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Plato's Phaedo: Dr. Elizabeth Jelinek on Forms, Causality, and Explanation
25 Plays3 months ago
In this episode, Dr. Elizabeth (Betsy) Jelinek, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Christopher Newport University, shares her insights into Plato’s Phaedo. We discuss her article, “Explanation in the Phaedo: An Argument Against the Metaphysical Interpretation of the Clever Αἰτία,” diving into the relationship between forms, causality, and the relevance of sensible particulars in Platonic thought.
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Transcript
Introduction to the Dionysus Circle Podcast
00:00:00
Speaker
Welcome to the Dionysus Circle Podcast. I'm Dr. Sam Bennett, your host. On this podcast, we explore the Eastern Christian Fathers and the philosophical traditions that influence them, including figures like Plato and Aristotle. In today's episode, my co-host Jack Bozar and I talk with Dr. Elizabeth Yellenik, chair of the philosophy department at Christopher Newport University.
00:00:21
Speaker
Dr. Jelenek specializes in the natural philosophy of Plato and will be discussing her recent article, Explanation in the Phato, an argument against the metaphysical interpretation of the clever idea. The Phato presents Socrates in a philosophical conversation on his deathbed, culminating in his drinking poison as part of his capital punishment by the state. This remarkable dialogue centers on four arguments about the immortality of the soul. Today's episode is part of a series we are dedicating to the Phato.
00:00:51
Speaker
And special thanks to Peter Anthony Taney for allowing us to feature his rendition of the hymn of the father's love begotten from his album, Sea Dreams. God bless you and I hope you enjoy the podcast.
Dr. Yellenik's Family History and Philosophical Journey
00:01:08
Speaker
So thanks for joining us, Betsy. Thank you very much for having me. Just to get started, maybe you could just tell us a little bit about yourself. You know, I'm kind of, I'm always curious, how did a philosopher get into philosophy? You know, was it,
00:01:20
Speaker
your time at undergrad, or maybe it happened even earlier. Yeah, so it's actually an interesting story. um My grandparents were German Jews, and it was they they had to escaped Nazi Germany in January of 1939. And my grandfather was a philosopher by avocation, you know not a professor of officially, but he just consumed philosophy all the time.
00:01:48
Speaker
And I was always taught that what saved their lives was the fact that my grandfather got a hold of foreign newspapers, and you because the media was controlled by the government. ah you know This was maybe 1938 when they were just thinking about this. So the media was um censored.
00:02:11
Speaker
But his doctor told him to go to Czechoslovakia for these mineral springs to cure his gallbladder problems. right So they had an excuse to leave Germany. go They went to Czechoslovakia. There my grandfather read the foreign newspapers and he read Mein Kampf. You and I know but philosophers know that analytical reading is such an important skill. It teaches you how to anticipate arguments, how to defend your own views. And it also teaches you how to confront views that may be conflicted with your own. ah so So it's critical reading. you know and And so he had those philosophical skills with him. And you know the story was always that
00:03:05
Speaker
It was his reading of these, it was for philosophical reasons that he left Germany, but it was because he was able to read and he had the training to do that from his background ah as a philosopher. Well, fascinating.
Choosing Plato: A Personal Story
00:03:19
Speaker
So from there, you know, I'd be curious like, in terms of like your scholarship and with Plato, do you consider him to be, do you kind of mainly study him because of it's like, he's such a significant historical figure?
00:03:33
Speaker
um Like he he tells you a lot about the history philosophy or do you study him? You know in terms you find him compelling today, you know a little bit of both so there is I can tell you a funny story about Why I chose Plato in particular if you want it. Yeah, sure. Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah so I was in seventh grade and um Elections for the president of the student council were taking place and And I was a straight A student and a huge nerd. I had these pink googly-eyed glasses, braces, and this was in the early nineties in New Jersey. So it was the era of big hair.
00:04:16
Speaker
I mean, aqua net tails were through the roof. So the the student who was running was super popular and she had huge hair. I mean, she just knew how to tease that hair. um And she her she campaigned on things that she knew people wanted to hear, like let's play, you know, top 40s music during homeroom. That has nothing to do with school, right? Yeah, yeah.
00:04:41
Speaker
So I decided she wasn't qualified. So I decided I should run. So of course, um you know, I had these pencils made.
00:04:54
Speaker
And my campaign slogan was, Betsy is your best bet. And it was printed on these consoles that I handed out. Cause my whole thing was that I'm a straight A student that should, shouldn't the most intelligent person or the be the leader. Having read the Republic. Yeah. Right. Sorry. oh I lost the election. I mean, I think the only people who voted for me were my three friends. And it's because my mom told their mom, please vote for Betsy.
00:05:24
Speaker
ah so i lost in And I wasn't so, when I came home, I wasn't so upset about my own loss. I said, mom and dad, you know, our democracy is doomed. Shouldn't the smartest person win instead of the person with the biggest hair? And, you know, it was a teachable moment. um And then I read Plato's Republic.
00:05:52
Speaker
And I thought, yes, philosopher kings. Absolutely. Nice. So the philosopher's king idea
Plato's Relevance in Modern Times: Ignorance and AI
00:06:00
Speaker
got you. Yeah. I mean, in terms of Plato's relevance today, um what the first thing that comes to my mind is that concept that that the philosophers need to be compelled to rule.
00:06:15
Speaker
the um the ignorant people who don't know anything about ruling. you know I'm thinking of the Ship of State analogy and we're in the Republic. um The people who are ignorant are really eager to rule, and they don't know what they're doing, and because of that, they're the most dangerous. so And another aspect of Plato that I've been thinking about a lot in terms of his relevance for today. So you know how in the gorgias, Socrates is talking about the ah you know what makes for a good ship pilot? Well, the goal as as as a pilot is to get your passengers safely from one one destination to the other. So that presumably would include saving your passenger from debt from drowning. So that wouldn' that's what would make you a good ship pilot because you're performing your function well. But Socrates raises the point
00:07:15
Speaker
Well, is it good that you saved that person from drowning? Was that a good thing? I mean, maybe that person was evil and dangerous and you should have let him drown, right? And so what but that reminds me of is this idea with artificial intelligence, just here, now, we have to confront it.
00:07:38
Speaker
It might be really good. where ah Scientists are really good at using artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is really good at what it does. But is it do we know when it's appropriate to use it and when it's not? ah so So that distinction between you know a functional good and a moral good is something that I think is is very relevant today.
00:08:05
Speaker
yeah I wanted to ask you though, before we talk about your article, what do you think about Plato's sort of metaphysics? Are you more, I mean, obviously this article is heavily metaphysical, but are you persuaded at all that his his metaphysical system is ah plausible?
Plato's Theory of Explanation in the Phaedo
00:08:21
Speaker
I think I'm a Platonist about mathematics. Okay, yeah, yeah. But I, I mean, there are problems, internal problems with his theory of forms.
00:08:33
Speaker
Well, that's a perfect segue into the the article then. I mean, could you give us for the listeners, maybe the 10,000 foot view, what you're trying to do and I guess maybe ah why the article you thought was worth, worth writing. In the article, I'm examining Plato's account of explanation, the nature of explanation. What makes for a good explanation or a legitimate explanation?
00:09:03
Speaker
The reason that that's important to look at is because Aristotle famously criticizes Plato for not being for attributteing you for attributing efficient causality to his forms in the feto, and of course that's absurd because forms are eternal on moving ontologically separate from this world. So Aristotle thinks, Aristotle has this beautifully ah developed theory of explanation. And he just makes fun of Plato for just not knowing what he's doing when it comes to explanation. you Plato just doesn't know what he's talking about. So is that true? is I don't think Plato has the same theory of explanation that Aristotle has, but was he as bad as Aristotle made him sound?
00:09:54
Speaker
um So that's what originally inspired the article, because now I'm looking at his theory of explanation in the Fido, and are the you know is the theory of forms enough? Is it sufficient for explaining the kinds of things that Socrates needs to establish in the Fido? Because if it's not, then that has interesting implications for what types of explanatory modes Plato has at his disposal and his philosophy. You you basically present how there's like kind of three types of explanation.
00:10:33
Speaker
that are considered in this, in the Fado. And specifically this appears in the intellectual autobiography. So this is obviously, you know, very famous portion of the Fado where Socrates kind of gives a little bit of an autobiography of himself. How it comes up, I guess it's like CBs is kind of like, Hey, Socrates, you haven't really proven that the soul is immortal, which is kind of the main topic of the whole dialogue. CB says, Hey, you haven't really proven it.
00:11:02
Speaker
And then Socrates kind of takes a long, um, you know, dramatic pause, I guess. And he says, you know, okay, we're going to have to, I'm going to have to tell you about my experiences, you know, i give you an account of my, some of my life. And then he gets into it, you know, the, in a lot, his, his autobiography yeah and he contract, he ends up kind of contrasting. It seems like three different kinds of explanation, right. And, and the first one,
00:11:31
Speaker
As you explain in your article, you know it's like a more commonplace natural scientific explanation. The second one occurs after Socrates as a second sailing, and which has to do with the theory of forms. And then the third one is the clever ah clever explanation. That is really what your article is really kind of focused on.
00:11:55
Speaker
Could you maybe describe for us, like, what is, what's motivating Socrates? Like, I'm kind of curious, you know, can you kind of describe us for us? You know, what kind of is the question that's motivating Socrates at the beginning of this autobiography? He's looking into the question of living things coming into being existing and decaying, dying.
00:12:18
Speaker
Now, his theory of forms, is just to jump ahead and then for perspective, his theory of forms, if something participates in a form, if it either is, you know if I participate in the form F, either I am F or I have a characteristic F. I have the property you know of F. Now, for living things,
00:12:49
Speaker
When you come into being, that could either mean that you come into existence or that you come to acquire an attribute, right? And for living things, coming into existence just is the same as acquiring an attribute. You're now living. So I think the reason he starts with that question is because the final proof of the immortality of the soul, he needs to established that the soul has this attribute in a certain kind of way such that it is, it will be immortal. Okay. Yeah. Cause it's, cause I mean, if it has it in the way of like, it's eternally alive or once it's alive, it cannot possibly die. If it has life in that sense, then it's going to follow that it's immortal. Is that that kind of the idea?
00:13:47
Speaker
Yeah, that's actually an interesting point. So the final proof for the immortality of the soul has this twist towards the end where he says the soul will never admit death and things that are deathless are indestructible and therefore immortal. Now,
00:14:17
Speaker
he And he makes some comment along the lines of, you know, everybody knows that the deathless is immortal. But that's an interesting it's just interesting way of going about the proof because fire,
00:14:36
Speaker
you know, or let's use a person, for example, they can be hot and then they can be cold. You know what I mean? Like these things can change. But the soul possesses life um in such a way that it will always bring life, and that life will never be destroyed. Yeah, it's yeah it's puzzling, right? Because, it yeah, like you said, you can think of things that it's alive. Like like a plant. Yeah, right. But maybe it can.
00:15:07
Speaker
I mean, yeah, maybe we can lose that quality. But anyway, yeah, well we'll kind of get maybe the touch on the the final proof ah further below. um So yeah, so he has this initial question. He seems to be concerned with understanding you know why things are generated, mean why why living things come to be. And famously in his in his autobiography, the first sort of explanation he gets involved in is a kind of commonplace type of explanation. It's one you might associate with the pre-Socratic natural philosophers and more generally with natural science. So can you kind of just tell us a little bit about this first kind of explanation that Socrates gets i interested in and then why he ends up considering it inadequate? I think one important detail to point out and in his discussion of the pre-Socratic natural philosophers and their scientific explanations, is his discussion of the works of Anaxagoras. So Anaxagoras talks about noose or intelligence. And so Socrates says,
00:16:22
Speaker
I thought he would, that Anaxagoras would say that noose is responsible for everything, that intelligence is responsible for everything, and that the earth is spherical because it's best for the earth to be that way. Right? And then Sagrati says, and I was so excited, but then my hopes were dashed when Anaxagoras didn't make use of intelligence at all. And instead he cited air, ether,
00:16:47
Speaker
and these other things as the causes of phenomena. And that's not a cause. That's as absurd as saying that my bones and sinews caused me to sit, you know, to be in this this jail cell. So what I want to point out about that is that a couple of things. So the explanation that Socrates really wants is what I would call a platonic teleological explanation, just to differenti differentiate it from Aristotle's teleology. ah ah but A platonic teleological explanation because intelligent agents always do what they think is best. And the degree to which that thing actually is good
00:17:41
Speaker
is directly proportional to the degree to which that the agent is intelligent. So gods are supremely intelligent, so everything that they do will necessarily be the best. Why am I pointing that out? Well, because notice that in that explanation, the the idea, the thing, or the god in this case, is a cause that will guarantee a certain result by virtue of that thing's essential nature,
Teleological vs Scientific Explanations in Plato
00:18:19
Speaker
right? So the nature, the essential nature of a god is that he's supremely intelligent. And so we're guaranteed that every time the god acts, it will be
00:18:32
Speaker
for what he judges to be best. And that's relevant to the other types of explanations that Socrates considers. So he has this funny passage where he says, it's absurd to say that Simeus is taller than Thebes by a head because he's also shorter you know, then Simeus is also shorter than Socrates by a head. So how could one thing, a head, be the cause of something large and something small? So, but notice that with a head, there's nothing about the essential nature of a head that guarantees tallness. So so I think his discussion, his rejection of the natural philosophers ah stems from his
00:19:23
Speaker
Insistence that a true idea genuine idea should should cite as the cause Something that guarantees the effect by virtue of the causes essential nature and none of the explanations that he Explores during his intellectual autobiography ah fit that description Okay, so to be a genuine cause um Is it like two parts to that? Are you saying like to be a genuine cause? One, it needs to guarantee the effect. In other words, when you have that cause, that's necessary and sufficient for the effect. So one, there needs to be a kind of guarantee relationship, right? um And that lacks in the head, right? i i have a
00:20:19
Speaker
I have a head or I'm not sure how to put it, but like I have a head, but that doesn't make me taller than Shaquille O'Neal. Is that kind the kind of point? Okay. is that All right. so that So just having a head doesn't guarantee that I'm taller than Shaq. Okay. So anyway, so the first part is that the the genuine cause it needs to be necessary and sufficient for the effect.
00:20:47
Speaker
And then also, are you saying there's like this extra element, which is that it has to relate to the essential nature of the genuine cause? Is that like a kind of a second element or? Yeah, I would say so because um ultimately,
00:21:05
Speaker
the soul, by virtue of its essential nature, namely bringing life, guarantees that it will enliven the body it occupies.
00:21:22
Speaker
Right. So this is looking forward to the, to the final proof where, okay, but yeah, so just get, okay. So the, the soul by its ascension. So it's kind of alive in the body when it's there. And not only is that effect guaranteed, but it's by, it's the nature of the soul that that's bringing about that effect. Okay. Exactly. Exactly. Yeah.
00:21:43
Speaker
So I mean, it's kind of so you know we're trying to set up you know these three different types of explanations you talk about. The first is this more commonplace one. The second is the, you know after the second sailing, we get Socrates talking about using forms to explain things. And then the third one is the more clever explanation, which is sort of like the mysterious one that your paper is about. Now, we're talking about the first commonplace one. You kind of pointed out.
00:22:13
Speaker
I mean, it's not so commonplace to say that it's because of noose intelligence in connection to an ex-aggress, right? But I think the more, anyway, so it's like a little bit confused, like there's like, it seems like in the first stage, there's like, there's a couple, I don't know where to put the noose type of explanation is what I'm saying. um But I mean, it's pretty obvious that like, when it comes to the first type of commonplace explanation, you're like saying,
00:22:41
Speaker
i I grew because I got more flesh. like That's a kind of very intuitive sort of commonplace explanation. a lot of Most scholars will read that passage and say, aha, that means that Plato rejects any type of explanation that incorporates matter or deep sensible particulars as an explanatory mode. He's just against be the Becoming, you know everything is about being becoming cannot play a legitimate role in an explanation. And that's what these scholars say. And I think that it has it's not because he doesn't reject mechanistic explanations because they have to do with nature. He rejects them because they don't guarantee the effect. right And so what's interesting is later on in the dialogue,
00:23:42
Speaker
He says um the reason the water flows back and forth is because it neither it has neither, you know it it doesn't have a resting place, something like that, right? So so he's explaining why water flows in a stream.
00:24:05
Speaker
And he's appealing to a sensible particular water. So he can't be against explanations that involve particulars altogether. Right. Okay. Okay. Yeah. And then because in your interpretation of this third type of explanation, the clever idea kind of explanation, you're going to bring in your interpretation. You think Socrates is willing to explain things using on the one hand, a little bit of forms or
00:24:41
Speaker
And then the second like ingredient is sensible particulars. Good. OK. Well, maybe let's talk then about the second type of explanation that comes up in the autobiography, the one that appeals only to forms.
00:24:59
Speaker
um Because this one, it looks like, yeah, it's not including um sensible particulars. So can you kind of flesh out what's going on with that type of, you know, it's part of the second sailing. What's going on with that type of explanation? Socrates' discussion of the safe idea is extremely exciting because you could argue it's the first time that he is you know describing the theory of forms that is so central to Plato's metaphysics. So we can use Helen as an example.
00:25:35
Speaker
Helen is beautiful because she participates in the form beautiful.
00:25:42
Speaker
What's distinctive about that, the innovation there is that rather than appealing to Helen's hair or her perfect teeth or whatever, those things don't guarantee beauty because you might think Helen is beautiful, but Jack might think she's not, right? So you can't appeal to physical characteristics.
00:26:05
Speaker
um as guaranteeing beauty, but if you participate in the form beauty, that is both that secure you know that guarantees that you are beautiful, right? To a certain extent, it doesn't guarantee that you're maximally beautiful, but if you're beautiful, you know if you participate in the form beauty, you have beauty as an attribute. Right, so it it fits that guarantee You know, it's like, I was kind of thinking, okay, so, you know, someone might think, Oh, I'm hurting because I got kicked in the back. But, you know, some people get kicked in the back and they're not hurting. So that doesn't guarantee that being kicked in the back doesn't guarantee you're hurting. However, if you participate in the, is there a form for pain? I don't know. If you participate in the form pain, I guess that's going to guarantee that you're in pain. um Okay.
00:27:02
Speaker
And so that's the, that's kind of his, I guess it's sort of like a revolutionary new thing that Socrates, it seems like a, obviously it's like a kind of bizarre explanation. Um, cause it seems like not super helpful in a way to be like, Oh, Helen's beautiful because she participates in the form of beauty. But yeah, that's the second type of explanation that's on the table. And then your article is about this third one.
00:27:31
Speaker
that he proposes, which he says, he says it's more clever, right? that's right So yeah, can you tell us about, okay, what's what's this more clever um explanation?
00:27:43
Speaker
So he says, now I can give you the type of explanation. I can say that a body is hot, not because it part participates in hotness, but because there's fire in it.
00:28:02
Speaker
So before we could, with this with a safe idea, we had fire is hot because it participates in the form hot. But now we're we're talking about ah things that carry with them certain attributes, ah carry with them certain attributes when they're in other bodies, right?
00:28:29
Speaker
so so Socrates is ill not only because he participates in the form illness, but because he has a fever. So I think the best way to wrap our heads around that is to think about how what I call the metaphysical interpretation ah reads that that passage. So the med according according to the metaphysical interpretation,
00:28:57
Speaker
Fire participates in the form fire, and the form fire entails the form hot. So that's why fire is hot. So in the metaphysical interpretation, they're positing more forms. Instead of just the form hot, they have the form fire, which has this necessary connection to the form hot, such that everything that participates in the form fire also then ah as a consequence participates in the form hot. So we have a fire. It's hot. And we want to explain. ah Why are we trying to explain right now why it's hot? Or what would we OK, so we want to explain why why is this fire hot and the.
00:29:48
Speaker
um The safe explanation, the second kind would be say it would be to say because it participates in the form fire. No, the safe explanation would say that it participates the fire is hot because it participates in the form hot. Okay. And then the third type of explanation, instead of saying it's hot because it participates in the form hot, it's going to say it's hot because. Because it has fire or it is fire. Because it is fire. Okay. And according to the metaphysical interpretation, fire is hot because fire participates in the form fire.
00:30:26
Speaker
and the form fire has this necessary connection to the form hot. So everything that's a fire must also be hot. Let me make sure I get the Plato's argument right. So the first type of explanation, is it safe to say that the material the natural scientist like Enix Agris is just listing necessary conditions and Plato's critique is really, you know, a bunch of necessary conditions are never gonna get you to an adequate explanation.
00:30:56
Speaker
For instance, you know, if you want to explain the birth of a cat, it's not an explanation to say, well, the parents are alive, and they're also like in that location, you have to have some sort of cause that guarantees that effect. Sometimes a sort of commonplace explanation It doesn't even identify something necessary, right? Cause like the one that I just gave about, okay, my, I'm in pain. Why? I got kicked in the back. Well, I could be in pain without getting kicked in the back. So it's not even really necessary. Yeah. and the The best example of that is when Sakshi says the reason I'm sitting in jail. If you look at the passage carefully, he says the reason I'm sitting in jail is because the Athenians thought it best to condemn me.
00:31:46
Speaker
And I thought it best to obey. Sure, I couldn't be sitting in jail. I couldn't be in a seated position if it weren't for my bones and sinews, but those same bones and sinews could have you brought me to exile mega, right? Like they don't, bones and sinews themselves don't guarantee that I'm in this jail. And they're not the the reason I'm in jail.
00:32:09
Speaker
Yeah, that's that's really good because Lloyd Gerson, in his characterization of this argument, he ah cashes out in terms of the opposites there. And so if you have one condition that can guarantee that could lead to different you know contrary things, like Socrates being in jail and not being in jail, then it can't be an explanation of one phenomenon. It's sort of arbitrary that you choose that to be an explanation. Excellent. Very well put. Yeah, I i agree with that. That's that's really helpful. Yeah.
00:32:39
Speaker
Okay, cool. So then he moves on to the second type and we've covered that. I think that's, that's a pretty good summary of that. So now we should, yeah, definitely get into your fever example, because that's doing a lot of the work in the article.
Critique of Metaphysical Interpretations of Plato
00:32:51
Speaker
A fever participates in the form fever according to the metaphysical interpretation and the form fever entails the form illness. Now with the clever explanation,
00:33:09
Speaker
Socrates is ill because he has a fever. So Socrates has a fever. So he participates in the form fever, which entails the form illness. So Socrates is ill. But that doesn't quite work because so because the fever itself isn't ill.
00:33:35
Speaker
yeah Socrates and the fever have the same relationship to this very same foreign forms in their entailment relationships. So shouldn't the result be the same? right Here's another example. um the The word for fever ah is more accurate accurately translated as excess heat. OK.
00:34:02
Speaker
i
00:34:05
Speaker
participate, so i if I, if there's excess heat in my body, I have a fever, but excess heat doesn't, we can't say that the form excess heat entails the form illness because my oven has excess heat and my oven is not ill, right? And so so here's the point that forms are eternal, unchanging,
00:34:32
Speaker
And so the relationships among them must be necessary. And Vlastos, one of the proponents of the metaphysical interpretation, goes so far as to say the laws of nature for Socrates are just as necessary as logic, you know, in the same type of necessity as we get in logic and mathematics.
00:34:56
Speaker
So it seems like, is there like maybe two problems going on? So basically, you know, we're laying out the ah the metaphysical interpretation of the third type of explanation and you've kind of are now touching on, yeah, your criticisms of it. And the first one, which is super interesting is that it seems like there's a sort of random or arbitrary asymmetry where fever participates in the form fever.
00:35:24
Speaker
And according to metaphysical interpretation, that entails participating in the form illness. But we're not running around saying that the fever is ill. Right. So we have a fever that's participating in the and you form one fever and then form two illness, but we're not running around saying it's ill. And then on the other hand, you know, we're supposed to be saying that the body sort of through the fever. It's a little bit confusing. Like the body is, thanks to the fever, participating in the form fever and then, because I guess it has a fever. Anyway, but anyway, the body is participating in the form fever and thereby the form illness. And we are saying the body is ill. So we're saying the body is ill, but we're not saying the fever is ill, but they're participating in the same forms. So
00:36:20
Speaker
So I mean, there's like this asymmetry. It's like, why is that why is there a difference? But I guess the maybe the main problem is is more it violates the conditions for an explanation, right? and right Because it would be like, or I don't know. i is Basically, so far, does that sound about like, right, Betsy? or you know Absolutely, Sam. OK, so there's that kind of problem. and But then also, I think you're, if I'm right, like you're kind of pointing to like almost a second problem, which is like, hold up. There's not even an entailment relation.
00:36:50
Speaker
because you're pointing out my oven can have excess heat, but it's not, it's not ill anyway. So that suggests in effect, it's like the oven is participating in the form fever and it's not right. So that's going to be, that's like a kind of a second issue. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Yeah. um Okay, great. So, uh,
00:37:17
Speaker
do we want Do you want to like talk of any more about, I mean, I think that criticism is pretty strong. I don't know what we would say in defense of the metaphysical interpretation, um but you do have some other kind of points against it um besides its difficulty with handling the fever example. Do you want to talk about, I mean, any of your other criticisms of the metaphysical interpretation? I think one of them has to do with like the the soul.
00:37:47
Speaker
Socrates, his the whole point of the feto is not just to say that the soul is alive, but that the soul quickens the body, the soul enlivens the body when it enters it. So that,
00:38:10
Speaker
now if the soul, okay, so if the soul were to enter a human body, it would enliven that body. um participation in the form soul and even participation in the form life doesn't explain the causal interaction, the effects, the way the body is changed by the soul. The soul is not just a life, it has this power to, and it it also has a power to enliven, right? um And I mean, another, maybe another
00:38:48
Speaker
objection that I raise is that um the soul only enlivens things when it enters mortal sentient bodies. If you put a soul in a clay pot, that pot is not going to become alive. Now, the reason that's important is because the forms, because they're eternal and unchanging,
00:39:17
Speaker
They cannot explain, in my opinion, they cannot account for counterfactual conditionals. So for example, if a soul is in a body, a human body, then it enlivens it. Oh, but wait, if the soul is in a clay pot, then it doesn't. right That complicated explanation or that principle, I mean, we have we're we today are fine with it. right um the law of gravity, if I drop something, it will fall ah unless it's a helium balloon, right? like we We have these if-then statements, these conditional statements in in the laws of physics and the laws of nature, and we're fine with it, but the Plato can't do that because the forms can't support that kind of explanation. Okay, so yeah, this is super interesting.
The Soul and Life in Plato's Theory
00:40:14
Speaker
So like, it's one thing for
00:40:17
Speaker
a fever to have the power to make a body ill when it's in that body. But it's another thing for the fever to itself be ill. So obviously a fever is not itself ill. Instead, a fever has this power to make the body ill. All right, and then go into the soul. The soul, it has this quality of being alive.
00:40:45
Speaker
But that's like a different thing than it having the power to make a body alive when it's in it. Now, you point out that, like you just said, you know, it's like, well, if you put a soul in a clay pot, it doesn't make the clay pot alive. Whereas if you put a soul in a body, it does make it alive. And if that's true, then It can't be that the the forms are capable of explaining they the fact that a soul can make the body alive. Because if it was explaining it, then it would just, you know, if it's in a... ah yeah it's it's a bit It's like the soul participates in the form, so it's alive. And thus, it you know, if that was alone capable of explaining these powers, then whenever it's in anything, it would
00:41:45
Speaker
bring life to it, right? But you're saying actually when it goes into a clay pot, it's not ah it's not making the clay pot alive. I think what's going on, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you have X, and X can, it it does guarantee this effect in a lot of cases. But then we have cases where it doesn't guarantee that effect. And so we have to have an additional component Y to account for, you know, why X is not doing this in other cases. And that's the whole counter counterfactual thing.
00:42:16
Speaker
And so that means that the explanation has to include both of these elements, not just, you know, the form in this case. Excellent. Yeah, I agree with that. But Betsy, so like one thing I was wondering is like, are we sure that the soul is not going to make the clay pot alive? What if soccer what if someone of the metaphysical interpretation just said, look, the soul maybe can't go into a kit clay pot. But if it could,
00:42:45
Speaker
it would make it alive. Yeah, so I guess I'm wondering is like, they could be like, no, look, anytime, this you know, if the soul is alive, that means whenever it's in anything, it just immediately entails that whenever it's in anything, it makes it alive. um And so yeah, if it could go into a clay pot, it would make it a alive, but it just turns out it can't go into a clay pot. The important point is, and you mentioned this earlier, that The ability, so with fire, for example, the ability to ignite objects is not the not the same as the property of being hot. So if I have a fever, I'm hot to the touch, but I can't, you know, I can't light the candle that's on my desk. You know what I'm saying?
00:43:40
Speaker
Right. so So that's why I emphasize that the soul's ability to bring life to the thing it ah to the body it occupies is distinct, is is not the same as just saying simply that the soul is alive. Yeah, with the ability to make something hot. like Something can be hot, but not be able to make something hot. So that suggests in general, just by participating in the form hot, you don't get the power to make other things hot, and necessarily. Right, right. And so, I mean, okay, so maybe let's then go to like, kind of implications of that, because like, so one kind of thought is like, you know, I don't know if you like people like certain plainness,
00:44:35
Speaker
I don't know, maybe a lot of playlists, but I'm thinking of like Eric Pearl. He's a contemporary playlist. And he, you know, he wants to say, look, every absolutely everything, you know, when you think about sensibilities, everything about them is reducible to forms. There's absolutely nothing about them. And and so he will even say that like ah a sensible thing is just an appearance of a form because it's like everything about the thing is reducible to forms. But your point, I mean, it seems like you're saying that there's something about things that are not, it's not reducible to form. So for example, the fact that a soul enlivenes the body, not only is alive, but enlivenes the body, you can't reduce that to a form. I mean, would you say that? Would you say, so, okay. So, so I guess what one thing I'm wondering is like, what do you think about the implications for like the broader platonic metaphysics? Cause like, you know, I'm thinking in Platonism, it's like, you know, we start with a bunch of, you know, we start with the one and then we go like,
00:45:31
Speaker
go down, we get a bunch of forms, and and we're just gonna use those things to explain absolutely everything. But it looks like, oh, that's gonna explain certain sort of stuff like the soul being alive, but it's not gonna explain these causal powers. So I don't know, can you just, yeah, what do you think about all that? Well, I agree with everything you you said, and ah that the forms can't explain account for causal powers.
00:46:02
Speaker
But I think that's a good thing for Plato because, I mean, Plato himself, in the Parmenides, for example, criticizes his own theory of forms. There are problems in the theory of forms. and and And the theory of forms is not necessarily the same in every dialogue, right?
00:46:23
Speaker
and
00:46:26
Speaker
So I think that's good news for Plato that there's an irreducible cause, an irreducible phenomenon or explanatory mode that cannot be attributed to the forms. Because now look at his theory of explanation as a whole. Now he can go to the Timaeus and explain ah why the cosmos is the way it is without having to rely exclusively on forms or the divine or the demiurge, right? it it I guess my point is that it enhances his ability to explain things. and it It enhances his theory of explanation. it It makes it more nuanced. And so I think it's a more charitable reading of Plato.
00:47:22
Speaker
so You know, we have certain qualities that can be explained in terms of forms, like Helen being beautiful. Then we have other qualities that can't be explained in terms of forms, like the causal power of being able, of the fire being able to actually ignite that wood.
00:47:38
Speaker
um Now, it would you wouldn it would be a problem if it's like, there's no explanation of of those causal powers, right? like what um if it's not in terms of the forms like you know why what do you think would be like the the idea behind like why is it that wood uh that fire can where does it get that causal power why can the fire ignite the wood if it's not the forms the more complicated answer is that if you look in the time as i've argued that the traces of the elements in the or the
00:48:17
Speaker
pre-elements in the pre-cosmos, you can't explain the ability to heat things in terms of fire's participation in a form. It would be i it would be great if Plato's theory of forms could account for the types of phenomena that we've been describing, like the soul and being having the power to enliven a body. That would be super cool. That would be awesome for Play-Doh. But I just think that the forms are to limited his theory of forms is too limited to go that far. So i'm not so I definitely agree that um
00:49:03
Speaker
You are strong because you participate in the form strong.
00:49:12
Speaker
But that's not enough to explain, but you know, so is Jack, right? Jack is also strong, but you can break a board in half with your hand, but Jack can't. Let's say it's actually the reverse, but no, you're not. I'm just kidding. But you agree though, that like, yeah, so I'm with you. It's not enough, but part of the explanation of the causal power right it's gonna somehow have to include my participation in the form strength yes but like you said it's not enough for sure yeah so i'm with so i'm wondering whether it's like the extra bit is the relations among um the particulars yes i would agree with that yeah yeah it's just interesting um it makes me think of um
00:50:03
Speaker
Edward Halper, his work, he talks about like, that's the lacuna. He he has like this whole like theory of like, you know, he's an Aristotle scholar, but he has this whole theory of like the development of Western philosophy. He's kind of like the thing that the Greeks had trouble with were relations.
Hybrid Explanation: Forms and Sensible Particulars
00:50:18
Speaker
So if we were to take, I mean, this could be ah maybe another criticism of the metaphysical interpretation. If we were to take um the example of the strength and we just say, oh yeah, the form of strength is sufficient to explain. Well, as you pointed out, you can explain why Sam can break the board and I can't by appealing to the same thing. So again, you're proving two contraries with the same explanation. And so the explanation fails.
00:50:47
Speaker
Exactly. Yeah. Very well put. For the last question here, Betsy, like, I mean, when it comes to your hybrid explanation, so this is the reading of the third type, clever explanation. You know, you reject the metaphysical interpretation for the reason we've just been describing and instead you put the, for the hybrid and it's hybrid because in this type of clever explanation, we're going to involve on the one hand, the forms, but on the other hand, sensible particulars. Yeah.
00:51:16
Speaker
Yet as an irreducible component of the explanation yeah that that can't be reduced to just relationships among forms. Like that's the stopping point of the explanation. So there's their forms and then their sensible particulars and those sensible particulars cannot be explained in terms of forms. They are the stopping point. This is really good because, like Sam, you mentioned earlier, Pearl's reading of of Platonism and and Plato, his system. And for Pearl, I mean, we've talked about this before, you see you and me, but he seems to think that there is no role in platonic metaphysics for sensibles. But I mean, here, it seems like there has to be a role if you want explanation at all.
00:52:03
Speaker
Exactly. This has important implications for the Timaeus in particular, right? Not just the FEDO, but I don't know how you can understand or read the Timaeus if you think that everything is explainable, you know, in terms of forms. It just wouldn't work. Betsy, thanks so much for coming on. Your article is absolutely ah fascinating. I mean, it's like obviously super important for thinking about platonic metaphysics. So thanks so much for writing it and thank you for coming on.
00:52:33
Speaker
Thank you so much for having me. I really enjoyed this.