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Elections that 'Shook the World': Allende’s Election in Chile 1970
20 Plays23 hours ago
Matt Davis interviews Dr. Sebastián Hurtado Torres, from Universidad San Sebastián about the election in 1970 of Salvador Allende, to become the first Socialist leader of his country. His election saw international support and condemnation in equal measure with support for his election being divided along the lines of the Cold War.
In this interview, Professor Torres explains the impacts in Chile, in Latin America, and globally and how the world reacted. By 1973, Allende was overthrown by a military coup following this election that shook the world.
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Transcript
Introduction to the Series
00:00:09
Speaker
Hello and welcome to the Observations podcast. I'm Matt Davis, the Special International Elections Correspondent for the Observation podcast. Today I'll be hosting the first in a new series on elections that shook the world, where we look at a series of surprising or impactful elections from around the world.
Chile's 1970 Election: A Historical Overview
00:00:26
Speaker
To kick this series off, we will start by looking at an important election that many countries around the world cared about. We'll be talking about the 1970 election in Chile that led to the election of Salvador all Allende.
00:00:40
Speaker
Allende has been described as the first Marxist to be elected president in a liberal democracy in Latin America. And this election set up a series of events that led to a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet.
00:00:52
Speaker
Pinochet's coup meant that these were the last general elections that Chile would have until 1989. This was especially surprising given that Chile was known as a strong and stable democracy in the region that had consistently held elections
Global Reaction to Allende's Election
00:01:05
Speaker
since 1925. To talk through this election, we have a guest who has looked at the history of the Americas in the 20th century from an international perspective.
00:01:14
Speaker
And of particular interest to us, he's explored the global reactions to this election in Chile. I'm delighted to be talking to Dr. Sebastian Jotaro Torres, a researcher at the University of San Sebastian in Santiago, Chile.
00:01:28
Speaker
Thank you for joining us. you know Thank you for the invitation. So to start us off, would you like to tell us a bit about how the election led to Allende becoming president?
00:01:40
Speaker
a That was the fourth time that Salvador Allende was candidate to the presidency. He had been the candidate of the left, and that means the Socialist Party and the Communist Party in Chile, both of which eventually converging to the into Marxism.
00:01:56
Speaker
um And he he ran against other two candidates in 1970, a candidate of the conservative right who had been president before, Jorge Alessandri, and the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, who was the party in power at the time.
00:02:14
Speaker
And this man was Radomiro Tomic. ah In 1964, Allende had lost to the Christian Democratic Party in what basically was a two-way, a two-man race.
00:02:31
Speaker
But in 1970, since the three candidates had a, um could aspire to get substantial share of the vote, it was yeah it it was evident from the beginning that no one would get a majority of the vote.
00:02:46
Speaker
And in the Chilean constitutional setting, ah the way to be elected president was to get to to get a the majority of the vote in the in the popular vote, or if that didn't happen, Congress, a joint session of both chambers of Congress, had to pick among the two largest pluralities.
US and South American Response
00:03:07
Speaker
So in 1970, it was thought that again, they had a better shot than in 1964 because he could get to that election, ran off election in Congress and then and be elected president.
00:03:23
Speaker
But um few people thought that he would get the largest plurality. and It was thought that Alessandri, the former conservative president, he would get the largest plurality.
00:03:34
Speaker
And in that case, ah according to what had happened before in situations like that, it was very likely that Congress would pick him.
00:03:45
Speaker
So There was a lot of planning before the election, especially by opponents of Allende, including the U.S. Embassy in Santiago and other U.S. agencies, to ensure that if Alessandri won that largest plurality, even if it was buszzed by a slim margin, he would get elected by the Congress and the Allende threat, from their perspective, would be stalled.
00:04:14
Speaker
But that didn't happen. And that was a bit of a surprise to many people. Allende won the largest plurality in the election on 4th September, and that gave him the first shot at being elected by the Congress.
00:04:27
Speaker
And that set off a series of frantic efforts by his opponents in Chile and the United States to try to prevent that situation. So, yes, ah you know, right at the back there, you can see it's it's shocking. um to people or to the other parties in Chile as well as, you know, well, and internationally already.
00:04:49
Speaker
um So with this election having this surprising outcome, what was the reaction from the rest of the world? You've mentioned a bit about the United States, but um feel free to go deeper into that as well.
00:05:05
Speaker
ah Well, and the the the reaction was, what's kind of follow the the lines of the Cold War divide, of the Cold War ideological divide.
00:05:16
Speaker
So in the United States, Nixon and Kissinger reacted very angrily and and um they kind of threw a, Nixon especially kind of threw a temper tantrum as one historian has called it and, you know, ordered the CIA to try to avoid at all costs that Allende be elected by the Congress and things that are kind of well known actually.
00:05:42
Speaker
um And in other countries, say the military dictatorships that rule they yeah several countries in South America, Brazil and Argentina, for instance, there was also great consternation.
00:05:56
Speaker
ah It was because ah because of the ideological differences, which were evident to everyone, but also because some of these governments, and and no no not all of them were were actually under under the under military rule,
00:06:11
Speaker
ah thought that Allende and the revolutionary government in Chile, even if it was elected by the people, could be like a haven for guerrillas and insurgents and revolutionaries of the kinds that they were fighting against in their own country.
Socialist Bloc's Perspective
00:06:31
Speaker
So they saw this as something of a threat or least a challenge to their own stability. And in some cases, they floated the idea in Argentina, especially if few officials floated the idea of doing something against Allende. there was more of
00:06:49
Speaker
It wasn't gonna happen, but they they they did toy with the idea. And um on the contrary, in other countries with different ideological outlooks, intergovernments, the reactions were different.
00:07:03
Speaker
ah In the Soviet bloc, there was a mild, optimism about the situation. they They weren't quite sure that i end they could succeed in implementing a socialist project without a real revolution, without a, a including even a violent revolution, without a photo transformation of the of the political institutions of the country.
00:07:29
Speaker
And some comments that that the right that I highlight in my article, like I think I quite representative of this, that the Bulgarians were were saying to the Chilean ambassador who went to talk to them, like they said something like, nah, nah, this is not going to happen in Latin America with the military on the right, with the United States in the north.
00:07:49
Speaker
No, no, no, this is not going to happen. And they were kind of right, actually, um eventually. But there was some some some sense of ah hope that at least some progress was being made in in in Latin America ah without, yes and this is very important, without having to do This is the the view from the Soviet Union without having to do a lot of about it.
00:08:13
Speaker
The Soviet Union had been sponsoring the Chilean Communist Party before, but the it wasn't a great cost for the Soviet Union. And it wasn't the driving force behind that growth, the growth of the left, the growth of the communists, the socialists, of Marxism in general.
00:08:30
Speaker
ah So they were pleased because they had gotten something of a victory of a victory without a lot to without having to do a great effort in that way uh but um there was still some suspicion some doubts about as to would this work uh will this uh chilian road to socialism be successful without the you know, classic Leninist revolution that brought about the success of socialism elsewhere.
00:09:02
Speaker
That was always on the table. In Cuba, on the other hand, ah Castro, who was a close friend to Allende, reacted happily. he he he He was the one who saw in this the best chance for a ah for an expansion of revolution, of Marxist revolution in Latin America.
00:09:24
Speaker
ah Even though he wasn't he was always, again, um suspicious that this democratic way, this institutional way would lead to the desired end,
00:09:37
Speaker
But since this victory also meant that his friend would be the president of Chile, well, if if if all things led to that after in the Congress and and all that that we talked about before, there was a possibility for Cuba, for his regime, for his for his conception of revolution in Latin America to exert significant influence in the Chilean government, in the Chilean coalition, and in in Allende himself, since they were so close.
00:10:13
Speaker
ah So but that that was kind of the general spectrum of reactions to the election of Allende around the world. or There are many particular cases that are kind funny when you yes describe them.
00:10:27
Speaker
The Paraguayan dictator, for example, ah said something like, why don't the Chilean military have the balls to step in and actually stage a coup?
00:10:39
Speaker
and He said something like, but the idea was that this is what we in Latin America do. So why don't we do it? And things like that that were said um in Latin America and elsewhere about the election. So kind of, yes, it seems like almost every country had an opinion broadly on those along those Cold War lines.
00:11:00
Speaker
um I remember in your article you mentioned ah the Yugoslavian reaction as being somewhat surprising given that they seem to support it as a non-Leninist way to socialism but weren't fully supportive.
00:11:17
Speaker
ah Right. Well, Yugoslavia had a... Tito had an independent position in the Cold War in general. so um The Chilean Communist Party was too beholden to Moscow.
00:11:29
Speaker
They were happy about that. so So they were suspicious of the communists. And the communists were the main backers of Allende and the coalition that led Allende to this success and then in power.
00:11:43
Speaker
So that's one one one issue. And Radomir Otomich, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democratic Party, by the way, was a Progressive leading party was was not really a the the same kind of conservative party that that Christian Democratic parties are in Europe ah And they had promoted in government and they actually have had implemented while in government several significant reforms like a kind of agrarian reform and the partial national nationalization of copper companies which were owned by US s companies by US corporations and other things and
00:12:25
Speaker
along those lines. It wasn't really a a a conservative type of party. And Radomir Tomic was of Croatian descent. So there was some some, as is the actual, the current president of Chile, that there is some some so importance to that emig immigration in the 20th century for Chilean political culture. so what and so So that candidate seemed to be closer to Yugoslavia in a different sense, not necessarily ideologically.
00:12:55
Speaker
Even though Tomic himself had said, and this is important, I don't think that I dwell too much on this in the in the article, but Tomic had said that he wanted to go he he wanted to implement a project of of of workers workers' ownership of of companies, of businesses,
00:13:19
Speaker
along the lines of what he thought Tito was doing in Yugoslavia. There was some sort of idealized view of Yugoslavian socialism among some of these leaders, which held
00:13:33
Speaker
which held that and Unlike what happened in the Soviet-led socialist bloc, where we're all world all businesses, all all the means of production were actually owned by the state.
00:13:47
Speaker
In this case, there was some some um participation um from the workers that made it different. and And they were kind of trying to imitate that. that They said that in a number of times.
00:14:00
Speaker
before the election. So there was some sort of link there too. um But in general, what I think is that Yugoslavia, even though sympathize with the left-leaning views of the Allende coalition ah suspected that it would get to be holden to the Soviet Union, to Moscow, or to Cuba, for that matter, and that wasn't actually something that they would see favorably.
00:14:27
Speaker
On the other hand, a progressive government that, even though was not fully Marxist, could be independent from that the influence would be better for Yugoslavian interest.
Chile's Political Landscape
00:14:43
Speaker
Okay, so we're now going to take a quick break before we take a deeper look into the global reactions to this election.
00:14:52
Speaker
Welcome back. So, in your article for the Journal of Cold War Studies, the Chilean moment in the global Cold War, you mentioned some ideas of Chilean exceptionalism Could you explain a little bit more about what this is and why other Latin American countries appeared to be appear to believe in the strength of the Chilean constitution um so much?
00:15:18
Speaker
Historically, since the times of the independence from the ah Spanish Empire in the 19th century, Chilean political institutions had displayed and stability and I would say peace to in a way that other Latin American countries have not been able to.
00:15:38
Speaker
In other words, in Chile there was a tradition of constitutional government. It was very authoritarian in the first decades after the independence, so it wasn't so it wasn't by any means democratic in the in the modern sense of the word, but at least the institutions held.
00:15:58
Speaker
it It was different from what happened in other countries where caudillos and regional warlords and civil wars and military rule and and and all that kind of dominated political systems in the 19th century and the 20th century as well.
00:16:16
Speaker
So Chile had a history in which those things were not completely absent but ah they they were less ah defining for the political system as a whole historically.
00:16:30
Speaker
And in addition, related to do that, Chile had a is strong party system and still has actually. And that was also a distinct fa distinctive feature of the Chilean political culture that set somewhat apart from other Latin American countries. So it it is exceptional within the Latin American context.
00:16:51
Speaker
And a part of that is that the Chilean Congress had a what so had only a brief interruption in its workings, in its long his history since 1811, that political parties actually represented consistently ah the people and they but and they could have long histories as institutions and they participated in Congress for long periods of time. They they they got substantial voting.
00:17:19
Speaker
voting ah in many elections, there was some consistency to the to the Chilean political system in which parties were important actors. and It was believed that ah Chilean institutions, you know, what what in the United States we would call check and checks and balances, would work to prevent the unfolding and the imposition of any revolutionary endeavor meant to do away with all those things.
00:17:50
Speaker
In other words, the socialist revolution that would, that many thought, would inevitably lead to a transformation of the political system could not succeed could not succeed thoroughly because there was a political system in place so that was meant to prevent that.
00:18:09
Speaker
And that had some said even worked in in in previous in previous moments of Chilean history. So that's a part of Chilean exceptionalism that many people ah thought that would a prevent the full the the full materialization of the aims of what for them and for many actually ah was yeah um and Marxist attempt to take over the system.
00:18:41
Speaker
ah That's the general description of the ah the visit of the situation. Right, yes. So as as as but you said there has been kind of such a strong history of checks and balances and you know party systems almost acting as checks and balances you know within elections um that and and the other us yeah um And the other aspect to it was that um ah it was thought that the military would always, would would generally stay out of politics.
00:19:18
Speaker
And this is what wouldn't happen in other Latin American countries or are the third world countries for that matter. So the military Chile was, according to this view, apolitical. the the The military would act as the civilian authorities well would tell them.
00:19:31
Speaker
That was kind of a simplification because there was instances of military intervention, significant ones. um And it's true that that they they have not been recent at the time, but um it wasn't heard of.
00:19:46
Speaker
ah But in comparison to what has what to what was going on at the time in other Latin American countries, several of them were under military rule, actually, in 1970.
00:19:57
Speaker
bra Brazil is the most emblematic case. um And historically, the military had intervened ah to impose order.
00:20:08
Speaker
that's but That's what they say, of course. So observers thought that Chile, this wasn't actually the historic case. And therefore, the military would not provoke a situation of crisis by intervening in order to either support or more likely to to oppose the political revolution in a project of Allende and Hitler's revolution. So what would happen in this view, in this kind of idealized view, was that everything would be solved through the institutional means that ah the Chilean political system provided.
00:20:49
Speaker
Okay. Now, um that point in the military, I think, is something that we'll definitely come back to a bit later on. um But just to start with, Given that the country was moving in a socialist direction, why was there such limited aid from both countries such as the Soviet Union, but also you know countries such as Cuba, which Castro and Allende were allegedly friends?
Economic Challenges and Soviet Relations
00:21:16
Speaker
Well, Cuba did provide significant support to Allende. Cuba did not have the means to provide significant economic support. Cuba a small and relatively poor country, but politically, Castro supported Allende a lot before the election and then after the election.
00:21:39
Speaker
during iende And term, Castro sent... probably thousands of men to Chile in in the capacity of advisors and in in security matters, in political matters, in diplomatic matters.
00:21:54
Speaker
And the Cuban representation in Chile was quite large in 1973. There was actually an actual battle between the Cubans in the embassy and the military when they took over and overthrew Allende in 1973.
00:22:08
Speaker
so so So Castro was was was very committed to the success of the Chilean revolution.
00:22:16
Speaker
Although at the same time, he was critical of it. He thought that at some point, the only way to make socialism work was to stage an actual revolution. And that meant taking all the power.
00:22:29
Speaker
and and that and And that's what Castro was advising Allende in 1973, actually. When 1970, he he counsel caution not to alienate the United States or the military military in Chile or the international system in general In 1973, he was advising, now you this is this is a ah this is a turning point. You have to do what is necessary to secure the gains of the revolution. And that meant probably overturning the political system in a more classical, Leninist way.
00:23:07
Speaker
So that's that's with Cuba. Soviet Union, on the other hand, ah was kind of skeptical of Allende's project for several of reasons. um they were supporting the Communist Party ah anyway from before the election and it was substantial economic support. but there are but when this when the When Russia opened Soviet archives in the 90s and early 2000s, some people were able to see some of some of these things, some of these ways of of of ah relating to Communist parties sales elsewhere.
00:23:48
Speaker
And the Chilean Communist Party, ah from what could be surmised from those documents, received substantial amounts of money in the 60s and early 70s from the Soviet Communist Party, which is to say from the Soviet state.
00:24:04
Speaker
ah But beyond that, um the Soviet Union did not want to get mired in another Cuba in Latin America. They were already sponsoring Cuba to very large extent.
00:24:18
Speaker
They were actually kind of paying for a lot of what Cuba could do internally and externally in the early 1970s. So the Soviet Union did not want that. It was the time of the tent.
00:24:30
Speaker
So they didn't want to alienate the United States too overtly. And they thought that Latin America was in the United States and kind of sphere of hegemony. So they didn't want to, you you know, make waves there.
00:24:51
Speaker
and um And crucially, they did not think that the Chilean project was actually going to be successful. They didn't think that that was proper socialism. It was more of a left-wing populism. Mm-hmm.
00:25:06
Speaker
The economic policies of the Allende government were expansionary rather than aimed at accumulating. So, Allende would raise wages, would print money and control prices.
00:25:24
Speaker
It was oriented toward expanding cons and consumption rather than to ah the accumulation of capital, which was the more orthodox view among the socialists of the Cold War um regarding what a state should do in order to build socialism.
00:25:44
Speaker
So for all these reasons, they didn't think that, again, there was a good investment. Let's put it that way. And again, they traveled to the Soviet Union in 1972 it was Chile was in a deep economic crisis at the time.
00:26:01
Speaker
The state was in a deep economic crisis at the time. And again depleted with the ah Soviet authorities to receive some substantial amount of aid.
00:26:14
Speaker
And the Soviet Union said, no, we're going to do something, but not as much as you want us to. And so so so the way to to to describe this, I think, is that Allende did not have in the Soviet Union the same ally as his predecessor, Frey, had in the United States.
00:26:37
Speaker
but So Frey received substantial aid from the United States and his economic policies were, let's say, more rational too. So nothing like what happened in Chile between 71 and 73 happened and when Frey was in power.
00:26:56
Speaker
But again, they did not find that same kind of... um ah support from his own allies, particularly from the Soviet Union, which was the only one actually who could do something in the economic realm that could be of importance for Chile.
00:27:10
Speaker
He did get some credits from other countries, even countries in the Soviet bloc, but it was mostly for purchasing things that they produced. So it it wasn't going to help the the you know the the the current account of the Chilean government.
00:27:26
Speaker
And just kind of for clarification there, Frey was the um previous... The Christian Democratic president that preceded Allende. yeah And he was very, very anti-communist and anti-Allende, actually. There's a whole another story of Frey trying to to avoid that Allende became president in 1970, which was he its its own effort to try to prevent that that realization. Mm-hmm.
00:27:54
Speaker
So... As we draw our questions ah to a close a bit here, um could you just describe a little bit about what took us from this election of Allende, this socialist in Chile, to the coup led by Augusto Pinochet?
The Path to Pinochet's Coup
00:28:13
Speaker
what kind of what's What's the journey that was taken there? Right. Well, we started by by saying that Allende had the best shot to be elected by the Congress and in 1970.
00:28:26
Speaker
he won the he He won the largest plural in the popular vote, but he had to be elected by the Congress. That that was what the Constitution said. And that that meant that the runner up in the popular vote could be elected by the Congress. too But we know that Allende was.
00:28:40
Speaker
And there's a fascinating story there. But say Allende was elected president in 1970. And he... and he ah tried to deliver on his promise of the implementation of socialism in Chile through the m the institutions of the Chilean political system, and that meant trying to use all the prerogatives that he had as president to nationalize as much of the Chilean economy as possible.
00:29:16
Speaker
Actually, he probably had to nationalize more than he wanted at the beginning. the The project did not contemplate nationalizing like every business in Chile, but ah the the pressure of workers actually made him and made the coalition have to do that.
00:29:34
Speaker
But that's one dimension of the story. The point is, ah from the perspective of the Allende coalition, they were implementing ah revolution of the Marxist type ah gradually and through the institutions of the Chilean political system as they had promised in the run-up to the election and actually throughout their their their existence as a coalition.
00:30:02
Speaker
That's what they were doing. That meant that they had to kind of a stretch ah the interpretation of the law not insignificantly, and they recognized that, but they felt that they were not acting under the constitutional mandate. In any case, they they they kind of knew that this wasn't the most important thing, that what they had to do was to cement ah enough public support so that ah if some sort of confrontation came or whenever new elections were held, they would have the upper hand.
00:30:37
Speaker
um the The thing is that this, in 1971, the first years of a in the government seemed to be going well, but from the end of thee From the end of the first year, from the end of 1971 until 1973, the economy went downhill.
00:30:56
Speaker
Inflationary policies, because that's what they were basically, caused inflation. And this created significant problems for especially the middle classes in Chile, which saw their own lives you know life altered because of scarcity, because of black markets and well all the things that come with inflation.
00:31:23
Speaker
And in addition, the left wing coalition that was in government was not as united behind Allende's leadership as Allende would have wanted.
00:31:37
Speaker
And that led to different approaches to how to but how to act. and Not only at the level of government, but also at the level of social organizations, of the civil society that was in any case very important for their project.
00:31:52
Speaker
especially in workers unions and and so on. ah So this created a sensation, widespread sensation of disorder and chaos ah that was actually visible in many instances, like businesses on strike, ah universities on strike, students protesting, not only university students, but also high school students and things like that.
00:32:19
Speaker
um And, uh, ah coupled with a few things that were kind of shocking for the Chilean public. Fidel Castro visited Chile in 1971 and he stayed for three weeks.
00:32:31
Speaker
And it was kind of embarrassing for everyone because he was supposed to be there for only a few days, but he stayed and he stayed and he stayed and he traveled the country and he made speeches and he aroused people ah to support the Chilean revolution.
00:32:45
Speaker
But the Chilean host, including Allende, were kind of uncomfortable because he was, I guess, was staying for too long. and and though and And Castro was not like like any man. he He was the leader of a communist revolution, the very radical communist revolution. He was saying very radical things in Chile.
00:33:04
Speaker
It wasn't well received by the opposition, even by the people who were not so not so dramatically opposed to Allende. That wasn't good for Allende in in in any way.
00:33:16
Speaker
ah So this situation of crisis gets to its peak in late 1972, a big national strike of ah of truck owners and other small businessmen and professionals and that kind of people.
00:33:42
Speaker
um And then a paralysis basically in Congress because the Congress, or at least the opposition to agenda in Congress, accused him of acting unconstitutionally, which was kind of true. He was acting unconstitutionally several ways.
00:33:58
Speaker
um Not yet in the sense that he was about to establish a dictatorship or anything like that, but he was actually acting much beyond what the constitution allowed him to do.
00:34:10
Speaker
um So this situation of crisis, which is political and social crisis at the same time, ah leads to what we thought, ah what or better said, what many people thought would not happen, which is the military getting involved ah directly directly in politics because they're called to serve as ministers by Allende in 1972 and then in several other instances later on, and ah conspiring.
00:34:38
Speaker
um The military, many military officers of a conservative bent thought that Allende was taking things too far, that Chile was on the brink of ah either an authoritarian takeover by Allende or civil war or something in the middle, in any case nothing good.
00:34:58
Speaker
So many of them thought that it was time to act and they were brought to in that direction by the opposition to Allende.
00:35:11
Speaker
And crucially, by say, mid-1973, the opposition was not only the conservative right, the traditional opponents of of of the left, but it was also the center, that and that the party of the center, of the Christian Democratic Party, but also the people, the people who were not really,
00:35:35
Speaker
who were not the kind of people that would that that that that was still thinking that there was a that there was a government of a president in trouble, but not necessarily a deep crisis of Chilean democracy.
00:35:48
Speaker
By 1973, the vision of these people who were willing to give Allende a chance in 1970 has changed, and it's now much more polarized. And now they're saying, no, this has to end.
00:35:59
Speaker
And probably the only way to end it is that the military overthrow Allende. And that's actually what happened in on 11 September 1973. The military acted and they acted unanimously and and that's the key.
00:36:13
Speaker
So there was no there was no rupture within the armed forces. ah All the armed forces acted to overthrow Allende, no dissent, so that's what avoided civil war or a confrontation of a larger magnitude and that was the end of the Chilean revolution. it's It's kind of a stunning.
00:36:35
Speaker
the The coup
00:36:39
Speaker
the coup actually won on the same day that the coup was staged. Any pockets of resistance that ah arose in the next few days were rapidly put out, basically, brutally.
00:36:53
Speaker
um But there was no actually chance of of any recovery of the of the forces that were in in power until only a few days earlier.
00:37:04
Speaker
Well, there's quite a lot in that story there, both with Castro... being a bit like ah a friend you invite round, but stays a little bit too long. And yeah then, you know, finishing off with that kind of classic Latin American coup, as that Paraguayan dictator would have said.
00:37:22
Speaker
um so It wasn't classic wasn't classic in in the sense that it was very it was a very cohesive action from the armed forces. And um yeah and It proved to have a political project ah some of somewhat a deeper deeper meaning and deeper duration.
00:37:48
Speaker
already fa The military dictatorship basically transformed Chile in the 16 years that they were in power. So and in a way, yes, it was a very Latin American thing to do.
00:38:00
Speaker
On the other hand, it was different in the sense that this was kind of a more bureaucratic and modern way of doing things with a with the political goal in mind. It wasn't there in 1973, but when it shaped up, it was pursued very, very ah dogmatically, actually. but done right so kind of Many people say that that was actually the Chilean revolution that won.
00:38:25
Speaker
So, yeah saying much more ideological, not just the military taking power for power's sake there. Okay, so ah so today,
00:38:36
Speaker
How is this election and what happened afterwards remembered in Chile?
Legacy and Global Impact of Allende's Election
00:38:41
Speaker
Is it remembered at all these days? ah Well, what is most remembered in Chile is the coup.
00:38:48
Speaker
yeah that's That's kind of the turning point of Chilean history and and and no one can you know, avoid that, actually, um because it's it's kind of the breaking point of what was supposed the normal Chilean trajectory of political institutions and political culture.
00:39:07
Speaker
ah But the the election is viewed as um
00:39:14
Speaker
especially by the left, as kind of the last chance they had of implementing the revolutionary project as the as it was conceived in the era of the Cold War.
00:39:25
Speaker
The Chilean left now, even though ah they they feel um they feel inheritors to Allende, they they're not really pursuing the same kind of project. It's it's a different time, it's a different world.
00:39:41
Speaker
um But... um In terms of of the symbolic meaning of the concept of revolution or of radical transformation, the election is seen as kind of the last moment in which that was possible at that time.
00:39:57
Speaker
um On the other hand, it's also seen by that same political culture as a representation of all the things that would prevent the materialization of that project.
00:40:09
Speaker
The US intervening, the military intervening, the conservative right making life impossible for the left in power and things like that.
00:40:20
Speaker
these are all very These are all things that one segment of the political culture believes, and many of them are inaccurate historically, but in any case, this is what and what feeds there they there their memories of that of that moment.
00:40:39
Speaker
um on the other hand it's also seen by some, this is not, of course, things that people talk about, but it's seen as a as a very imperfect way of defining the presidency.
00:40:56
Speaker
As I told you before, if no candidate won the majority of the vote, it was the Congress that had to choose between the two largest rallies. And a lot of the and and and And the seeds of the crisis that came afterwards, ah you can find them them. Because the Christian Democrats were were progressive, but they were basically anti-Marxist.
00:41:21
Speaker
So they voted for Allende in Congress to elect in president because they thought that they could not go against the...
00:41:32
Speaker
the principle that had been stated in the previous instances in which the Congress had to choose. And because they negotiated with Allende,
00:41:43
Speaker
what and some some what what in Chile is called constitutional guarantees, which was a promise of Allende not to go against the constitution so that Christian Democrats could feel safe in voting for him.
00:41:56
Speaker
But... if it It is very likely that if the election had gone to ah second round of popular vote, Allende would not have won. The Christian Democrat constituencies, the Christian Democrat voters, we' were really more anti-Allende than the party was.
00:42:20
Speaker
So ah this is counterfactual, of course. We cannot know. But considering what had happened in previous elections and what happened in the last election in Chile, which which was the congressional election of 1973, six months before the coup, it is very likely that in that scenario, Allende would not have won.
00:42:42
Speaker
And that would have, of course... caused things to go a different way, which we don't know which which way would would it be, but it would have been different. So in the sense of institutionally thinking about these things differently, it is a hallmark.
00:42:57
Speaker
And now until elections follow different rules and there is popular runoff in case no one gets majority in the first round. And this proved to be a little better for stability.
00:43:11
Speaker
toability so It seems like this election's in quite an interesting situation where it's been given this significance by the later coup, but has also largely been overshadowed by it because of the, well, um as you said, potentially revolutionary impacts that that coup had later on.
00:43:31
Speaker
So I suppose just to finish this off very quickly, do you think that the Chilean election of 1970 was an election that shook the world? Yes, absolutely.
00:43:41
Speaker
I think, and I say this as a... I said this is a historian. I'm Chilean, of course, and I pay attention to Chilean things, but I've been able to to to look at ah sources from different parts of the world, including the ones that are presented in in that article.
00:43:59
Speaker
And yes, but but it it was seen as something ah of a turning point, positively or negatively, ah but it left almost no one indifferent, really.
00:44:12
Speaker
well Thank you very much for joining me today. I'm very appreciative of your fascinating insight into the Chilean elections for this series on elections that shook the world.
00:44:23
Speaker
And thank you for listening. And if you found yourself interested in Latin American elections, have a listen to our episode on the election in Suriname that we recorded earlier this year.
00:44:34
Speaker
Thank you. Thank you,
00:44:46
Speaker
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00:44:59
Speaker
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