Transcript
Speaker: One of my favorite things about Enlightenment era philosophers is how excited they were about the power of reason, how hopeful they were about it. Immanuel Kant himself said that they were drunk on reason, that they really thought that you can get perfect knowledge of the world, right? And and Kant, of course, tried his best to sober things up, but maybe he was also drunk on reason, right?
Speaker: Kant believed in moral perfection. Sure, we had to believe in a couple of things and think in a particular way that he told us how to do.
Speaker: But once you do all that, you can achieve moral perfections. Be like the angels, right? That's what you can do. Maybe, or maybe not, maybe from our perspective today, that all seems a little bit too pie in the sky, maybe even a little naive.
Speaker: What we are worrying about today is this.
Speaker: Given these two ethical theories that we've spent quite a bit of time on, We are at a crossroads. We cannot be both Kantians and utilitarians.
Speaker: Kant developed his moral theory in a way that jived with, in a way, kind of, science, right? It made room for both belief in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God and ah freedom of the will and the moral law and science, right? He gave every...
Speaker: Everyone has a part. The utilitarians, well, it's not quite as ambitious of a project, but John Stuart Mill definitely gives us a moral theory that he says he says can really help us shape society in a better way.
Speaker: And so the fact is, though, they have diametrically opposed methods. Of course, one is deontology, that is the method of Kant, and the other side uses consequentialism.
Speaker: So today, we have to decide. And how are we going to decide? i think what I'll do is I'll give you some pretty serious problems with both of them.
Speaker: Now, I'm going to really focus on Kant because I gave so much time to lovingly explain all the details of Kant's philosophy.
Speaker: And because by covering ah critique of Kant, it really takes us through a quick little historical survey of what people after Kant said about his philosophy So we'll focus on Kant, but of course, toward the end, we'll also look at some issues with utilitarianism and maybe by the end of it, you can try to make up your mind.
Speaker: Okay.
Speaker: Let's begin with the romantics now. The romantics were around during Kant's own lifetime. And so we've already mentioned them briefly, but to remind you,
Speaker: They argued that emotion, creativity, and even a mystical reverence for the natural world, these all matter too, not just reason, logic, and science.
Speaker: Now, their fight against the Enlightenment Thinker's Method started during Kant's life, And they claimed that enlightenment thinkers and Kant, they just overemphasized reason.
Speaker: And they said instead that emotion and our creative intuition, these are also necessary for discovering truth, maybe be even more necessary.
Speaker: So stop trying to get us to only use reason, all you enlightenment thinkers. We should also make room for some of the more subjective expressions of the human mind.
Speaker: In the realm of morality, the Romantics made a really interesting point. They basically said that good deeds done out of duty the way that Kant wants us to do things, that's just cold and mechanical. If someone does something nice for you, it's kind of weird if they were to tell you, I did it out of respect for the moral law.
Speaker: That just sounds not um you know endearing at all. It's best to act out of love, say the romantics. Speaking of science, by the way, today we can say that there is actually good empirical evidence that all those things that the romantics were harping on about are actually pretty good in terms of good deeds.
Speaker: Emotion, creativity, and awe of natural wonder, these all lead to greater pro-sociality. What is pro-sociality? We have talked about it before, but basically whenever you do deeds that are good for others, good for the group, good for society, these are all pro-social behaviors. And we talked about these in the context of Kant's moral philosophy.
Speaker: Kant said that there's lots of reasons why you might you know perform some good deeds, but good deeds in and of themselves aren't morally good behaviors.
Speaker: It's only a moral behavior when it comes out of respect for the moral law. So Kant would say, yeah, you know, emotion might make you do good deeds and all, but that's not really morality.
Speaker: The romantics might say, who cares where it comes from? If emotion, creativity, and like just respect for nature, if these make you do good things, good. You know, let's get more of that on here. We don't need it to, strictly speaking, be called morality.
Speaker: I'd like to highlight two of the books listed here in particular, What's Wrong with Morality by Daniel Batson. In that book, Batson argues that it looks like empathy is one of the more powerful drivers of pro-social actions, not moral principles. So whereas Kant would emphasize moral duty and moral principle, ah that they don't seem to do much. It seems to be the case that feelings, especially empathy, are ah much greater drivers of good deeds for other people.
Speaker: And there's also this book by Keltner called Awe. And it looks like awe makes you feel small, but small in a tolerable way, right? You kind of feel like there's so much beyond you. You're you're part of a much bigger picture.
Speaker: Well, that minimizes the self and that leads to greater prosociality. In other words, you act for the benefit of others because you see yourself as less important or maybe a better way to put it is that there's less of a difference between you and others. So doing good for others feels like doing good for yourself and you just do more of it.
Speaker: In any case, there are good reasons to emphasize emotion, creativity, and awe of natural wonder into your life. Incorporate more of that into your life. And so you should do it.
Speaker: Give it a try. More objections to Kant. Hegel, Mill, and Nietzsche. We are going from the late 1800s into 1900.
Speaker: nineteen hundred that is when Nietzsche dies. And so, yeah let's talk about Hegel first. Hegel is a very severe looking individual.
Speaker: And what Hegel is going to talk about is Kant's idea that moral judgments should be made independently of the phenomenal realm, the realm of things as we see them.
Speaker: Hegel famously argued that the categorical imperative is too abstract to determine concrete moral duties on its own. In other words, what Hegel is trying to say there is if you only use a categorical imperative, that's actually not gonna get you to any moral conclusions because it's not sufficiently, you know, it doesn't have enough to work with basically.
Speaker: And so what he adds is that what you really need to develop the kinds of duties that Kant develops is actually knowledge or substantive facts about human institutions, social practices, and the circumstances in which people act. In other words,
Speaker: If you want to know whether a maxim can genuinely be universalized, basically the project that Kant said he was trying to work on, then you need to know how humans work, what they do, the kind of institutions that they build.
Speaker: And all of those come from the phenomenal realm. So you need actually to know certain things from the phenomenal realm to really actually test whether a maxim is universalizable.
Speaker: This brings us to Mill. Mill really was the leading utilitarian of the 19th century. in the 20th century, we have some other figures that arise and kind of take that mantle. But Mill really is championing the consequentialist cause against Kant.
Speaker: And what Mill says against Kant is that Kant actually is secretly relying on consequences. When Kant is using his universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, he's asking basically, what if everyone did this? Would I still be able to do the thing that I want to do if everyone did that thing?
Speaker: And, you know, what Mill wants to say is really what Kant is thinking about is consequences. And it's maybe sort of more obvious now that we covered Mill's moral philosophy. Here is a line from Mill. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.
Speaker: That is philosophical speak for saying, look The guy who says he's doing deontology and that he says that he's never using the phenomenal realm to form his moral conclusions, he's lying.
Speaker: He really is thinking about consequences. So J.S. Mill there basically telling us that Kant is actually a consequentialist. You should be a consequentialist too. Now let's move on to Nietzsche.
Speaker: Nietzsche here with a very imposing mustache was a German philosopher and he had some different views, but by the time that he got to his mature stage, he argued ah against quite a few um of kant's aspects of Kant's moral philosophy.
Speaker: But we're going to focus on Kant's division of the phenomenal realm, what we perceive, and the quote-unquote true reality of the noumenal realm, the world as it really is. Nietzsche argued that it makes no sense to talk about a true reality completely beyond all possible perspective.
Speaker: And the way we're going to figure out this argument from Nietzsche is by thinking about apples. Apples are delicious after all. To think about an object, say an apple, we must think of it from some point of view. So every act of knowing involves a subject. There is a person, me, looking at this apple from a particular point in space at a particular point in time.
Speaker: And here I am looking at the side of this, um I don't know, it looks like an MV apple. So here it is. And thinking about objects always requires some subjective perspective. This means there is no such thing as a view from nowhere.
Speaker: Try to think about this apple as, you know, from no perspective, a view from nowhere. It's not possible. All you can do is change your perspective. Here I am looking at this apple at a different time from a different angle and something definitely happened to the apple. It was sliced in half, but I'm still looking at it from my subjective point of view, a particular angle, a but particular point in time. There is no such thing as viewing something or thinking about something.
Speaker: in a perspective-less way. If something is described as a world of objects seen from no perspective at all, it's actually not clear what that even means.
Speaker: Nietzsche would say, that's not even an intelligible thought. I don't even have an image for this. How would I show you an object from from no perspective at all? doesn't make any sense.
Speaker: And so, of course, Kant's true world That's exactly what it's supposed to be. Not seen from any perspective, not experienced by any subject, independent of human cognition, right? Not accessible in any way.
Speaker: Well, Nietzsche's verdict is a world beyond all perspective is not a higher truth. It's actually a meaningless idea. So that is Nietzsche's argument against basically the starting point of Kant's metaphysics, right? there's There's two different realms. And so if you reject that that very fact, then we begin to ah collapse the Kantian project. Remember, that's how he got free will. And eventually that's how he got morality and belief in God and all that. So this is a a big attack, a major attack on Immanuel Kant's whole system of philosophy.
Speaker: But Nietzsche doesn't finish there. Nietzsche goes further. He actually talks a lot about Kant. He calls Kant an idiot to at a certain point. I'm not going to get into that here.
Speaker: But Nietzsche also rejected the idea of pure reason, this idea that you can Think in a way that is totally separated from any of your preferences and any of your past empirical observations. Away from all that, just pure reason by itself, Nietzsche says, that is totally not a thing.
Speaker: And funnily enough, modern neuroscience supports Nietzsche's position. It turns out that there is no neat division between the regions of the brain associated with reasoning and those regions of the brain having to do with emotional processing.
Speaker: Let me say that in a simpler way. The way the brain works does not lend itself for there to exist something like pure reason. It's all mixed up and interconnected.
Speaker: And so that is actually something that we can definitely emphasize. It's all interconnected. But maybe the deeper and slightly more interesting point is that it actually only functions optimally in this way. It only works, in other words, when it's all interconnected.
Speaker: And so even if having you know pure reason was possible, ah given our brain, you wouldn't want it. It actually works better, the brain does, when it's all interconnected.
Speaker: Let me give you an example of this to try to persuade you. And yes, there are cases where where due to neurological damage, some individuals have diminished input from the emotional processing parts of their brain.
Speaker: So let me talk about the very famous cases, Phineas Gage, who had like ah some kind of steel bar ah shot through his eye or cheek or something, and it kind of hurt the ah the emotional processing region of his brain. So Antonio Damasio, author of Descartes' Error, the book here on the screen, he talks about Phineas Gage, but more so he talks about his own patience. And, you know, they all have damage to this particular part of the brain, the part that processes emotions.
Speaker: I'll explain later on what exactly that part of the brain does. But if you get damage to a particular part of your brain, you will feel less emotion. That's sort of the point that I'm trying to make here.
Speaker: And, you know, if you are maybe a Kantian fan, you would say, awesome. If you can like, you know, basically knock out that part of your brain, the emotional part of your brain, you'd get pure reason and you'd be like, you know, basically a perfect Kantian moral exemplar. You can, ah you know, be totally free from, you your preferences and your inclinations and your desires and just think and arrive at perfectly sound moral conclusions and be a perfectly good moral person. Wouldn't that be awesome? That is so not what ends up happening when you have damage to the emotional processing parts of your brain.
Speaker: Instead, you get social dysfunction. You basically stop being able to, um you know, I don't want to say be normal, but a bunch of things that you really don't want in your life. One of them that Antonio Damasio details about one of his patients is chronic indecisiveness. You couldn't pick, like, for example, what pen to use. What is that about?
Speaker: Compulsive behaviors. You get some desire and you just, ah that's what you do. You don't even... um You don't even stop yourself from from doing it. And maybe the ah the more more expected one, a lack of empathy. In other works, maybe in this one too, Damasio talks about acquired sociopathy.
Speaker: Basically, if you knock out certain parts of your brain or they don't work for some reason, then you you're just really kind of a ah more cold, unhelpful, uncooperative, rude person.
Speaker: And they, all all these patients or many of these patients, it was said of them that they weren't the same person after their brain damage, which of course kind of makes sense, right? But um so there you go. Even if you could ah be a a pure reasoner by like, you know, selectively damaging some part of your brain, you wouldn't want to do it because it actually wouldn't lead you to be ah a perfect Kantian moral philosopher, right?
Speaker: So that's ah really interesting. I do want to do a quick sidebar because I just can't help myself basically, but there's, you know, obviously it's a little bit tongue in cheek to to say, hey,
Speaker: you can actually ah just knock out a part of your brain and and you'd have pure reason all of a sudden, right? That's a little unfair to Kant. Kant, of course, emphasized developing our moral views and really thinking about it and it involved philosophizing. And so,
Speaker: You know, ah brain damage is not a very fair ah ah counter to Kantian moral project. And so I have something that I think is a little bit more fair and it still doesn't work out in Kant's favor.
Speaker: There are some people, my friends, who have trained to be more, you know, more like pure reasoners, more like what Kant wanted ah wanted us to be.
Speaker: So through ah meditation and reading their ah Buddhist theory, Buddhist monks have, you know, learned to become less emotionally reactive.
Speaker: So maybe we can't be, you know, have pure reason because that's just um not how the brain works. But maybe we can arrive at purer reason, you know, just more rational than emotional. Right.
Speaker: And that is exactly what some Buddhists do, right? Not every Buddhist is a Buddhist monk and not all all of them agree on this philosophy, but at least some Buddhist monks exactly work on this skill, being less emotionally reactive. And so now the question is, does that mean that they end up agreeing with all of Kant's moral conclusions?
Speaker: If it really was the case that pure reason led Kant to his moral conclusions, and these Buddhist monks are also kind of working in that pure-ish reason kind of space, they should also be Kantian, right?
Speaker: Well, unfortunately for Kant, no, they are typically not Kantian in their moral outlook. I'll give you a couple of differences. You can read this book here by Jay Garfield and and try to get some other differences between Buddhist ethics and Kantian moral philosophy. But here, let me give you three.
Speaker: First of all, Buddhists um of a particular type, they believe that morality needs to consider context. This is so very un-Kantian. For Kant, there is a moral law and it applies to everyone at all times.
Speaker: There is no thinking about context here. But Buddhists of certain traditions, they do take into consideration context. You know, there might it might be the case that Buddhist monks have one set of rules that apply to them, but Buddhists that aren't monks have their own set of rules. Or it might be the case that sometimes you can bend a rule because it actually is the more empathetic thing to do.
Speaker: And so context really matters to Buddhists. This is one that really clashes with Kantian moral philosophy. Buddhists believe that moral value comes from our perceptions when we learn to see no distinction between ourselves and others.
Speaker: So this rhymes with what we just learned about the romantics and about awe in the natural world, which basically makes you see less of a difference between yourself and others.
Speaker: Well, Buddhists believe that through enough meditation and reflecting on Buddhist philosophy, You will learn to see others as not different than you. And so when you behave for others, you behave in in a weird way for yourself, or you behave for, you know, all...
Speaker: living creatures, right? You become more compassionate toward the world. But the key here is that it's in the way that you see people. And Kant, of course, says what you see, what you perceive, that has nothing to do with it. All your moral conclusions ought to come from pure reason itself. So there is another place where Buddhist ethics and Kantian moral philosophy clash. One more.
Speaker: Buddhists literally train themselves to have compassion. It's called, I'm going to probably mispronounce it, Metta, I think is how they pronounce it. It's a Metta meditation.
Speaker: And the whole idea here is that you sort of train yourself to ah have positive feelings toward not only other individuals, but maybe eventually toward the whole of sentient creation, So the main point that I want to make here is that Kant totally said the opposite. He said that you should just use reason to become morally perfect or to work on um recognizing your moral duties. Compassion, not only did it not play a role, but he told you to not use it.
Speaker: And so that is just, you know, another point that I wanted to make here is that it's not clear that a pure reason as even a thing, but we're also making ah a more subtle point.
Speaker: It's not clear that whatever pure reason is, even if it you know ah doesn't exist exactly in the way that Kant mentioned, but it's not clear that that's actually what led ah Kant to his views. Because other people that use something like pure reason, like Buddhist monks,
Speaker: They don't arrive at the same conclusions as Kant. Let me just do one more devilish comparison just because I'm really, I'm mean and I can't help myself.
Speaker: It has to do with psychopaths and ah it's, you know, it's kind of funny. The literature on psychopathy is very interesting. And Kevin Dutton is one of the researchers in this domain. And his big thing is that what a psychopath really is, isn't necessarily someone that wants to like hurt people.
Speaker: It's that they have ah less emotional experiences. They just don't feel as hard as the rest of us. And in some people, this does lead them to do horrible things.
Speaker: But Dutton says there's also like functional psychopaths. They can actually do things that are good for society because they don't feel feelings as hard as they as the rest of us.
Speaker: So one example this might be a surgeon, right? ah Surgery requires you slicing into people. And I totally can't do that. I would freak out. I can't even like pull a splinter off my wife's skin, right? Because it hurts her and I stop. When someone's hurting, I stop hurting them.
Speaker: ah But ah of course, if you are a surgeon, you have to just you know go in there. And it's ultimately obviously good for the person to go through the surgery or it's maybe the best option for them.
Speaker: And the whole point that Dutton is making is that this kind of job is best done by a psychopath, someone who can remain cool during during really intense situations.
Speaker: Okay, why do I say all of this? Well, basically, a psychopath is someone who can reason and they have less emotional intensity in their reasoning, right? Because they can't feel as hard.
Speaker: So psychopaths are also, i don't want to say unfeeling reasoners, but like purer reasoners, right? Kind of like as close as we can get to Kantian moral philosophers. They separate their feelings and their preferences as much as they can from their rationalizing.
Speaker: Okay, well, does that mean that psychopaths are, you know, they tend to go Kantian when it comes to their moral judgments? um First of all, you might think that that's a joke and because you think of psychopaths as killers or whatever. But again, remember, in this way of thinking about psychopaths, they're not all necessarily killers. In fact, some of them might do things that are good for society, like surgery, like I just mentioned. So when we do evaluations of ah psychopaths, are they more Kantian or are they more utilitarian?
Speaker: Well, you would imagine that they're more Kantian because Kant says from pure reason, you can arrive at moral conclusions and psychopaths are, you know, purer reasoners, less emotion in there.
Speaker: But it turns out, no, psychopaths have a preference for utilitarian moral judgments. And so there it is, one more strike against Immanuel Kant's claims about pure reason.
Speaker: In summary, a it probably doesn't exist. And B, the closest thing to it, purer reason, ah that doesn't actually get you to Kant's moral conclusions.
Speaker: Buddhists don't end up agreeing perfectly with with what Kant said about morality. And neither do psychopaths, which is, ah you know, just, I couldn't help myself.
Speaker: I'm sorry.
Speaker: Let's move into our third objection here against Kant. And let me remind you that this is sort of a historical survey, right? The Romantics were around in the eighteen hundreds ah early that's when the movement began. Hegel and Mill were around in the later eighteen hundred s Nietzsche died in 1900, although his last published work was about but a decade before that.
Speaker: And now we're moving into the 20th century with the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle is, um they're not homogenous. They have lots of different views, but they did sort of gang up on Kant and they said a lot of things against Kant.
Speaker: ah First of all, they argued that there is no such thing as synthetic a priori knowledge, which is what Kant claims to be what morality is.
Speaker: The Vienna Circle also argued against the existence of pure reason, I should mention. And for our purposes, what we'll be focusing on today is the Vienna Circle's members of the Vienna Circle's claim that moral judgments aren't true or false at all.
Speaker: So there is nothing for pure reason to discover. This view, again, not everyone in the Vienna Circle had it. And really, it was actually after the Vienna Circle ended where this view kind of became even more popular. But the Vienna Circle has something to do with the following view. Non- none Cognitivism. All right. What in the world is non-cognitivism? It's the view that although moral judgments appear to be factual statements, in other words, descriptive sentences that are either true or false,
Speaker: They are actually expressions of our feelings or attitudes, or maybe they're commands which aren't true or false. Let me say that in a much, much simpler way.
Speaker: There's descriptive statements. And there is, you know, exclamations and commands or imperatives. These are just different types of sentences.
Speaker: And we typically think that moral judgments are are descriptive statements, right? They just say some fact, right? And it's either true or false. Something like, what do I what do i want to say here Parents have the moral right to raise their children however they want.
Speaker: that sounds that's a you know That contains a moral judgment and it sounds like it's either true or false. But really what the non-cognitivist would say is that that's actually just expressing your attitudes about child rearing. Or it's a weird way of saying a command. I'll give you that later.
Speaker: But in short, moral judgments are less like Garcia is less than six foot tall and more like Garcia rocks. right Garcia is less than six foot tall. That's either true or false.
Speaker: And ah that's what moral judgments sound like. But they're not like that. They're more like Garcia rocks, which is really just feelings. And so that's what non-cognitivists try to argue, each in their own unique and special way.
Speaker: That moral judgments are simply feelings. feelings being expressed in a linguistically ambiguous way, but it's just feelings.
Speaker: So let me give you a mini history of non-cognitivism. Maybe, arguably, it starts with David Hume. Hume argued that if moral judgments came from reason, then that means reason has the power to motivate actions.
Speaker: Just think about that for a second. If you think something is really, really wrong to do, you're likely to not do it. And so that means that reason, if they you know if it really does produce our moral judgments, can make you do things.
Speaker: But Hume says, reason doesn't actually motivate our actions. Only emotions motivate our actions. If I wanna do something, let me put it another way.
Speaker: If I do something, it's really mostly because I wanted to do it. I have a desire. I feel like doing it. You can give me all the reasons in the world, but if I don't wanna do something, I'm not gonna do it. So ultimately, it is emotion actually that makes you do things.
Speaker: Which means if moral judgments make you do things, it's more likely that they come from emotion instead of reason, right? Moral judgments don't come from reason alone. It seems to be the case that there's a little bit of emotion mixed in there.
Speaker: That's Hume's argument against, well, I don't want to say against Kant because Hume was around before Kant, but ah basically it works against Kantian moral philosophy.
Speaker: Then quite a few years later comes the Vienna Circle. One of the members of the Vienna Circle was Rudolf Carnap, and he argued that because moral statements cannot be empirically tested or proven by definition, they lack cognitive meaning. What was the example I gave earlier? um Parents have a moral right to raise their children however they see fit.
Speaker: Can you do an experiment that proves that right or wrong? I'll wait. Okay, my guess is no. You can't think of an experiment that could possibly prove that either right or wrong.
Speaker: And of course, it's not true by definition. no one thinks about the definition of parenthood and thinks to themselves, you can do whatever you want to your children. And so here's what basically the Vienna Circle or members of the Vienna Circle would say.
Speaker: There's either science or logic and moral judgments fall into neither category. And as such, they don't have any cognitive meaning. They're meaningless. Or we might even say they're nonsense.
Speaker: Okay. There's another step up the non-cognitivist ladder. Then comes emotivism. A.J. Ayer, ah he argued basically something like, you know, when you say stealing is wrong, you're not really saying something that's true or false, you're more so saying something like stealing, boo, like, hey, don't steal. he's You're trying to manipulate others, ah namely their emotions, to make it so that they don't steal.
Speaker: That's emotivism, who in Ayer, by the way, was involved with the Vienna Circle. Finally comes R.M. Herr, and his view is called prescriptivism or universal prescriptivism.
Speaker: And he said Ayer was like half right. Yes, we do seek to influence the emotions of others with our moral statements, but he said that it's a little bit more than that too. We are also issuing commands that we want everyone to abide by.
Speaker: So when you say stealing is wrong, what you're really saying is, nobody steal, me included. Right. So there's a little bit of emotion there, but also there's a command there.
Speaker: It's like, hey, no one steal. I want all of you to listen to me. So that is ah the trajectory of non-cognitivism. Let me just now pull it together and tell you why this is a problem for Kant.
Speaker: In terms of the beginning of the 20th century, the first half of the 20th century, the Vienna Circle was very, very influential. And they said that there's only two kinds of meaningful statements. Everything else is just, you know, poppycock, just nonsense.
Speaker: and so If you are doing serious philosophy, your statements must be of these two kinds. Either they're true by definition, or some kind of logical truth, or they're testable by observation. In other words, they're some bit of science that we've discovered.
Speaker: Well, moral judgments are neither. And so they seem to be some kind of nonsense. Now let's remember that Kant famously argued for a third kind of statement, synthetic a priori, a substantive truth known by a reason alone, independent of experience. We spent a whole lesson explaining that, so I won't go over it again here But of course, the Vienna Circle basically is saying those things don't exist.
Speaker: And so if there is no synthetic a priori knowledge, then pure reason has no moral truths to find. Let me put it another way. Even if there were something like pure reason, there's no moral truth for it to discover.
Speaker: and Moral judgments aren't even true or false in the first place. So the whole Kantian picture is all messed up. I should add, by the way, and this also cuts against Mill's utilitarianism.
Speaker: On this kind of view, the principle of utility isn't true or false either. But of course, we are currently focusing on Kant. So I will leave the utilitarians for later.
Speaker: Okay, that was a tough one, but let me try to just summarize the points I made on the Vienna Circle as follows. A, they said, even though I don't have it here on the slides, they said there's no such thing as pure reason.
Speaker: But B, even if there were, there is no such thing as synthetic a priori knowledge. And so there is no such thing as moral truth that you can discover ah from pure reason.
Speaker: And c the last thing, Some members of the Vienna Circle argued that moral judgments are not even the kinds of sentences that can be true or false. They seem like it, but they're actually more so an expression of our feelings and emotions.
Speaker: So many, many points there against Kantian moral philosophy by various members of the Vienna Circle. Let's move into our final objection on Kant and it is this.
Speaker: Some people, including Joshua Green and Eric Schwitzgabel, are today, these people are around today, arguing that Kant's moral philosophy is mostly rationalization.
Speaker: emotional intuitions dressed up as pure reason. They are saying, in other words, that Kant didn't derive at his views from pure reason, actually emotion and his upbringing had more to do with it. And then he just came up with a nice story to justify his pre-existing beliefs. Of course, that is known as confirmation bias. So that's really what Kant was doing. And so let's take a look at this argument.
Speaker: Let's begin with the work of Joshua Green. Joshua Green is both a philosopher and a psychologist, and he kind of made his name by getting people to ah jump into claustrophobia inducing machines known as fMRI machines.
Speaker: so that he can map out their brain when they were performing various judgments. And of course, the most interesting thing that he worked on are moral judgments and the kind of um scenario he would make people work on is actually very famous now. It's called a trolley dilemma.
Speaker: I'm sure you've heard of these. Here is one situation. There are five people and they are tied to a track and there's a runaway trolley and it's gonna hit those five people, but you're standing right next to a lever. And if you were to pull it, the runaway trolley would go down a side track and it wouldn't hit those five people, but it would. hit one unsuspecting bystander.
Speaker: And so the question is, what do you do? Do you pull the lever and save the five, sacrificing the one? Or do you not pull the lever and you just let the five people die?
Speaker: Most people, by the way, i Say they would pull the lever and spare the five people even though one person dies. And of course, there's various versions of this trolley dilemma.
Speaker: Joshua Green also asked people the crying baby dilemma. And I think it's from a show called MASH. I've actually never seen this show. But I think it's set in Korea ah during the Korean War.
Speaker: I'm probably wrong about all these things. But the crying baby dilemma goes something like this. There are ah enemy soldiers and you are hiding from them with several other people.
Speaker: and you are holding a baby and this baby starts to whimper a little bit and you know the baby is about to start crying. If the baby cries, you will be caught and you and your companions will all be put to death.
Speaker: So, One option that you have is to essentially not let your child make any noises, which entails, unfortunately, smothering it, right? So you kill your own baby, but in doing so, you actually save the lives of yourself and all your companions.
Speaker: Anyway, I'm saying all this because i need you to know what Joshua Green was asking people when they were in the fMRI machine. And he wanted to know...
Speaker: you know Depending on how they decide, what part of the brain is more active? right So let's just say that someone said, you know i can't pull the lever, I can't hurt people like that.
Speaker: um What part of the brain was more active when they you know made that decision? Or I can't smother my baby, i wouldn't be able to do that kind of thing. What part of the brain was most active when that happened?
Speaker: So all these dilemmas, you can kind of divide them into a Kantian side and a utilitarian side. The utilitarian would say, hey, you can sacrifice someone for the greater good. You can sacrifice that one person on the track for the five people because five is greater than one.
Speaker: Or you can sacrifice your baby for all your companions. Let's just say it's 10 people because 10 lives is worth more than one. So the utilitarian argument is like, hey, sometimes you have to sacrifice. That's okay. It's for the greater good. The Kantian side might be something like never harm innocence.
Speaker: And that means, of course, that you would not be able to sacrifice the baby or the person on the track. And so Green tried to figure out... um Which parts of the brain were more active when people made Kantian type moral judgments or what appeared to be Kantian type moral judgments? Things like never harm others or never harm innocence or never take life willingly or something like that, right?
Speaker: It turns out that the people that may that had those kinds of moral conclusions, or maybe a more careful way of saying it, is that the people that ended up deciding something that aligns with Kant's moral conclusions, those subjects tended to have greater activation of the ventral medial prefrontal cortex. Let me say all that one more time.
Speaker: All of these thought experiments have a Kantian and a utilitarian decision or conclusion. And Green looked at the people who had the Kantian adjacent conclusions, the the conclusions that line up with Kant's moral philosophy. And he saw what they all had in common. And it turns out that they had this part of the brain, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, the most active that's just kind of the part that was really ah going off what does the vmpfc even do well it is in charge of emotional processing we actually were talking about it earlier when we were mentioning the work of antonio damasio
Speaker: And what it does is it modulates the activity ah of the evolutionarily older parts of the brain so that they can communicate with the newer parts. So what does this mean for Immanuel Kant? Well, Joshua Green concluded that Kantian type judgments are surprisingly largely emotional.
Speaker: Let me say that again in a slightly different way. The people that had moral conclusions or conclusions about those scenarios that we talked about that line up with Kant's way of looking at what we're supposed to do, all those people had greater activation of the emotional part of the brain.
Speaker: And so ah how can we square this circle, right? Didn't Kant say that he arrived at his views from pure reason? Well, Green says, well, Kant's theory is just, you know, window dressing.
Speaker: He just said a bunch of stuff, but it seems like he was just really in tune with probably his upbringing and his, he he was raised Christian, very hardcore Christian pietist. And so that's where Kant's moral conclusions really come from.
Speaker: and he had those thoughts. you know strongly held convictions, Christian convictions. And he found some theoretical, philosophical theory by which he can justify those beliefs. That's what Green says, at least. Let me...
Speaker: further elucidate Green's work here. um Patients with damage to that part of the brain, the VMPFC, make more utilitarian judgments, which makes perfect sense, right? If that's a part of the brain that makes Kantian judgments, and then you damage that part of the brain, then the utilitarians have no competition, right? And so you end up making more utilitarian moral judgments.
Speaker: And these people faced with dilemmas like the crying baby, they are just far more willing to sacrifice one person to save many. And so there you go, you have a Kantian part of the brain and a utilitarian part of the brain, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Speaker: And if you knock one of those out, you end up being more the other way, right? That makes sense. And this brings us to a point that I made earlier where it seems like pure reason wasn't what got Kant to his views, but it must have been something else, right? Otherwise, Buddhist monks would have similar views as Kant.
Speaker: and This is actually jiving perfectly with that. If you reduce the brain's emotional input, people don't become Kantians. It's not like if you get rid of emotions, you suddenly become a Kantian. Actually, quite the opposite. You become utilitarian.
Speaker: This is absolutely mind-blowing. What is going on here? Kant had this super complicated philosophical framework explaining how we arrive at fundamental moral truth through pure reason.
Speaker: And then there's a bunch of science that shows that if you get rid of emotion and, you know, what what does that leave? Reason. You aren't a Kantian in the end. You're more utilitarian.
Speaker: wow, this is this is crazy. It seems like we have been able to fully divorce Kant's moral conclusions from the idea of pure reason. He said pure reason took him to moral truth, but that doesn't seem to be the case.
Speaker: Kant has some egg on his face. And hey, on the one hand, We can't say, hey Kant, you should have known better.
Speaker: he was around 200 years ago, right? That's a long time. And so um we can't fault him for not knowing how a psychology was going to shake out.
Speaker: um But one thing that we can do is provide arguments against his philosophical framework. And that's exactly what people are beginning to do.
Speaker: They're going to go ahead and say that what Kant really did is that he already had his moral views and views about other stuff, which we'll talk about in a second. And he just found a way to justify them.
Speaker: In other words, Kantian philosophy is actually maybe in large part just an exercise in confirmatory thinking. It's confirmation bias at work.
Speaker: Okay, let's make this argument. let me give you some context. Kant grew up Pietist. The Pietists were a Protestant reform movement that emphasized personal faith, devotion, and please note, a strict sense of duty.
Speaker: Okay, duty. That's what Kant is always talking about. What else do we need to know for context? Kant was a pioneer of scientific racism.
Speaker: I put that in scare quotes because it's not very scientific at all. um Okay, so those are two factoids you have to know about the man. Now here ah here is a factoid that you have to know about our minds.
Speaker: Some scholars believe that our ability to reason is an adaptation that evolved specifically to help us defend our views.
Speaker: What does that mean? Confirmation bias is a feature of our cognition. It's not a bug. We think that it's like this thing that we have that's bad and we have to get rid of.
Speaker: And maybe it is bad because it doesn't help us think clearly sometimes. But some people are saying, some scholars are saying that it evolved for a good reason. We have to be able to defend ourselves. In our evolutionary history,
Speaker: We lived in groups, right? We were hunter-gatherers. And if we did something wrong or kind of ticked someone off, we have to be able to defend our views and our actions because if we get kicked out of the group, we're basically dead, right? It's not like today.
Speaker: Back in those days, if you didn't have a group, You were a goner. And so confirmation bias evolved so that when we mess up or do something that didn't turn out too well, we can say, hey, here here's the did it. And it's okay, i was doing my best and whatever other reasons you're gonna give, you're always gonna be able to give your side of the story.
Speaker: You'll tell a tale that makes you look good or at least not as bad. That's what reason is for. And so if you believe that theory, well, here's one more thing you need to know to generate the argument we're going to generate against Kant.
Speaker: Kant routinely relied on pure reason for generating his philosophical views. So, A, Kant had a bunch of views. B, reason is for defending what we already believe. And C, Kant used reason basically exclusively when defending his views.
Speaker: He wouldn't go out and look at the latest science to develop his views. He did that maybe a little bit, but not enough. He mostly made his project an exercise of pure reason. And reason is biased.
Speaker: And so maybe now you can start to see this argument. Perhaps this explains why he developed a moral system that protected like, you know, all his favorite things, the things that he grew up with, the things that reminded him of his parents, whom he had a profound respect for.
Speaker: belief in free will, belief in the immortality of the soul, belief in God, belief in inviolable moral commandments. And by the way, science, he liked science too.
Speaker: So he just found a way to defend believing in all these things. So it might've been that he already believed in them and he just invented invented a rationalization of them.
Speaker: I have one more for you here. it has to do with the racist remarks from Immanuel Kant. ah Let me lay down this story for you.
Speaker: Kant had a public feud with a man named Georg Forster. Forster was this German guy who had sailed with Captain Cook and he saw basically, you know he was all over the place. He was what we would today call like an anthropologist and he wrote ethnographies, which is basically where you try to understand ah cultures that are very different from yours by understanding their inner workings and um try not to judge them, trying to just explore the culture for its own sake.
Speaker: And so Forster, you know, he went all over the world and he developed his own views on race. Now, they weren't exactly correct or anything like that, but he challenged Kant's armchair race theory. And Kant said some borderline bonkers things. like that obviously that the whites are ah superior, but also that eventually all the races would go away except the whites. mean, he had all these kind of weird theories and I'll put them somewhere on the website so you can check them out and decide for yourself what was going on. Anyway,
Speaker: ah Forster, you know, challenged Kant's views and Kant basically doubled down. right He objected that you need to have a theory first and then you can go out and see the world and really discover it. And let me say that again, maybe with less jargon.
Speaker: Kant basically said, you need to have ah your beliefs in place. That way, when you see the world, you can interpret it correctly. So Forrester went out into the world and just saw things and built his theory.
Speaker: And that seems like the way we should do things, right? I mean, I think a lot of people see that and like, isn't that just science? Isn't that how we do things? And Kant already had his views and he said, no no, no, theory first and then go out into the world. So what he was saying, Kant was, is that Forrester couldn't even really see reality correctly because you had to have your theory on race in your head So that you can correctly interpret all the things that you see out in the world.
Speaker: Now, this is really funny from a guy who never went further than 100 miles from his hometown. Kant never went much farther than his hometown of, I think it's Konigsberg is how you pronounce it.
Speaker: Now, can you um be a genius even though you never travel out of your hometown? Of course, of course you can. But the way that you become knowledgeable is by reading the work of people who have left their hometown and explored and looked at things and tested things and basically reported this information to you.
Speaker: But Kant did not do that. He read Forrester's work and his critique of his own work and said Forrester's wrong. His method is wrong. He doubled down on his racist beliefs instead of revising them, he should have taken that data and said, well, let me think about this again. But that's exactly what he didn't do.
Speaker: And so for all these reasons, it seems like Kant just had his beliefs. They were already there. maybe from his upbringing or something.
Speaker: And then he just found a really creative and complicated way to explain them. This is what Joshua Green is saying. Jonathan Haidt says something very similar to what Joshua Green says.
Speaker: Eric Schwitzgable goes a little further and he actually calls Kant spineless. Now we don't have to, you know, go all in with Schwitzgable, but we can now see that there's maybe a point here and maybe the Kantian project isn't as open-minded as we originally thought.
Speaker: Now, we've spent quite a bit of time looking at problems with Kantian moral philosophy. That does not mean that you can simply assume utilitarianism must be true. They can both be wrong after all.
Speaker: And so let's transition into some objections against utilitarianism. To be honest, we will not complete our objections with this consequentialist view because utilitarianism comes into the fore once again in this course in unit three. And so we want to we want to let utilitarianism live until then so we can consider it even more carefully.
Speaker: Today, i want to begin with a strange objection or a strange problem, I should say, that comes from a utilitarian.
Speaker: This individual is named Henry s Sidgwick, and he is considered one of the three great utilitarians. That is Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, of course, and Sidgwick is the third.
Speaker: And take a look at this passage with me. Thus, the utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be this. a utilitarian may reasonably desire, on utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally.
Speaker: or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, insofar as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands.
Speaker: What is Mr. Sidgwick getting at? Well, utilitarian moral judgments are very challenging and there is a degree of um sophistication, mental sophistication required to make sure that you actually do the right you know reasoning in performing these calculations.
Speaker: And it might be the case that a lot of people, the people that he calls the vulgar, they're just not up to the task. And maybe because of that, We shouldn't even let them know about utilitarianism. In other words, we should maybe keep utilitarianism a secret because people might not be cognitively sophisticated enough to use it wisely.
Speaker: oh man, that is an interesting objection here. And so what I'm going to do, I'm going to pull this idea from s Sidgwick's methods of ethics, and I'm going to generate a s Sidgwick inspired argument. Now, this is not exactly what he said. it just, you know, inspired and by his work.
Speaker: And so here we go. Humans are unreliable when making predictions. This just happens to be the case for any human that comes equipped with a human brain. We are not very good at that particular activity.
Speaker: Two, utilitarian moral judgments are predictions. So three, humans are unreliable when making utilitarian moral judgments.
Speaker: Four, unreliable utilitarian moral judgments are likely to cause harm. Five, this is contrary to the principle of utility. You obviously don't want to cause harm if you are a utilitarian. That's like the whole point.
Speaker: So six, On utilitarian grounds, utilitarians should not promote the use of the principle of utility.
Speaker: This is kind of bonkers, right? Now I'm going to motivate this argument in a second. In particular, I have to show you that number one is true. Humans really are quite bad at making predictions. But I want you to notice first that even if this argument is valid and sound, it's not the case that we have shown utilitarianism to be false.
Speaker: In fact, All we're really doing with this argument is showing that utilitarianism as an ethical theory sort of fails to guide our actions. Like if you were to speak to the you know principle of utility itself, it would say to you, don't use me, which is sort of bananas for an ethical theory. That's the whole point.
Speaker: of an ethical theory, that it becomes, you know, a practical guide for making the right decisions. But it seems to be the case that this might not be in the cards for utilitarianism.
Speaker: So let me motivate premise one here that humans are quite bad when making predictions. For this, I'm going to invoke ah the work of Daniel Kahneman. Yes, this is very anachronistic. Daniel Kahneman was around 100 years after the people that we're covering right now. So where are we on this story?
Speaker: Last time we covered the Civil War. Today we're covering s Sidgwick, which is, you know, let's just say 1900 when he died. And so we're between and but we are shooting ahead just for today to the work of Daniel Kahneman, because he is one of the most prominent researchers into the flaws of human judgment. He has two very famous books, Thinking Fast and Slow, which he wrote in, I think, 2011 when it came out
Speaker: and Noise, which he co-wrote with some other scholars. And in these two books and throughout his career, he made the case that many of our judgments are made in automatic slash intuitive ways rather than the slow, deliberative way that we should make them. And because we do it in the automatic way,
Speaker: Well, that routinely leads to errors, biases, and unwanted variability or what is called noise. So I think you know what errors and biases are. Noise is when you look at the same information, but make two different judgments about it. So let's just say you're, don't know, a doctor and you look at an x-ray one day.
Speaker: And you say, I see the the problem is this. And then you look at that same x-ray the next day and you have a ah different diagnosis. That would be variability. you knowre You're not consistent in your diagnosis. And so that's what's called noise. So Kahneman shows that in general, if you, again, if you come equipped with a human brain, you make a lot of flawed judgments. So I'm going to go over some of the literature here from Daniel Kahneman, maybe not him directly, but stuff that he covers in his books.
Speaker: And the general you know thread that I want you to follow is that if all of these things are true, that makes it really hard to be a good utilitarian, meaning to be good at making utilitarian moral judgments. So Let's begin with a couple of psychological biases that basically conspire to render us incapable of adequately processing statistical information.
Speaker: so There's three of them that I'm going to talk about. The representativeness heuristic, the anchoring effect, and the framing effect. The representativeness heuristic is, going to simplify it for you.
Speaker: it basically is the case that if you're told to make a prediction, you should generally rely on statistics, right? So if I were to ask you, hey, what's the major of this student here in the picture?
Speaker: What you should do if you know like basically nothing else is pick, you know, what's the what's the most popular major? Probably business, right? OK, so then they're probably a business major.
Speaker: That is what you should do, given that you have no other information. But if I were to tell you a story about this student, like that they are active in the feminist movement, then you will change, you're you're starting to build a nice little story in your head and you end up with some other major that just fits that story. Now, rationally, what you should do is still probably go with the most popular major.
Speaker: But stories influence our judgments. And so we end up kind of going with them. And it might, it typically, I should say, leads us to an error in our judgments. It kind of leads us astray from what the facts actually may be.
Speaker: So that is the representativeness heuristic. We hear a story and we tend to, you know, align our judgments with whatever lines up with that story instead of the way we really should do things, which is based on baseline statistics.
Speaker: Then there's the anchoring effect. This is kind of a funny one, but if you hear a number, it tends to kind of lock you into that general ballpark. So in one study, judges rolled some dice.
Speaker: Let's make it so that you're the judge. And what's happening is that you're going to figure out how long some criminal's sentence should be, right? They've already been found guilty. How long should they go to jail?
Speaker: And you roll some dice and let's just say a lands on 11. And they ask you, should they go to jail for 11 months? And you say, oh, no, no, that's that's too much. But let's make it 10 months. All right. So 10 months is what it is. But for other judges, the dice landed on three.
Speaker: And they say, should that be how many months they ah they should go to jail? And they say, oh, no, that's that's too little, but let's make it four. So basically, once you see this number from the dice, you basically just kind of stay in that ballpark. And so you are anchored to that general number.
Speaker: And that's kind of weird. It shouldn't be like that. A roll of the dice is literally the last thing. that should be influencing judges, right? But that tends to be how our minds work, at least in some studies.
Speaker: And then there's the framing effect. There's actually a couple of versions of this. The one I'm gonna focus on has to do with psychiatrists. And basically they found that psychiatrists will um decide what to do with the patient differently depending on how the information is presented to them.
Speaker: So if you hear, let's just say that you're the psychiatrist and they say, hey, there's a 20% chance that this person will, you know, I don't know, harm themselves.
Speaker: Okay, well, that's 20% and you come up with your, you know, your judgment of of what we should do. But then for other ah cases, they might say, oh, there's a 0.2 chance that this person will harm themselves. Now, 20% 0.2,
Speaker: and point two are the same thing, they're equalities, right? But for some reason, maybe the brain just processes them differently, but clinicians came up with a different answer.
Speaker: Or if you presented the ah the the information as 20 times out 100, right? 20 out 100. are all the same thing. out of depending on how the information is presented, what numerical format they give it to you in, that that affects people's decision. Or even if you say 80 times out of 100, nothing bad will happen. That sounds different than 20 times out of 100, something bad will happen.
Speaker: And that is the framing effect. How we frame information affects our judgments. All of these, I hope you can see, lead to flawed predictions.
Speaker: If something seems more likely because you heard a nice story around that theory, That's not good. that That means you're basically increasing the likelihood of a particular hypothesis, not based on the facts, but based on like some story that someone told you that just sounds good to you.
Speaker: The anchoring effect is completely bonkers. Why would some random number actually make you want to stay near that ballpark? It should be based again on objective facts, not roll of the die or whatever. And the framing effect, that's just embarrassing. it shouldn't be the case that we yeah we fall for that kind of stuff, but we do.
Speaker: And of course, when you are making utilitarian moral judgments, you have to predict, okay, so if I do this, what are the chances that it will work out? How much happiness will it produce? What are the alternatives?
Speaker: All of that requires some sort of, actually not even one judgment, but several judgments to do it correctly. But it seems to be the case that we are just not well equipped to do that. Maybe if we were statisticians or or you know trained in mathematics, it would be easier.
Speaker: But it seems to be the case that for most of us, it just doesn't land. We we are not terribly good at processing probabilistic information.
Speaker: Okay, so that's one set of biases that make utilitarian moral judgments very risky for us to to undertake.
Speaker: Let's now talk about mood. I do love talking about mood for some weird reason. And so we're going to talk about mood and also we're going talk about more trolley dilemmas. So earlier we heard about the switch trolley dilemma where you're standing next to a switch.
Speaker: and there's a runaway trolley. And if you want to save the five people on the track, you can pull the switch, but then it goes down a side track where one person will die. Well, this is called the footbridge dilemma.
Speaker: And it's basically very similar. Instead though, of a switch, you are standing next to a very large man. And if you want to save those five people, you do have to push the large man in front of the trolley. ah the man's bulk will stop the trolley and he will die. But you will save those five other ones. Now the question is, do you push the fat man over the footbridge?
Speaker: Okay, well, I mean, you can decide on your own. Most people say no, by the way, but that's, you know, no judgment if you, if that's what you, if you want to push the man, I guess.
Speaker: ah Let me tell you about this study that um invokes this footbridge dilemma. In this study, subjects watched either a few minutes of Saturday Night Live, which I've heard is funny,
Speaker: Or dull documentary about Spanish villages. That probably is quite boring. So either something funny or something boring.
Speaker: Then they had to face the footbridge dilemma. They had to answer, would they push the fat man over? Those in a good mood because they watched Saturday Night Live were roughly three times more likely to say they'd push some man to save five.
Speaker: So what Valdicello and Desteno conclude is that good moods make us temporarily more utilitarian. Okay, so good moods line up with utilitarianism. Interesting, but okay.
Speaker: What else do good moods line up with? Ah, good moods also seem to amplify our biases. In one study, subjects were instructed to read a short philosophical essay, which included a small picture of the author. Some saw a stereotypical philosophy professor,
Speaker: you know, the ah the jacket, the wool jacket with the elbow patches and the glasses or whatever. Others saw a young woman instead.
Speaker: Subjects who were put into a good mood before evaluating the essay were even more likely to rate the essay as favorable when they thought it was written by the middle-aged man.
Speaker: In other words, we might have some and secret sexist stereotypes in our minds. And it's already the case that people tend to think that if the old man wrote the philosophy essay, they were more likely to find it the essay you know valuable and favorable.
Speaker: But those people that were in a good mood were even more likely to do so. In other words, good moods amplify our biases, or at least some biases.
Speaker: What else do good moods do? Other research shows that good mood makes one more receptive to bullshit. Now, bullshit is a actual technical term in philosophy. It means something that is trying to convince you whether or not it's true. doesn't really matter. The bullshitter says something just to persuade you of their view. They are completely indifferent to whether or not it is true or false.
Speaker: Well, in this study or one study, participants were given various pseudo profound bullshit statements. Things like hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty.
Speaker: Now that sounds profound, ah but it's not saying anything. In fact, the fact that it sounds profound is what clues you into it being bullshit, right? It's just like, you're saying something pretty and flowery, but it's not really of any substance.
Speaker: So they these participants heard stuff like that. They also got some conventionally profound statements. A wet person does not fear the rain. I mean, that's like,
Speaker: You know, yeah, there there's something there, I guess. And they also heard some mundane stuff, right? Newborn babies require constant attention. There's nothing um interesting about that or particularly revealing. It is true, newborn babies do need a lot of attention, but there's nothing profound there.
Speaker: So basically the subjects in this experiment heard these three kinds of things, pseudo profound crap, ah some semi-profound statements and some quite mundane, boring stuff.
Speaker: It turns out that the subjects in good moods more readily believed that the pseudo-profound statements actually contained substance.
Speaker: In other words, if I put you in a good mood, for example, by watching some SNL, you are more likely to think that that phrase, hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty, actually says something worth listening to.
Speaker: That is kind of weird. So how do we combine all this information to generate an argument against utilitarianism? Well, let me tell you the point of all this.
Speaker: Let me remind you of the first bit. First of all, we tend to just be pretty bad at handling statistical information unless we use formal methods, right? Like mathematicians.
Speaker: but you know most of us don't and so being bad at handling statistical information that's just bad for utilitarian moral judgments they're probably gonna hurt somebody if you know if we actually go through with them moreover good moods temporarily steer us toward utilitarian judgments but probably also make those judgments even less reliable So to sum up even more, we're just not good at making ah the kinds of predictions required for utilitarian moral judgments.
Speaker: And good moods make us more utilitarian, but also even worse at making utilitarian moral judgments. That is not good, my friends. They almost seem impossible to perform without committing some kind of error such that it ends up being luck whether or not you actually get it right and don't end up harming someone.
Speaker: Sidebar, ah good moods are linked to apparently ah being more receptive to bullshit. It turns out that bad moods have ah their benefits. So good moods have their drawbacks and bad moods are associated with a subject's ability to more readily distinguish between reliable and unreliable information.
Speaker: So you're less vulnerable to bullshit. That's kind of wild, right? So I like to call that the sagacity of the misanthrope.
Speaker: Misanthropes are, of course, Krabby Patties and they're always hating on everything. But there's a wisdom to that apparently. And so there you go. ah Go be sagacious like the misanthrope.
Speaker: Go be in a bad mood. Anyway, modern psychology gives us a lot to think about. More than anything, for our purposes today, it gives us quite a few reasons for thinking it's not at all straightforward to engage in utilitarian moral judgments. And so this Sidgwick-inspired argument, again, it doesn't show that utilitarianism is false, but it does put us in a really weird situation.
Speaker: Even if we do believe it's a good theory, doesn't that mean we should say it's not? So if we're being good utilitarians, let's keep this whole utilitarianism thing just between us.

