“The thirteen colonies that became the United States were not even half of the British colonies that existed in the eighteenth century. We need to think about why some colonies rebelled and others did not.” — Sarah Pearsall

 

Earlier today, the historian Dominic Erdozain came on [https://keenon.substack.com/p/to-love-or-hate-the-united-states] the show to argue that American patriotism has the same exceptionalist Puritan roots as British imperialism. But not all historians of the American revolution would agree. Take, for example, Sarah Pearsall [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/707010/freedom-round-the-globe-by-sarah-m-s-pearsall/], author of Freedom Round the Globe [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/707010/freedom-round-the-globe-by-sarah-m-s-pearsall/], who turns 1776 inside out to present the American rebellion as a kind of world revolution. 1776 as 1917. American patriotism as an explosion of borderless humanity.

 

Pearsall argues that 1776 was as globally significant in its revolutionary promise as 1789, 1848 or 1917. She reminds us that there were at least 26, possibly as many as 32 British colonies in existence in 1775 — in the Caribbean, in Canada, in East and West Florida. And the radical ideas that drove the Declaration of Independence — security, happiness, respect — were being asserted simultaneously all over the world. So in Edinburgh debating clubs, Caribbean sugar plantations and West African castles, the American revolution was welcomed as a global revolution. Universal rather than exceptional. The Tea Party as the Storming of the Winter Palace.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       32 British Colonies, Not 13: The Forgotten Empire: People talk about the thirteen colonies as if they were all the British colonies in North America. They weren’t. There were at least 26, possibly as many as 32, depending on how you count groups of islands. British colonies in the Caribbean. In Canada. In East and West Florida. Each had its own relationship to the British Empire, its own internal tensions, its own calculations about the costs and benefits of rebellion. The question Pearsall asks — why did some rebel and others not? — is the question that opens up the global story.

 

•       The Caribbean Undermines the Slavery Thesis: There is a popular argument that the American Revolution was primarily fought to preserve slavery — that the colonists feared British abolition and revolted to protect the institution. Pearsall’s counter: if this were the main driver, the Caribbean colonies would have been the first to join. They were far more dependent on slavery than the mainland colonies. They did not join. The relationship between slavery and the revolution is genuinely complicated — not simple in either direction. The Caribbean story is the evidence that demands a more nuanced account.

 

•       From St Kitts to Kolkata: The Declaration’s Global Keywords: Pearsall’s organising device: she takes thirteen key words from the Declaration of Independence and finds the spark of each in a far-flung location. Security in the Six Nations cornfields of upstate New York, where it meant something very different to the Haudenosaunee than to the Philadelphia delegates. Happiness in the debating clubs of Edinburgh, where women were demanding it alongside men for the first time. Respect in the streets of Kolkata. This device lets her write about the globe without losing the Declaration as her anchor.

 

•       Americans Were Already Thinking Globally in 1776: One of Pearsall’s more surprising findings: Americans in 1776 were far more aware of global events than we tend to assume. They were reading about events in India. The Boston Tea Party is unintelligible without knowing that tea was an Asian commodity and t

1776 as 1917: Sarah Pearsall's World History of the American Revolution

“We must perpetrate the paradox that our American cultural tradition lies in the future.” — Randolph Bourne, via Dominic Erdozain

 

Should Americans be proud of their country? The Anglo-American historian Dominic Erdozain [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/795670/to-love-a-country-by-dominic-erdozain/] thinks not. His new book, To Love a Country [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/795670/to-love-a-country-by-dominic-erdozain/], argues that there’s a problem with American patriotism. Americans shouldn’t love their country, Erdozain says. It’s not a good place.

 

His argument is that American patriotism has the same Puritan root as British imperialism. The idea of a chosen people, a city on the hill, a nation with a special mission is a kind of moral virus. He says it infected America in the great awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has provided moral cover for slavery, military aggression abroad, and the denial of rights at home.

 

So what America needs, he argues, is a new set of foundational myths laid out by progressives like Jane Addams, Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison and Martin Luther King Jr. This would establish a new kind of American patriotism which is forward-looking and internationalist rather than nativist or exceptionalist. Erdozain even gives Gandhi a shoutout as a model of American patriotism, although one wonders what the Indian pacifist would have made of this.

 

So what will the Atlanta-based Erdozain be doing on July 4? Hiding under his bed, perhaps, rather than enjoying the hotdogs and fireworks. In hiding from hundreds of millions of patriotic Americans.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Puritan Root of American Exceptionalism: The idea of America as a chosen people, a city on a hill with a special mission to the world, was not invented in America. It was inherited from English Puritanism. As it spread through the first and second great awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries — what some scholars call the New Englandization of America — it became the canopy under which very different kinds of people sheltered. You didn’t have to be a Puritan in any theological sense. You just had to accept the premise that America was righteously exceptional. And once you accepted that, a great deal of scrutiny became unavailable.

 

•       Nationalism Is Immune to Failure: One of Erdozain’s sharpest observations, via historian Lindsey O’Rourke’s work on American interventionism: nationalism can absorb any amount of failure. The defeat in Vietnam, the disaster of Iraq, the failure of Afghanistan — a certain kind of nationalism insulates itself from the lessons these events might teach. It’s always someone else’s fault. It’s always a particular administration’s failure, never the national premise. This makes exceptionalism uniquely resistant to the ordinary mechanism of democratic accountability.

 

•       Randolph Bourne and the Patriotism of the Future: Erdozain’s most original historical recovery: Randolph Bourne, a radical journalist writing during the First World War, who argued that nativism and nationalism were European imports, backward-looking and derivative. Bourne’s phrase: “we must perpetrate the paradox that our American cultural tradition lies in the future.” A patriotism faithful to the diversity of modern America — its bustling pluralism, its immigrant energy — cannot be built by looking backward to the founders. It must be built by looking forward to the founders we have not yet had.

 

•       Alternative Founders: Addams, Douglass, Garrison, King: Erdozain proposes replacing — or at least supplementing — the canonical founders with a different cast. Jane Addams, who said the question is not what can we teach

To Love or Hate the United States? Dominic Erdozain on the Problem of American Patriotism

 “I deliver it with the credibility of having won a district that Trump carried by 13 points. Not only how to speak to these voters, but how to win them back.” — Joe Cunningham

 

Yesterday’s guest was Alexandra Natapoff, co-editor of America Unfinished — a collection of essays by illustrious Harvard Law School professors grading the march toward justice in the United States over the last 250 years. America got about a C+ from this progressive clique. “Could do better” their report cards suggested.

 

Today’s guest is a very different kind of Democrat. Joe Cunningham [https://lifeofthepartybook.com/] is a lawyer and personal injury attorney in Charleston, South Carolina, a one-term US representative, and the author of Life of the Party: How Democrats Lost America’s Trust and How They Can Win It Back [https://lifeofthepartybook.com/]. Cunningham got his law degree at Northern Kentucky University’s Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Harvard, he jokes, was his safety school.

 

In contrast with Harvard Law professors, Cunningham’s credibility is hard to dress up. He was the first Democrat to win South Carolina’s 1st Congressional District in over forty years, in a seat Trump carried by 13 points. He was also the first Democrat in elected office to publicly warn against Biden seeking re-election. His diagnosis of what went wrong is that the Democratic Party abandoned kitchen-table economic issues in favour of culture wars, dismissed legitimate voter concerns as bigotry, and told people what they should care about rather than listening to what they actually cared about. The party, he argues, replaced empathy with arrogance. It’s as if it’s been colonized by morally prickly Harvard Law professors. Professor Cunningham gives the Dems a D+. Could do significantly better.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Winning Trump +13: The Credibility Argument: Cunningham’s case for why his diagnosis should be taken seriously is not his ideology but his record. He won South Carolina’s 1st Congressional District in 2018 — a heavily gerrymandered seat that Trump had carried by 13 points — making him the first Democrat to hold it in over forty years. He was also the first elected Democrat to publicly warn against Biden seeking re-election. His prescriptions don’t come from a think tank or an op-ed page. They come from a man who has actually won where Democrats can’t win, and lost where Democrats keep losing.

 

•       The Party Replaced Empathy with Arrogance: Cunningham’s central diagnosis: the Democratic Party stopped listening and started lecturing. It told people what they should care about — immigration wasn’t an issue in West Virginia because West Virginia is far from the border. It told people the economy was fine when they couldn’t afford their bills. It dismissed legitimate concerns about crime, immigration, and cultural change as bigotry rather than trying to understand them. The result: voters who felt condescended to left. The party that was founded on speaking for ordinary people no longer speaks their language.

 

•       Big Publishing’s Progressive Insularity: The book didn’t get picked up by a major publisher. Cunningham was told, more or less directly, that a book this critical of the Democratic Party — of Biden, of Harris, of the party’s leadership — was too much. He published it himself, through South Battery Press, named for a street in Charleston. Andrew’s observation: isn’t this itself evidence of what the book argues? If progressive culture controls big media and big publishing, those institutions will inevitably filter out self-criticism and reinforce the insularity that caused the problem in the first place.

 

•       The Geriatric Oligarchy and the Technology Frontier: Cunningham uses th

Life of the Party: Joe Cunningham on How Democrats Lost America’s Trust and How They Can Win It Back

“As long as democracy is a collective endeavour of all the people who belong to it, in some sense it can never be finished — because we are constantly bequeathing to the next generation the opportunity and the freedom to have these conversations over and over again.” — Alexandra Natapoff

 

It’s less than six weeks until America’s 250th birthday. The official America 250 store is selling T-shirts while Harvard Law School is doing something slightly less commercial. 62 HLS professors have written 1,000-word essays, assembled into a single volume to be published on July 4. Entitled America Unfinished: Two Hundred and Fifty Years of Law and Governance [https://mitpress.mit.edu/], it’s co-edited by Alexandra Natapoff [https://mitpress.mit.edu/], a Harvard Law professor who spent years as a federal public defender in Baltimore. The title, of course, is borrowed from the Gettysburg Address, where Lincoln charged the living with completing “the unfinished work” of those who died in the Civil War.

 

So is America unfinished or is it just getting started? For Natapoff and other Harvard Law School professors like this year’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Jill Lepore, the answer is suitably complex. Yes and no and maybe. Everything all at once. The essays focus on 250 years of both justice and injustice in America. Perhaps the only thing all authors agree on is the central role of capitalism in the history of the United States. Follow the money, Natapoff suggests. Those dollars will transport the reader to the heart of the American story.

 

That said, America Unfinished will certainly cost you less than a three-year Harvard Law degree. And if you wait six months, the book will be available at no cost online. So follow the money. It will take you to some unexpectedly free places.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Gettysburg Address as the Title’s Source: The book does not merely allude to Lincoln’s famous speech — it reproduces it at the front, so readers can go back to the original. In the Address, Lincoln charged the living with completing “the unfinished work” of those who died at Gettysburg — the work of building a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Natapoff and Charles chose this frame because it captures both the challenge and the hope: democracy is unfinished in the sense that it demands active work from every generation. It is not a gift that has been fully delivered. It is a task being handed on.

 

•       America and Democracy Are Not the Same Thing: Andrew’s challenge — you use the words interchangeably — earns a concession. Natapoff’s work in criminal justice has led her to argue repeatedly that the American criminal system fails many tests of democracy: it is exclusive, inegalitarian, overly coercive, inconsistent with democratic principles. So ‘America’ and ‘democracy’ are not synonyms in the book. Many of the 62 essays disagree about the state of various pieces of governance. The book’s inquiry is whether it is fair to call any particular piece of American legal governance a democracy — which both editors consider a compliment, and not a certainty.

 

•       A Federal Public Defender in Baltimore: The Biography Behind the Scholarship: Before she became a law professor, Natapoff was a federal public defender in Baltimore’s federal courts. Her job was to be adverse to the federal government all day every day, defending some of the most vulnerable and dispossessed people in the city against the massive resources and power of the federal apparatus. Those years shaped everything: her subsequent twenty years of scholarship on criminal courts, plea bargaining, misdemeanors, and race and inequality; her book Punishment Without Crime; and her contribution to America Unfinished. In her read

Is America Unfinished or Just Getting Started? Alexandra Natapoff on 250 Years of Justice and Injustice in the United States

“I took it for granted that we were trying to make the world a better place. But I think in retrospect that was naïve. What kind of change? For whom? We kind of forgot to specify what the purpose of all this disruption was.” — Eric Ries

 

In 2011, Eric Ries [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Incorruptible/Eric-Ries/9798893311860] published The Lean Startup, a book that reflected the optimistic zeitgeist about disruptive Silicon Valley companies. Fifteen years later, in Incorruptible: Why Good Companies Go Bad and How Great Companies Stay Great [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Incorruptible/Eric-Ries/9798893311860], Ries reflects today’s totally different zeitgeist about the value of companies inside and outside Silicon Valley.

 

Back in 2011, everybody loved tech. Ries, creator of the Lean Startup method and founder of the Long-Term Stock Exchange, admits he was naïve in his positive view of disruptive corporations. In Incorruptible, Ries argues that corporate corruption is structural, rather than a problem of bad actors. As organisations grow (ie: become more disruptive), the systems that govern them — ownership, incentives, charters, accountability — quietly reshape behaviour. Success itself becomes a form of financial gravity, diverting companies away from their original purpose.

 

Ries proposes that we design organisations to be incorruptible from the beginning. It’s the Patagonia model. When the outdoor clothing company almost went bankrupt in the 1990s, their bank agreed to restructure their loans if they would suspend their charitable donations for a couple of years. No deal, the CEO said. The bank blinked and Patagonia remained Patagonia. Now, Ries argues, every corporation should try to emulate Patagonia and become the incorruptible corporation. We must all join Eric Ries in getting beyond the lean startup.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Corporate Corruption Is Structural, Not Ethical: For decades, we’ve explained corporate failures as problems of bad actors, moral weakness, or isolated scandals. Ries’ argument: that story doesn’t match reality. Again and again, companies founded with strong ideals drift toward short-term thinking, extractive behaviour, and mission abandonment — often despite the best intentions of people inside them. The failure is structural. As organisations grow, the systems that govern them — ownership structures, incentives, charters — quietly reshape behaviour. Success becomes financial gravity, bending companies away from their purpose.

 

•       The Patagonia Model: Organisational Strength, Not Moral Righteousness: When Patagonia nearly went bankrupt in the 1990s due to outsourcing to poor-quality foreign factories, their lead lender agreed to restructure the loans on one condition: suspend charitable donations during the restructuring. Reasonable request — any other company would have said yes. Patagonia said no. The bank blinked. Ries’ reading: this is not moral righteousness. It is organisational strength. The ability to resist external pressure and stay true to a core principle. That is what makes a company not just good but great. Also: Black Wednesday, the day of their layoffs, is still referred to by name inside the company.

 

•       The Wrong Distinction: For-Profit vs Non-Profit: Ries argues that the distinction between for-profit and non-profit is fundamentally a tax code distinction that has come to define how we think about organisations in ways that are misleading and harmful. He proposes a reframe: if profit means the maximisation of human flourishing, then the Smithsonian is very for-profit and Philip Morris is very non-profit. This reframe changes what we should demand of governance, of accountability, of what organisations are for. It is simultane

Beyond the Lean Startup: Eric Ries on Why Good Companies Go Bad and How Great Ones Stay Great,

“There is a pretty powerful strain in America today in which men feel some need to be violent and domineering to sort of prove their masculinity. And there’s sort of less intense but still prevalent strains that infect many other types of men.” — Jasper Craven

 

Today is Memorial Day — America’s annual celebration of its warriors and military ethic. But for Jasper Craven [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/God-Forgives-Brothers-Dont/Jasper-Craven/9781668087190], author of God Forgives, Brothers Don’t: The Long March of Military Education and the Making of American Manhood [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/God-Forgives-Brothers-Dont/Jasper-Craven/9781668087190], it should be a day of muted self-reflection rather than bellicose celebration. Especially in May 2026 with America involved in another ludicrous overseas war.

 

Craven’s argument is that from George Washington onwards, America has fused military manliness with a self-destructive masculine identity. Thus young men are trained at top military academies like West Point to be unthinkingly domineering and violent. But for Craven, America — a continent surrounded by oceans to the east and west and by friendly neighbours to the north and south — has no need for the unreflective militarism fetishised by its military academies and culture.

 

So what has West Point wrought? A nation of Pete Hegseths, Jasper Craven implies. Happy (ie: peaceful) Memorial Day everyone.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Military Manliness and American Identity: From Washington to Hegseth: From the Founding Fathers — most of whom were Revolutionary War veterans — America has explicitly fused military manliness with core masculine identity. Boys who want to define themselves as Americans have felt a need to be strong, to serve, to defend. The archetype has only been beefed up over time: through the steroid era and into the world of Navy SEALs and special operators. The result is a culture where men feel the need to be violent and domineering to prove their masculinity, from carrying AK-47s to protests to becoming ICE agents. The problem: the archetype has no relationship to actual national security needs.

 

•       West Point and the Civil War: A Fuse, Not a Remedy: West Point was created to produce a well-schooled officer class. What Craven argues: when you allocate massive resources to building a military, you will feel the consequences. Before the Civil War, West Point was segregated into northern and southern companies — which exacerbated tensions rather than building union. When war broke out, many West Point officers defected to the Confederacy, including Robert E. Lee, who had been superintendent. West Point officers on opposite sides then killed each other in their thousands. Many lawmakers called for West Point to be abolished. They were not heeded.

 

•       Race, Integration, and the Military’s Complex Legacy: Craven acknowledges the military’s partial role in racial integration: Truman’s executive order in 1948 desegregated the armed forces, which was a genuine milestone ahead of civilian institutions. But he is careful about what this means. Integration at the institutional level did not eliminate racism within the culture. And the same military that desegregated also produced the culture of violence, dehumanisation of the other, and misogyny and homophobia that Craven chronicles throughout the book. Partial credit is still only partial credit.

 

•       January 6th and the Politicisation of the Officer Class: In Trump’s first term, General Mattis and General Kelly and others demonstrated real courage in reining in Trump’s worst impulses. By the end of that term, they had all been replaced by loyalists. During the transition to Biden, Trump’s military cron

God Forgives, Brothers Don’t: Jasper Craven on the Damage West Point Has Done to American Boys

“We’ve learned how to tolerate acts of violence, acts of widespread death, disease — that other developed nations simply don’t tolerate. And that tolerance manifesting in myriad political failures — all of which go back to our refusal to maturely deal with mortality and issues of grief.” — David Masciotra

 

Earlier this week, we talked to Ece Temelkuran about her book Nation of Strangers, a manifesto about strangers finding one another. But for the cultural critic David Masciotra [https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/05/01/a-country-of-strangers-death-despair-and-indifference-in-the-us/], strangerdom is the problem rather than the solution. Contemporary America, he argues in his new essay A Country of Strangers [https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/05/01/a-country-of-strangers-death-despair-and-indifference-in-the-us/], has become a place of death, despair and indifference.

 

Masciotra takes his cue from Albert Camus’ 1942 novella The Stranger. Camus’ Meursault — the narrator of The Stranger — is a man completely detached from meaning. He attends his own mother’s funeral without feeling anything. He murders an Arab man on a beach without motive. He faces his execution with a shrug. Masciotra’s argument is that the United States has become Meursault writ large. America’s failure is existential rather than political. It is a failure to mourn — a sustained refusal to engage with death, grief, and the weight of history that produces a society of strangers who cannot connect with one another across race, class, or geography.

 

So is Masciotra right? Are we all Meursault now? What can Albert Camus teach us about America?

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Meursault and America: The Same Detachment: Camus’ The Stranger is narrated by Meursault — a man who attends his mother’s memorial without feeling, murders an Arab man on a beach without motive, and faces execution with indifference. The novel, Camus said, was his attempt to detail “man’s confrontation with absurdity in its nakedness.” Masciotra’s argument: this is America now. A country that has adopted Meursault’s emotional posture toward mass death. Columbine stopped the nation in 1999. Mass shootings now barely register. That is not political failure. It is existential failure.

 

•       A Failure to Mourn: Masciotra’s central thesis: America’s deepest problem is its refusal to mourn. Not guilt — he is careful to distinguish mourning from guilt. You can have a national memory that reckons with both what you celebrate and what you grieve. If the Founding Fathers are worth preserving in active memory, so are the people they enslaved. Never properly dealing with the Civil War allowed the resurgence of white supremacist movements. Never properly mourning mass shootings allows them to accelerate. The failure to grieve is not sentimental. It is political.

 

•       Is Meursault Autistic? The Spectrum Reading: Some contemporary critics read Meursault as someone on the autism spectrum — a man whose emotional detachment reflects neurodivergence rather than moral failure. Masciotra is skeptical. His reading: Camus’ portrait is one of moral refusal, not neurological condition. The distinction matters for the American parallel: if America’s indifference is a structural feature rather than a disease, the remedy is not therapy but political and cultural change. You can’t medicate a country into empathy.

 

•       The Colonial Murder and the Racial Hierarchy: Meursault murders an Arab man in French Algeria and feels nothing. Some critics fault Camus for not making colonialism more explicit. Masciotra defends Camus: Meursault doesn’t care about anything, including his own mother’s death. His indifference to his Arab victim’s humanity is the

What Albert Camus Teaches Us About America: David Masciotra on a Country of Strangers,

“If you write something you think is really fanciful today, tomorrow’s news headlines might be telling the exact same story. That’s the challenge of writing realism today — when everything feels so sci-fi and so dystopic.” — Fred Lunzer

 

Boy meets girl meets AI therapist. That is the premise of Sike [https://celadonbooks.com/book/sike/], the debut novel by Fred Lunzer [https://celadonbooks.com/book/sike/]. Adrian is a rap ghostwriter who has never met any of the rappers he writes for. After a relationship collapse, he signs up for Sike — a Facebook-style AI psychotherapy app that tracks your every move and emotion via smart glasses and guides you toward mental contentment. He meets Maquie, a venture capitalist and Sike refusnik. You can imagine the rest.

 

Sike is a self-consciously “realist” love story set in a world where AI therapy is ubiquitous. Lunzer wanted to write AI fiction that is realistic rather than dystopian or utopian. He started it speculatively. By the time he’d finished, ChatGPT had launched and what he’d once fancifully imagined had become reality. It’s the futuristic writer’s permanent predicament. Make the future believable before it becomes so familiar that we barely notice it. Turn science fiction into social realism.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       AI Fiction Without Dystopia: The Gap Lunzer Is Filling: Almost all AI fiction is either utopian or dystopian. James Bond loves gadgets. Most literary fiction treats technology as vaguely grubby and pushes it into genre. Lunzer’s ambition: find the realism. Write about a world where AI is already everywhere, the initial fears are already past, and we’ve reached the same ambivalent relationship with it that we have with our smartphones. We don’t know what model we have. We barely think about it. That’s where the interesting questions live.

 

•       Reality Caught Up Before He Finished: Lunzer wrote Sike speculatively. By the time he finished, ChatGPT had launched. William Gibson’s observation: the future is already here, just unevenly distributed. His corollary: if you write something fanciful today, it’s tomorrow’s news story. Lunzer’s solution to this perpetual problem is to stop writing near-future speculation and instead set the story in a world where the technology is already past its introduction — where the hype is over and the real reckoning begins.

 

•       Realism Is the Hardest Genre Right Now: Andrew’s observation: the best AI fiction is realist. Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun treats unimaginable things as taken for granted. That’s the technique. Lunzer agrees — and notes that realism is particularly hard to write now because everything already feels surreal. Trump, AI, the state of the world: if you’d described any of it thirty years ago, people would have called it fiction. The challenge of the realist novelist in 2026 is to find the quiet normality inside the chaos.

 

•       Non-Polarising AI Fiction: Lunzer deliberately avoided writing a book that slams Meta, or that is obviously pro- or anti-AI. He calls it non-polarised. In Sike, some characters love the AI therapy app, some refuse to use it. No one is obviously right. The book’s thesis — insofar as it has one — is that the interesting questions about AI are not the ones about whether it’s good or bad, but the ones that arise once you’ve stopped arguing about that and started living with it.

 

•       The Economics of Writing: Trenches, Not Glamour: Lunzer has a day job — AI researcher at Sony. Sike was his first published novel, not his first written. Before it: a travel narrative about the Japanese restaurant industry that went nowhere, and a novel about a global pandemic finished in early 2020 and over

Boy Meets Girl Meets AI Therapist: Fred Lunzer on Sike, Fictional Realism, and the Future of Love

“Vaccine hesitancy in the U.S. should be understood as religious expression — not as the product of scientific misinformation. These debates have been proxies for existential concerns about justice and morality.” — Kira Ganga Kieffer

 

Are anti-vaxxers simply bizarre anti-science crazies egged on by conspiracists like RFK Jr? For Kira Ganga Kieffer [https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691224664/unvaccinated-under-god], author of Unvaccinated Under God [https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691224664/unvaccinated-under-god], what she calls “vaccine hesitancy” in America is actually a more complicated and prescient affair.

 

The prevailing narrative — that vaccine-hesitant people lack scientific facts or serve their own individual agendas — misunderstands what’s actually happening. Kieffer’s argument is that vaccine hesitancy is best understood as a kind of religiosity. Not in the narrow context of church doctrine, but in the broader sense of meaning-making, moral reasoning, and an intensely individualist relationship with the body that is deeply rooted in American evangelical and alternative-spiritual tradition.

 

This hesitancy, Kieffer shows, is not new. It has been present since the smallpox vaccine in the eighteenth century. What recurs across very different eras and very different communities is a set of metaphysical rather than scientific concerns expressed in the language of wellness, purity, and bodily sovereignty.

 

The most interesting political implication of Kieffer’s argument is that the same hyperindividualistic anti-modern instinct behind vaccine hesitancy also drives the wellness movement, the rejection of AI, and the political coalition that coalesced around RFK Jr. She sees this as a broad and growing constituency that neither party has fully understood nor spoken to. Rather than crazies, today’s anti-vaxxers might offer a window onto tomorrow’s American politics.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Vaccine Hesitancy Is Moral Meaning-Making, Not Ignorance: The dominant public health framing: vaccine-hesitant people lack scientific knowledge. Kieffer’s reframe: they are engaged in profound moral reasoning about the body, purity, parental responsibility, and the relationship between the individual and the state. The parent who fears the MMR vaccine is not asking a scientific question. They are asking: if I consent to this intervention and my child is harmed, am I responsible? That is a theological question — about guilt, intention, and moral agency — dressed in the language of health.

 

•       Evangelical Hyperindividualism Is the Root: Kieffer’s structural argument: American evangelical Christianity is, at its core, an individualist proposition. You are saved by your personal choices. This translates directly into the wellness culture’s logic of bodily salvation: you are saved from illness, aging, and death by your personal choices about diet, supplements, and vaccines. The individual body becomes the site of spiritual as well as physical salvation. This hyperindividualism is very American — and very old. It predates the wellness movement and will outlast it.

 

•       Vaccine Hesitancy Has Been Present Since the Eighteenth Century: Kieffer’s most important historical corrective: vaccine hesitancy did not begin with COVID, with MMR, or with the anti-vaccine movement of the 1990s. It has been present since the smallpox inoculations of colonial Massachusetts. What recurs across very different eras is not the same people or the same science — it’s the same core concerns: bodily purity, parental moral responsibility, and distrust of external authority over the body. Each generation clothes these concerns in the available language. Today it is wellness. Earlier it was religious freedom.</

Unvaccinated Under God: Kira Ganga Kieffer on Religion and Vaccine Hesitancy in Modern America

“The rules-based system just hasn’t worked. China’s system is so opaque that you can’t see the subsidies. And when you’ve got China not interested in new rules and the US not interested in a referee, you’ve got two of the world’s biggest actors who aren’t on board.” — Soumaya Keynes

 

It would have been nice to get John Maynard Keynes on the show to get his critique of Trump’s trade war. But in the long run, we’re all dead — even old Maynard. So instead, we found his great-great-niece, Soumaya Keynes [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/How-to-Win-a-Trade-War/Soumaya-Keynes/9781668221310] — Financial Times columnist and co-author of How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy [https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/How-to-Win-a-Trade-War/Soumaya-Keynes/9781668221310].

 

Having already appeared on Jon Stewart this week, Soumaya has a bit of Keynesian star quality about her. But she’s also a first-rate economist. Her thesis is that the old rules-based trading system that her great-great-uncle helped design after World War II is gone. And it ain’t coming back. China’s subsidies are so opaque that rules can’t be written to constrain them, let alone enforced. The US is no longer willing to submit to a referee. Without the two biggest players, no rules-based system is meaningful.

 

So — now what? Keynes says we must think like a trade warrior. Donald Trump should leverage the tools available — but use them strategically. Trump’s error in his second term was not being tough on China while being too tough on everyone else, especially allies like Canada and Mexico.

 

Soumaya Keynes’ most contemporary idea might be her most Keynesian one. John Maynard Keynes proposed penalties for countries running large trade surpluses as well as those running deficits — recognising that global imbalances are a two-sided problem. That idea didn’t make it into the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement. Eighty years later, in equally anxious economic times, his optimistic great-great-niece is reviving it.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Can Trade Wars Be Won? Yes, Sometimes: The conventional wisdom: no one wins a trade war. Keynes and Bown agree — in theory. In practice, countries in a weaker position cave. History has examples: France in the late nineteenth century told its trading partners they were renegotiating treaties, and the smaller partners complied. Trump’s tariffs in his first term produced concessions. The problem is not that trade wars can’t be won. It’s that the smaller power’s only defence — coordinating with other smaller powers — is extremely hard to sustain. There’s always an incentive to cut a deal first.

 

•       China Is the Doper on the Sports Field: Keynes’s sharpest analogy: the global trading system is like a sports game that needs rules to ensure a level playing field. China’s subsidies — cheap credit, corporate handouts, opaque support for state-linked companies — are the equivalent of performance-enhancing drugs. The problem is that unlike doping in sport, China’s subsidies are invisible. You can write a rule saying China won’t give these handouts. But you can’t verify compliance. And without enforcement, rules are meaningless. The WTO has not solved this. Nothing has solved this.

 

•       Trump Was Right About China, Wrong About Everything Else: Keynes is careful here. She credits Robert Lighthizer in Trump’s first term with identifying China as the real problem and building a focused strategy. In the second term, Trump put tariffs on everyone simultaneously — which dissipated leverage, alienated the coalition of allies needed to pressure Beijing, and mixed up the problem of China’s subsidies with grievances against Canada, Mexico, and the EU. If you were genuinely tough on China, yo

How to Win a Trade War: Soumaya Keynes on Trump, China, and Her Great-Great-Uncle Maynard

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