well. um they're In Socrates' famous autobiography, he introduces this this famous um ah noose, as he calls it, talking about Anaxagoras' noose. And it seems that noose there is doing something similar to what Timaeus' craftsman god is doing in the dialogue Timaeus.
00:08:21
Speaker
ah that deity is also described as noose. So it seems to foreshadow a lot of ideas that come later in a way that makes us wonder whether Plato already had some of these ideas in a kind of proleptic sense from as early as the Fido, being this kind of transitionary dialogue from the early dialogues into Plato's middle period dialogues and then into the later dialogues.
00:08:48
Speaker
um Now, in terms of the second part of your question on the affinity argument, um the affinity argument is just one part of the feeder, as I'm sure your audience will be aware. um It begins with Socrates' famous defense of the philosophical life and his um desire, I would say, to be separated ah from the body.
00:09:11
Speaker
and his hopes as well for what's to come afterwards. He then goes into presenting um some arguments in defence of the immortality of the soul so that his interlock interlocutors don't really need to fear ah Socrates' imminent death.
00:09:26
Speaker
and also to kind of inspire them towards the the path of of philosophy as well. um And the first argument he presents is the cyclical argument. um I won't go into really kind of discussing that now since we're focused just on the affinity argument.
00:09:43
Speaker
um Though the relationship between some of those different arguments in the overall economy of the dialogue will be important, I'm sure that will come out at a later point. We then go on to the recollection argument, ah the affinity argument, and then after that um Simeas' famous objection that the soul is a harmony, Socrates then talks about his own autobiography, how he got into philosophy, and that he talks about Anaxagoras, Anaxagoras' noose and how he was disappointed, because rather than explaining how noose ordered all things with a view to the best in this kind of teleological sense,
00:10:23
Speaker
and Exagris actually went on to talk about physical explanations rather than noose as what truly binds things and holds them together. ah We then have Seabees' objection, so those two interlocutus, Simeas and Seabees, then the final argument which is Socrates' real kind of clinching point, um as the the final nail in the coffin, excuse is the pun, and then Socrates gives us this elaborate myth of the afterlife and this um ah image of the cosmos.
Critiques and Analogies in the Affinity Argument
00:10:58
Speaker
um And then we go on to Socrates' death and him drinking the hemlock, which is a very moving scene. um and And I think touches most most readers, um even even today when reading that. So just the affinity argument is just one part of a large kind of complexity of ideas that's kind of going on in the feeder. Absolutely. Yeah. And so Like you said, you know, the people often put it, the philosophical core of this dialogue are those four arguments you mentioned, the cyclical argument, the recollection argument, the affinity argument or the kinship argument as David, David every likes to call it. And then the fourth and final argument, which is like you said, it's kind of the climax of the of the
00:11:53
Speaker
of the dialogue, although you know the most scholarly attention is directed toward the recollection argument, the second argument. But anyway, we are going to be focusing, like you said, on the affinity argument, that third of the four core arguments. And at this point, we should just kind of refresh the audience's memory or just give a little quick rendition of the argument. um My thought is I can just, I'll just briefly describe it, and then you can kind of correct correct or elaborate on it, however you see fit. So basically, the affinity argument, the goal of it is to show that, um you know, to Simeus and Cabe is that no, we do not need to be fearful of our soul being destroyed upon death. um We can be like more like Socrates who is ah fearless, apparently in the face of death, right? So
00:12:46
Speaker
And the argument goes something like, you know, we should not fear our soul being destroyed because the soul is in fact similar to the unseen, to the invisible. ah For example, the transcendent forms, the gods, those are invisible, those are unseen. So the soul is similar to the unseen or the invisible. And the unseen or the invisible cannot be destroyed. And so thanks to this similarity or kinship between the unseen and the soul, we don't need to be fearful that our soul will be destroyed once we die. So obviously, that's a very rough sketch of the argument. um yeah So, Doctor, is there anything you would want to add to that? anything you would
00:13:28
Speaker
you yeah just Any initial thoughts on that, really? ah Yeah, i don i't I don't necessarily object to the sketch, although I think certain things um should be highlighted or or mentioned if they weren't already mentioned there.
00:13:44
Speaker
and The first being that it's it's important to focus a lot on how the affinity argument is framed. So you began by saying that it kind of falls out of um this this fear, this childish fear from Socrates' as interlocutors that the soul will be ah destroyed upon death. Now biological death in the feeder is conceived as the separation of the body ah from the soul and the interlocutors don't necessarily object to that. What they're fearful of is what happens to the soul itself after ah the separation of the soul from the body, which is what I'm calling biological death.
00:14:26
Speaker
um And specifically Simeas and Sibis seem to be afraid that the soul will somehow be dispersed. um Now, um if your ah if you have knowledge of the Greek, it's really it's really interesting to look at the specific words that um that ah that Plato uses here. He seems to be using words which um give us a conception of the idea, as ah give us a conception of the soul as a kind of material entity which can be dispersed or scattered apart. So um ah it's it's within those specific fears of the soul being scattered or dissolved specifically in that way that the affinity argument emerges.
00:15:15
Speaker
um So then Socrates, so it's important to keep that in mind because I also think that within the overall economy of the dialogue, we spoke about those different arguments that Socrates presents for the immortality of the soul. It seems to me that the affinity argument is the only argument amongst all of those, which which directly addresses this concern of the soul being of such a kind that it will be dispersed upon biological death, taken apart, scattered into the winds.
00:15:45
Speaker
um So then Socrates goes on to say, well look, um is the soul the sort of thing which is then likely to be scattered in its essential nature? um What kind of thing should we be fearful of that?
00:16:01
Speaker
That that that thing could be actually dispersed or scattered um Right. It's interesting move. It's like they're worried about it getting scattered But then he kind of takes a step back and ask well what kind of things in general? Right either can be scattered or are likely to be scattered and is the soul one of those kinds of things So yeah, anyway, sorry Yeah, what kind of thing? and And this idea of what kind of thing ah introduces us to this kind of dichotomy between ah certain objects.
00:16:35
Speaker
um which are encompassed really by the forms, the category of the forms, the category of the unchanging. Socrates goes on to introduce two kinds and the category of the changing, the visible, the material, et cetera. But before even really bringing up that category, and this is this is something that you're reconstruction kind of glossed over, Socrates says well what sort of thing is liable to be scattered and he introduces this distinction between composite and in composite entities and um
00:17:11
Speaker
It's really that distinction that I'm interested in in this article and that I think
Composite vs. Incomposite Entities in Plato's Thought
00:17:17
Speaker
needs to be taken more into consideration when ah thinking about ah the affinity argument, the feeder, and the soul's essential ah indestructibility and immortality.
00:17:29
Speaker
Exactly. yeah Yeah. So your art your art your paper really delves it kind of delves deep into this distinction between composite things, things that have parts, and in composite things, things that lack parts that are perfectly one, such as the forms. And like you said, you know, that distinction is introduced early in in the affinity argument. Yeah, at the very beginning, right. And um and and as you go into the argument, you know,
00:18:03
Speaker
you know It's almost somewhat puzzling you know what happens to this distinction. But at any rate, you your reconstruction really emphasizes that distinction. And we will delve into that further in a moment. So he introduces that distinction. And then he goes on to talk about those entities that were early introduced in the recollection argument, namely the forms. And then he goes on to give us this binary distinction between ah ontological entities like the forms versus things ah that aren't the forms. But it's important to note that this distinction between composite and incompetent entities comes before that. So it seems to be Socrates' real kind of classic way of introducing this this distinction and thinking about the relationship between these two kinds, between the forms and physical particulars on the other on the other hand. So he's already inviting us to consider this distinction as being pertinent to the distinction between two different kinds of entities.
00:19:01
Speaker
Good. And so this kind of like touch on, you know, what we might say is the thesis of your paper. So um this is something and David Ebre talks about as well. You know, this argument, the affinity argument is often criticized as one of the weakest arguments Plato presents in the phato. But you disagree with that. And it seems like the thesis, you know, of your paper could be that it's actually a plausible argument for the immortality of the soul. So let's get into I mean, we've already kind of touched. It's going to have to do with understanding this distinction between the composite and then the composite. But yeah, just can you kind of just roughly say, you know why is the affinity argument often dismissed as a weak argument? And then what are what are people missing? what What is it that they are missing about this argument?
00:19:49
Speaker
most Most commentators seem to kind of dismiss the affinity argument for a variety of different reasons. ah On one extreme, it's kind of taken as a failed demons demonstrate demonstration of how to argue for the immortality of the soul. and that seems to really Most of the criticisms, but that one in particular, seems to arise from the fact that um how the argument itself is structured in this kind of analogical way by saying by introducing these two different ontological kinds and saying well the soul is more like one of those kinds and on the basis of the result on the basis of that resemblance we shouldn't be fearful that the soul is the kind of thing to be dispersed. so
00:20:33
Speaker
Socrates seems to be argued for the immortality of the soul in the in that analogical way and and some commentators find it. It's hard to interrupt, but it's it's kind of a funny sort
Neoplatonist Interpretations and Ethical Implications
00:20:42
Speaker
of argument, right? It's, you know, you almost gloss over it. Maybe if the listeners are hearing what I said, right? You almost assume that I said the argument is that, you know, the soul is unseen. It is invisible. And therefore, you know, since invisible unseen things,
00:20:58
Speaker
are not destroyed the soul won't be destroyed but no it's actually yeah like you said it's analogical it's it's something like the soul has a similarity to the unseen it's akin to the and it has an affinity yeah with the unseen and invisible and that sort of analogical language is is fairly bizarre uh sorry but just or surprising something like that yeah one way to put it philosophically underwhelming maybe or no then not not not very kind of promising as a way to kind of do philosophical argument um now obviously i i argue for a less kind of analogical um i i appreciate that plato does
00:21:40
Speaker
have his reasons for ah doing the argument in this way. um and And it might be that he's also deliberately doing it in that way and kind of inviting ah an element of doubt on behalf of his ah readership and and wider audience. But I think kind of reading reading between the lines um and really thinking about um this distinction between two ontological kinds and what that what that ah binary distinction seems to be doing, why Plato is introducing that binary distinction and thinking about where the soul is placed within that distinction in a less analogical way. I think that's a promising direction to go down. um And you haven't mentioned it so far, but one one part of my argument is also um
00:22:33
Speaker
ah also looks at kind of these less analogical ways of reading the affinity argument, which were very popular amongst the Neoplatonists and the Neoplatonic reception of the affinity argument, which perhaps we'll go on to to discuss ah later on. um But that seems to be the main one of the main reasons why it's dismissed. ah Some commentators say, well look, um there seems to be obvious gaps or flaws in the argument, so maybe we should think of it its function in slightly different ways, ah maybe it should be taken more as a kind of ethical argument for why the soul ought to practice philosophy, what the rewards of practicing philosophy are, the dangers of ah not practicing philosophy are, and and i think I think that's right to think about the kind of broader function of the affinity argument, to think of all of those different elements, but I wouldn't want i wouldn't want to focus on that at the expense of
00:23:28
Speaker
the, the kind of plausibility of the affinity argument itself, and all that that distinction that Socrates introduces at the beginning ah between composite and in composite entities.
00:23:42
Speaker
um So there are a variety of ways, yeah. And I think no one has really, you know just thinking about the literature here, the the and of broader scope and landscape here of the literature, no one has really attempted to give the distinction between composite and incompetent entities the the attention that it deserves. um And so this paper is kind of revisiting that distinction in an original way.
00:24:09
Speaker
um so Yeah, absolutely. And it really is fascinating what um how to look at this paper but this this argument once you really emphasize that distinction. And so, ah yeah, maybe we can also just, or I'll just briefly highlight something that you just mentioned, which is that, yeah, ah kind of a second or a further really interesting part of your paper is that you are kind of um <unk>scitating I don't know what the word revitalizing whatever you want to call it returning to a more neoplatonic reading of the affinity argument so the type of argument that you that your reconstruction of the affinity argument.
00:24:49
Speaker
in in in certain ways is very much continuous with ah the neoplatonic tradition of reading that argument. And maybe we can get back to that point later on. But for now, let's just um let's just sit on, let's just think of a little bit more about what you call the CI distinction, the composite-incomposite distinction. um And just, you know, we've already touched on this, but let's just talk about, okay,
00:25:15
Speaker
What does it mean to be composite? What does it mean to be in composite? And then for the for the listeners, just a few examples of things that are composite versus in composite.
00:25:27
Speaker
Yeah, so the distinction is between composite and in composite entities. As you say, the Greek for that is sunteton versus the as sunteton, the composite and the in composite. The way I understand that distinction, the way I understand those those words um is quite simple really.
00:25:49
Speaker
um, sunteton meaning, uh, to be, uh, to contain parts, to be composed of parts, and asunteton to be without parts. Um, and it's really that, uh, analysis of ah sunthetton asen theton and that understanding of composite and incomposit as being with or without parts that plays a key role in in in my argument, in my analysis of the affinity argument.
Impact of Fido on Plato's Later Dialogues
00:26:20
Speaker
Another thing to say um really is that um in terms of thinking of the examples, right, ah that that you that you kind of invited me to um to talk about,
00:26:33
Speaker
um Really, we're talking about kind of anything material, anything in the material world. Some people might find that unconvincing, thinking about everything in the material world as being composed of parts. ah But remember that the material world for Plato is a fundamentally generated entity. It's a created entity. And there's reasons to think that created entities for Plato just do have parts and specifically um the way they're created is in such a way ah that they have parts which are kind of put together ah in a certain way.
00:27:16
Speaker
um So we really, we're thinking about anything generated, anything material, ah specific examples, I mean, intuitive examples. um We might think of a house being made up of different parts, bricks, mortar, etc. ah But in in in other contexts, like the Republic, for example, when Plato ah talks about um Syntheta, composite items. He also includes there um things like clothing, um things like um ah things like clothing, a house. um What else does he use? um
00:28:00
Speaker
Really anything kind of created, generated, um I mean, the city itself is also a complex of different parts. that's That's more of a kind of ah conceptual item, let's say, but anything physical, you know you can think of my ah my clothing, my my robe being made up of different parts, um my house being made up of different parts. Yeah, I mean, one idea you know is like when it comes to, well, first off, but it's interesting that connection you're drawing between being created and being a composite. We'll have to kind of dive into that a little bit further because that's an interesting idea.
00:28:37
Speaker
um ah But yeah, just the idea that, you know, if you think about something material, for one thing, normally the, but I mean, it seems like every material thing is going to be kind of extended in space to some degree. ah And anything that's like extended, well, then you can divide it. And if it's divisible, if you can divide something, then at least is going to have those two, the different parts after the division. Could you, could you kind of just give a rough sense of
00:29:08
Speaker
You know, what what's the what's the pull for thinking that a form, you know, whatever is the form of beauty. what What's the. intuition or the pull for thinking that lacks parts? Yeah, there seems to be two things there. The first is a kind of metaphysical consideration. um Why think of forms as being without parts? Well, um within the affinity argument and within Plato's thought in general, that seems to be one of the reasons why these forms are eternal.
00:29:40
Speaker
and therefore indestructible. um So that that's kind of the initial pull maybe for thinking from a metaphysical perspective, ah for thinking of forms as being without parts in composite entities.
00:29:53
Speaker
So it's it's an explanation of indestructibility. we'll We'll get into that further, but this idea that it's because the thing lacks parts that it can be eternal and indestructible. Right. Right. And speaking of the forms as in composite entities reveals something distinctive about these items. It tells us something about them and and specifically about what sort of items they are and why they are in destructible entities. from a more So that's a metaphysical perspective. From a more ethical perspective, why it might be ah helpful or interesting to think about forms as being in composite entities. um and And I like your your example of the form of beauty.
00:30:32
Speaker
because it seems to reveal something about the kind of pure simplicity of these items, that the form of beauty just is beauty in every single way. And having any sort of internal variety or part that might be just in in a kind of very small way, not beautiful, would affect the kind of purity of beauty that that item possesses. So it seems to be the case that any sort of internal variety or differentiation in the form of of parts would just affect the the kind of goodness of what these items represent, whether that thing be beauty or justice, you know, you don't want a part of injustice, injustice, otherwise that would affect its pure purity of justice, if you like. um so So those are the kind of two reasons why
00:31:26
Speaker
you know, Plato might be wanting us to think about forms as in composite entities and why intuitively we might want to think of certain transendent transcendent items, whether they're forms, whether there are other kind of kind kinds of divinities, depending on what metaphysical or religious framework you're coming from, it might be helpful to think of these transcendent entities as being without parts. Great, great.
00:31:52
Speaker
Um, and yeah, so let's now, um, why is it that Socrates is introducing the distinction between composite and in composite? Well, it looks like he's trying to get a handle on what kind of entities can be dispersed. What kind of entities cannot be dispersed. And as we already indicated before, it's because.
00:32:12
Speaker
Simeas and Cabes, they're worried that the soul is just, is going to get dispersed by the wind, you know, that we're going to die, the soul will separate from the body, and then the wind will come and just kind of ah below the the the soul into many part, into many little individual parts kind of thing. It's going to get dispersed. And so Socrates' response is, okay, well, what kind of things actually can be dispersed in the first place? And so he's trying to get a handle on that. So can you kind of connect that for us?
00:32:41
Speaker
What's the relationship between being composited and composite and capable of being dispersed or incapable, yeah. Right, um so Plato's thought seems to be that anything with parts is in principle liable to um to being kind of destroyed. um And so it's a natural place for him to look at this distinction between composite and all composite entities since we're interested in the sort of thing that can be, that's liable to be dispersed and that's not liable to be dispersed.
00:33:13
Speaker
um And Plato's thought seems to be that anything with parts is is um by definition liable to be broken up. um You know, I spoke a moment ago about this kind of all kind of material entities, the created world itself, anything within the created world. um And so um On the other side of that argument, you have these in composite entities which are not made up of parts. And Plato's thought seems to be that anything which kind of doesn't have parts isn't liable to be destroyed. Now, where does where does the idea of change come into it? Well, you might think of change in the case of composite entities as ah denoting the change or internal rearrangement of certain parts within a composite structure.
00:34:03
Speaker
and that change eventually leading to complete destruction or death in the case of the soul if it was a composite entity. um So the connection between changing and being composite seems to amount specifically to this ah internal rearrangement of parts. um Like, for instance, the human body ah being made up of a composite of different elements, at least that you know that's the way that the ancient seemed to think of biology, ah the four different humors and kind of change within the level of the organic ah body.
00:34:38
Speaker
eventually leading to old age decay and destruction, ah being due to some kind of change of those of those internal parts, some sort of internal rearrangement, and disease as well, um as a mounting to those parts being organized in a certain way, or being reorganized in a certain way.
00:35:00
Speaker
inclusive entities don't suffer from this. they they don't Because they don't have parts, that kind of bolsters one reason why they don't change and why they are eternal and indestructible entities, um because they don't have parts.
00:35:15
Speaker
Yeah, it's so so interesting, so many things to think about. um I mean, so one so one thing to think about, like, okay, so there's one idea of if something has parts, it is liable to be destroyed. I'd be curious what you mean by liable there. I mean, you know, one idea is if something has parts, it's possible, it has the potential to be destroyed. Now, another idea, though, is that if something has parts,
00:35:43
Speaker
necessarily it will be destroyed. So not only does it have the potential at any time to be destroyed, but really it will come to pass eventually. um And so anyway, I mean, you know, the relevance of this really quickly is just like, for example, you know, if the soul turns out to have parts, well, you know, maybe it could be destroyed.
00:36:08
Speaker
because of those parts, but maybe it will never be destroyed for some reason. On the other hand, if it has parts, you know maybe it's necessarily, it will be destroyed eventually. So anyway, I don't know if you wanna comment on that at all, just this issue of like, can be destroyed versus necessarily will to be destroyed.
00:36:25
Speaker
Yeah I mean that that's actually the way in which and Socrates kind of introduces introduces the distinction in the first place. he and He invites us to think about what kind of thing is ah kind of likely to be scattered.
00:36:41
Speaker
um what kind of thing is is not likely to be scattered um and um that being composite and a compound by nature being liable to be split up into its parts and only that which is in composite if anything not ah liable or likely to be split up. um So one might say that liability for x doesn't denote kind of um
00:37:13
Speaker
the actual realization of X. So I might have a liability. you know We often say of people that they have a liability to do certain things. It might be the case that despite that propensity or likelihood of liability, they they never write they never end up actually doing that thing. so liability might not be kind of doing enough, it might not be strong enough. And you know I think that going back to the kind of ah standard criticism of the affinity argument and the and analog analogical structure of the affinity argument, this is
00:37:48
Speaker
This language is one of the reasons why people find this distinction and the affinity argument in general kind of unconvincing. um But there might be another way to kind of read that language of liability. It might be that Plato is saying, um for what kind of thing is it apt?
00:38:07
Speaker
or appropriate, ah we could say, for being um destroyed or not destroyed. so and And composite and incompetent entities seem to fit that criteria, right? um In terms of what kind of for what kind of thing it's appropriate and for what kind of thing it would be not appropriate. Well, that doesn't deny the possibility that eventually, you know, that thing is not just liable, but it's kind of,
00:38:37
Speaker
um actually ah a genuine kind of outcome at some point. If if an incomplete thing is not liable to be destroyed in the sense of it it doesn't even have that potential, then if the soul were to be in composite, we would secure the the strong metaphysic kind of strong result that you're referring to rather than than just an analogical kind of like, well, the soul is like something that can't be destroyed. So presumably the soul won't be destroyed.
00:39:07
Speaker
Um, okay, good. Um, uh, let's move on to this. I mean, I want to just highlight really, I mean, this just, you know, you know, I'm going to be mindful of the time, but, um, you know, it seems like one idea here is that if you have parts that entails the potential to change and which you we were mentioning uch earlier, that re potential for rearrangement. And then that.
00:39:37
Speaker
potential for rearrangement, that opens the door for destruction. So it seems like anything with parts, it's always going to have this door open to destruction via change. Now, I just really quick want to throw out like, you know, an objection or or or just what would you say to something like this where, you know, it's like, okay, you know, if we're talking about material things with their material parts, I can see how parts opens up changeability and opens up destruction. ah I just see that kind of intuitively or whatever. But if we're talking about like an an abstract item that has parts, I mean, so, for example, you know, what about the idea that, like, if you think about the definition of a human being, at least the traditional definition definition, it's, you know, on the one hand, we got some rationality, we have some am animality.
00:40:34
Speaker
Put it together. We have rational animal. So it looks like, you know, it seems like maybe that's there's two parts to to the definition of a human being. And so that's an abstract object, you know, the definition of humanity ah potentially. And there it looks like it has parts, but there it looks like, you know,
00:40:53
Speaker
that's an abstract object that could never change. So anyway, I'm just kind of curious, like, what do you think about the idea that look, you know, yeah material things? Yeah. Okay. I think what you what you're referring to is kind of conceptual parts. So you can think of forms having, the you can think of forms having these more conceptual parts, but as a lot of commentators have noticed when um looking at Plato's you know Plato hasn't kind of got got that far yet really you know Aristotle has a much more sophisticated ah apparatus for describing parts and holes and what these kind of things are what they entail when Plato is talking about parts I think he's
00:41:35
Speaker
referring to them in these kind of ah concretely material terms so a part as being something something really something kind of material. um I mean one objection to that is the different parts of of the state in the republic they don't seem to be um ah you know the different social classes, they don't seem to be ah material entities, that's true. um And yet the ideal state is actually dissoluble and does have an expiry date and will dissolve by virtue of some relation between its parts.
00:42:15
Speaker
But at some level, those those different classes are made up of um of human beings, of of material things in some levels. so the ah The idea of part um for Plato, I think, signifies something concrete, something material. um So it would be helpful yeah it would be interesting to think about these more abstract items um as potentially having parts but not being destructible because of these more kind of conceptual parts. um But Plato seems to be interested in in
00:42:52
Speaker
the more I mean, the abstract items for him are the forms. um And to talk of to talk of the forms as having parts would um signify that they have kind of material parts by virtue of which they would that they they could be liable to be destroyed in the strong sense of actually being ah destroyed or actually being destroyed. Yeah. Okay, great. That's that's fair. Okay. um Good. Okay. So, um, so we've kind of briefly gone into the kind of the fascinating metaphysics, physical issues related to the, you know, the CI distinction, the the composite and composite distinction. Um, at this point, you know, maybe we can just think about, you know, where does this, where does this take us in terms of the goal of the affinity argument, right? The affinity argument, he's trying to allay the fears of his interlocutors. He's trying to,
00:43:48
Speaker
say, look, you know, we do not have to fear that upon death, the soul will be destroyed. So how does, you know, it seems like the way that, I mean, I guess, you know, it just seems pretty obvious what the next move is, it's to to prove that the soul is an in composite thing, because that would allay the fear. So is that how the argument goes? Does it end up, does Socrates end up ah Proving that the soul is in composite or you know, yeah, just can you take us to the next step here? So the problem? Yeah, so so that's kind of two different aspects or parts of my paper if you like it's this distinction between composite and in composite entities um and Socrates introducing that distinction for helping us think about what sorts of thing is is liable to be destroyed What sorts of thing is is not liable to be destroyed?
00:44:33
Speaker
um and um inviting us to consider these two different kinds and to already think well what what kind does the does the soul fit into um and the strong kind of supposition seems to be that and and many commentators seem to take Plato to be suggesting that um the soul just is an incompetent entity and because of its essential in compositeness, it's therefore indestructible. um And that is the way that the Neo-Platonists read it. That's the way that um kind of reading beneath the lines, if you will, or taking a bit more of a brave approach to reading the Affinity Argument, that's the way that I think it could be taken and the way that I kind of present it here.
00:45:19
Speaker
um The problem with all of that is of course the second or the the kind of main part of the affinity argument by virtue of its of its very name is that ah Plato doesn't ever really say the soul is in composite in those explicit terms. He says that the soul is like ah these incompetent entities like the forms. It's like ah the category of the invisible, immaterial, unchanging, you purely uniform. It's like that, ah but being like something doesn't necessarily entail being exactly the same as that thing. um And that's the kind of major objection or um kind of pitfall of the affinity argument, if you like, is that it introduces this distinction
00:46:09
Speaker
it wants to imply that the soul is in composite and on the basis of that internal nature it's not the sort of thing that's liable to be destroyed so as to allay the fears of Simeas and Sibis but then Socrates doesn't say that he says the soul is like the forms and on the basis of that he concludes at the end of the argument ah therefore the soul um ah is um therefore um altogether indissoluble or nearly so ah and that nearly
00:46:52
Speaker
And that nearly seems to kind of open up some reasonable doubt. yeah If it's nearly indestructible, then in some level, if we take Plato's principle of desolubility seriously and his view of composite and in composite entities and his view of destruction and change, et cetera, if we take that seriously, then if it's nearly ah in thisollia in the soluble. That leaves open some reasonable doubt that maybe the soul does have ah parts. But does it have parts or does it not have parts? I think that's what we really need to think about. um So that there them you know there are other reasons why um Plato might be leaving the argument ah open in this kind of open-ended way.
00:47:38
Speaker
You know, he might feel that further argumentation is still needed. ah He might want to kind of play on those fears a bit more, notwithstanding the strong supposition that the soul really is in composite. He might want to leave room for the final argument. He he he might just have bigger fish to fry. I mean, there's the there's the ethical part of the argument as well that we haven't even discussed yet.
00:48:01
Speaker
um But that's the kind of main criticism of of the affinity argument, kind of how it ends and why really, um on the basis of reading the affinity argument, we we can't really conclude that the soul is this in composite entity. um There seems to be, you know, doubt there. Yeah, absolutely. It's fascinating. So I mean, you know, just to highlight a couple of points. So, you know, one thing that's interesting is like, okay, he sets up the distinction in composite composite,
00:48:32
Speaker
Uh, the in composite seems to be indestructible. Uh, and so you're expecting, okay, now here, we're going to do an argument where we, you know, show, you know, was a sub argument where we show that the soul is one of those in composite things. Instead, we just get an argument that it's like an in composite thing. Now it's interesting to think about, well, what would be the argument that the soul just is an in composite thing? That might be how, how would we go about arguing that? Is there.
00:49:02
Speaker
is it it's not clear what you would do. So it's like, maybe this is just the best thing we can do. I mean, maybe we can't, we don't have an available, just a straight up proof that the soul is in composite. So what's the next best thing? You just show that the soul is very much akin to all those in composite things. And thus, ah you know, it's probable, it's likely that the soul is in composite. Anyway, I just throw that out there is like, it's kind of interesting to think about, you know,
00:49:31
Speaker
do we really have that um straightforward proof that the soul is in composite? um Although I don't think I don't think it's enough for Plato to just say to just say it's like or it's strongly akin. I think Plato really wants. I think Plato wants something stronger than that, even though he doesn't explicitly give us that. Sure, sure. I think it ideally, yeah, we would get that. But you know, it's interesting to think about what What would that proof look like? maybe it's maybe and maybe would be Maybe it's just too hard. We can't figure it out. know Do we know whether the soul, do we have a direct possibility for a proof, a direct proof that the soul is, yeah, you know, that's those. Right. Just thinking about it, thinking about it intuitively though. I mean, Socrates introduces these two kinds.
00:50:17
Speaker
the two different ontological kinds, right? And really, I mean, the way I read it, and the way that the Neoplatonist read it as well, he's introducing these two kinds. And um the soul just has to fit, you know, this is a binary distinction, we're not really told of any kind of third intermediary entities, perhaps it's the soul insofar as it's like the forms and sometimes like, um maybe like, you know, entities from the material ontological kind. um But I think to say that the soul is like the forms, really he's saying that
00:50:54
Speaker
well to be like you know resemblance entails identity in in in a kind of in a kind of stronger way um we have these two kinds and what we're really thinking about is of which kind does the soul okay got you okay i got you i got you so it's like one idea is that actually by establishing resemblance in this instance at least we actually thereby do achieve that proof that the soul is an incomplete thing. So maybe establishing resentments doesn't always constitute identity. I don't know, maybe, or maybe it does, but at least in this case, potentially. Yeah. Let me say something as well about maybe why, you know, I said a moment ago that Plato seems to leave it in this open-ended way by seeing the soul is completely indissoluble or nearly or very close to it.
00:51:46
Speaker
um and why the soul and and why it might be helpful for Plato to think about the soul as being akin to the forms but not exactly like them. Let's think about the ethical kind of function of the affinity argument as well. I think that will bring us nicely to some of the other questions you had in in the rest in the rest of the talk. Plato doesn't seem to want to say or just take it for granted that the soul is completely like the forms, because if it was like it, then it would just enjoy a blessed existence all the time. It would be with the forms all the time. So he seems to kind of leave leave it open, say, well, it's it's it's like the forms.
00:52:25
Speaker
where I read that in the strong sense of having the same essential nature as the forms and being in composite-like forms. But it's not always like the forms in absolutely every respect, because sometimes it does change. It goes from being wise to ignorant, from being ignorant to wise.
00:52:42
Speaker
it undergoes various kind of other qualitative ah changes over time. And so, you know, at least the at least the impure soul does not seem to be absolutely like the forms in every single respect. um So he's this seems to kind of exhort us towards the path of philosophy so that we can really become like the forms in absolutely every respect. Now, the problem not necessarily a problem you know despite that exhortative function the soul still needs to have some sort of basic indestructibility some sort of ah similarity or identification with the forms as being essentially in composite you can't think of it being
00:53:32
Speaker
like the composite maybe you know ah kind of changed between it's maybe having parts or not having parts because if it has parts then it's liable to be destruction in the strong sense of actually being destroyed so in its essential nature the way I read it I interpret it it really is you know, of the same ah metaphysical kind as the forms, but it doesn't always live a pure, unadulterated, ah you know, life of goodness as as the forms seem to enjoy. So he's exhorting us to become more and more and more like the forms, despite the fact that within our internal configuration, like the forms, we don't have parts. Right, right. And you actually kind of describe this, all the the ethical language, as kind of constituting the greatest threat to your ah strong reading of the affinity argument. um And I want to be sensitive to time here, but yeah, do you do you want to just, you know, to kind of identify, you know, yeah, you mentioned the ethical language is, yeah, kind of almost threatening. um
00:54:42
Speaker
You're strong reading. Could you could you kind of explain that for us briefly? Yeah, I mean in some places, you know, for instance um Socrates um Seems to describe the soul as being, you know interspersed with the corporeal or or gathering itself together which seems to imply that it may be how does it gather itself together by ah making its parts increasingly unified and this ah this idea, you know Socrates' language um of the soul being polluted by the body, grown in the body, interspersed with the corporeal um seems to signify some sort of threat to the soul's essential nature as being perhaps without parts in composite. um So that' that that's the threat. that um Because if it's material it seems like straightforwardly it's going to be
00:55:37
Speaker
Yeah, if it's if a composer like we discussed earlier, if it becomes more like the composite, and it and it and it becomes interspersed with the body, which is a composite entity, then you know, that might affect its its internal structure. And it seems to me that the soul can still be an in unity and in its essential nature, and still kind of bear the scars of embodiment or still have a propensity towards the body or still be kind of mixed up with the body in such a way that it retains its essential nature as being an incompetent entity. the the The ancients did an experiment of water and wine kind of mixing them together and then
00:56:17
Speaker
actually separating them again after that so the water doesn't seem to kind of lose its kind of purity let's say as water and maybe that might be ah one conceptual framework to go down to say that the soul doesn't lose its essential nature.
00:56:32
Speaker
um despite the fact that it becomes more like the body and becomes increasingly attached to the body, it still doesn't it still doesn't get destroyed or die. It just undergoes various reincarnations. So what's keeping it together? It's essential in destructibility. It's basic in destructibility, the fact that it's not a composite entity.
00:56:55
Speaker
um But notwithstanding that, it it's still kind of inclines towards the bodily. It mixes itself up with the bodily. ah But despite that, doesn't die, just undergoes various subsequent reincarnations. I mean, and so what do you think about the idea that, you know, this interspersal, this becoming, you know, kind of mingling with the body of the soul, which is supposed to be kind of like the ethical ah thing to avoid, we want to avoid that. Instead, we want to kind of keep our souls pure, not intermixed. um What about the idea that, you know, really, this is metaphorical language for the soul desiring? Yeah, yeah, that body, you know, in other words, the the soul becomes impure in the sense that its desires, its interests,
00:57:45
Speaker
these non-physical things are kind of directed toward the corporeal. What do you think about... Yeah, that that's right that that's kind of similar to the argument that I was presenting. um that that that That might be one promising way to go down. um I don't object to that. um I think that could retain the soul's the souls essential indestructibility. as for As for the soul actually being material or having parts, being composite, ah being extended in space, etc. I should say that the the the the the the argument I'm presenting is restricted is restricted to the Fido itself. um It, so of course, writes many other dialogues and in later dialogues,
00:58:28
Speaker
and And this is this is ah really quite an important point for reading the feeder, reading the affinity argument, thinking about the relationship between the feeder and the affinity argument to later platonic dialogues. Plato does in the Timaeus say that the soul, um not just the composite soul, but the rational kind of immortal part of the soul itself is a composite entity. It is made up of parts because everything is created ah except God.
00:58:58
Speaker
who is purely ungenerated and unchanging. God created the rational soul as a composite of three distinct parts, being sameness and difference. And note note that note that um in the Timaeus, when ah when Plato does introduce this ah discussion of the generation of the soul and the generation of the lesser gods, the kind of cosmic planetary gods, he says that because of their ah having parts and being generated, they are in principle dissoluble.
00:59:33
Speaker
um However, they will never be dissolved despite their despite the fact that by virtue of having parts that they are in principle dissoluble. They won't be dissolved through the good will of God. So it it could going back to the affinity argument, it could be that the soul ah is a composite entity despite despite this strong supposition that it isn't, ah but that and and but despite its liability because it's, um
01:00:05
Speaker
ah It has the potential, it doesn't. But then Plato needs to tell us, well, what is that other thing then that keeps the soul together? And I think Plato's aims in the dialogue are to ah really ah prove the essential basic indestructibility of the soul.
01:00:24
Speaker
uh so it's being in composite and just not sub not subject to kind of ever being destroyed so he doesn't talk about i mean he does talk about uh noose uh in the oto biographical section as being that which truly binds all things together so it could be that noose as noose does in the time aces which binds all things together but he doesn't go in that direction there so that's just to say that he is leaving himself open to the possibility that um maybe not in the Fido but in the Republic again he brings up this distinction in book 10 of the Republic which also I invite your your your audience to look at book 10 of the Republic and the immortality of the soul there and the argument for the immortality of the soul there
01:01:11
Speaker
where Plato once again introduces this distinction and he says um it's it's you know it's unlikely for um for a composite items to to to and to to be eternal, but it's not impossible. So he's leaving himself open that there could be a case where we do have certain composite items of parts which do not in fact ever get destroyed. And the Tymias takes that up and says, ah well, yes, we do have composite entities like the soul, like the world, like the lesser gods.
01:01:53
Speaker
They are in principle dissoluble, but they won't ever get dissolved because of the good will of God. um In the Fido, we're not when not within the framework. We're in a different framework altogether where Plato really wants to kind of argue for the basic indestructibility of the soul.
01:02:09
Speaker
So it's helpful to really think of the broader ah broader picture here of Plato's views are on composition, in composition. And really, that's what I tried to do in an earlier draft of this paper, but it was necessarily too long. And I need i needed to ah needed to restrict the scope, but for a future inquiry, it would be really helpful to kind of bring these different threads together. Absolutely, yeah. I mean, it's a really fascinating set of issues. and you know I want to be sensitive of our time here and just you know thank you so much for for having this discussion with us. I highly recommend all the listeners that they check out your article and hopefully yeah maybe a future article where you you go even further into into these issues. um mean As we close, is there anything anything you want to emphasize? i mean There's somebody many <unk>s a fascinating discussion of Plotinus in the article, of other neoplatonic readings, but is there anything to close that you'd like to
01:03:08
Speaker
I'd like to emphasize at this point. Well, I mean, just very, very briefly, ah again, being sensitive of time, just to think of the Neoplatonists and their reading of the Affinity Argument, you know, they they take it in this much stronger sense that the soul is not just like the forms, it's really of the same metaphysical c certain Neoplatonists.
01:03:29
Speaker
of the same kind as the forms and they do take this composite in composite distinction seriously um and they have this stronger sense of the soul ah as kind of really being of the same kind they read the affinity argument in a less analogical way um and i guess I guess what I'm saying is it's it's not implausible to do that it's a worthy undertaking to kind of take that risk and you know I think I tend to sometimes read Plato in that way in a less kind of superficial way and to think more as a Platonist as such and to put my mind ah in in in that
01:04:09
Speaker
in that framework of Platonism itself and to think about, well, what are the what are the assumptions in the text? What can we kind of feed off and really thinking about Plato in this more doctrinal sense? So I see myself sometimes as doing something similar maybe in the way that I read Plato in in this Neoplatonic way.
01:04:29
Speaker
um And generally being inspired by Plato, you know, just as a final point, generally being but inspired by Plato, you know, not just as an exegete, but also also reading those ideas to kind of help us really think about the broader underlying ethical considerations of Plato's arguments, you know, how to live life today, the relevance of Plato, the relevance of these arguments.
01:04:54
Speaker
um So other than those final points, I guess I just wanted to thank you as well for the invitation. I've really enjoyed, like I said, it's been a while since I've um ah since I've looked at this article. So thank you. for Well, you could tell it's it is. Thank you for bringing me back to it. I appreciate the invitation. I hope your your audience find the discussion helpful or meaningful in some way. And, you know, I'm open to questions or comments from any of your audience members.
01:05:25
Speaker
and But it's been a real pleasure, Samuel. So thank you very much for the invitation. and Yeah. Thank you so much, Dr. Zephanides. I really appreciate it. And yes, again, to those listening, please check out an excellent article, reconsidering the essential nature and indestructibility of the soul and the affinity argument of the phato. All right. Thank you. Thank you.