“His descent is in a sense our descent.” — Peter Wehner on Trump at 80

 

Donald Trump turned 80 two weeks ago. But Peter Wehner [https://www.theatlantic.com/author/peter-wehner/]’s timely Atlantic piece [https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/06/trump-decline-ufc-fight/687582/], “The Apotheosis of Donald Trump,” isn’t much of a birthday present. Wehner even suggests that for all Trump’s madness, mayhem and malevolence, the orange octogenarian eludes Shakespearean tragedy. So no historic hall of infamy for Donald. He’s too sad for that.

 

Trump is a man, Wehner says, of borderless corruption — malicious, totally corrupt, without any visible redeeming qualities. But he isn’t King Lear. Trump lacks Lear’s complexity, Wehner says. Lear was a figure with whom you could have some empathy. Trump is not. He is, as Wehner notes, “a flatter figure in that sense” — but that doesn’t make him any less dangerous.

 

For the DC-based Wehner, what makes Trump more dangerous, as an octogenarian, is his decomposition. The signs are everywhere: the disinhibition intensifying, the impulsivity more easily triggered, the volatility producing a foreign policy that no ally can track or trust. His descent, Wehner warns, might be our descent. Peak Trump. The apotheosis of a pathetically malevolent madman. Just in time for the semiquincentennial, which Wehner will “celebrate” at Monticello.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Trump at 80: The Apotheosis and the Decomposition: Wehner’s Atlantic piece, written to mark Trump’s 80th birthday, argues that what we are seeing is not just the decline of an old man but a visible decomposition in his mental and physical capacities that is making him more, not less, dangerous. The disinhibition is more intense. The impulsivity is more easily triggered. The volatility is producing a foreign policy that no ally can track or trust. Trump 2.0 is more dangerous than Trump 1.0 — and Trump 1.0 was not a walk in the park. The question is not whether this ends well. The question is how badly it ends.

 

•       Not King Lear: A Man of Borderless Corruption: Wehner uses a King Lear allusion in his Atlantic essay but hesitates to lean on it. Lear was a complicated figure — someone you could have empathy with, who saw things at the end he hadn’t seen earlier. Trump is not like that. He is, as best Wehner can tell, a man of borderless corruption, malicious from head to toe, with no visible redeeming qualities — a flatter figure in the Shakespearean sense. That flatness makes the Lear parallel partial. But it does not diminish the danger. His descent is in a sense our descent.

 

•       European Mystification: When It Happens Twice, That Breaks Trust: Andrew has just returned from Europe, where every prominent journalist and historian he met was mystified by Trump. Wehner agrees: Trump is sui generis, unlike any leader the post-war world has produced. What he says is particularly disturbing is the second election. If it had happened once, Europe could have told itself it was a parenthesis. When it happens twice, that breaks trust. Even if the next president is sane and rational, there is no guarantee the following one will be. That uncertainty, Wehner says, is a real inflection point in the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world.

 

•       The Crack-Up of MAGA World: The cult-like grip Trump had on the Republican Party and the MAGA base is no longer there. His approval among Republicans has dropped from the nineties to the seventies — still high, but significant. And the fissures in MAGA world are, in Wehner’s word, extraordinary: Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly and Candace Owens have broken from the movement or turned on its leadership. Marjorie Taylor Greene too. The crack-up has b

The Apotheosis of Donald Trump? Peter Wehner on Madness, Mayhem and How Trump Eludes Shakespearean Tragedy

“The frontier AI companies invited the government into the room. Now the government is beginning to behave as if it owns the door, the guest list, the schedule, and the product roadmap.” — Keith Teare

 

Last week, I was away in Europe. So Keith Teare [https://thatwa.st/] ran our That Was The Week show solo — with a chillingly authentic Andrew Keen bot. So realistic, in fact, that the fake version sounds (to me, at least) more interesting than the real one.

 

The bad news is that I’m back. The good news is it’s been an interesting week in tech. That was the week in which the US Commerce Department told both OpenAI and Anthropic that they now need government approval for whom they can sell their frontier AI models. This is supposedly “voluntary” — for now, at least.

 

Keith’s TWTW editorial argues that Dario Amodei and Sam Altman have spent over a year crying wolf about the dangers of their own technology, supposedly deliberately seeking government involvement as a regulatory moat against competitors. And now the government has walked through the door that Sam and Dario left ajar. Now, Keith argues, the US government is behaving as if it owns not just the door and the guest list, but the entire product roadmap. “Payback’s a bitch,” Keith bristles in his editorial.

 

The other major news this week is the rumour (via David Sacks) that OpenAI has offered the US government a 50% stake in a sovereign wealth fund. If true, this would change everything — not just in Silicon Valley, but in the political debate about public ownership of our AI economy. It’s not just tech insiders like Sacks and Altman who are on board the sovereign wealth fund express, but also Bernie Sanders and other leftist critics of Big Tech. So maybe payback, at least when it comes to public investment in AI, isn’t always such a bitch.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Fake Andrew Keen: An Hour of Work on a Local Nvidia Card: Keith ran last week’s show solo with an AI-generated Andrew Keen: trained on a few episodes of the show, animated from a YouTube still, scripted from Keith’s newsletter. No third-party service. Just a local PC with an Nvidia GPU, about an hour of work, three attempts. Andrew, listening back, second-guessed whether he was actually there. The result was “pretty bad compared to our normal actual live shows,” Keith says. But also: really good. The question hanging over this episode and every future one: which Andrew are you listening to?

 

•       Payback’s a Bitch: How AI Companies Created Their Own Regulatory Trap: The US Commerce Department has told OpenAI and Anthropic they need government permission for who gets to use their latest models. Voluntary, for now. Keith’s diagnosis: AI leadership spent more than a year crying wolf about existential risk — not because they believed it, but because government regulation creates a moat against competitors. Now the government has taken them at their word. Dario and Sam Altman wanted to be wrapped in government clothing. They are. The government now owns the door. They asked for this. They got it.

 

•       American and Chinese State Capitalism: Converging Models: Andrew raises the macro argument: what we’re watching is the convergence of American and Chinese models of capitalism toward a more state-centric model. China has always been explicit about state control. America has prided itself on free enterprise — even when the internet, atomic technology, and now AI were all substantially government-funded or government-shaped. Keith agrees at this level: all governments seek to control things they frame as dangerous. The difference is the framing. The direction of travel is the same.

 

•       OpenAI’s Rumoured 50% Stake Offer to the Government: Keith has heard — fro

Payback’s a Bitch: AI Sovereign Wealth Funds, the Fake Andrew Keen, and America’s Inevitable Decline

“You cannot expect a society to open its doors if there is no way to close them. You cannot expect a society to open its gates if there is no gate to open.” — Justin Gest

 

It’s a counterintuitive and deliberately provocative argument. Rather than bolstering open societies, migration actually benefits authoritarianism. And it’s the argument that Justin Gest [https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democratic-drain/D8497D6A38FCA61ADE68CC62235449B9] makes in his new book, Democratic Drain: Global Migration and the Struggle for Democracy [https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democratic-drain/D8497D6A38FCA61ADE68CC62235449B9]. Drawing on data from 149 countries, Gest shows that global migration has been inadvertently strengthening authoritarianism by stealing liberal democrats from the places that need them most.

 

When liberals emigrate from authoritarian countries, Gest argues, they take their democratic values with them. As a consequence, fewer people dare to vote against the autocrat, fewer people protest, fewer people cling to liberal norms. The argument turns the normal discourse about migration on its head. Immigration is usually framed as a question about the countries experiencing migration. But Gest reframes it from the perspective of the countries losing people. So, for example, when Hungary’s young liberal professionals move to Berlin or London, Orbán’s job got easier. Or when Venezuela’s middle class emigrated to Miami, Maduro’s grip tightened.

 

And, of course, when people leave America, it benefits Trump. That’s the real bite in his polemic. Be patriotic, Justin Gest is telling American liberals. Stay home. Don’t go down the democratic drain.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Democratic Drain: Migration Is Strengthening Authoritarianism: Gest’s central argument: when people emigrate from authoritarian countries, they are disproportionately people who hold liberal democratic values — people who would vote against the autocrat, protest in the streets, or organise civil society. He calls them “demmigrants.” When they leave, they leave behind a population that is, on average, more sympathetic to authoritarian governance. The result: Orbán’s Hungary is easier to govern after Hungary’s young liberals move to Berlin; Maduro’s Venezuela tightens its grip as the middle class departs for Miami. Across 149 countries, the correlation is striking.

 

•       White Working Class as Protest Voters, Not Authoritarians: Gest, whose earlier book The New Minority anticipated the Trump and Brexit era, pushes back on the characterisation of working-class voters as simply authoritarian. Many are protest voters: they want to see the system shaken, they see populists as the only candidates willing to speak truth about the system’s failures, and they are willing to tolerate short-run damage to democratic institutions in the hope of building something better from the ashes. Immigration is the sine qua non of far-right populism: when immigrants are framed as an existential threat, voters make transactional short-run compromises to democratic integrity. They are not irrational. They are strategic.

 

•       The Left Must Embrace Nationalism to Win the Immigration Argument: Gest’s most provocative political prescription: the left has ceded nationalism to the right as if there is no nationalist case for immigration, no nationalist case for climate policy, no nationalist case for progressive values. This is, he says, inexcusable. The national interest served by carefully selected immigration is plain: immigrants make countries younger, fill labour shortages, innovate, create jobs. If the left can frame the immigration debate in terms of the national interest rather than moral obligation, the debate changes. He wrote a piece for the Washin

Down the Democratic Drain: Justin Gest on How Migration Is Unintentionally Strengthening Authoritarianism Around the World

“Narrative remains a pretty unbeatable delivery device for information.” — Patrick Radden Keefe

 

Has London really fallen? That’s the question Patrick Radden Keefe [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/788428/london-falling-by-patrick-radden-keefe/] — staff writer at The New Yorker and bestselling author of Empire of Pain and Say Nothing — addressed in his new book, London Falling: A Mysterious Death in a Gilded City and a Family’s Search for Truth [https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/788428/london-falling-by-patrick-radden-keefe/].

 

One thing for sure is that Keefe himself hasn’t fallen. He’s been surprised by the book’s success. “I thought the antibodies would get up because I’m an interloper,” the American confesses about writing about Britain. Antibodies or not, the book has been a #1 bestseller in both the UK and US. And we can look forward to an A24 and Brightstar TV adaptation soon.

 

On London, the story is murkier. London Falling begins on November 29, 2019, when nineteen-year-old Zac Brettler falls to his death from a luxury apartment above the Thames. Every parent’s ultimate nightmare. As it happens, I’ve known Zac’s dad, Matthew, for many years. But what appeared to be a tragic accident or a suicide turned out to be something far more sinister — a story of double lives, dirty money, a dishonest businessman named Akbar Shamji, and a terrifyingly violent gangster known as Indian Dave.

 

Lurking behind the Brettler death is what Keefe presents as the greatest deceit of all — London’s cruel descent into what he sees as the moneyed miasma of post-Thatcherite neo-liberalism. London is, in Keefe’s compelling narrative, the most invisible of cities — where power lies with criminals like Indian Dave, where the police are at best bystanders, and where a teenage fantasist from a comfortable middle-class family can become fatally entangled in a fallen world he barely understood.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Zac Brettler: The Double Life That Led to His Death: Zac Brettler was nineteen years old. He fell — or was pushed, or was forced to jump — from a luxury apartment balcony above the Thames on November 29, 2019. He had been living a double life: to London’s criminal underworld, he was Zac Ismailov, the son of a Russian oligarch, heir to a great fortune. He had even fabricated bank statements showing a personal account holding $1 million. Under this guise, he became entangled with Akbar Shamji, a slippery businessman, and a man known as Indian Dave, a violent extortionist. Keefe’s reporting suggests Zac jumped to escape from one of these men. Scotland Yard’s passivity in investigating the case is, in Keefe’s word, bizarre.

 

•       London as a Twenty-Four-Hour Laundromat for Dirty Money: Keefe’s portrait of London is the book’s macro argument: a global city that has been hollowed out by decades of financial deregulation, whose financial sector is stacked with professional facilitators eager to help protect or conceal a dubious fortune, where posh mansions and private nightclubs serve as the visible surface of a hidden economy of criminal money. Zac Brettler was not rich. He was a boy from a comfortably off family who became fixated on the glitzy, mercenary, aspirational culture embodied by foreign billionaires who had bought mansions and football clubs in his city. London, in Keefe’s telling, did this to him.

 

•       The Brettlers’ Consent: A Long Haul With the Family: Keefe had written 15,000 words for The New Yorker when he knew there was a book. He went to Matthew and Rochelle Brettler and their surviving son Joe and told them: I will only do this with your blessing. They read the finished piece, talked amongst themselves, and came back with a yes. Keefe

Is London Really Falling? Patrick Radden Keefe's Search for Truth in the Most Invisible of Cities

“The United States and America are not the same thing. The United States is a government, an administration. America is an idea — and that idea is still there, even when the government is not.” — Konstanty Gebert

 

What is the best thing about America? At least when viewed from Warsaw. For Konstanty Gebert [https://ecfr.eu/profile/konstanty-gebert/] — Polish-Jewish journalist, Solidarity activist, co-founder of Gazeta Wyborcza, and one of his country’s most celebrated public intellectuals — the answer is the interlibrary loan system. The ability to order any book from any library in the United States and have it delivered to your local branch within days, for free. To Gebert, it represents something irreducibly American: access to knowledge as a public good. What the internet once was. What America once represented to freedom-loving Poles like Gebert.

 

And the worst? Yalta. Gebert’s narrative is damning. In February 1945, FDR and Churchill caved into Stalin’s demands and agreed to Soviet colonisation of Eastern Europe in exchange for Russia’s entry into the Pacific War. Poland was once again bartered by the great powers. “We were sold,” Gebert describes a perfidy that resulted in a forty-year Soviet occupation of Poland.

 

Between the interlibrary loan and Yalta lies a more complex Polish-American history: Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points enabling an independent Poland; Herbert Hoover feeding a starving Europe after WW1; Reagan’s support for Solidarity. Now, however, Konstanty Gebert warns, Trump’s America isn’t just failing Poland, but all of Europe in its disdain for freedom, especially in Ukraine. That’s the view from Warsaw. And it’s closer to Yalta than the interlibrary loan system.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Interlibrary Loan System: The Peak of American Civilisation: Gebert’s opening answer to Andrew’s question about what the United States means to him: the interlibrary loan system. The ability to order any book from any library in the country and have it delivered to your local branch within days, for free. It represents something specific about the American idea: that access to knowledge is a public good, that no individual library can hold everything, and that the solution is to share rather than compete. It is, he says, the most civilised thing any country has ever done. He is not entirely joking.

 

•       The United States and America Are Not the Same Thing: Gebert’s structural distinction: the United States is a government, a foreign policy, a set of institutions that can be well or badly run. America is an idea — a myth of liberty, opportunity, and democratic self-governance — that has shaped the world’s imagination since 1776. When the United States fails, as it has under Trump, that is serious and damaging. But it does not destroy America. The idea persists independently of what any administration does to it. Poland’s relationship is with America, not just the United States. That is what survived Yalta. That is what survived Trump’s first term. He is less sure it will survive the second.

 

•       Wilson Square, Hoover, and Yalta: America’s Polish History: The arc of American-Polish relations is extraordinary. Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points gave Poland its independence after 123 years of partition — which is why Wilson Square in Warsaw exists. Herbert Hoover fed Europe after the First World War — a gesture of generosity that Poles still remember. But at Yalta in 1945, Franklin Roosevelt traded Eastern Europe to Stalin in exchange for Soviet entry into the Pacific War — or so the Polish reading goes. “We were sold,” Gebert says flatly. Reagan’s support for Solidarity rehabilitated the American image. Trump’s presidency has damaged it again. The cycle is long but the memory is longer.

 

•       Solidarity a

The Best and Worst Thing About America: Konstanty Gebert on the Interlibrary Loan and Yalta

“People in my generation worshipped the United States during communism. Everybody wanted to flee to the US. It was the land of the dream. And now we confront a different type of country, different type of politics — and we don’t dream of the US anymore.” — Bartosz Wieliński

 

I’m just back from Warsaw where I spent an afternoon at the offices of Gazeta Wyborcza, Poland’s liberal newspaper of record. I talked with Bartosz Wieliński [https://wyborcza.pl/], the newspaper’s Deputy Editor and one of the country’s most respected journalists.

 

The message from Warsaw is dire — at least for America. Wieliński told me that his generation grew up worshipping the United States. But they no longer do. The Americans, he says, have lost not only their credibility and their values, but their minds.

 

Invoking Timothy Snyder, Wieliński describes this as the “suicide of a superpower.” Trump didn’t have to start a trade war. He didn’t have to bomb Iran without strategic objectives. He didn’t have to destroy US aid programmes that were the most cost-effective democracy-promotion tool in the world. He didn’t have to cripple NATO or sacrifice Ukraine. He chose to do all of it.

 

Wake up, America! That’s Bartosz Wieliński’s stark message from Warsaw. Don’t lose Europe. Trump will be gone sooner or later. Make sure he hasn’t burned every bridge with Europe before he exits.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       We No Longer Dream of the United States: Wieliński’s generation grew up under communism worshipping America — the land of the dream, the place everyone wanted to reach. Now they confront a different country with a different politics. The Americans, he says, didn’t lose anything. The Poles didn’t lose their innocence. The Americans lost their credibility, their values, and their minds by electing Donald Trump. If anyone lost anything, it was Americans. Not Poles.

 

•       The Suicide of a Superpower: Wieliński invokes Timothy Snyder’s phrase to describe what Trump is doing. The US started a war with Iran without having any strategic objectives. Nobody heard Trump say what his objective was. America had friends, influence, and soft power — US aid was the most cost-effective democracy-promotion tool in the world. It is being deliberately destroyed. NATO was the best investment America ever made: the only time Article Five was invoked was by Europeans, to defend America, after September 11. Crippling NATO means losing Europe, and there is no way back.

 

•       The Dark Enlightenment and Silicon Valley: Wieliński identifies a specific group behind Trump’s project: very rich and powerful people connected to big tech who believe they can reshape politics through platforms, influence behaviour through technology, and create a new technological order — reversing political development back to before the Enlightenment. They call it the dark enlightenment. Europe, he says, rejects it. Europe will defend its societies against that influence.

 

•       The New Division: Democrats vs Anti-Democrats: The key political division everywhere Wieliński looks is no longer between left and right. It is between supporters of democracy and its enemies. In Germany: the AfD at 30%, while the mainstream parties have collapsed from a combined 70% to a combined 35%. In France: the horseshoe theory — far left and far right meeting at the ends of the arc, both willing to work together to dismantle democracy. In Poland: a colourful coalition from right to left defending democracy against PiS. The same coalition will be needed everywhere.

 

•       Wake Up: Don’t Lose Europe: Wieliński’s message to Americans: wake up. You still have friends in Europe. Europeans still want to believe in America as the land of promise and freed

We No Longer Dream of the United States: Bartosz Wieliński on America, Poland, and the Suicide of a Superpower

“If your opening position is: your views are beyond the pale, you are deplorable, there is no space for you in democracy — then how on earth do we expect anything other than revolutionary conservatism as a response?” — Maciej Kisilowski

 

For Americans concerned about the fragility of their democracy, Poland offers some reassuring news. Having experienced its own illiberal blip, democracy in Poland now seems amongst the healthiest in Eastern Europe. So what does a democracy only created in 1989 teach America as the old republic braces for its surreal semiquincentennial celebration?

 

The Vienna-based constitutional scholar Maciej Kisilowski [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lets-agree-on-poland-9780198979562] is the author of Let’s Agree on Poland: A Case Study in Strategic Constitutional Design [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lets-agree-on-poland-9780198979562]. In this bestselling 2025 book, Kisilowski argues that Poland is a map of where other Western democracies could go. If they choose to.

 

Poland elected its first illiberal conservative government in 2005. Hungary followed in 2010. Both explicitly served as models for Donald Trump — relatively tamed in his first term, unshackled in his second. Like the United States, Poland is a relatively rich country with per capita GDP growing an astonishing 650% in a single generation. So, Kisilowski argues, the conventional argument that Poland embraced illiberalism in response to economic hardship is mostly wrong. Instead, what triggered illiberalism in Poland was culture, particularly the compressed, accelerated challenge to traditional identity — national, male, religious — that EU accession triggered in Central Europe.

 

Kisilowski, who teaches at Central European University, might have entitled his book Let’s Agree to Disagree. Poland’s solution to this cultural crisis of identity is what Kisilowski calls “subsidiarity” — genuine decentralisation that allows both conservative communities to remain traditional and liberal cities to become progressive, all within a common democratic framework. He warns both the left and the right that if you tell people their views are somehow foreign, it’s entirely rational for them to want to smash their “foreign” democracy.

 

This is the Polish model of a viable 21st century democracy. Ironically, it’s a Madisonian warning about the dangers of faction. The “deplorable” gambit always backfires. Péter Magyar’s remarkable victory in Hungary — a staunch conservative ending Orbán’s 16-year mafia-style illiberal chapter — offers the Hungarian model of Kisilowski’s argument. So this July 4, worried Americans might read Let’s Agree on Poland. Or reread James Madison.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       Central Europe as the Leading Indicator: Poland and Hungary Before Trump: Poland elected its first revolutionary conservative government in 2005 — sixteen years before the January 6 insurrection. Hungary followed in 2010. Both were explicitly cited as models by the architects of Trump’s political project. Kisilowski’s argument: what happened in Central Europe is not a regional anomaly but a leading indicator of what happens when open society’s challenge to traditional identity is concentrated and rapid rather than gradual. The walls of liberal democratic institutions were weaker in Warsaw and Budapest. They will not hold indefinitely in Washington or London either.

 

•       It’s Not the Economy, Stupid: The Case Against Materialist Explanations: Poland and Hungary are economic opposites. Hungary was the “happiest barrack” of the Soviet bloc but fared poorly after 1989. Poland was among the poorer countries of the bloc and grew 650% in per capita GDP in one generation, with a Gini coefficient below France’s. Same revolutionary con

Let’s Agree to Disagree: Maciej Kisilowski on How to Save Democracy From Deplorables on All Sides

“The Gross National Product measures everything except that which makes life worthwhile.” — Robert F. Kennedy, University of Kansas, March 18, 1968

 

It is June 5, 1968. An eleven-year-old English boy is watching the assassination of Bobby Kennedy on his black and white television. That little boy is Tim Jackson [https://timjackson.org.uk/] — now one of Britain’s most influential critics of capitalism. He had no idea then that RFK would change his life. It happened years later, when Jackson discovered a speech Kennedy gave in Kansas in the spring of 1968. It was a speech that changed the way Tim Jackson thought about economics.

 

The March 1968 speech, one of the first of RFK’s presidential campaign, was delivered at Phog Allen Fieldhouse, University of Kansas. It opened with a joke at the expense of rival Kansas State University. Then Bobby turned deadly serious. For the first time (at least for a Presidential candidate), he attacked the very idea of the Gross National Product itself. RFK argued that GDP quantifies all the worst stuff including air pollution, cigarette advertising and jails. But it doesn’t measure the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It quantifies everything except that which makes life worthwhile. Then fetishizes the data. Worse than wrong, Bobby Kennedy suggested, GDP makes data evil.

 

For Jackson, who has spent his career mulling over the idea of economic growth, RFK’s Phog Allen Fieldhouse speech came as a revelation. Indeed much of his later thinking, including his 2021 award-winning book Post Growth: Life After Capitalism [https://timjackson.org.uk/ecological-economics/postgrowth-book/], is indebted to this March 1968 speech. Almost sixty years later, in our ever-more-quantifiable age of data-centres, it’s a speech that appears uncannily prescient. Both Tim Jackson and Bobby Kennedy are right to remind us that there is an alternative to quantifying progress. There is, indeed, life after GDP. And it can’t be measured.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       An 11-Year-Old Watching the Assassination on His Birthday: Tim Jackson was born on June 4. On the night of June 4–5, 1968, after the California primary, RFK was shot at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. Jackson — watching on a black and white television in the UK — remembers thinking: oh no, not again. His aunt had just sailed for America from Southampton. Is this the country she is going to? Two high-profile assassinations. Violence as a condition of American political life. He had no idea then that RFK would become important to him professionally two or three decades later.

 

•       The Kansas Speech: GDP Measures Everything Except What Makes Life Worthwhile: The speech RFK gave at Phog Allen Fieldhouse, University of Kansas, March 1968 — one of the first of his presidential campaign — opened with a joke at the expense of rival Kansas State University and became one of the most prescient political speeches of the 20th century. Kennedy attacked GDP directly: it counts air pollution, cigarette advertising, and the jails for the people who break the law. It does not count the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile.

 

•       The Two Wrong Turns of Post-War Capitalism: Jackson’s account: fossil fuels made mass production possible; the Great Depression revealed the danger of overproduction; the post-war solution was to persuade people that having more stuff is what matters. Two big mistakes were embedded in that solution. First: material consumption is not all we are — we have social, relational, spiritual needs that GDP ignores. Second: more production does more environmental damage. Both wrong t

Life After GDP: Tim Jackson Returns to 1968 to Excavate a Post-Capitalist Future

“Just 25 literary agents represent more than half of all prizewinning novelists in the 21st century. The agent is the unacknowledged legislator of the literary field.” — Laura McGrath

 

We think of publishers and editors as the ultimate tastemakers. As those godlike gatekeepers controlling what we read. But if you’re looking for literary gods, Laura McGrath [https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691256160/middlemen] argues, then you need to look at literary agents rather than publishers or editors. Her ten-year project, Middlemen: Literary Agents and the Making of American Fiction [https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691256160/middlemen], is the first serious scholarly account of the literary agent’s astonishingly powerful role in shaping what America reads. Except, of course, the Middlemen are actually Middlewomen — since 80% of literary agents are women.

 

The numbers are striking. Just 25 literary agents represent more than half of all prizewinning novelists in the 21st century. McGrath interviewed 75 of them over ten years. Shelley called poets the unacknowledged legislators of the world. McGrath’s agents are the unacknowledged legislators of the literary field. They shaped postmodernism (Candida Donadio and Pynchon, Heller, Gaddis). They launched the debut novel as a literary form. They made the short story collection viable. And 25 of them control more than half of the prizes.

 

So will AI replace the agent? In operations, perhaps, McGrath acknowledges — the slush pile is overwhelming and smart machine assistance is welcome. But in creative work — in the business of writing, editing, translation, cover design, and above all taste — she thinks not. No algorithm will ever learn the Catch-22 of publishing — separating the Thomas Pynchon or Joseph Heller from all the dross. And no bot (male or female) is ever going to host a three-martini lunch in Manhattan.

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       The Literary Agent as the New Gatekeeper: Replacing the Publisher: In the early 20th century, publishing was shaped by the taste of individual publishers: Bennett Cerf at Random House, Alfred and Blanche Knopf at their imprint, Max Perkins at Scribner’s. Those days are over. Publishers are now conglomerates where individual editors may have excellent taste but no single figure shapes the house. Into that vacuum has come the literary agent — who now operates, McGrath argues, exactly as the great publishers once did: as the primary tastemaker, the person whose aesthetic and commercial judgment shapes what America reads.

 

•       25 Agents, Half the Prizes, 80% Women: The Numbers: McGrath’s most striking statistical finding: just 25 literary agents represent more than half of all prizewinning novelists in the 21st century. Twenty-five people. The field is 80% women — hence the tongue-in-cheek title — and 73% white. Agents tend, McGrath found, to represent authors who resemble themselves. One answer to the question “why is contemporary literary fiction so white?” is: because agents are. And agents, because they work on contingency fees rather than salaries, face severe financial pressures that concentrate power at the top of the profession.

 

•       The Unacknowledged Legislators: Agents Shaped American Literary History: McGrath’s book is full of literary history rewritten from the agent’s perspective. Sterling Lord persisted past dozens of rejections to place On the Road for Kerouac. Candida Donadio — Pynchon’s, Heller’s, Gaddis’s, and early Philip Roth’s agent — championed maximalist, experimental writers whom no one was interested in, and built the social network of editor relationships that made postmodernism possible. The debut novel as a cultural form, the persistence of the short story collection d

Middlewomen: Laura McGrath on the 25 People Who Control American Fiction

“AI companies are taking advantage of our natural tendency to ascribe an inner life to our interlocutors. They profit when you think the chatbot cares.” — Kate O’Neill

 

If we don’t like someone, we call them a fascist. And if we like them, we say they are a humanist. The F and H words. Both meaningless in our sloppy, bot-infested age. But maybe I’m just a cranky anti-humanist. Even anti-human — whatever that means.

 

Or maybe I’m being harsh (moi?). Humanism certainly is all the rage in our AI age. Corporate consultant Kate O’Neill [https://www.koinsights.com/] likes the word so much that she has built her brand around it. The self-styled “Tech Humanist” is the author of Tech Humanist [https://www.wiley.com/en-us/What+Matters+Next%3A+A+Leader%27s+Guide+to+Making+Human-Friendly+Tech+Decisions+in+a+World+That%27s+Moving+Too+Fast-p-00431772], the host of the Tech Humanist Show [https://www.thetechhumanist.com/], and a frequent speaker on the TED circuit.

 

So how to use the H word without sounding like Claude or ChatGPT? O’Neill argues that what makes us human is our quest for meaning. The M word. That’s what distinguishes us from the bots. But as Kazuo Ishiguro warns in Klara and the Sun, we are fast arriving at a point when the bots are better than us at extracting meaning from the world.

 

So did Kate O’Neill pass the Keen Test (reverse of Turing)? Did the Tech Humanist say anything that would have eluded Claude? Or have we already arrived at Ishiguro's bleak terminus where the bots are more skilled at infusing the H word with meaning than we are?

 

Five Takeaways

 

•       What Is Tech Humanism? Aligning Business and Human Outcomes: O’Neill’s definition: technology shapes human experiences at scale, and it does so almost always in service of a business objective that is accelerating its advance. The purpose of tech humanism is to find the business objectives that need to be met and align them with human outcomes that are rewarding and fulfilling for people. This means using technology to amplify the alignment between business and human outcomes — rather than simply making the business more successful. It is, she acknowledges, not the habit of most business leaders. But it is a habit that can be developed.

 

•       You Sound Like a Bot: Andrew’s Challenge: Andrew’s opening challenge: O’Neill sounds exactly like a well-prompted language model. She uses the h word (humanism) and the m word (meaning). What is she saying that Claude couldn’t say? O’Neill’s answer: meaning is not a word but a phenomenon. It is what emerges from the combination of embodied sensory experience and language — the way humans encode meaningful experiences with language in their brains. As far as we know, this is a uniquely human capability. Machines process information statistically. Humans process it meaningfully. That distinction is, she argues, precisely the gap that matters.

 

•       AI Companies Profit When You Think the Chatbot Cares: O’Neill’s sharpest observation: we are constituted to look for inner life in the things we interact with. We give nicknames to our cars and talk to our toasters. At this early stage of interacting with large language models, it is entirely natural to assume there is a consciousness on the other side. The problem: AI companies are actively taking advantage of that natural tendency. They profit from it. The more people believe the chatbot genuinely understands them, the more they use it. That manipulation is real and it is working. Developing critical thinking about AI interactions is, O’Neill argues, now a form of self-defence.

 

•       The Intersection of Meaning and Scale: O’Neill’s key contribution to the tech humanism conversation: the problem with

What Makes Us Human? Kate O’Neill on the H Word, Verbal Slop, and the Meaning of Tech Humanism

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