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Particularism Reaffirmed!
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Aw, Particularism - why so glum? You look like you need some positive affirmation - some reaffirmation, even. Well, you're in luck, because M, Kurtis and Charles have just authored “Particularism Reaffirmed: Why Conspiracy Theories (Variously Defined) Should Be Judged on Their Own Merits”! Let's have a look through it together and see if it can't perk you up.
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Transcript
What Defines a Masterpiece?
00:00:00
Speaker
What, Josh, constitutes a masterpiece? Well, that's a good question. um Historically, masterpieces have been, given their namesake, the works of the great masters, da Vinci, Botticelli, Rembrandt.
00:00:13
Speaker
But in recent years, the idea of the masterpiece has shifted. I think if we take a look at the artistic turn of the for example... I was thinking more about what makes something a masterpiece such that we cover it in conspiracy theory masterpiece theatre.
00:00:28
Speaker
Oh, well, that's quite simple. um a it needs to be at least five years old, and B, you have to tell me to read it. Does not B override A? Well, I guess it might. Some things could become instant classics, I suppose.
00:00:43
Speaker
And what have made you read recently? ah Well, I don see what you've done, you crafty bastard, but the joke's on you. I'm editing this episode, and I'll play whatever if chime or sting I like.
00:00:55
Speaker
Well, listen, it's a turn-up for the books.
Introduction to 'The Podcaster's Guide to the Conspiracy'
00:01:04
Speaker
The Podcaster's Guide to the Conspiracy, brought to you today by Josh Edison and Ian Denteth.
00:01:25
Speaker
Hello and welcome to the Podcaster's Guide to the Conspiracy. am Josh Addison in Auckland, New Zealand. They are Dr M Denteth in Guangzhou, China. And we have a paper review.
00:01:36
Speaker
But not just any paper. ah paper with your own name on it, Dr Denteth, among others. Yes, right smack dab in the middle. So this is a paper that was recently published in the journal Social Epistemology.
00:01:50
Speaker
It has the lengthy title, Particulism Reaffirmed, colon, Why Conspiracy Theories, brackets, variously defined, closed brackets, should be judged on their own merits.
00:02:01
Speaker
And it's a collaboration between myself... Curtis Hagen and Charles Pigden, of which the all the ordering is Curtis, then meself, then Charles.
00:02:13
Speaker
Right, so how did you find yourself and and as as the meat in a philosopher's sandwich? how did this How did this paper come of about? So many people will know that I run a reading group, the Conspiracy Theory Theorist Social Club.
Origins of the Paper on Conspiracy Theories
00:02:27
Speaker
And a little while ago, we read a paper by Keith Harris, Some Problems with Particularism. And Charles, Curtis and myself had issues in the way that Keith covers particularism.
00:02:46
Speaker
And mostly because we felt that Keith got Charles and myself wrong. and vitally was kind of ignoring Curtis's work.
00:02:57
Speaker
So Charles mooted that we should write some kind of reply to the hey this paper, and Curtis and I went, actually, that's a good idea. And then for six months, we did nothing whatsoever.
00:03:10
Speaker
And then I sent out an email saying, are we going to write this thing? And so Curtis and I did a large amount of the initial first draft of the paper and then gave that to Charles. Charles gave his input and then two papers emerged from this.
00:03:29
Speaker
So there is a second paper, which is also based upon a kind of giant paper we wrote that got so big that we decided we need to kind split it in twain.
00:03:41
Speaker
And this Second paper has been the one that has come out first. So there's another paper in review elsewhere, which touches on some related topics.
00:03:55
Speaker
This is the one which is out in the wild right now.
Particularism vs. Generalism in Conspiracy Theories
00:03:58
Speaker
Right. Yes, because i was going to ask, it it does spend a decent chunk of it replying to Keith Harris specifically. So is this is this first and foremost a response to Harris, or did you think it was time to to sort of make the case but for particularism in general? And Harris made a good a good case study.
00:04:21
Speaker
Both. So it was essentially a case of being annoyed at Keith's portrayal of particularism, which we, as we'll talk about in the paper itself, we think he misattributes a view to Charles Pigden and myself.
00:04:36
Speaker
And also we felt that this was a good way to then kind of demonstrate once again that generalists just by and large get particularism wrong. And they get it wrong in kind of interesting ways. So it was a good way to kind of go, well, look, actually, if you're going to come at the king, then complete the the metaphor properly.
00:04:59
Speaker
Right. Okay, well, let's let's let's let's waste no more time. um I'm going to play a chime. Will it be the Conspiracy Theory Masterpiece Theatre Chime? Will it be something else? I kind of hope not, because it's a bit vainglorious. It's a little bit. But it is your episode to edit, so you can you can stick in the Benny Hill theme if you really want to.
00:05:19
Speaker
Ooh, not a bad idea. Well, let's find out. Welcome to Conspiracy Theory Theatre.
00:05:34
Speaker
And of course, I won't know. and I may never know because i I never listen to our episodes. i i'm I'm too busy recording them to listen to them.
00:05:45
Speaker
Well, that's fair. Okay, so we have a paper to look at, and like all good papers, it starts with an abstract. It's your paper, so why don't you give us the abstract? In the philosophical debate over the epistemic status of conspiracy theories, the view that each theory ought to be judged on its own merits, particularism, has the upper hand.
00:06:04
Speaker
But challenges to this view continue to be put forth. This paper summarizes that debate and reaffirms the particular perspective. In this paper, we address how different conceptions of what counts as a conspiracy theory impact how one might evaluate particularism, with specific emphasis on one, a simple definition of a conspiracy theory as a theory that posits a conspiracy, and two, contrarian conspiracy theories, those that contrast with an official account.
00:06:36
Speaker
When you say particularism has the upper hand at the moment, would you say it's just just more more widely accepted? There are more particularists than there are generalists? I mean, yes, I mean, i would I would go somewhat stronger than that. So I think there are more particularist papers out there than there are generous ones.
00:06:55
Speaker
And that's in part because I think there's a greater diversity of particularists in the philosophical literature at this time compared to a paucity of generalists putting forward their views.
00:07:07
Speaker
But I'd also say particularism has the upper hand in that it's actually fairly able to conclusively show that the types of generalism that have been put forward by various generalists fail with regard to their own metrics.
00:07:24
Speaker
So generalism isn't just a problematic theory about conspiracy theory theory. It also tends to be self-defeating on the kind of notion that generalists want to argue for.
00:07:38
Speaker
So I think it's both... having the upper hand and is kind of becoming in the consensus position amongst philosophers who are interested in doing conspiracy theory at this time.
00:07:52
Speaker
But of course, I'd say that I'm a particularist. I would say that I'm one of the co-authors of this paper. Indeed. So to the paper, it's in a few sections. Section one, fittingly, is the introduction which starts,
00:08:07
Speaker
the debate in the philosophical literature regarding the epi epistemic status of conspiracy theories has often contrasted particularists with generalists particularists maintain that conspiracy theories want to be judged on a case-by-case basis based on their particular merits and faults rather than summarily dismissed To be clear, particularists can help themselves to general criteria for dismissing false or foolish conspiracy theories, but these relate to
The Danger of Dismissing True Theories
00:08:30
Speaker
the particular falsehood or folly of the conspiracy theories in question, not to the mere fact that they count as conspiracy theories.
00:08:38
Speaker
And so it goes on to say that particularism is a response in particular to pejorative uses of the term conspiracy theory. It's a response to academics who argue that we can or should be dismissive of conspiracy theories.
00:08:52
Speaker
And it's a response to, quote, research projects that assume that there is something wrong with believing conspiracy theories and gives a few examples of such research projects, including those by our friend Kasim Kassam. Indeed.
00:09:05
Speaker
Indeed. I mean I'd also add to this that there is also a positive project that's been put forward by particulars now, which is also making a case for when you should and shouldn't believe particular conspiracy theories. So these are what we might call the negative projects. So particulars is a response to this thesis, this thesis, and this thesis. But there is also a positive project being put forward by many particulars now, which is going, well, look,
00:09:36
Speaker
When we're looking at a conspiracy theory, is this the kind of theory we ought to believe? Or is it the kind of theory that we have good reason to be suspicious of in such a way that we can then dismiss the theory as being likely false?
00:09:51
Speaker
Right. Well, being an introduction, of course, um we we have a few more have more definitions. It gives us a definition of a generous. Now, I should probably say at the top here, I think I'm i'm going to skip over some parts of this paper fairly quickly, simply because it's stuff that we have gone over many times in the past, and I assume we're all familiar with.
00:10:11
Speaker
um And in particular, we're we're probably familiar with the definition of a generalist, but ah the paper does note that there are different kinds of generalists due to their differing definitions of what counts as a conspiracy theory.
00:10:26
Speaker
The paper says most generalists recognize that at least some version of particularism is true, that one is not entitled to completely dismiss all theories that have been derisively called conspiracy theories, and so such generalists often soften their explicit claims regarding the suspect epistemic status of conspiracy theories while continuing to treat them dismissively, making broad assumptions about some on the basis of others.
00:10:47
Speaker
In other words, generalists argue you or assume that even though conspiracy theories can't reasonably dismissed merely on account of being conspiracy theories, they should nevertheless be regarded with a, quote, prima facie suspicion, and the words of Kassam, or as prima facie unwarranted, quoting Levy.
00:11:03
Speaker
Or they may be characterized vaguely as implausible or unlikely to be true. And the paper, rather the introduction, finishes up by saying that while this is an epistemic matter that we're talking about, there are practical considerations to it. It's not all just theory.
00:11:17
Speaker
um As it says, the cultural presumption that conspiracy theories as such, even if they are conceived of as essentially contrarian, are simply silly or mad, bad, and dangerous, can and has been used to discredit the proponents of true or plausible conspiracy theories, often with catastrophic effects. And here it uses the example of the dodgy dossier leading to Iraq War II, where Critics of that were simply dismissed as conspiracy theorists.
00:11:42
Speaker
So it's not it's not all hot air it's not all I know you and your academics sit around in in large chambers swilling brandy and smoking cigars while you while you while you ponder on all these matters, but vast real people also actually are affected by some of the things you talk about.
00:12:01
Speaker
The other thing us real people also sit around in chambers smoking cigars and swilling brandy. I don't know whether, it Josh, you're the right person to go us real people here. I'm the realist person who existed.
00:12:14
Speaker
ChatGPT told me so. Don't you own a house? Aren't you one of you know one of those one of those rich bastards and by definition back home? Aren't you part of the 2%?
00:12:26
Speaker
I'm one of those old bastards who was around back when buying a house was was merely a bit tricky instead of flat out impossible. But yes, I see your point. Perhaps we should move on.
Defining Conspiracy Theories
00:12:37
Speaker
We should move on to section two, which is particularism and a simple definition of conspiracy theories. ah So this section starts, Some people understand conspiracy theory simply as a theory which posits a conspiracy. It is a secret plan to influence events by partly secret means.
00:12:53
Speaker
Many philosophers, including some of us, have used something like this definition in their analysis of conspiracy theories, here referring to Basham, Clark, Denteth, and Pigden. It has the advantage of being fairly straightforward both to understand and apply.
00:13:06
Speaker
There are some nuances, however, that are sometimes thought to apply depending on how the word conspiracy is conceived. Now, I want to interject here and talk a little bit about how the sausage is made.
00:13:17
Speaker
So when we sent this paper out for review, we, of course, had to anonymize it And what is interesting about this paper is that you have two particulars, Charles and myself, who are advocates of the simple definition of conspiracy theories, and Curtis, who is an advocate of the kind of contrarian definition that conspiracy theories are in opposition to some kind of official or theory or story, but that official story or theory doesn't have much epistemic weight on the consideration of the conspiracy theory.
00:13:52
Speaker
So we had to de-anonymise the paper and put in things like some of us ah we think or some of us think. Of course, we had to be very careful about who we attribute particular views to, which is why you get this locution, including some of us, because this is a reference to Charles and myself, but not Curtis.
00:14:13
Speaker
And it turns out de-anonymizing a paper with three authors is a lot more difficult than you think it's going to be, because the way you would de de-anonymize it often makes the paper seem incredibly arch, unless you do some really clever rewriting.
00:14:31
Speaker
Yes, I think a bit later on we'll see a couple of times it comes up. One of us says this, Denteth 2012 or something, and and every time it refers to you as one of us, brackets, Denteth.
00:14:43
Speaker
Yeah, yeah. so So we said that there there are there can be nuances to the particularist view depending on how we define a conspiracy. These nuances include things such as what counts as a conspiracy, does it have to be malicious,
00:14:59
Speaker
Does it have to be of note? Does it have to be a conspiracy about something important in some way? Or or can it be anything such as your favorite example of the surprise birthday party? No, no, just a surprise party. doesn have to be a birthday party. That's true. yeah that's true um It could be any surprise party. yeah It could be a surprise death party.
00:15:18
Speaker
It could. Well, that moment maybe that's the surprise. um And also, you're what counts as a conspiracy? Also, what counts as a theory and talks about the fact that the the word theory has has multiple meanings. Colloquially, it often just sort of means a hunch, something I reckon might be true.
00:15:36
Speaker
Whereas in scientific, a theory is a much more powerful and and and defined term. And I think that's... um That's going to come up a little bit later also. But at this point it says, in some sense then, a theory is a set of exp explainins which establish some explanandum.
00:15:52
Speaker
Theories can be true or false, silly or sensible, well-established or untethered to reality. Crucially though, a theory does not stop being a theory if it is intellectually well-established or proven beyond reasonable doubt. And I have to say the words explainins and explanandum, this is the first time I've encountered those words, didn't much care for them.
00:16:09
Speaker
Yeah, so i i mean I'd say exponance, but I also don't know whether that's the right way to pronounce it. I mean, I know these terms from doing the philosophy of explanation.
00:16:20
Speaker
So Carl Hempel, who came up with what's called the deductive nomological model of of explanation, kind of reconstructs explanations as being logical arguments that go from a premise to a conclusion.
00:16:35
Speaker
But as he points out, explanations are not the same things as arguments. Arguments are meant to persuade you a particular point, and explanations meant to prove some particular point.
00:16:46
Speaker
So the premises of an explanation are the explanans, and then the conclusion is the explanandum. And this is just kind of standard terminology in explanatory theory.
00:16:57
Speaker
theory, but you don't see it discussed much in the conspiracy theory theory literature. Yes. i Well, my my visceral distaste of them is is neither here nor there. It's my problem to deal with. I would say that um the idea that a theory does not stop being a theory if it is intellectually well established or proven is very much a characteristic of the more scientific definition because i've heard people talking colloquially about theories who very much say that if something's been proven then it's not a theory anymore because again we're using that definition of a where a theory is just something you reckon yeah at which point you go so why yeah why do we still call it the thick theory of evolution by natural selection scientists don't talk about oh it's a fact they also said know it's a theory but that also gets you into a kind of
00:17:44
Speaker
tricky conversation about the role of realism and anti-realism in the practice of science. Often people think that scientists are interested in a kind of factive investigation of the world.
00:17:59
Speaker
Well, actually, often scientists are more interested in a good and accurate and predictive description of states' affairs without necessarily buying into the theory we've come up with is the one true theory that explains everything.
00:18:17
Speaker
But that's a kind of Phil Science thing. Yes. But, you know, in a colloquial sense, I've heard of people, like I've heard people say things like, you know, you forget there are conspiracy theories, but there are also conspiracy facts. Conspiracy facts. By which they mean conspiracy theories. to yeah yeah I've had the experience of saying, oh, yeah, i I do this podcast about conspiracy theories. Oh, what are you talking about? And it was, I think the time had this conversation was when you were talking the BMW emissions theory. And they said, oh, but hasn't that been, isn't that true?
00:18:46
Speaker
And I have to say, yeah, but that and doesn't mean it's not a theory analysis. Anyway, but but but but but the the the point is made. There are lots of different kinds of theory, and that's okay. um So the paper carries on to talk about, we we've got the simple definition of conspiracy theory, which is epistemically neutral.
Challenging the Unbelievability of Conspiracy Theories
00:19:04
Speaker
and, quote, does not imply that conspiracy theories in general are either believable or unbelievable. Now, it points out that if if conspiracies, if if kind conspiring and conspiratorial activity was something that was very rare, then then then then that could be a reason to be suspicious of any theory that posits a conspiracy theory.
00:19:28
Speaker
But a good thing that's not the case. As we know, conspiracies are all... ah you Well, I mean, good thing is a interesting locution there. that Most people would say actually it's actually very bad thing, a conspiracy. thing for the purposes of the particular project. yeah so so you can't you can't even be you can't be suspicious of conspiracies conspiracy theories on the ground that conspiracies are very, very rare, and therefore a theory that posits one is sailing against the...
00:19:55
Speaker
Current, tide, probably both bad things to sail against. um Wind? Wind. Do you see sail against the wind? You can, yeah, it depends. I've never understood how it is possible to sail a boat going into the wind. I don't understand how that works. But it does matter.
00:20:09
Speaker
does not matter. Josh, it toy it's all all about the sophistication of your sails, basically. Yeah, something like that. Anyway, the yeah the the the paper carries on. As such, the simple definition of conspiracy theory allows us to arrive at an interesting conclusion.
00:20:25
Speaker
Though many conspiracy theories may be false, silly, or unbelievable, they are not false, silly, or unbelievable because they feature conspiracies, but because the conspiracies that they feature are unlikely or non-existent. So we all have to sing it with me.
00:20:41
Speaker
Evaluate conspiracies on their evidence. Nice harmonies. If a conspiracy theory is implausible, it will be because the evidence for it is bad, not because it's a theory about a conspiracy.
00:20:55
Speaker
So we're done then. that's That's the end of the paper. We've solved the problem. Oh, no, of course we have not. That was only section two out of five. Because it says, nevertheless, nevertheless there are generalists, Kassam included, who continue to want to defend the cultural presumption that conspiracy theories are intrinsically suspect.
00:21:14
Speaker
But they have a problem, given that the opposite conclusion follows from the simple neutral definition of conspiracy theory plus the historico-sociological truth that people frequently conspire.
00:21:25
Speaker
And so ah generalists tend to suggest a narrower definition of what counts as a conspiracy theory. Yeah, they move away from the simple and minimal definition to a conspiracy theory with feature X, which is the name of the next section.
00:21:40
Speaker
but Certainly is. Conspiracy theories with feature X. Which is, I know i know i've I've said this is something that that always occurs to me reading through the literature. The number of times you get people who sort of who want to say conspiracy theories are bad, but know for the reasons, as we just said, that you can't actually say they're all bad and they and then they want to say you.
00:22:00
Speaker
but But you know the ones that we mean. We're talking about those those conspiracy theories, waggling eyebrows, those ones. And so this is this this chapter is talking about various attempts to come up with a a particular feature X that allows them to mark out a kind of conspiracy theory that it's okay to disbelieve. So chapter three starts, compared to question-begging definitions, and by which I think that this has come up in the previous chapter, they talk about as ah as opposed to definitions that make conspiracy theories unbelievable by definition.
00:22:32
Speaker
it says, a more sensible generalist strategy would be to define a conspiracy theory as not simply a theory that posits a conspiracy, but which also includes some further feature X, such that all theories with that feature are usually unbelievable.
00:22:47
Speaker
There are at least three problems with this approach. And it goes through the three problems. One is that, obviously, sometimes conspiracy theories with feature X are true or well accepted.
00:23:00
Speaker
It's also, you you'll notice that that previously it was theories with this feature are usually unbelievable. Well, that usually is a bit of a problem if you're trying to come up with ah a workable theory.
00:23:11
Speaker
And then the third one was more of a practical problem, which is that even if such, even even if you've got, you you've you've you've refined, you've defined your feature X, such that all such theories with feature X are unbelievable.
00:23:25
Speaker
The problem is that when you talk about it in this way way, people still tend to just hear conspiracy theories are unbelievable, not conspiracy theories with feature X are unbelievable. and And definitions just sort of get more and more muddy to the extent that you you you find people using, just going for the I know it when I see it style of definition, which is not particularly useful at all Oh, who's written a paper on that?
00:23:50
Speaker
Hmm. Probably some madman, some wild individual with no conception of mortal stuff. ah Mortal stuff?
00:24:00
Speaker
Mortal stuff. Interesting. Wow. Got watch for the mortal stuff. ah No, so then it goes through examples of feature X. And here here I think is where i I'll skip through things very quickly because I think we will recognize all of these as thing as features of papers that we have discussed previously. But examples of feature X are conspiracy theories are anti-Western,
00:24:20
Speaker
Conspiracy theories imply nefarious intentions. Conspiracy theories tie together seemingly unrelated events. Conspiracy theories appeal to errant data. Conspiracy theories are self-sealing or self-insulating.
00:24:32
Speaker
Conspiracy theories are speculative. Conspiracy theories are amateurish. Conspiracy theories imply an almost nihilistic degree of skepticism. and conspiracy theories imply that nothing occurs by accident that conspiracies succeed in completely determining events. So all of those are...
00:24:50
Speaker
Candidates for feature X are things people have have suggested as well, conspiracy theories with this feature, it's okay to to discount out of hand. And I'm pretty sure if if you've been listening to the conspiracy theory masterpiece theater episodes for for some time,
00:25:06
Speaker
you will recognize every one of those things as being features in a paper that we have talked about and and generally found wanting. Indeed, they are. so So that is why i choose to skip over the rest of Chapter 3.
00:25:19
Speaker
and just Chapter 3? I think you mean Section 3. Section 3, I suppose. They're not big enough to be chapters, are they? ah But nevertheless, Section, Chapter, whatever you call it, it finishes with... In brief, most of the features do not constitute a sufficient reason to dismiss a theory.
00:25:35
Speaker
This seems to be the case for features 1, 5, and 6, that is, nefarious, speculative, and amateurish. Some of these features are not problematic at all, such as features 2 tying together
Examining Contrarian Conspiracy Theories
00:25:45
Speaker
seemingly unrelated events, and feature 3 appealing to errant data.
00:25:48
Speaker
The more damning features among them, such as the last two, apply to precious few actual and significant conspiracy theories. For some of these features, including Conspiracy 4, that was the erudata one, the degree to which the feature is damning depends on how extreme the interpretation of it is.
00:26:03
Speaker
But we did we we we missed one. We missed one in that group of potential feature Xs, and that is the feature that conspiracy theories are contrarian, contrary to to the official view, because that particular feature X gets a section all to itself.
00:26:21
Speaker
Yeah, so this is where we're moving away from looking at the particularist notion, which is a simple and minimal definition, to looking at the other particularist notion that there is something contrarian about being a conspiracy theory.
00:26:38
Speaker
Now, this feature is quite common in a lot of generalist papers. But what is interesting is it's also common to at least some particulates as well. um And part of the argument here is that when people talk about conspiracy theories and are appealing to some kind of notion of ordinary language, how the folk talk about conspiracy theories, it is often assumed that the folk talk about conspiracy theories as being in opposition to some official theory of the event.
00:27:12
Speaker
Now, I myself, me, myself, and i we as a holistic version of myself, we are not entirely sure that's what the folk mean.
00:27:23
Speaker
And that's in part because I'm doing some work with another scholar, which kind of challenges that notion. But it is true, it is a common intuition about conspiracy theories, that they are in they are contrary to or in opposition to some official theory or story.
00:27:43
Speaker
And this is where the particulars definition gets interesting, because there is at least some similarity in the definition between some generalists and some particulars.
00:27:55
Speaker
But of course, they end up with very different notions of what we should be doing with that in opposition to official theory stuff. Yep.
00:28:06
Speaker
So... the section starts the feature that seems to be most commonly held against conspiracy theories is that they are contrarian that is they contrast with some official or received view this feature was raised by keeley and later emphasized by levy and cassam it was also cited in a critique by lewandowski lloyd and brophy and has been recently revived by harris and by ross Conspiracy theories are often contrasted with official accounts.
00:28:30
Speaker
These accounts are sometimes assumed to be supported by a properly constituted set of epistemic authorities or experts. This leads some to conclude accepting the official story is almost always rational.
00:28:43
Speaker
It's a reference to Levy, 2007. Levy, who was the first to argue at length for this view, has been responded to by Cody, Dentith, Hagen, and Hayward. Below we outline some general problems with relying on experts and will address a recent version of this argument in its
Critiquing Reliance on Credentials
00:28:57
Speaker
particulars. That recent version, of course, being the version by Keith Harris.
00:29:01
Speaker
And so... the The rest of the section is basically, in particular, a critique of Harris's views. So it's us by saying that particularists would would tend to agree with Harris that, quote, a consensus of credentialed experts conflicting with a theory is evidence against that theory.
00:29:20
Speaker
The difference is that particularists will think, well, that's that's not necessarily decisive evidence. The fact that all the experts disagree with something, yes, maybe that is evidence that we should disbelieve it, but it's not it's not enough by itself.
00:29:32
Speaker
Whereas people like Harris are saying, well, this this the very fact of this this conflict, of this the the fact that they're contrary to this, is evidence by itself. I ah talked about at this point there being a real world problem with arguments like Harris's, which I did not quite get the gist of.
00:29:49
Speaker
i The issue with Harris is that when he talks about the experts we should rely upon, he actually chooses pretty poor examples. So in one of his earlier papers, he puts forward the security services of the United States as being you know appropriately qualified credentialed experts.
00:30:11
Speaker
And if you know anything about what the CIA have done, you end up going, i don't know that you can trust the CIA. And one of the reasons why you know you can't trust the CIA is the CIA has a web page devoted to the deceptive things it's done in the past.
00:30:29
Speaker
So we know there we know they're untrustworthy. So the kind of experts that he refers to, often are people who go but their track record is so poor. Why are you referring to them?
00:30:41
Speaker
but Okay, right. and And that's going to come up in more detail later. So, okay, I see he was just just teeing up that issue. Right. So, at any rate, the the paper then goes to look on at Harris in detail. So Harris begins with Levy's definition of conspiracy theories as contrary to the claims of relevant epistemic authorities.
00:30:58
Speaker
But Harris... quote, understands epistemic authority in terms of credentials, positions and the like, in contrast to those who understand it in terms of reliability. So in other words, um it's not just the epithe epistemic authorities are reliable, because otherwise you'd just be saying conspiracy theories are unreliable by definition, if if they're opposed to these experts. He's saying, they ah have authority in terms of the fact that they have the right credentials.
00:31:22
Speaker
So instead, Harris defines conspiracy theories as theories that allege conspiracies and conflict with the claims of ah and and it gets expanded on, got to say, claims of or consistent consensus position among them, because, of course, whenever you get authority, you know, there can always be dissenting opinions, but there'll often be a consensus. So theories that allege conspiracies and conflict with the the claims of relevant epistemic authorities, where epistemic authority is a matter of credentials and positions.
00:31:52
Speaker
Now, the paper points out this assumes that our credentialing systems produce experts who are actually reliable, not just technically capable of evaluating the relevant kinds of evidence. I think we're going to get really into this, especially when you're talking about things like the uran your intelligence agencies, who certainly would be technically capable of evaluating the evidence, but can we actually trust them to to report that correctly to us?
00:32:15
Speaker
ah But first we have a discussion of credentials. um So the paper says that Harris conflates two kinds of credentials. You have credential credentials from academic expertise, so sort of scientists who are credentialed by the fact that they have studied this stuff at a university and have earned a doctorate and and and and um have their credentials in that way.
00:32:36
Speaker
And then you get the credentials given simply by being a member of an organization, so such as being a member of a government intelligence agency or being a member of the press. And the paper points out that those those those two those two examples don't exactly have spotless records when it comes to reliability.
00:32:55
Speaker
And not just that, because part of Harris's argument here is that, look, we know that sometimes these people get up to no good, but in a well-functioning society...
00:33:09
Speaker
We can say that these credentialed experts are reliable, because in a well-functioning society, you wouldn't give credentials to these you these people.
00:33:22
Speaker
And the problem is, he doesn't really give us an argument to say we live in a well-functioning society. he just kind of asserts it. So it's not just they are reliable. They're reliable because they belong to society where only reliable people are credentialed as experts.
00:33:41
Speaker
But for that, you need an argument to say we live in a well-functioning society. And the particulars will say, well, don't you know about the conspiracies these people get up to all the time? Yes, exactly. ah In the words of the paper,
00:33:54
Speaker
but it's telling that harris does not even attempt to answer the question of whether art we currently live in a well-unctioning society he just seems to assume that we do but it turns out that we have ample reason to think we probably do not both basham and one of us dentist have argued that we have good grounds to think that our society is not as well functioning as we might suppose Basham talks about what he calls toxic truths, claims so toxic to the public good that people in positions of authority think they have a duty to to the public to conceal such truths from them, whilst one of us, Denton again, argues that there are some truths the public refuses to acknowledge, i.e. they are open secrets out of a strange or misguided sense of politeness.
00:34:31
Speaker
Both papers that we have talked about in the past. And then, of course, it brings up friend the podcast, Catherine Olmstead, and her work as a historian pointing out the sorts of dodgy things that people have in in in in official positions have got up to. What the US government did over the course of the 20th century, some of which will shock you.
00:34:53
Speaker
they will, yes. So all of this means that can be difficult to know if an expert is a genuine expert or just a reputed expert, someone who who who they say is an expert but may or may not actually be genuine.
00:35:08
Speaker
So the paper says, given these concerns, there are two ways of understanding the critique of contrarian conspiracy theories. That is, conspiracy theories with the feature of being contrarian. Have one, we may and should even dismiss or disbelieve conspiracy theories in a given domain that go against the consensus of genuine experts in that domain, since such theories are unlikely to be true and thus are probably false.
00:35:33
Speaker
Option two is we may and should even dismiss or disbelieve conspiracy theories in a given domain that go against the consensus of the reputed experts in that domain, since such theories are unlikely to be true and likely to be false.
00:35:46
Speaker
Now, the second one it's pretty clearly false. we We can't say that we should dismiss things that go against people who are simply reputed to be experts, because that's not good enough. um so So both we and Harris will want to avoid that second one.
00:36:00
Speaker
and and and And to illustrate this, the paper again gives the example of Gulf War II, dodgy dossier and all that, to show how government agents and the sympathetic press, people who Harris gives as examples of properly credentialed experts, were not at all reliable. They were reputed experts, but they ended up not being genuine.
00:36:16
Speaker
So the paper concludes of that, so it is not just that principle two is false. There is at least one case in recent history in which the lay public acted on this principle, dismissing a conspiracy theory that was substantially true with catastrophic results.
00:36:29
Speaker
at being a second war in Iraq. So principle two is no good. What about principle one, saying that we that we can dismiss conspiracy theories that go against the consensus of genuine experts?
Consensus and Expert Honesty
00:36:41
Speaker
And here's where the CIA come in. Here's where the CIA comes in. one problem is that genuine experts on, for example, what the CIA are up to are probably people in the CIA or or formerly in the CIA. or Or as Charles would put it, the people who are most likely to know what the CIA are up to are the experts in the CIA.
00:37:03
Speaker
They are the best experts to go to. So CIA, what are you up to? Because, I mean, you know what you're up to. Tell us what what you're up to, CIA. ah But unfortunately, those people, and in in in at least some cases, are incentivized to lie about what they're up to for reasons of national security or other.
00:37:22
Speaker
So that means they're not reliable. So... That means perhaps we now need we need to um to revise principle one. So we have principle one dash, which is now, we may and even should dismiss or disbelieve conspiracy theories in a given domain that go against the honest consensus of the genuine experts in that domain, since those theories are unlikely to be true and likely to be false.
00:37:46
Speaker
However, even the honestly held consensus of the experts can be wrong, and contrary alternatives can be resisted due to systemic bias. And here the paper gives the example which you talked about before of of the cause of stomach ulcers, which for a long time were thought to be caused by stress. And then eventually people brought forth the theory, well, no, it's the H. pylori bacteria. Stress excessive can exacerbate them, but they're actually caused by a bacterial infection.
00:38:11
Speaker
um And this was resisted for quite some time until people finally proved it. And the other example people always give of this is plate tectonics, and indeed the the XKCD webcomic had an example this very week, which pointed out that plate tectonics did not become the generally accepted theory until after the beginning of the US space program. It wasn't until the late 60s that I think plate tectonics was officially the generally held theory, and and we we'd already put people in space by that point.
00:38:41
Speaker
And actually, Brian Keeley has pointed out there's also a kind of oddity about plate tectonics in that scientists, and I'm using a kind of generalized term here, don't like to talk about the resistance to plate tectonics. So you'll find a lot of textbooks will tell you about plate tectonics, but they won't tell you about how recently plate tectonics was accepted.
00:39:05
Speaker
So it's almost as if it's a little bit embarrassing how resistant we were towards something which now seems obviously true, they're also just going to rewrite our history and say, no, we were always at war with Eurasia.
00:39:19
Speaker
Yeah. So with this in mind, we revise principle one again. We now have principle one dash dash, which is we may and even should dismiss or disbelieve conspiracy theories in a given domain that go against the honest consensus of the genuine experts who are not systematically biased in that but in that domain, since such theories are unlikely to be true and likely to be false.
Revising Dismissal Principles
00:39:42
Speaker
So the paper says, these three factors lack of genuine expertise dishonesty and bias ah interact synergistically especially in institutions that have been to some degree captured thus less of each may be required to produce a more substantial effect than one might otherwise expect for example the top of an institutional hierarchy may be dominated by people who are not genuine experts and yet play a significant role in maintaining institutional imperatives and condition the incentive structure.
00:40:08
Speaker
They themselves might be either biased, perhaps by a certain ideology, especially if they're political appointees, or corrupt, or both. Those lower in the hierarchy, including genuine experts, would naturally seek to please those higher up.
00:40:21
Speaker
Such circumstance would be systematically biased to some degree, and some level hint of intellectual dishonesty would not be too surprising in this context either. So by the time we get to to to the revised definition one dash dash, we've qualified it to the extent that it's it's barely useful, especially not to the lay public, if we if we have to make sure that we're that we we can dismiss a conspiracy. In order to know that we can dismiss a conspiracy theory, we have to make sure that the can that that that what it is contrary to is the honest consensus of genuine experts and that there's no systemic bias. That's an awful lot of work to have to do.
00:40:56
Speaker
to be able to just say, yeah, we can dismiss that conspiracy theory out of hand. So ah this section sums things up by saying, In sum, of the two ways of understanding the critique of contrarian conspiracy theories, one appropriately qualified as true but platitudinous and unhelpful, whilst the other is false and dangerous.
00:41:17
Speaker
And that brings us to section five, the conclusion, which is short enough, I think, that I can read it in full. It says... Sure, sure.
Evaluating Theories on Their Own Merits
00:41:25
Speaker
Surely I should read the conclusion. I did help write it. Actually, even and maybe you should.
00:41:29
Speaker
you may You did the abstract, yes, to tie it all up with the conclusion. The simple and straightforward definition of conspiracy theory has come to be favoured by many philosophers working in conspiracy theory theory, as it indicates a significant category of thought.
00:41:45
Speaker
After all, people, perhaps unfortunately, frequently conspire, as the historical record, including the recent past, amply demonstrates. And because conspiracies are common, people theorise about them, sometimes developing conspiracy theories that are substantially true.
00:42:04
Speaker
Regarding conspiracy theories so understood, the particulars are clearly correct. Such theories cannot reasonably be dismissed on block as suspect or unbelievable.
00:42:16
Speaker
And even if conspiracy theories are defined as necessarily contrarian, it is still not the case they should be treated dismissively on that basis. For one thing, determining the significance of their contrast with an official account depends on several considerations that need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
00:42:36
Speaker
Are the reputed experts supporting the official account in question genuine experts? Do we have reasons to worry about their honesty? Do they have conflicts of interest?
00:42:49
Speaker
Are there reasons to suspect pervasive bias? And, of course, the relevant evidence always matters too. All this and more must be weighed.
00:43:00
Speaker
After all, the consensus of experts is not always right, and blocking all challenges to that consensus, which is what dismissing contrarian theories on account of being contrarian presumes to be legitimate, is both bad epistemology and dangerous.
00:43:18
Speaker
Well, some, potentially many, conspiracy theories can be dismissed in short order as wrong-headed or downright demented. What makes these particular theories bad is that they are wrong-headed or downright demented in their particulars.
00:43:33
Speaker
It is not because they belong to the class of things labelled as conspiracy theories. And there you have it. So, I mean, apart from section four, I don't think there was anything in there that we hadn't seen before.
00:43:47
Speaker
um But the specific the specific replies to um Harris, and going going it into the contrarian conspiracy theories in detail, I think it was good to see. Is it a good thing in general just to sort of make the particularist case on a, you know, just just just to sort of remake it on ah on ah on a regular basis so it doesn't doesn't get stale?
00:44:08
Speaker
I mean, in part, you need to make the case because when a generalist puts forward an argument against particularism, you either want to show that particularism is superior or the generous argument is bad or both.
00:44:26
Speaker
And I think in the case of Harris's argument, in its current form with respect to an appeal to credentialed experts, it just doesn't work.
00:44:37
Speaker
Because to get to the point where we can articulate theory as to why we might prefer the views of honest experts acting in consensus where there isn't some systematic problem in the credentialing system means that the the principle is so weak that it's, as you point out in your review, it just isn't applicable to the ordinary person and thus doesn't justify and appeal to any claim that we can just suspect generally that conspiracy theories are mad, bad, or dangerous.
00:45:16
Speaker
And you could just critique the generalist argument there and go, well, look, this argument kind of falls apart on its own merits. But if you could also use that to go, look, there is a better way, a superior alternative, which is judging arguing judging conspiracy theories on their particular merits.
00:45:36
Speaker
Why not take that opportunity to remind people particularism is right there and it's been there for a while? Now, you said at the start this was one of a pair of papers. Is the is the other one more making the positive case for particulars? Well, no, the other one kind of deals slightly more with the notion that there is a contrarian definition amongst the work of some particulars.
00:46:02
Speaker
So it dives more into... the kind of odd lacuna of generalists who critique particulars for using simple and minimal definitions and points out that's not the only game in town.
00:46:16
Speaker
So even if you could show that the simple and minimal definition fails as an operating definition of conspiracy theory, particulars have a backup definition they can work with as well.
00:46:29
Speaker
But I'm saying too much about a paper which is under review. Indeed, yes. we will we'll We'll burn that bridge when we come to it. Always burning bridges, never building them.
00:46:40
Speaker
That's what they're for. So you should not be involved at any kind of civil engineering work whatsoever. Well, it's a good thing that I'm not, as far as you know.
00:46:52
Speaker
So I think we're done. But, of course, no sooner have we have we finished this episode than we, of course, will produce a bonus episode for our patrons. This time around, we're going to be looking at the Anselmo case.
00:47:06
Speaker
Yeah, I'm very excited about this. It's been on our list for a while. We finally have got a slot. cscn So yes, the Anselmo case is our patron bonus episode this week. And if you want to hear all about that, you just need to become a patron, which you can do by going to patreon.com and looking for the podcaster's guide to the conspiracy. You'll find us. We're there.
00:47:26
Speaker
we we We exist. That's a thing. That's true. With that out of the way, then... um It's probably time to let you good people go about your business, which I will do by saying, I think, conspiracy see you later.
00:47:41
Speaker
I thought you were retiring that. ah No, no, no, no. that's no this is my ways This is my way of say of saying goodbye now. I thought you were retiring that. Oh, in that case, I'll accept it.
00:47:53
Speaker
But I did think you were retiring that.
00:48:01
Speaker
The podcaster's guide to the conspiracy features Josh Addison and Associate Professor M.R. Extenteth. Our producers are a mysterious cabal of conspirators known as Tom, Philip, and another who was so mysterious that they remain anonymous.
00:48:16
Speaker
You can contact us electronically via podcastconspiracy at gmail.com or join our Patreon and get access to our Discord server. Or don't, I'm not your mum.
00:48:43
Speaker
And remember, according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, a stranger is just a friend you haven't met.